


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
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IN MEMORIAM  
JAMES W. POULTNEY  
1907–1993

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## AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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### ON THE DESCRIPTION OF THE HARBOR OF PHORKYS AND THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS, *ODYSSEY* 13.96–112

As has often been pointed out, the *Iliad* is quite sparing in the use of spatial details, and when it does introduce them it does so as isolated elements interspersed throughout the narrative rather than in descriptive blocks. The *Odyssey*, on the other hand, more frequently refers to details of the setting of its fictional world, and at several points does so in lengthy descriptive set pieces. The devices and techniques that the poet uses to introduce these descriptions into his narrative and to organize their details have received a good deal of attention from a number of scholars and critics in recent decades.<sup>1</sup>

Although they are sometimes regarded as digressions, these descriptions are not really that; as Genette reminds us, such descriptions, "as constituents of the spatiotemporal universe of the story, are *diegetic*," i.e., an integral part of the narrative discourse.<sup>2</sup> Still, the nature of the semantic and thematic relationships between extended descriptions of setting and the narratives into which they are inserted has been problematic both for general literary theory and for Homeric criticism. Such descriptions tend perceptibly to interrupt the forward movement of the narrative, and by doing so they seem to reduce the unity and coherence of the text. Unity and coherence can, however, be maintained through integration of the description into the dynamics of the story or, perhaps most important, through underlying thematic connections between the description and the narrative. Philippe Hamon, one

<sup>1</sup> See esp. Hellwig, *Raum* 31–39; Elliger, *Darstellung* 103–56; Andersson, *Scenery* 37–52; Richardson, *Narrator* 50–61.

<sup>2</sup> Genette, *Discourse* 94 n. 12. Cf. Austin, "Digressions" 299–300: "the word 'digression' is inevitably controversial in poetic criticism and perhaps always a misnomer. Certainly it is a misnomer to apply it indiscriminately to the expanded description of any object, scene or person within a poem"; he restricts the term to narratives of action external to the action of the work.

of the most prominent modern theorists of description, has pointed out the tendency of description not only to suspend narrative but at the same time to duplicate its contents; thus, "the setting confirms, sharpens, or reveals the character as a bundle of significant features, or else it introduces an indication (or a red herring) concerning what is to happen. . . . the role of description is, on the one hand, to organize narrative, and on the other hand, through the redundancy which it introduces into the narrative, to act as its memory" (Hamon, "Description" 168). Hamon's theories, however, are based largely upon observations of the practice of realist and naturalist novelists. Whether the sort of hidden connectedness outlined by Hamon is really "in" texts belonging to different narrative traditions, and how far one's tendency to seek and find it is natural and universal, how far conditioned by the interpretive conventions of one's own time, is a matter of much debate.<sup>3</sup> Apart from simply providing furnishings for the fictional world or details necessary for the plot, the set-piece descriptions of the *Odyssey* have been seen by some as amplifications mostly "for their own sake," inserted for the delight of poet and audience.<sup>4</sup> At the other extreme, Norman Austin (*Archery* 149-57), for example, has found in the descriptions of the cave of Calypso and the palace and gardens of Alcinous profound metonymic encapsulations of the nature and character of those who inhabit them.

This essay considers one of the descriptions in the *Odyssey*, the one on the harbor of Phorkys and the Cave of the Nymphs (13.96-112), which is inserted at one of the most dramatic points of the poem. In both form and content, it has much in common with other Homeric descriptions.<sup>5</sup> But it exhibits a somewhat unusual constellation of features; it is unusual, too, in the role that many of its details play later on in the story and in that the gist of the description recurs, with much verbal repetition, in the words of one of the characters of the poem. I begin with the narrative technique that is employed in this description,

<sup>3</sup>For a theoretical discussion of this question from a classicist's point of view see Fowler, "Narrate." Heath (*Unity*) has recently cautioned against what he sees as the anachronistic tendency to import modern presuppositions of thematic coherence and unity into our readings of ancient texts.

<sup>4</sup>E.g., Brauneiser, *Tagzeiten* 130-39; Whitman, *Homer* 293; Reeker, *Landschaft* 26-30.

<sup>5</sup>On the landscape features that are typical of Homeric harbors, and the expressions that are commonly found in descriptions of them, see Nestle, "Odysseeland-schaften" 38-39.

drawing out the implications of this technique for the meaning and significance of the description within the narrative. By examining the way the narrator controls and manipulates our knowledge of the spatial details that he presents, I hope to show that the description is an important contributor to the power and beauty of an episode that is a major turning point of the *Odyssey*.

In book 13 the narrator tells us of Odysseus' departure from Scheria, the island of the Phaeacians, and of his arrival at last, after so many years of wandering, in Ithaca. Odysseus finishes his *apologoi* to the Phaeacians, and his last evening in Scheria ends with Alcinous' proposal that his chieftains offer Odysseus further gifts (13.1–17). Then the narrative pace picks up. The events of the next day, the stowing of the gifts on the ship, the feast, Odysseus' leave-taking and embarkation, and the casting off of the ship are passed over in sixty lines (18–77). Then the tempo picks up even more, and only fifteen lines (78–92) are used to narrate a voyage that lasts a whole night,<sup>6</sup> during which Odysseus is sound asleep. And then, with the rising of the Morning Star, as the ship approaches Ithaca (93–95), the pace abruptly slows—in fact, story time seems to stop. While the ship is still some distance from the island, the narrator breaks in to describe the Harbor of Phorkys and the Cave of the Nymphs (13.96–112).

He first describes the general form of the harbor, with its steep, jutting headlands verging towards it and protecting it from waves raised by winds outside (96–100a). Then, with ἐντοσθεν, he moves to the inside of the harbor, commenting on the easy anchorage it affords to ships (100b–101), and describes its head, where there is an olive tree and, near it, a lovely, misty cave sacred to the nymphs called Naiads (102–4). The remainder of the description is concerned with the interior of the cave. Ἐν δὲ (105, 107, 109) introduces the description of three of its features, the stone basins and amphorae where the bees store honey, the tall stone looms where the nymphs weave wondrous purple cloths, and the ever-flowing water. Last (109b–12) are described the two entrances, one on the north by which men descend, the other on the south which only the immortal gods may use.

In abruptly slowing the narrative pace, this extended description

<sup>6</sup>“The voyage of the supernaturally swift ship of the Phaiakians to Ithaca is told in 13.81–92 with such a great emphasis on the speed that we are unaware that the narrator has accelerated story time. But we see in 93–95 that the journey, which began at nightfall, comes to an end just before dawn” (Richardson, *Narrator* 18–19).

of the harbor and the cave gives great emphasis to what is to follow, heightening the audience's anticipation of the continuation of the narrative and at the same time delaying it.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the description introduces the audience to details that will become important later in the narrative. The harbor itself, the olive tree at its head, and the cave of the nymphs are the means by which Odysseus will at last recognize his homeland when they are pointed out to him by Athena (13.344–51). Furthermore, it is to the nymphs of the cave that Odysseus will pray in joy at his return (355–60), and it is in the cave that Odysseus and Athena will conceal the gifts given him by the Phaeacians (363–71); it is beside the olive tree that the Phaeacian sailors leave Odysseus' gifts (122–24), and it is beside the olive tree that Athena and Odysseus will plot destruction for the suitors (372–440). Thus, the description is compositionally well motivated and a functional part of the poem's structure. But there is more than this to be said about its role in the poem.

Most of the longer descriptions of setting in the *Odyssey* are integrated into the forward temporal movement of the narrative by being presented as part of the discourse of one of the characters of the story or, if presented in the discourse of the narrator, as an explicit or implicit report of what one of the characters is perceiving.<sup>8</sup> Thus, for example, Odysseus describes to the Phaeacians the island on which he had landed before he crossed over to meet the Cyclops (9.116–45) and, in his beggar's guise, describes and makes inferences about his own palace, which lies immediately before him (17.264–71). And thus the narrator clearly implies that Hermes has been looking at the details that are

<sup>7</sup>The description thus performs the functions that Hamon ("Description" 178 n. 43) calls *demarcative* and *dilatory*. Cf. Heubeck and Hoekstra, *Commentary* 169. A further interruption of the main narrative is effected by the brief interlude in which Poseidon, with Zeus' permission, punishes the Phaeacians by turning the ship to stone at the mouth of their harbor (125b–187a). This interlude is apparently intended to show that the fairy-tale world of the Wanderings is now forever and completely cut off from the world of home (Erbse, *Beiträge* 145); but "if this is so, the result is rather mediocre," as Heubeck and Hoekstra observe (173).

<sup>8</sup>These are two of the three techniques that Hamon ("Description" 149–56) has found to be regularly used in realist novels for integrating descriptions into the narrative movement: "saying" and "looking." For examples in the *Odyssey* see Hellwig (*Raum* 34–35 n. 15). The poet of the *Odyssey* also uses the third technique identified by Hamon, "doing," in which a character acts upon or with the object described, as when, narrating how Odysseus finds Eumaeus at his farmstead, he gives an account of how the swineherd had built the wall and palisade and pigpens (*Od.* 14.7–14); but here the description verges into narrative proper to become what Andersson (*Scenery* 35) calls "genetic description."



presented in the description of Calypso's cave and its environs (5.59–74); he mentions only such details as Hermes could perceive or know from his standpoint in time and space, using past tenses to indicate that his statements are true of them at the time of the story, and ordering those details in such a way as to imply that they follow the sequence of Hermes' perceptions.<sup>9</sup>

These techniques the narrator does not and cannot employ in the present passage, for an obvious reason: Odysseus is asleep at this moment of the story, wrapped in a sleep that is akin to death (13.80), a fitting symbol of his transition from the fairytale world of the wanderings to the real world of home.<sup>10</sup> He is in fact asleep throughout his journey, and remains so until after the Phaeacian sailors have carried him ashore, stashed the costly gifts that he was given in Scheria beneath the olive tree, and departed. It is important to the poet's story that Odysseus not yet be aware of Phorkys' harbor, because one of the main points of book 13 is his belated recognition of his homeland through the agency of Athena.<sup>11</sup>

As Schadewaldt says ("Prolog" 29–30), Odysseus' landing on Ithaca in book 13 is the culmination of his external homecoming; then begins his internal homecoming, which will culminate in his winning back his house and his wife. Occupying more than half of the book is the scene (187b–end) that presents Odysseus' awakening on the shore, which Athena has enshrouded in mist so that he does not know where he is; the approach of Athena, who is initially disguised as a shepherd; and their conversation. This scene effects the transition between the two homecomings. After a playful cat-and-mouse game, Athena reveals herself to Odysseus as his divine patron and reveals that the land

<sup>9</sup> Similarly, it is clearly implied that the details presented in the description of the palace and garden of Alcinous (*Od.* 7.84–132) are being perceived by the approaching Odysseus. Only the first part of the description (84–94), however, presents details that could have been perceived from his standpoint; thereafter, the narrator moves on to describe the interior of the palace and in 104 switches from past tenses to the present tense. For discussion of this see Bassett, *Poetry* 88–89.

<sup>10</sup> Segal ("Phaeacians" 23, 38–46) sees Odysseus' sleep, and his awakening at dawn, as symbolizing his transition from fantasy to reality and his rebirth into mortal life; cf. Frame, *Myth* 75–78 and Nagy, *Mythology* 218–19 (I owe these references to Nagy).

<sup>11</sup> The lack of strict verisimilitude had the harbor been presented as though perceived by a (wakeful) Odysseus—the Morning Star is just rising, so presumably the scene must still be quite dark—would probably not have bothered the narrator. As Andersson (*Scenery* 40–41) points out, it is dark when Odysseus stops before the palace of Alcinous, but that does not prevent him from admiring it.

in which he finds himself is in fact Ithaca, dispelling the mist so that he can recognize it. She then helps him to conceal his treasures and gives him counsel about how to proceed in reclaiming his home.<sup>12</sup> The episode thus contains the first of the recognition scenes in the second half of the poem, a poem that largely, as Beye puts it (*Tradition* 181–82), “turns on Odysseus coming to know and to be known.”<sup>13</sup>

Odysseus, then, cannot recognize Ithaca before he is reintroduced by Athena. And so the description is not tied to his perceptions but rather is presented from the spatial and temporal point of view of the narrator himself.<sup>14</sup> In so presenting the description, the narrator becomes more than usually overt, and the communication between him and the audience more than usually intimate; the description is an aside (not a digression), a confidence imparted by the narrator to his audience.<sup>15</sup> It becomes particularly intimate in that the harbor and cave are not described from a temporal standpoint strictly within the “narrative present” of the story line. The verbs, predominantly copulatives, are in the present tense; not historical presents—these do not exist in Homer—but rather “generic” timeless and habitual presents, which refer to a geographical state of affairs that was true of the fictional world of the story and is true as well of the “real” world in which the story is told: the harbor and cave existed in the epic past and persist up to the present day of the narrator and his audience.<sup>16</sup> Thus the *narrated*, the

<sup>12</sup>It is this scene that has attracted the most critical attention in the book. It was long a hunting ground of Analysts, who found it to be full of supposed inconsistencies and inconcinnities and who therefore excised in one place or another lines that they suspected of being interpolations or the result of later reworkings of the poem. Kleinknecht (“Platonisches” 59 n. 4) observed that, of the verses he dealt with, only twenty-nine had not been objected to by one scholar or another. However, the scene’s overall coherence and unity have been vindicated by more recent scholars, notably Erbse (*Beiträge* 143–65) and Clay (*Wrath* 186–212).

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Goldhill, *Voice* 5–9. Murnaghan (*Disguise* 22) sees in Odysseus’ kissing the ground when Athena has revealed his homeland to him (13.354) an example of the “gestures of physical union” that are characteristic of the “typical form” of the recognition scenes in the poem.

<sup>14</sup>On the concept of “point of view on the spatial and temporal planes,” which may, as in the description we are considering, be a moving point of view, see Uspensky, *Poetics* 57–69.

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Chatman, *Story* 219–25.

<sup>16</sup>“Whenever the poet uses the present tense outside of the speeches, he is speaking directly to his audience of what is either a part of their own experience or is as true for them as for the story” (Bassett, *Poetry* 87–88). Cf. Chantraine, *Grammaire* 191–92;

fictional world of the story, and the *narrating*, the world in which the narrator tells the story to his audience,<sup>17</sup> two planes that are usually kept distinct in the epic as separate ontological domains, are here linked by the harbor and cave that are anchored in the one but that project into the other; they become part of a world that is *shared* by the fictional characters and the audience. This sharing increases the empathy that we feel with the fictional characters, particularly with the (sleeping) Odysseus; although the description breaks the "epic illusion," it increases our sense of the reality of the story world, and of our connection to its places and characters.<sup>18</sup> Just as Odysseus has now returned to the "real" world, so, in a sense, have we.

But if the generic presents tend to move the "narrative present" of the main story line into the background, other features of the narrative technique tend to keep our attention focused upon it. In the first place, it is not really true that the story time stops while the narrating time continues during the description. By breaking off his narrative while the ship of the Phaeacians is approaching the island but still out at sea (προσεπλῖνατο, he says, using the imperfect tense, "it was in the process of approaching," 13.95), and by resuming it after the description with the Phaeacians putting ashore inside the harbor (ἐνθ' οἳ γ' εἰσέλασαν, where we find the aorist tense, "there they brought the ship to land," 13.113), the poet suggests that the story has been moving forward while he has stopped to describe a place in it.<sup>19</sup>

The spatial point of view adopted by the narrator contributes to this same effect of narrative movement: the description begins with the

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Fleischman, *Tense* 126; Rijksbaron, *Syntax* 5, 11–12. Generic presents are also used in the Homeric narrator's brief descriptions of places introduced by the formula ἔστι δέ τις, e.g., *Il.* 2.811–15, 13.32–34, *Od.* 4.844–47; cf. also *Il.* 22.147–56.

<sup>17</sup> On these terms see Prince, *Dictionary* 56–57, and Tamir, "Narrative" 403–4. Cf. Genette, *Discourse* 212–15; Fleischman, *Tense* 125.

<sup>18</sup> Quite different conclusions about the effect of some of the same features of the description that are discussed here are reached by Williams (*Tradition* 640). He too sees the manner in which the description is formally demarcated from the narrative and the use of present tenses as making the description a particularly intimate communication from the poet to the audience, but he believes that this is in order to divert the audience's attention from the narrative so that they may "enjoy a type of digression that invites poetic treatment on its own account."

<sup>19</sup> A somewhat similar technique is employed in *Od.* 21.8–42, where the poet says that Penelope sets out for the storeroom to get Odysseus' bow, proceeds to tell us the history of the bow, and resumes the main narrative with Penelope's arrival at the storeroom. See Gaisser, "Digressions" 20.

seaward side of the harbor and then proceeds inside it and then to its head and down into the cave near the shore, the details being so selected and arranged as to imply a moving point of view, the point of view of the narrator sailing in his imagination into the harbor, landing, and descending into the cave. Thus the sequence of details in lines 96–101 parallels and mirrors the movement of the Phaeacian ship into the harbor and to the shore; and, since the description covers over a gap in the narrative, it becomes a sort of stand-in, or substitute, for a continuous narrative of the ship's arrival and landing.<sup>20</sup>

The effect of all of this, I believe, is to put us, the audience, in a sense inside the frame, and indeed inside the ship as it lands at Ithaca. We are vouchsafed the spatial point of view that Odysseus would have had if he had been awake; we stand over him there on the ship as he sleeps. In this way, we are drawn more closely into the fictional world of the story, we are made to empathize even more with Odysseus, and we therefore feel a greater sense of sympathetic anticipation of his joy at recognizing his homeland.

At the same time, however, we are distanced from Odysseus. We are distanced from him partly because we are afforded a view of Ithaca that pointedly is not given to him—we have seen in advance, and come to know, what he will only later see and come to know again. But we are distanced from him also because we are drawn into the world of Ithaca, with the narrator at our elbow, and are presented with a vision and knowledge of the harbor and cave that is not merely equal to what Odysseus had obtained through his past familiarity with the island, but that is superior to it. We are, as we have seen, given a view of the harbor

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Elliger, *Darstellung* 124: "Die Beschreibung erfolgt, während sich das Phaia-kenschiff der Insel nähert, sie ist also der epischen Handlung parallel geschaltet. Da sie ferner von aussen nach innen, von der Einfahrt zum Kopf hin erfolgt, nimmt sie die Bewegung des Schiffes auf bis zu dem Punkt, wo es am Lande Aufläuft." Cf. also Leach, *Rhetoric* 32–33, who says that Homer "is apparently not concerned with the impression the visible juxtaposition of its features might give, only with the order in which a ship entering the harbor passes by them in its progress to the further shore," and that his description "is interwoven with the continuation of action."

It is interesting that some of Homer's similes seem to afford comparable instances of such "substitute" narrative, through the details and imagery of their own narratives filling in gaps in the main narrative; see Lyne, *Words* 68–71. His similes, too, effect pauses in the forward movement of the main narrative, and through them the communicative relationship between the narrator and his audience is foregrounded and two worlds are juxtaposed, the heroic world of the story and the world presented in the similes, which is that of the narrator and his audience. On this see Richardson, *Narrator* 64–66.

and cave *sub specie aeternitatis*, a view that transcends the here and now of this moment of the story, that in fact transcends the boundaries of the world of that story. But what above all makes our vision and knowledge superior to Odysseus' is that when we have come to the end of the description, we have moved beyond the external, ordinary aspects of this Ithacan scene, aspects with which Odysseus is familiar, and are told more than Odysseus himself, or indeed any mortal, could know: we are told about the mysteries of the cave, and about the entrance that is used only by the gods.<sup>21</sup> The difference between what we know of the place and what Odysseus knows about it becomes apparent when we compare the narrator's description to us with Athena's description to Odysseus when, dispelling the mist, she points out to him the features of the landscape by which he can recognize his homeland: "Look here, I will show you the landscape of Ithaca, and then you will believe me. This is the harbour of Phorcys the Old Man of the Sea; this is the olive tree with its long leaves; this is the vaulted cave where you have offered so many solemn sacrifices to the nymphs; there is Neriton hill covered with woods" (13.344–51).<sup>22</sup>

Her description follows the same general sequence as the narrator's, and many of her words are the same as his. Lines 345 and 346 are close adaptations of lines 96 and 102, respectively, to the changed context, and lines 347 and 348 are identical to lines 103 and 104, respectively. This repetition is of course what one would expect given the economies and exigencies of oral-formulaic composition. But de Jong ("Mirror" 5–22) has shown that in what she calls "retrospective mirror stories," in which a character narrates to another character or characters an event that the narrator has already told to us, the poet is at pains to repeat no more than is consistent with what the character can reasonably be expected to know and with his or her motives and purposes in telling the story. Athena's description of Ithaca could be called, on the

<sup>21</sup>Richardson (*Narrator* 126, 139) finds in this ability to provide his audience with access to superhuman knowledge, particularly about the world of the gods, one of the most distinctive traits of the Homeric narrator: "only the gods and the narrator see the entire picture, and we profit from the narrator's clear vision." And "what is unusual is that his abilities are in every instance mirrored by the supernatural characters within the text. The gods take on the attributes of the narrator and the narrator those of the gods."

<sup>22</sup>The translation is that of Rouse, *Odyssey* 155. While still playing her cat-and-mouse game with Odysseus, and before dispelling the mist, Athena has earlier (13.242–48) described and identified Ithaca, but in general terms that may be deliberately misleading and which do not convince Odysseus; see Clay, *Wrath* 194–95.

analogy of de Jong's term, a "mirror description"; and there are analogous reasons for the similarities and dissimilarities between it and the narrator's version. Athena's purpose is to convince Odysseus of where he is, and so she confines her description to what he can now see and what he remembers. She adds the detail of the mountain Neriton, the landmark that Odysseus had singled out in his own brief description of Ithaca to Alcinous (9.21–22). She does not speak of the interior of the cave, nor of the activities of the nymphs, nor of the two entrances; instead she simply reminds Odysseus of the sacrifices he used to make there to the nymphs.

The narrator introduces us to the harbor and the cave much as Athena later (re)introduces Odysseus to them, but he gives us a more profound, "god's eye" view of them. He imparts to us the Olympian knowledge of the scene that the Olympian Athena does not communicate to her mortal protégé. And this distanced, godlike knowledge that we are thus granted intensifies and deepens the poignancy of the dramatic irony of Odysseus' not knowing at first where he is.

Dramatic irony permeates the second half of the *Odyssey*. For the most part, this irony is at the expense of the enemies of Odysseus, the suitors, who do not realize that the beggar whom they are maltreating is in fact their king, the owner of the substance that they are wasting and the lawful husband of the woman whom they are laying siege to,<sup>23</sup> while the audience shares with both the narrator and Odysseus knowledge of the true state of affairs. The episode of the recognition of Ithaca is replete with irony, too. But here—for the last time<sup>24</sup>—the irony is at the expense of Odysseus; and the audience shares with the narrator and with the disguised Athena their insight into the identity of Ithaca and into the nature of its harbor.

And so, the description of the Harbor of Phorkys and the Cave of the Nymphs serves to deepen both sympathetic closeness and ironic distance. Our sympathies for Odysseus, having been fully engaged by the *apologoi*, are intensified by the description that brings us into the scene and make us participants in his homecoming. At the same time, the description helps us to look upon his meeting with Athena and his

<sup>23</sup>Stanford, *Odyssey* II lvii–lviii. For a full-length study of irony in the poem see Dekker, *Ironie*.

<sup>24</sup>Dekker, *Ironie* 151. As Elliger points out (*Darstellung* 126–27 n. 72), the narrator's repeated use of the phrases γαίη πατρώτη and πατρίδα γαῖαν (188, 197, 219, 251) to refer to the land that is yet unknown to Odysseus further heightens the dramatic irony.

recognition of Ithaca with detached and distanced Olympian objectivity and knowledge.

There is perhaps another sense in which the description contributes to the meaning and effect of the poem. We have seen how the first part of the description serves as a sort of substitute for a narrative of the landing of the ship in the harbor. More than that, however, the whole movement of the description is a sort of map of the actions and movements of Odysseus in book 13: of his arrival and his being carried ashore, his awakening beside the olive tree, his conversation with Athena and recognition of Ithaca, his praying to the nymphs of the cave, and his descent into the cave to hide his gifts. To this extent, the description duplicates the narrative of the events of this book. But the description may also duplicate, in a sense more like that meant by Hamon, the events of the narrative on a deeper and more symbolic plane. The outside-to-inside movement, toward the intersection of the projecting headlands and the safe and secure anchorage they there afford, perhaps symbolizes the change from the wide, broad world of the wanderings to the enclosed, restricted, and (superficially) safe space of home. Moreover, as Elliger argues (*Darstellung* 127–28), there is a deepening sense of mystery as the description progresses: the harbor itself is presented with matter-of-fact realism, but description of the cave introduces fairytale elements with the mention of the nymphs and of the two entrances, one for mortals and one for immortals; and Elliger sees in this conjunction of the human and the divine spheres an image of the interaction of the two that we find in the colloquy between Odysseus and Athena.<sup>25</sup> In all of this, then, we may perhaps see a symbol of Odysseus' return to the familiar, everyday world of his fellow men, a world that is nevertheless interpenetrated by the powers of the divine world, upon which his safety and prosperity will ultimately rest.

CALVIN S. BYRE

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

<sup>25</sup> Allegorical interpretation of the cave goes back at least as far as Porphyry, on which see now Lamberton, *Theologian* 119–33. For a cautious, yet to my mind excessive, concession to allegorical interpretation see Dekker, *Ironie* 147–55. I cannot agree with Leach (*Rhetoric* 34) that “Homer’s harbor description is a mythic paradigm that associates the physical features of the hero’s homeland with the internal structure of his personality. Our visual image of the landscape is almost irrelevant to a meaning that is not to be seen, but only understood within a context of motifs that has gained its symbolic value through recurrence” (cf. Segal, “Phaeacians” 48–49).

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## GODS' INTERVENTION AND EPIPHANY IN SOPHOCLES

As I have illustrated in three recent papers, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* use different emphases in presenting the physical figure of the gods when the divine beings intervene among mortals and are perceived as being there (epiphany).<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to summarize a complex matter in a few words, but I may safely say that the *Iliad* does not invite its reader to imagine the shape and the form of the divine bodies and does not claim to describe them in their visible appearance, but either presents the divine beings in disguised human figures or covers their physical presence with extreme reticence. With a very few exceptions, the text lets us imagine nothing of the semblance of the epiphanic god. We confront, so to speak, a blank figure. Often the hero recognizes only the voice of the god: this is the only way through which Odysseus receives and recognizes the presence of Athena (*Il.* 2.282, δ δὲ ξυνέηκε θεᾶς ὄπα φωνισάσης, and 10.512). Gods have a special voice that sometimes makes them recognizable even when they appear in disguise.

The invisibility of the gods is not an easy concept. It is representable by language as the negative speech act that declares that their full manifestation is intolerable for human senses and unutterable. At the sight of the goddess's luminous beauty Metaneira remains without voice (*aphthongos*) (*Hymn to Demeter* 275–80). Accordingly, it is starting from their invisibility that their visibility becomes thinkable and imaginable, but it becomes so in the mode of its unutterability, in the mode of the unsayable.

When in the *Iliad* the gods are imagined as presenting themselves disguised, they generally assume the aspect of a familiar figure, one that the hero to whom the god presents himself or herself easily recognizes. When the *Iliad* presents an anonymous disguise, as in 21.285, we know only that Poseidon and Athena look like men (*andressi eiktēn*) and nothing more.

The *Odyssey* practically ignores the technique of the blank figure, and the recognition by the mere voice. This poem prefers the disguised epiphany that is staged in a lavish way. We have Athena in the disguised figure of Mentor, traveling with Telemachos through the Mediterranean

<sup>1</sup> See "Epifanie testuali nell'*Iliade*," "Les figures de la Metis dans l'*Odyssee*," and "Strategia epifanica e intertestualità nel secondo libro dell'*Iliade*."

Sea, sacrificing, praying, and banqueting with him and Nestor's family, and acting as a double person, often in embarrassing situations. Furthermore the *Odyssey* claims to represent the *enargēs* figure of the gods, that is, their figure in full light, and visible, even when they in fact appear and become recognizable to the hero through a semblance and a disguise. This is the case at *Odyssey* 16.155ff., where Athena is said to appear only to Odysseus. She is *enargēs*, as the text declares, and yet she bears a resemblance "in her stature to a beautiful and tall woman, expert in splendid handiworks," δέμας δ' ἤικτο γυναικὶ καλῇ τε μεγάλῃ τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργα ἰδύει. The text adds the theme of the running dogs to emphasize the appearance of the divine, but this divinity is a semblance.<sup>2</sup>

From the standpoint of religious conception, the difference between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* perhaps signals the *Odyssey's* larger familiarity with anthropomorphic representations and images of divinity. Yet this familiarity goes hand in hand with an ironic recognition that this self-presentation amounts always to a semblance and that the real figure of a god is not retrievable. This familiarity with the disguise of the gods is not surprising in a poem like the *Odyssey*, a world of deceptions, make-believe, false names, etc. The god with his immortal beauty, majesty, and luminous body is other: finally, if divine beings can transform themselves into whatever thing or being they want, no man, as Odysseus states, can recognize their transformations (*Od.* 13.313).

The divine epiphanies in epos do not have a unique significance, but point to various textual functions and roles. The gods suggest a course of action, and sustain this suggestion with different signs of their presence: voice, disguise, a mingling of the two (e.g., *Il.* 3.396–97), a


<sup>2</sup>The verb *eikō* that is used in both poems to denote the semblance of the gods points to an appearance that is different from their being, and therefore to a deception, an *apatē*, built in their semblance. Even when the gods assume a disguised figure to help their favorites, their figures betray their true being. Yet the Homeric text does not generally comment negatively on this disguise—as Virgil would later do with pathos in *Aen.* 1.406–9—but seems content to emphasize the continuous presence of the gods to the heroes as a privilege that preempts any negative comment on the reticence of their appearance. Therefore, the tension between appearing and being remains implicit most of the time, becoming explicit only in the cases of overt deception by the gods, as for instance in *Il.* 22.224ff., where Athena cruelly deceives Hector. We have in this semblance and deception the kernel of the Greeks' enduring mistrust of the image, the semblance, the appearance, a mistrust that would become philosophically productive in the fifth century.

suggestion of their divine nature at the moment of their departure (e.g., *Il.* 13.71–72, *Od.* 1.319ff.). They may express a gesture of consolation or support to the hero, with different degrees of divine self-exposure (*Il.* 21.284ff.). They may attack a hero, as Apollo assails Patroclus, with a superhuman power that the hero does not perceive, though he is later aware of it, and that the reader imagines more than sees (*Il.* 16.788ff.). Or they may appear in a figure that is recognizable to the character, but a blank for the reader (*Il.* 1.188ff.). When the gods are described in their superhuman power and luminous aspect, they are not seen by the eyes of the mortals (*Il.* 5.864ff., etc.). Only in the *Homeric Hymns*, though rarely, do they manifest the full presence of the divine persona as being visible—and also confusing—to mortals.

As we turn our attention to tragedy we face the difficult question of how the stage can represent, in action and by acting, the divine presence of the gods among mortals. Here no blank figure and no expression of semblance (“they look like . . .”) is possible: here the gods must have their iconographic figure, a precise face, a place where they move, their feet placed on some solid ground. Moreover, since they must move and speak, they are impersonated by human actors, and therefore they necessarily have human stature and voice. Aristotle himself calls attention to the greater difficulty of producing marvelous effects in tragedy than in epic; among these—though he does not mention them—we may include divine epiphanies: “It is necessary to create marvelous effects (*thaumaston*) also in the tragedies, but in epic poetry even the irrational, through which the marvelous effects especially arise, is possible, since we do not see the acting character” (*Po.* 1460a12–18).

I hope here to elucidate some of the questions that arise from translating the epic epiphany into the tragic, by analyzing the appearance of the gods on stage in Sophocles’ *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*. I emphasize the following common points: (1) the marginality of these epiphanies; (2) their formal epic source, and their adaptation into the tragic context; and (3) their function as a sign of what Sophocles explicitly calls “the care of the gods” (*meletē theōn*, e.g., *Phil.* 196). I also emphasize the differences between the two epiphanies, starting with their formal diversity: the invisibility of Athena to Odysseus and probably to Ajax, and the visibility of Heracles to Philoctetes and Neoptolemus.

On the marginality of these epiphanies a few words are sufficient. In *Ajax* Athena opens the action, in a dialogue with Odysseus and Ajax for the first 133 lines of the play. This constitutes a sort of miniature



drama, close and complete in itself, with a final moral or taxonomy (127–33). It functions as a drama within the drama of which it is formally the prologue. The epiphany of Heracles in *Philoctetes* occurs at the close of the action of the play and radically changes its ending. This final and resolving role of the gods' appearance in tragedy was called *deus ex machina* by Plato (*Crat.* 425d) and has been criticized as arbitrary and external ever since (Plato, *ibid.*; Aristotle *Po.* 1454a37–b7). But I am not concerned here so much with analyzing this nomenclature or this criticism<sup>3</sup> as with underscoring the marginal position of these divine interventions, which are placed at the beginning or at the end of the dramatic action.<sup>4</sup> Marginal placement may signal the relative heterogeneity of this device in tragedy and mark its alien nature, as a technique imported from another genre.

In *Ajax* Athena first addresses Odysseus, who is tracking footprints on the ground, and tells him to ask her, since she knows. Odysseus must have glanced around at the sound of her voice, must have recognized it and listened to it without, however, seeing her, for he answers her in the following words:

᾿Ω φθέγγμ' Ἀθάνας, φιλιτάτης ἐμοὶ θεῶν,  
ὥς εὐμαθὲς σου, κἄν ἄποπτος ᾗς, ὅμως  
φώνημ' ἀκούω καὶ ξυναρπάζω φρενί,  
χαλκοστόμου κώδωνος ὥς τυρσηνικῆς. (Aj. 14–17)

"O voice of Athena, my dearest goddess,<sup>5</sup>  
though you are out of my sight,  
how familiar is your voice,

<sup>3</sup>Plato focuses on the *deus ex machina*'s external function in resolving the difficulties of the plot: "the tragedians, when they are in trouble about the plot, have recourse to the machine and raise (*airontes*) the gods" (*Crat.* 425d).

<sup>4</sup>In Euripides' *Heracles*, Iris' and Lyssa's intervention is sandwiched in the middle of the action so as to constitute a new prologue for the second part of the play. Moreover, it is perceived only by the Chorus, who will not inform Heracles of this divine intervention, so that it is played mainly for the puzzlement of the audience.

<sup>5</sup>Athena's love for Odysseus is traditional in epic poetry: see *Il.* 10.245, φιλεῖ δέ εἰ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, and 280, νῦν αὖτε μάλιστα με φίλαι Ἀθήνη . . . ; and *Od.* 3.218ff:

εἰ γάρ σ' ὥς ἐθέλοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
ὥς τότ' Ὀδυσσεὺς περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο  
δήμῳ ἐν Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε' Ἀχαιοί—  
σὺ γάρ πω ἴδον ὥδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,  
ὥς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη—  
εἰ σ' οὕτως ἐθέλοι φιλέειν κήδοιτό τε θυμῷ, κτλ.

that I am hearing and grasping with my mind,<sup>6</sup>  
as that of the Etruscan trumpet with its bronze mouth."

Whether Odysseus sees or does not see Athena is a long-debated question; critics have variously argued the necessity of the one or the other interpretation. Today there is a sort of critical consensus that ἀποπτος means "out of sight," though the arguments are not often presented.<sup>7</sup> The word does not exclude either "visible at a distance" or "out of sight," for it may signify that Athena is placed visibly at some distance, or, if we give to ἀπο- a privative meaning, that she is not visible at all.<sup>8</sup> Once we realize that ἀποπτος does not exclude either meaning we have to look for internal reasons to support either one or the other significance. In my view there are cogent reasons for concluding that Odysseus does *not* see Athena. As I have already mentioned, in the *Iliad* Athena always approaches Odysseus invisibly and makes herself recognizable only through her voice.<sup>9</sup> Here we have the same sort of epiphany that may have become conventional in the Iliadic tradition for our hero. The epithet for this voice, *eumathes* (15), could indeed refer—at the metatheatrical level—to that convention and familiarity.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Ξυναρπάξω φρενί is stronger than συνίημι, since it includes the idea of stealing.

<sup>7</sup> Among the exceptions, see Taplin, *Tragedy in Action* 185 n. 12, who argues that gods in prologues are always on the ground and that therefore Athena must become visible to Odysseus, who after recognizing her voice turns to her and sees her. But the gods who in prologues speak on the ground are *prologizontes* gods (Pickard-Cambridge, *Theatre of Dionysus* 54–55), and this is a different matter, since conventionally there are no humans present. Furthermore, the text does not at all support this double recognition, first by ear and then by sight; in fact it would be ridiculous for Odysseus, after thirteen lines of Athena's talk, to insist on his recognition of her voice if at the sound of her first words he had turned and seen her. The last scholar to write on this matter is, to my knowledge, Pöhlmann, "Scene di ricerca" 97, who supports the invisibility of Athena to Odysseus.

<sup>8</sup> For the privative meaning of ἀπο- see ἀπόθετος (Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* s.v. θεσάσθαι) and ἀπόθεος, "far from the gods" and therefore "godless," "impious," and the cases where the preposition has both a positive and a negative sense, as in ἀποβλέπω, "to look at" but also "to remove the eyes from," ἀπολέγω etc. We may think that something visible only from afar ceases being visible due to its excessive distance—in analogy, for instance, with words like ἀπόθετος, which means "put aside" but, by extending to mean "placed fully outside," comes to signify "secret," "mysterious."

<sup>9</sup> See my "Strategia epifanica."

<sup>10</sup> Tragedy knows that the gods may manifest themselves to mortals only through their voices. In Euripides' *Hippolytus* (85ff.) the young man places a garland either on Artemis' statue or on her altar and then states: "I consort with you and dialogue with you,

Furthermore, it would be a pedantic detail for Odysseus to assure Athena that he understands her voice well, though he sees her from a distance: the detail ceases to be pedantic and acquires the correct emphasis if he states that her presence to him is manifested only by her voice.<sup>11</sup> I conclude, therefore, that Athena is invisible to Odysseus.

If the Iliadic technique seems to us to be a possible model for this epiphany, we cannot forget that Sophocles had before him at least two texts recounting Ajax' madness: the *Micra Ilias*, and Aeschylus' *Hoplōn krisis*, the first part of his trilogy including *Thrēssai* and *Salaminiai*. Whether both texts were faithful to the Iliadic model of invisible epiphany, and to what extent Athena was directly involved in causing Ajax' madness, we cannot know. There exists a fragment of a cup (see Robert, *Fünfzigstes Programm zum Winkelmannsfeste*, 34ff., with illustration) in which we see some traces of the representation of Ajax' madness. Robert was inclined to think that the source of the picture is the *Micra Ilias* and argued that the scene shows that Athena and Odysseus are invisible behind Ajax, who is dragging a ram into his tent. If this reconstruction is correct, the invisibility of the goddess would also have been a feature of the narrative in the *Micra Ilias*.

At the same time, Athena's invisibility in *Ajax* may have a different purpose than in the *Iliad*. In the poem, Athena's limited self-revelation to Odysseus plays off against her full revelation to Achilles in the first book, implying a series of comparisons between the two heroes.<sup>12</sup> In *Ajax* the goddess does not come to Odysseus to give him advice: her intervention reveals her unlimited, tremendous power (*fascinum, mysterium tremendum*) that literally crushes the weak pretensions of even

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hearing your voice (*audē*), but without seeing your face." If Hippolytus states this while standing before Artemis' image, his statement that the goddess is invisible is stronger because it implicitly dismisses the image as a form of the goddess's presence and appearance. A stage example of Artemis' invisibility occurs at the end of the play, when the goddess appears on the *mēkhanē* and remains invisible to Hippolytus. See Barrett (p. 306), who compares that invisibility to Athena's in *Ajax*.

<sup>11</sup>Jebb says something similar when he writes: "The emphasis on voice and thought—*phthegma, phōnēma, xunarpazō phreni*—is so strong as to imply that he does not see her even at a distance" (*Ajax* 13).

<sup>12</sup>In "Strategia epifanica" I have emphasized the effects of that implicit comparison. Perhaps Athena's dramatic and full self-revelation to Achilles underscores the importance and the difficulty of her task in persuading the hero, whereas her limited self-exposure to Odysseus may imply her easy task in suggesting to him an action that he already wishes for.



the great heroes. She comes down to show Odysseus how she saved the Greeks from Ajax' fury, how she made and makes of him a pitiful plaything: she wants this to be known by the Greeks. Hers is a display of tremendous divine power: "See, Odysseus how immense is the force of the gods!" 'Ορᾶς, 'Οδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν δοῖ; (118). The goddess does not speak of herself, but of divine power in general, hinting at an otherness and absoluteness of power that she merely exemplifies in this specific case. This divine power is not visible in the divine person, but in the effect that the invisible person produces. In other words, Sophocles would be using Athena's invisibility to Odysseus in the Iliadic epiphanies to emphasize the invisibility of the divine in its manifestation of power. No epic god ever speaks to one of his favorite heroes with this distance and this edifying intention. To be sure, each taxonomic feature raised here occurs also in epos—namely in the gods' recognition that men are creatures of a day and last like leaves—but the presentation of these themes by a patron god does not seem to belong to the epic genre.

Odysseus' answer expresses pity for his adversary and also for himself, for he recognizes that before the superhuman stature of the gods, men are only *eidōla*, images, and light shadows:

Ὅρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν  
εἰδῶλ', ὅσοι περ ζῶμεν, ἢ κούφην σκιάν. (125–26)

"I see that all we who live are nothing  
but phantoms or light shadow."<sup>13</sup>

In Homer the *eidōla* are *phasmata*, *oneirata*, and *psuchai*. *Phasmata* are images that the gods create in the semblance of some real person, as Apollo does in creating a being similar to Aeneas in *Iliad* 5.449–53; *oneirata* are images of real persons that the gods send to sleeping people as dreams, and *psuchai* are images of the dead that are reduced to mere semblance of their former selves. All these modes of *eidōla* are real entities, not mental images: they speak, move, have garments; but they lack consistency, are like phantoms of smoke.<sup>14</sup> Odysseus feels like one of those airy entities before the power of the goddess. The disconcerting paradox is that the *invisible* goddess is a solid and real presence; she

<sup>13</sup> An attitude of sobering humility is expressed by Odysseus at *Od.* 13.312–13, after the impressive epiphany by Athena and her slightly mocking remark at 299–300.

<sup>14</sup> I derive this interpretation of the *eidōla* from Vernant, "Destin de l'image."

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really *is* a power grounded on earth, unlike Odysseus, whom she makes feel insubstantial and makes visible or invisible at her whim.

The members of the audience, however, *do* see the goddess. But what they really see is her invisibility to Odysseus. As I have indicated at the beginning of this essay, the visibility of the gods is thinkable only by starting from their invisibility. Since the gods are invisible, their visibility is representable as a blank, as the unsayable, the unutterable. Accordingly here the audience see Athena, but they see her—whatever image the stage production presented of her—as a sign of her invisibility to Odysseus. Her figure is the sign of a blank.

Now the question arises, where do the members of the audience locate the goddess on the stage? The conventional wisdom is that Athena is standing at some height, at a station somewhat removed, which would make her invisible to Odysseus and probably to Ajax. She would be located where many *dei ex machina* are placed—for example, exactly where Artemis stands so as to be invisible to the dying Hippolytus, in Euripides' play as Barrett suggests (*Hippolytus* p. 306).<sup>15</sup> If this were the case, I imagine that in *Ajax* the simplest mechanism was used, one that allowed Athena to rise at some height and distance. We may even imagine that Athena acted on the same ground as the other actors, though at some distance from them (*apoptos*) and that Odysseus and Ajax dealt with her as blind characters would.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup>From the same commentary I summarize and transcribe some points of conventional wisdom about the position onstage of *dei ex machina*. From the ancient scholia and Pollux—who speaks of the *theologeion*, the pedestal from which the *deus ex machina* would speak—and on up into modern scholarship, the question of how and where the gods appear in these scenes rests largely on hypothetical grounds. The orthodox idea is that the god would appear at some height, "either stepping up from behind the building, or from behind a pediment or the like, or to some sort of raised platform (the *theologeion* of Pollux 4.127)." The fourth-century writers speak often of *mēchanai*, but we do not know whether they were used in the fifth century, nor do we know what kind of contrivance is meant. "Some kind of crane or derrick" is probable; yet it is difficult to imagine these machines not breaking the desired illusion; nor is it probable that a god merely suspended by a *mēchanē* should be kept pendant for anything from 50 to 160 lines. "Alternatively one might think of a telescopic tower on which the god might be raised into sight immediately, behind the stage building" (Barrett, *Hippolytus*, p. 396). On the static, simple nature of the machinery that assured the tragic epiphanies before Euripides, see Marzullo, "Storia di una macchinazione."

<sup>16</sup>See, e.g., *OT* 1325. Some features, however, favor the placement of Athena at some distance from the human action: (1) the mention of her remarkable voice ("O voice of Athena . . . as that of the Etruscan trumpet with its bronze mouth") would be more appropriate if it were thought to proceed from far away. (2) Athena mockingly scolds Ajax

The epic derivation of the scene is occasionally marked in the text by precise epic reminiscences, if not direct quotations. I have already pointed to the mention of Athena's special *philia* for Odysseus (14), but one should also add the epic-lyric-tragic δέδορκα (1), κατεναρίζω (26), δῖρύνω (60), κυρεῖς (87), πάγχρυσος (92), and the mention of Ajax' *sakos* (19) with reference to *Iliad* 7.219ff. The most precise allusion occurs probably at line 51, where Odysseus asks Athena how it happened that Ajax detained his hand furiously eager for blood:

Καὶ πῶς ἐπέσχε χεῖρα μαιμῶσαν φόνου; (Aj. 51)

The expression seems literally taken out of the scene in the *Iliad* where the two Ajaxes speak to each other after the inspiring intervention of Poseidon:

καὶ δ' ἔμοι αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι  
μᾶλλον ἐφορμάται πολεμίζειν ἢ δὲ μάχεσθαι,  
μαιμῶωσι δ' ἔνερθε πόδες καὶ χεῖρες ὑπερθε.  
Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη Τελαμώνιος Αἴας·  
οὕτω νῦν καὶ ἔμοι περὶ δούρατι χεῖρες ἀαπτοὶ  
μαιμῶσιν, καὶ μοι μένος ὥρορε, νέρθε δὲ ποσσὶν  
ἔσσουμαι ἀμφοτέροισι (Il. 13.73–78)

Of the seven examples of *maimaō*—the verb occurs exclusively in the *Iliad*—only in 13.75 and 78 does the verb have χεῖρες as its subject.<sup>17</sup>

(89–90) for neglecting her first order to appear before his house (71–73): his neglect would be more justifiable if her voice were coming from far away than if she were commanding him before his tent. (3) Finally, if *apoptos* implies “out of sight” because of the distance, the word would suggest Athena's relative remoteness; and this placement would suggest to the audience the goddess's distance from humanity. Whether Ajax sees Athena or not is an idle question. Possibly he saw her during the night of the massacre, since he recognizes that she was standing by him (92)—though in Robert's interpretation of the cup she would have been invisible even on that occasion—but he saw her while he was mistaking cattle for men. His senses are therefore completely corrupted and distorted by Athena. Even now, when he comes out at her order, Athena, as she says, has obscured or shadowed his eyes (85, Ἐγὼ σκοτώσω βλέφαρα καὶ δεδορκότα, “I shall shadow his eyes, even as he sees”) so that he may not see Odysseus. Athena distorts Ajax's sight so fully that, for the audience, Ajax sees only the phantoms she allows him to see. The audience, therefore, cannot decide whether he sees Athena, or believes that he sees Athena, or whether it is at all important what he sees, since all his senses are distorted. Taplin (*Tragedy in Action* 108) finds a “nightmare element in Ajax's appearance.”

<sup>17</sup>In the other five other passages the subject is αἰχμή (5.661, 15.542), ἦτορ (5.670), Αἴας (15.742), and πτόρ (20.490).

Sophocles adds φόνον, partially on the model of such phrases as αἰχμή δὲ στέργονιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα (15.542). The “remake” is not without a tragic violence in the mention of a φόνον that initiates a rhyming of murder (*Aj.* 55, 61).<sup>18</sup> We could therefore suspect a precise “remake” of this text, considering that this dialogue between the two Ajaxes follows the visit of their patron god, Poseidon, who has stimulated their μένος, just as in *Ajax* Athena has stimulated and directed the furious hand of the hero against the cattle—and detained it from the Atreidae. Another epic allusion could be detected in lines 92 (ὦ χαῖρ', Ἀθάνᾳ, χαῖρε, Διογενὲς τέκνον, ὥς εὖ παρέστης) and 117 (τοῦτό σοι δ' ἐφέμει, τοι-ἀνδ' αἰέ μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι), where the use of παρέστημι for the assistance and the presence of a god seems epic.<sup>19</sup>

The allusions to the epic genre in the scene are therefore several and cleverly sustained by various devices: the self-revelation of the goddess to Odysseus through her voice, the *philia* of Odysseus for Athena, the characterization of Ajax, the occasional “remakes” of the epic language, etc.<sup>20</sup> Through the reenactment, that is, through the *mimēsis* of some generic features, the text makes it possible for the reader to recognize the “genre” from which it borrows.

The presence, function, and effects of this sort of allusion present us with the question of how we should interpret the relationship that Sophocles' text opens with epic poetry. For Sophocles' text is inscribed within a poetic tradition of which it is both a result and an active agent

<sup>18</sup>This Iliadic allusion may continue until line 52:

{AΘ.} Ἐγὼ σφ' ἀπελγῶ, δυσφόρους ἐπ' ὀμμασι  
γνώμας βαλοῦσα τῆς ἀνηκέστου χαρᾶς,

“I detain him by throwing on his eyes heavy images of irresistible joy.” The text may allude to the same Iliadic scene and specifically to 13.81–82, where we are told that the two Ajaxes are “full of the battle-joy that the god inspired in their heart” (χάρμη γηθόσυνοι, τὴν σφιν θεὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ). In our play Athena inspires Ajax with false, maddening images of battle-joy, directing his fury against cattle. Diggle and other editors prefer to make τῆς ἀνηκέστου χαρᾶς dependent on Ἐγὼ σφ' ἀπελγῶ (“I detain him from the irresistible joy by throwing heavy images on his eyes”). The allusion is not lost even in this version.

<sup>19</sup>See, e.g., *Od.* 3.223 and elsewhere.

<sup>20</sup>I am of course referring to the epic text we possess, the *Iliad*, which in this case is only a sort of substratum for our tragic text, since the episode that *Ajax* stages did not occur there but only in the *Micra Ilias*. It is useless to speculate how close or how removed our tragic text is from its immediate source.

inasmuch as it interprets, transmits, and modifies the Homeric text. It is obvious that in this dialogue between the two texts, in this "fusion of horizons"—to give a hermeneutic conceptual frame to the notion of "tradition"—Sophocles' subjective, intentional purposes are fused with the objective, historical conditions that constitute the grounds of that dialogue and enable an understanding and an exchange between far-removed poets and writings. Besides subjective intentions, we should therefore account for the literary code (though this notion is fraught with problems), for the canon of the privileged authors, for the sentiment of an alienation and of a distance constantly to be dialogued with, for the movement of the past, for the passivity itself of the word.

The traditional understanding of "allusion" is too narrow and too empirical to accommodate such a complex horizon of links and connections. For in the traditional view, "allusion" names a "remake" that text B would produce of text A (see, e.g., Pasquali's "Arte allusiva") and assumes that a certain intention of rivalry or admiration animates the author of that imitation.<sup>21</sup> It thus establishes a readable authorial intention, a one-way movement, a before and an after. But none of these presuppositions remains stable if we understand the allusion as the "function" and "effect" of a dialogue between texts and historical ages, within a specific genre, through a certain passivity of language. For in this case the subjective motivations fuse with the objective ones. Furthermore, "the past" is not a fixed term: it moves and changes with the moving and changing that each interpretation gives of it, so that a present interpretation changes the figure of the past, and a new interpretation of the past likewise affects the reading that the present gives of itself.

This does not mean that authorial intentions do not mark the text, simply that they cannot be neatly circumscribed, or defined,<sup>22</sup> since they fuse with other passive or active motivations that construe the

<sup>21</sup> See Conte, *Rhetoric of Imitation* 26: "The instances of 'allusive art' studied by Pasquali are in large part 'emulative' allusions, that is, they refer to cases where the allusion stands primarily in a relationship of 'aemulatio', of competition with and improvement over the original. . . . On closer examination, Pasquali's approach reveals a privileging of the moment of intentionality in the 'poetic memory'. His method creates a substantial opposition between inert material and intentional elements."

<sup>22</sup> The romantic overevaluation of these intentions brings Bloom (*Anxiety of Influence*) to construe oedipal conflicts between authors and therefore to contribute to the endless flow of oedipal narratives with their domesticated polarizations, fixed roles, misrecognitions (= misreadings), fixed drama, etc.

allusion. The effects that allusion enacts are readable—though no diacritical sign induces the reading of the allusion—in the texts that are dialoguing: these effects may signal the reciprocal recognition of the texts or of the conscious or unconscious use of the conventions that produce both; they may produce a rhetorical emphasis, as a figural meaning, and connotate the text as a textual artifact. By opening a text to the question of its formation, of its textuality, these effects emphasize the literary nature of its texture, its passivity and activity, its similarities and differences, misreadings and authentic interpretations, etc. For instance, my analysis of the conventions that control the epiphany of Athena in the Iliadic tradition is sufficient to explain Sophocles' treatment of Athena's appearance to Odysseus without needing to find any intentional similarity between *Iliad* 2.182—where Athena is recognizable to Odysseus only by her voice—and the passage in *Ajax*.

The positivistic exegetes of allusion are drawn to it by the comforting assurances they derive from "allusion": whether the allusion is admiring or polemical, in any case it would consolidate the literary creativity of the text, give instructions of reading, limit the indeterminacy and the drifting of meaning. The allusive awareness that the text displays would be a producer of sense, would suggest a differential feature that aims at controlling the instability and drifting of the poetic language.

Of course these assurances are certainly sought by many authors in the composition of their texts, or at any rate by the monarchic drive of every work, but the polysemy and drifting of (poetic) language remain inevitable and irrepressible. The simple fact that a new context remakes the linguistic expression proves that the linguistic expression has no original integrity or autonomy. This principle also shakes some of the assurances of the hermeneutic and semiotic interpretations, insofar as it questions the notion of a "code" as something fixed and stable and thus capable of referential power. Accordingly the interpretation of allusive expressions and texts cannot rely on a confrontation with a "system of conscious and deliberate rules,"<sup>23</sup> but may remain sus-

<sup>23</sup> Conte, *Rhetoric of Imitation* 31: "In the traditional arsenal of classical philology there exists the notion of an Exemplary Model, the single word to be precisely imitated. There is, however, an alternative model, that is, the Model as Code. The literary institution permits more or less *faithful* representation, or, in other words, a system of *conscious, deliberate* rules that the *author identifies* as indicators of ways in which the text must be interpreted" (emphasis mine). This code, it seems to me, reintroduces the au-

pended in a spectrum of alternative, indecidable readings. This spectrum constitutes a field of expressive forces striving to repress each other.

The drawbacks to the traditional notion of allusion being so many, the notion of intertextuality has quickly been adopted by critics, as a new, modern conceptual mean. But the "intertextuality" that has been put in the market by Julia Kristeva (*Desire in Language*) meant for its inventor a quite different thing than allusiveness, something like the set of the signifying premises of a culture, the set that makes possible the meaning of a text (see Culler, "Presupposition and Intertextuality"). Later this notion was enlarged by Barthes ("The Theory of the Text") and interpreted as the systematic textuality of any text, which is always a product of endless texts; as such it could be employed in poststructuralist or textualist analysis as a possible deconstructive tool.<sup>24</sup>

Within these conceptual coordinates, it is understandable why Athena's epiphany in *Ajax* presents features that contain and bypass authorial intentions, and why the distortion of its meaning is necessary and irrepressible. We have seen that the invisibility of the goddess is here formally and in content a different business than in epic poetry—her invisibility being actually made visible for the audience, and her invisibility pointing to a tragic vision of man's powerlessness. In epic, on the contrary, readers have less control of the epiphany than does the character, since most often only he knows what he sees when he sees a god. Accordingly this epiphanic theme becomes recognizable as a feature of the epic "genre" at the point where it is oddly performed as an "improper" version of the "original" feature. This fidelity in treason, this identity in the act of becoming different, constitutes the double bind that allows us to think of the generic allusion, and allusion in general.<sup>25</sup>

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thor's consciousness and intention, which Conte, in the previous pages, has so painstakingly tried to remove from allusive texts. On the inadequacy of demonstrative power of general norms and laws for the knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) of literary work, see Szondi, *Hölderlin Studien* 263–86.

<sup>24</sup>I here use "allusion" in the open sense I have sketched, and "intertextuality" either as a synonym of "allusiveness" or more precisely as a "generalized allusiveness," in principle pointing to the total allusiveness of each text.

<sup>25</sup>The question of how a "genre" becomes constituted and defined for its practitioners is too complex to be treated in these pages. The inquiry is theoretically difficult, since it is hard to find the determining traits that define the individuality of the genre, as many features at different levels—nominal, normative, essentialist, contextual—interfere

Even Athena's ground for her epic epiphany to Odysseus, her *philia*, belongs, as we have seen, to the allusive construction in *Ajax*. But here too the differences are remarkable. The epic gods descend to visit, advise, help, and comfort their heroes, out of *philia*, *timē*, and *kēdos*. For *philia* and *kēdos* see *Iliad* 1.196 (= 209), where these two feelings prompt Hera to send Athena to stop Achilles from killing Agamemnon:

ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη  
οὐρανόθεν· πρὸ γὰρ ἦκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη  
ἄμφω ὁμῶς θυμῷ φιλέουσά τε κηδομένη τε· (Il. 1.194–96)

Athena came from heaven:  
white-armed Hera had sent her  
since she loved and cared equally for both of them.

In the *Odyssey* Nestor speaks similarly of the care of Pallas Athena for Odysseus:

εἰ γάρ σ' ὥς ἐθέλοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
ὥς τότ' Ὀδυσσεὺς περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο  
δῆμῳ ἐν Τρώων. δθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε' Ἀχαιοί·  
οὐ γάρ πω ἶδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,  
ὥς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·  
εἰ σ' οὕτως ἐθέλοι φιλέειν κήδοιτό τε θυμῷ, (Od. 3.218–23)

"Would that blue-eyed Athena were ready to love you  
as she greatly cared for glorious Odysseus  
in the land of the Trojans when we Achaeans suffered our pains.  
For I never saw the gods to be so visibly loving anyone  
as Pallas Athena was, visibly standing by him;  
if she were ready to love and to care for you in her heart . . ."

Nestor mentions these privileged relations of Athena with Odysseus to Telemachus while the young man is accompanied by Athena, disguised

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and may contradict each other. It is also historically a difficult investigation: how a "genre" or a "generic tradition," epic for instance, emerges from individual poetic performances (or events), how their reenactment produces an implicit *eidōs*, notwithstanding both the intertextual contamination and the continuous changes. See Schaeffer, *Qu'est-ce qu'un genre littéraire?*



as Mentor. With this intervention, the goddess shows the same care for the son as for the father.<sup>26</sup>

When we compare these epic expressions of divine care and concern to the Sophoclean ones, we are struck first by a certain continuity of words and thoughts and then by a deep difference. As concerns the continuity of words and thoughts, in the Sophoclean texts, including *Ajax*, the gods' intervention is still prompted by their divine care, described by μέλω, μέλημα, μελέτη. In the dialogue between Odysseus and Athena, the goddess explains that Ajax wanted to kill the Atreidae and the other Argives, and that he would have carried out his plan "had I not taken care," Κἄν ἐξεπράξατ', εἰ κατημέλησ' ἐγώ (*Ajax* 45). Her intervention, therefore, is prompted by her *maletē* for the Atreidae and for Odysseus, just as her *kēdos* prompted her intervention in the epic.<sup>27</sup> We can also consider within the epic coordinates the use of the words φυλάσσω and φιλέω: as Odysseus recognizes Athena's timely intervention, the goddess confirms it by describing herself as his φύλαξ:

Καιρὸν δ' ἐφήκεις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τ' οὖν πάρος  
τὰ τ' εἰσέπειτα σὴ κυβερνώμαι χειρί.

[ΑΘ.] Ἔγνων, Ὀδυσσεῦ, καὶ πάλαι φύλαξ ἔβην<sup>28</sup>  
τῇ σὴ πρόθυμος εἰς ὁδὸν κυναγία.

(*Aj.* 34–37)

<sup>26</sup>For *philia* and *timē* see *Il.* 2.197 (with Shipp, *Studies* II 154) and 9.117–18: in both cases the phrase asserts Zeus' *philia* and *timē* for a *basileus*, and of course there is no question of Zeus' epiphany. Analogously Hera's recent love and honor for Heracles, in Hesiod fr. 25.32 (MW), does not entail any epiphany. In the *Odyssey*'s popular religiosity "the blessed gods do not love criminal actions but honor justice and the good actions of men" (*Od.* 14.53–54). The *philia* of the god for the hero is mentioned in many other cases, e.g., in prayers, *Il.* 5.115ff. (Athena's *philia* for Diomedes), 10.278ff. (Athena's *philia* for Odysseus); in short biographical sketches, e.g., *Il.* 5.61, 10.245, 14.491, *Od.* 8.63, etc.

<sup>27</sup>*Kēdos* and *kēdomai* are never used for gods' care in Sophocles' plays: the verb announces only human concerns and cares, for victims (*Phil.* 170), for loved ones (*Trach.* 966, *Ant.* 741, *Ajax* 203, *El.* 1060), for the self (*OT* 1061, *El.* 1327), and finally for those who depend on a leader (*Phil.* 621). The preference for family concern and care is understandable as *kēdos* after Homer implies parentage, family alliance, etc. In contrast, we find *kēdomai* only once in Aeschylus (*Sept.* 137), but it implies divine care and it has a Homeric ring: σύ τ', Ἄρης, φεῦ, φεῦ, πόλιν ἐπώνυμον / Κάδμου φύλαξον κήδεσσι τ' ἐναργῶς.

<sup>28</sup>To exemplify the epic use of the notion of divine φυλάσσειν, I quote from Diomedes' prayer to Athena at *Il.* 10.291: ὧς νῦν μοι ἐθέλουσα παρίσταις καὶ με φύλασσε. We notice that Diomedes' verb παρίσταις occurs in the version of Odysseus's ἐφήκεις (*Ajax* 34).

A remarkable interruption in the continuity of thoughts and words from epic to tragedy occurs in the realm of divine *philia*: while Odysseus calls the goddess *philtatē*, nowhere does the goddess say that she “loves” Odysseus. But as she is leaving him, and delivering to him her moral advice, she limits and circumscribes the gods’ love to only one class of mortals:

{ΑΘ.} Τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέркоπον  
 μηδέν ποτ’ εἴτης αὐτὸς ἐς θεοὺς ἔπος,  
 μηδ’ ὄγκον ἄρη μηδέν’, εἰ τινος πλέον  
 ἢ χειρὶ βρέθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει·  
 ὥς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν  
 ἅπαντα τάνθρωπεια· τοὺς δὲ σῶφρονας  
 θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακοῦς. (127–33)

“Seeing these things, do not utter any arrogant word against the gods, nor assume any pretension if you get any advantage either from your strong hand or from a quantity of great riches. For one day bends or raises human affairs. Gods love the wise and hate the villains.”

Contrary to the Iliadic presumption that the gods love *basileis* as such, because they descend from Zeus and are the human counterparts of their powers, here the gods love only τοὺς σῶφρονας. With this one word, the entire epic scenario is wiped away.<sup>29</sup> For we understand now that Athena’s *meletē* is performed only because Odysseus is *sophrōn*, not because he is a *basileus* and her favorite hero as the human counterpart of her *mētis*, as in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. We thus have to assume that in relation to Ajax the Atreidae too appear as *sophrōnes* to Athena, though there is no indication for it. Here Eumaeus’ ethical code (*Od.* 14.53–54) emerges, rather than the aristocratic view of the Iliadic heroes. But since in Homer Eumaeus would never have been blessed by the privilege of a divine epiphany, Athena’s epiphany to Odysseus insofar as he is *sophrōn* is deviant and contradicts one tenet of epic poetry.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup>This φιλοῦσι (*Ajax* 133) is the only example of divine *philein* in Sophocles. Of course men still may call a god *philos* as Odysseus does, but it is rare. Divine *philia* is also very rare in Aeschylus’ plays; we may cite two occurrences of the adjective *philos* attributed to a divine being: *Agam.* 355, 515.

<sup>30</sup>The different focus on moral excellence goes hand in hand with a different human reaction to the brutal work of deception by the gods. Whereas at *Il.* 22 Athena can cruelly deceive Hector without raising any feeling of compassion in Achilles, Odysseus at the sight of her tricks feels pity for his enemy Ajax and says so to the goddess. She

A deep shift has taken place between Homer and Sophocles, within the continuity of their dialogue and of their language. Even the words μελέτη, μέλω, etc. disclose unprecedented and disquieting aspects of divine care. On the one hand, gods' care depends on their subjective appreciation of piousness (are the Atreidae, in *Ajax*, really pious?) and of justice (*Phil.* 1036–37); on the other, the very nature of this care implies a concern that may not be necessarily favorable (e.g., *Phil.* 196, *OT* 377, *Ant.* 1335, etc.). Divine "care" assumes some mysterious quality that may intrigue mortals.

Yet even so, Athena's intervention in *Ajax* remains in the wake of an epic scene: its different generic nature may help to explain the autonomous character that this scene has in the play,<sup>31</sup> its being a closed up antecedent of the tragedy and, to some extent, an exhibition of metaphysical awe, alien to the small, realistic world of fear, meanness, and generosity that follows it.

Let us now turn our attention to the epiphany of Heracles in the last scene of *Philoctetes*, in order to define its relationship with the rest of the drama. This epiphany too, like the one in *Ajax*, has a strong epic quality, even dissonant with the rest of the play. And, like the epiphany in *Ajax*, it is autonomous in character and encroaches, as an alien discourse, on the end of the play. We may begin our analysis with the *meletē* of the gods. The expression first occurs at the point where Neoptolemus, responding to the Chorus' pity for the abandoned Philoctetes, suggests that all Philoctetes' sufferings are derived from divine care:

Οὐδὲν τούτων θαυμαστὸν ἔμοι-  
θεῖα γάρ, εἴπερ κἀγὼ τι φρονῶ,  
καὶ τὰ παθήματα κείνα πρὸς αὐτὸν  
τῆς ὁμόφρονος Χρύσης ἐπέβη,  
καὶ νῦν δὲ πονεῖ δίχᾳ κηδεμόνων,  
οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς οὐ θεῶν του μελέτη,  
τοῦ μὴ πρότερον τόνδ' ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ  
τεῖναι τὰ θεῶν ἀμάχητα βέλη,  
πρὶν δδ' ἐξήκοι χρόνος ᾧ λέγεται  
χρῆναί σφ' ὑπὸ τῶνδε δαμῆναι.

(*Phil.* 191–200)

realizes it (127) and draws the moral lesson we have analyzed. Euripides, on the contrary, facing some cruel behavior of the gods, would have one of his characters raise the question of the god's *sophia* and argue that gods should be wiser than men.

<sup>31</sup>This point was perfectly outlined by Robert Rust in one of my seminars.

"None of his pains fills me with wonder;  
 for, if I have some understanding, those sufferings  
 which came upon him from cruel Chryse  
 are from divine ordinance,  
 and also the troubles he undergoes now in his isolation from friends  
 are certainly due to the care of some of the gods,  
 so that he should not throw against Troy the irresistible divine arrows  
 till the time comes in which Troy, as the rumor goes,  
 is fated to fall by his arrows."

Hidden beneath the expression λέγεται lies the oracle of Helenus, an oracle that mysteriously emerges little by little, first through the false merchant's story and then through Neoptolemus' last and useless plea to Philoctetes. Because this oracle declares the necessity for Philoctetes willingly to assail Troy with his weapons,<sup>32</sup> after having been healed from his plague, Neoptolemus can advance some deductions and inscribe Philoctetes' misadventures into a large plan and design of the gods'. However, this oracle never gains enough prominence and authority to convince Philoctetes, who at first pays no attention to it and later discards it on moral grounds. Yet it is this oracle that tangibly embodies θεῶν του μελέτη.

We recognize here one typical mode in which divine oracles and divine care operate in Sophocles' drama: they hover over the action of the characters, sometimes ignored by them, sometimes honored by them, and always ready to come down to earth. They manifest the care of the gods for men. In *Oedipus Tyrannus* Teiresias tells the king that Apollo "takes care" to accomplish the oracle that pertains to Oedipus:

<sup>32</sup>Schnebele, *Die epische Quellen* 137ff., correctly emphasizes the condition that this oracle utters, namely that Philoctetes be persuaded and willingly agree to go back to fight against Troy. This condition seems to be a Sophoclean innovation and distinguishes Sophocles from both his epic sources and the tragedians Aeschylus and Euripides (137ff.). In Dio's summaries of the three plays, only the Sophoclean Philoctetes is said to sail willingly to Troy (52.17), while in his general summary of the story Dio emphasizes the hero's unwillingness (52.2), though some editors have needlessly changed the manuscripts' ἀκὼν to ἐκὼν. On the way that the oracle emerges in the play, first through Neoptolemus' cryptic allusion (194ff.), then through his explicit narrative (1314ff.), see Knox's illuminating discussion in *Heroic Temper* (187–90). Kirkwood, *Sophoclean Drama* 81, explains Neoptolemus' relative ignorance at 194ff. with the suggestion that "Sophocles wanted to stress the influence of Odysseus over him."

Οὐ γάρ με μοῖρα πρὸς γε σοῦ πεσεῖν, ἐπεὶ  
ἱκανὸς Ἀπόλλων ὃ τάδ' ἐκπράξει μέλει.<sup>33</sup> (OT 376–77)

"It is not my destiny to fall under your blow:  
Apollo is enough as he cares for accomplishing these things."

The oracle is a care of Apollo; it is in the care of Apollo, and it will be recognized by those who now deny it as being accomplished and therefore truthful (1329–30). The mysterious purposes of some of these oracles, their slow, contrived ways of manifesting themselves,<sup>34</sup> reveal the perverse and theatrical side of this divine μελέτη. In Philoctetes' case the oracle is fully positive and favorable, but the way it is brought to his knowledge and its timing render its message unacceptable to him.

The ironic complexity of this situation is that Philoctetes fully realizes that the gods care for justice. He says so in a debate with Odysseus:

Κακῶς δλοισθ'· ὀλεῖσθε δ' ἡδίκηκότες  
τὸν ἄνδρα τόνδε, θεοῖσιν εἰ δίκης μέλει.  
Ἔξοιδα δ' ὥς μέλει γ'· ἐπεὶ οὔποτε ἄν στόλον  
ἐμλεύσατ' ἄν τόνδ' οὔνεκ' ἀνδρὸς ἀθλίου,  
εἰ μὴ τι κέντρον θεῖον ἦγ' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ. (Phil. 1035–39)

"A curse on you! A curse on you, who have persecuted me,  
if the gods care for justice! Oh, yes they care for it, I know it for sure.  
For you would never have sailed here for the sake of this miserable man,  
of me, if some divine stimulus had not led you."

Philoctetes is right: the *kentron*, the *meletē* of the gods, is pushing the Greeks to fetch him because they have learned that only he can capture

<sup>33</sup>The text is variously corrected and interpreted by the critics: see the commentary by Bollack. Here the god's *meletē* concerns specifically the realization of his oracle.

<sup>34</sup>Helenus' prophecy is revealed the first time to Philoctetes by the false merchant, in a dubious and contrived atmosphere, just as if it were one of Odysseus' *sophismata* (this word is used at line 14). Apollo's oracle in OT hits Oedipus unexpectedly when he had asked a totally different question, and is finally shown to be true by the account of an old slave who speaks under threat of torture. It is ignored most of the time, and its recognition is helped by such devices and *coups de théâtre* as the plague, a second oracle, a drunkard's revelation, etc. In Sophocles' drama, the oracle is divine, but it finally imposes its authority through tricks, and *coups de théâtre* that form a good section of the exciting theatrical plot. Such is also the case with the oracles in *Electra* and *Oedipus at Colonus*, and Nessus' false advice in *Trachiniae*.

Troy. But in his legitimate hatred for the Greeks, Philoctetes too misreads the care the gods take for justice: he cannot believe that any justice may ever reside in the actions of the Atreidae and Odysseus. Yet however perverse this *meletē* may look to him and to the audience, it is finally embodied and enforced by Heracles as he appears at the end of the dramatic action to tell Philoctetes the will of Zeus.<sup>35</sup> Just as the oracle was meandering, slow, and weak, so the words of Heracles are, on the contrary, direct, immediate, and authoritative. They follow some rare Iiadic models in which the epiphanic god spells down his will in all visibility, with total clarity.

The god appears probably at some height, either on the *theologeion* or on another *mēchanē*,<sup>36</sup> and immediately makes himself known to Philoctetes both because of his voice and because of his aspect:

Μήπω γε, πρὶν ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων  
 ἀλγὸς μύθων, παῖ Ποίαντος·  
 φάσκειν δ' αὐδὴν τὴν Ἡρακλέους  
 ἀκοῇ τε κλύειν λεύσσειν τ' ὄψιν.  
 Τὴν σὴν δ' ἤκω χάριν οὐρανίας  
 ἔδρας προλιπὼν  
 τὰ Διὸς τε φράσων βουλευμάτα σοι  
 κατερητύσων θ' ὁδὸν ἣν στέλλῃ·  
 σὺ δ' ἐμῶν μύθων ἐτάκουσον.

(*Phil.* 1409–17)

“Do not yet move until you have heard  
 my words, son of Poias.  
 Be sure, you hear the voice of Heracles  
 and you see his aspect.  
 I am here, for your sake, after leaving  
 my celestial seat,

<sup>35</sup>Schnebele (*Die epische Quellen* 142ff.) forcefully connects the utterance of the oracle with the actions of Odysseus, Neoptolemus, and finally Heracles, and shows how Odysseus misreads it by neglecting its condition—the willingness of Philoctetes—and how Heracles implements it with his appearance.

<sup>36</sup>Heracles appears at the end of the play as a *deus ex machina*. This is the only example in Sophocles' extant plays; among the lost ones a *deus ex machina* has been assumed for *Tereus* (fr. 589 Radt). Whether a final epiphany featured in Aeschylus' and Euripides' *Philoctetes* plays is open to dispute: Calder, “Aeschylus' *Philoctetes*” 177 and “A Reconstruction of Euripides' *Philoctetes*” 61, has argued in favor of a divine appearance in both, but others have recently denied this assumption; see Luzzatto, “Il *Filottete* di Euripide” 21, and Schnebele, *Die epische Quellen* 137ff.

to tell you the will of Zeus,  
and to detain you from the way you are moving on.  
Listen to my words."

Heracles appears in his glorious new status of immortality and invites Philoctetes (and of course the audience too) to recognize the evidence of his divine being: "as you can see" (1420). This means that he appears in such a way that he can be recognized as being a god. As Webster interprets this statement, Heracles appears to be young and beautiful, very different from the Heracles fatigued by the labors and by his final agony. It is difficult to assess how the stage production could make such fine features recognizable; more probably the garb of Heracles and his station at a height, in the conventional place of the *deus ex machina*, might have contributed to the visibility of his new status. At any rate it is clear that Heracles must appear visibly as a god and recognizably as Heracles.

The derivation of the main features of this scene from epic poetry is obvious as soon as we analyze the epic diction of Heracles' anapaestic part and compare the patterns of a parallel epic scene. For instance, form and content of Heracles' epiphany follow those of Athena's epiphany in the first book of the *Iliad* (188ff.), where the goddess prevents Achilles from killing Agamemnon. Notice in both texts the mention of the divine descent from Heaven, the name of the sender, and the will of the god, combined in one sentence:

ἦλθον ἐγὼ παύσουσα τὸ σὸν μένος, αἶ κε πίθῃαι,  
οὐρανόθεν· πρὸ δέ μ' ἦκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη  
ἄμφω ὁμῶς θυμῷ φιλέουσά τε κηδομένη τε· (Il. 1.207-9)

Τὴν σὴν δ' ἦκω χάριν οὐρανίας  
ἔδρας προλιπὼν  
τὰ Διὸς τε φράσων βουλευμάτα σοι  
κατερητύσων θ' ὁδὸν ἦν στέλλῃ· (Phil. 1413-16)

Of course Heracles has to preface his words with the assertion of his new nature and being, since Philoctetes has known him as a mortal. The epic patterning is obvious in Sophocles' text, and we must recognize only by its absence any comforting mention of the divine care and love which in Homer flows from the gods to their chosen heroes. In Sophocles' drama the epiphanic being was a man who had had his large share of troubles and sufferings, just as Philoctetes has, and who paral-

lels his own lot to the future destiny of his friend. The community of suffering that here unites the speaker and his addressee emerges in the place of the care and love of the gods and raises the pathos of the message to a higher level than Athena's. Furthermore, Heracles' message, coming from Zeus, reveals the Father's concern for Philoctetes' life and destiny.<sup>37</sup>

Heracles descends as a friend of Philoctetes to bring Zeus' message; but this friendship is not a sufficient ground to deserve in principle gods' attention and care. Here too, as in *Ajax*, gods respect the good men, those who are pious, the *eusebeis*:

Τοῦτο δ' ἐννοεῖθ', ὅταν  
πορθῇτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς·  
ὥς τὰλλα πάντα δεύτερ' ἡγεῖται πατὴρ  
Ζεὺς· οὐ γὰρ ἡϋσέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς,  
κἄν ζῶσι κἄν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυνται. (Phil. 1440–45)

"Take care of one thing, when you sack the land:  
respect the divine things, for father Zeus  
considers everything else less important.  
For piety does not die with mortals,  
and among living and dead it does not vanish."

The special and privileged relationship that epic describes between the hero and his god is lost here too. No man per se deserves more divine care than another, and no one gets this care if he is not *eusebēs*.

The formal aspects of similarity between the epic and the epic scene in *Philoctetes* are enhanced by the epic features of the diction.<sup>38</sup> Heracles defines the words he is going to utter as *muthoi*. In the whole play this word *muthos* is used only three times and only to denote the words of Heracles (1410, 1417, 1447). The arguments that Philoctetes and Neoptolemus exchange until the appearance of Heracles are consistently called *logoi* (1393, 1395, etc). *Muthos* is always a special *logos* in Sophocles: it carries sacred connotations, as in prayers and oaths (*El.* 50) and insults (*Aj.* 770); it hints at inflated and men-

<sup>37</sup> Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* 348, splendidly highlights Heracles' phrase τὴν σὴν δ' ἥκω χάριν ("I am here for your sake," 1413): "Philoctetes will go to Troy, but not at the order of the Greek generals, not even as a result of human persuasion. He will obey only the divine voice that comes to him personally for his sake (1413) from Olympus."

<sup>38</sup> On the language of Heracles see the observations by Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* 348, 351–52, and *passim*.



dacious words (*Aj.* 189), proclamations, edicts (*Ant.* 11), edifying stories (*OC* 1581), etc. The verb ἄλω is an epic reminiscence and is used by Sophocles mostly in lyric and anapaestic utterances, twice in trimeter but with a special emphasis.<sup>39</sup> What Philoctetes and Neoptolemus (and of course the audience) are listening to is not the utterance of tragic *logoi*, but a divine, epic mythos. (The Homeric simile at 1436 may derive from *Iliad* 10.297, where Odysseus and Diomedes set out ὥς τε λέοντε δύω.)

We should ask ourselves why is it that the text comes so close to repeating the design of the epic epiphany, while throughout the play the criticism of the epic ethos, characters, and *telos* has been so continuously and bitterly pronounced.<sup>40</sup> The answer should be articulated within the context of the generic deviation that the order of Heracles produces from the tragic action. When Heracles appears, Philoctetes had long since resolved and persuaded Neoptolemus to give up the heroics of the Trojan War and to return home. The epic world has appeared to them utterly corrupt, and because of its violent, deceitful, unscrupulous ethos its life of glory has become for them a disgraceful sham. Their decision to return home means a refusal of that equivocal glory and a renunciation of the perverted values of the epic world, of the world *tout court*. Heracles' injunction to Philoctetes to join the Trojan War forces the tragic action to switch back and to retrieve the life and thought patterns of the epic world and its narrative. Accordingly Heracles leaves aside the questionable issues arising in the play and enjoins Philoctetes to make his life glorious (1422, εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον) by what he has suffered and by his heroic deed.<sup>41</sup> The epic epiphany signals the switch from tragedy to epic, from a bitter view of the business of life to its trusting acceptance, and from the neglected voices of the oracle to the powerful presence and word of the god. Simultaneously, the epiphany signals the unpredictability and arbitrariness of this switch. Some-

<sup>39</sup>*Ajax* 1263: Agamemnon boasts of not hearing/understanding Teucer's barbarian language. *OC* 304: Theseus will hear, listen with care to the story about Oedipus.

<sup>40</sup>The most impressive moments and themes of this criticism are Neoptolemus' resistance to Odysseus' seduction, the dialogue between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes about the exclusive survival of the *kakoi* in war, and Odysseus' expediency and final defeat.

<sup>41</sup>Neoptolemus in his final plea had invited Philoctetes to the same goal (1347), but Philoctetes had deemed that goal impossible in the world of the *kakoi*. For he had said that it was not his anger at the past villainy of the Atreidae that now detained him, but the notion that the mean nature of the actual leaders could only produce new villainy.

thing external and alien to the tragic world creates a wishful, utopian effect of language (stage, representation, etc.) and an ideological twist. It is as though it were not possible within the terms of the tragic *logos* to give a justification or a favorable account of the world in general unless by recourse to the epic mythos.

Alternative ways to read the epiphany would consist in glossing over the alien aspect of the epic switch. In fact, in the history of recent criticism readers have tried to harmonize Heracles' message with Philoctetes' own state of mind, so that the epiphany does not descend on him as an external decision. One common manner of approach has been to assume that the generous and powerful plea of Neoptolemus has not left Philoctetes unaffected and that Heracles' words simply continue and conclude a process that had already begun in the hero's soul. This reading relies on weak textual marks (1350–51, 1466),<sup>42</sup> and especially on the wishful desire and well-meaning disposition of the reader. More frequently, and more interestingly, it has been implied that Philoctetes' self-righteousness leads him astray from the ethical codes of both tragedy and epic. His relentless hatred, even after his own recognition that the gods desire him to be cured and to take up arms against Troy (1035–39), and his implacable stubbornness, even in face of the explicit oracle (1348ff.), would make of him an impious man, and Heracles' appearance would constitute a salutary intervention to bend him and to make him *eusebēs*, respectful of the gods.

But even that interpretation would not produce a real coherence between Heracles' appearance and the tragic tenets of the play. For in this line of interpretation the tragic issue would entirely focus on the problematic aspects of *eusebeia*, that is, of the religious respect and piety that the gods demand from men. For if *eusebeia*, as Heracles argues, is the single virtue honored by the gods, Odysseus acts all through the play as the champion of this virtue, and Philoctetes as the villain. This characterization of Odysseus as champion of *eusebeia* is unsavory and unconvincing, because Odysseus asserts his pious compliance with the gods' desires by means that are repulsive to men of noble and pious standing, such as the young Neoptolemus.<sup>43</sup> If, then, Odysseus is *not* a champion of *eusebeia*, and Philoctetes is *not* a villain,

<sup>42</sup> Among recent scholars who have upheld this view see Hölsle's eloquent arguments, *Die Vollendung der Tragödie* 141ff.

<sup>43</sup> He would also neglect the letter of the oracle, according to which Philoctetes should be persuaded and not forced to go to Troy.

the play struggles with a conflicting and problematic notion of *eusebeia*. Certainly Heracles' injunction eliminates this tragic notion of *eusebeia* and reduces it to simple and straight ideas: either respect for sacred things and ritual observance, or the absolute subordination of men to the inscrutable plans of the gods, or both. In this last case, Philoctetes' sufferings receive a hard legitimization, but a legitimization nevertheless. The "generic" switch which I am emphasizing would correspond to an ethical and religious switch: the will of the gods is unfailing and not optional, as the oracle gave occasion to believe, and the words of the gods are coming directly from their mouths, clear and unambiguous, contrary (again) to the *logoi* of the oracle.

This switch underscores the different media through which gods communicate to mortals in epic and tragedy. In epos, gods manifest themselves and declare their will. In Sophocles' tragedy, the divine *meletē* manifests itself in labyrinthine oracles, often forgotten and reactivated by theatrical events, with no distinguished attributes, no authoritative evidence of truth: they seem to be ruled by the vagaries of *tukhē* or of *sumphorē*, appearing and disappearing on the crest of accidental events.<sup>44</sup> Such is the case in *Philoctetes*. Odysseus' knowledge of the necessity of Philoctetes' bow if the Greeks are to conquer Troy (113ff.) comes from Helenus' oracle; and yet, he seems to have misread it, since he behaves (1054ff.) as if he had not understood that Philoctetes must come to Troy through persuasion (612–13).<sup>45</sup> Also, Neoptolemus' confidence that Philoctetes' misery is due to the divine *meletē* is inscribed in a vague "people say" (195ff.) which seems to comprise Helenus' oracle. When at the end the oracle is reported by Neoptolemus with due emphasis and respect, it is simply a *logos* that Philoctetes should inscribe in his mind—as though, among all the false *logoi* and half-baked truths which have been concocted for him, another *logos* would really make any difference.

The labyrinthine nature of the Sophoclean oracles also becomes evident in another term and notion that I have not yet addressed: *tukhē*, "chance" or "fortune." Divine care (*meletē*) is sometimes represented as divine fortune or chance (*theia tukhē*), a notion that imbues the providential care of the gods with some ambivalent and disquieting tones. In

<sup>44</sup> See my *Oedipus* 30–41, 52, 140; and Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* 242, where he equates Sophocles' oracles with riddles (*aenigmata*).

<sup>45</sup> On this point see Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* 267ff., who notices that misreading of oracles is a Sophoclean trait, and Hölsle, *Die Vollendung der Tragödie* 137.

his most pathetic plea to his friend, Neoptolemus attributes Philoctetes' suffering to *theia tukhē*:

Σὺ γὰρ νοσεῖς τόδ' ἄλγος ἐκ θείας τύχης  
 Χρύσης πελασθεῖς φύλακος, ὃς τὸν ἀκαλυφῇ  
 σηκὸν φυλάσσει κρύφιος οἰκουρῶν ὄφεις. (Phil. 1326–28)

"You suffer this pain from divine fortune,  
 since you approached the guardian of Chryse, the hidden snake  
 that guards and protects the roofless sanctuary."

We find here a specifically tragic term that defines gods' will in an enigmatic way, for at the time when Sophocles wrote *Philoctetes* the expression *theia tukhē* sounded either ancient or somehow uncommitted, as in this period *tukhē* began to assume a secular connotation of "event," "accident," "chance," "destiny," and the like.<sup>46</sup> Here the expression refers to the bite of the sacred snake, guardian of the sanctuary.

This *tukhē* is divine, and it hides the reason and the logic of the events. In Neoptolemus' previous lines, Ἀνθρώποισι τὰς μὲν ἐκ θεῶν / τύχας δοθείσας ἔστι ἀναγκαῖον φέρειν (1316–17), "It is necessary for men to withstand the ill fortunes given by the gods," the *tukhai* are the sufferings of Philoctetes and are denoted as events produced by the gods and therefore inevitable.<sup>47</sup> In his previous statement (196), Neoptolemus had termed this *tukhē* from the gods, the *meletē* of the gods, their care and concern: we measure here the contiguity and the difference between the two terms. After all the excruciating experience of assisting and persuading Philoctetes, Neoptolemus is no longer sure that his friend's sufferings are really caused by a divine care, and prefers a less committed expression. His thought now rings close to He-

<sup>46</sup>Though accidents may often be said to be a godsent *tukhē* (cf., e.g., Eur. *El.* 890), this denotation of ill fortune (sometimes good fortune as in Soph. *OC* 1505–6) implies a certain inexplicability of the event and the impossibility of avoiding it (see Soph. fr. 201f Radt, Eur. *HF* 309–10). For the suggestion that *tukhē* may be autonomous from the gods cf. Eur. *Cyclops* 606, and for examples of *tukhē* with secular and even skeptic connotations see Soph. *OT* 977 and my *Oedipus* 96. Aeschylus would give this divine chance another name, *kaka* (*Suppl.* 211) or *pēmonai*, "sufferings" (*Pers.* 293–94). Euripides too uses the *tukhē* terminology: see Busch, *Untersuchungen*.

<sup>47</sup>Heracles had to die before he could learn that the *tukhai* he endured and the *ponoi* that he labored through granted him at the end the immortality that now he shows to Philoctetes. In an analogous way, Heracles suggests to Philoctetes that his miseries will gain him a glorious life (1418–22).

rodotus', when he spoke of the incomprehensible interventions of the gods.<sup>48</sup>

With the appearance of divine *tukhē*, the metaphysical horizon under which the Sophoclean hero usually suffers is completed. He acts, errs, and suffers in the space of tension that emerges between divine *meletē* (which can also be called divine *tukhē*) and human *tukhē*, between the will of a divine guardian snake and the will of the human commanders, between the divine oracle and its messy human interpretation. There would be no resolution to this utter tension and confusion unless the clear voice of the god would appear in the striking epiphanic scene.

However retouched by the tragic context, Heracles' mythos carries heavy epic connotations and therefore constitutes a harsh switch from the language and the action that precedes it. The measure and the ideological nature of this switch have been variously assessed by critics. It has been often suggested that Heracles' message, by forcing Philoctetes to join the world of corrupted values, proves the villainy of the world and the distance of this world from the hero.<sup>49</sup> Alternatively the message of Heracles would reestablish order and would give mean-

<sup>48</sup>Cf. Darbo-Peschanski, *Le discours du particulier* 61: "Il leur [aux dieux] arrive d'intervenir dans le monde humain sans avoir été provoqués à le faire, de manière absolument autoritaire et injustifiée." Of course we would expect a different emphasis in Neoptolemus' words: namely that when he tries to persuade Philoctetes of the oracles' message, he would use the strongest words in the Greek language to speak of the care, of the love of the gods for men. But he cannot: these words would probably sound like a sinister mockery in reference to the suffering and the mistreatment that Philoctetes has received.

<sup>49</sup>The play would thus show the immoral and corrupt status of the world, and accordingly the paradox of the divine injunction that forces Philoctetes both to neglect it and to participate in its deeds, remembering to *eusebein* the gods. This is, in the main, Reinhardt's view of the play. He reduces the force of the paradox by assuming that Philoctetes is limited by his private vision and blind to the total view of the world that the gods possess. Philoctetes' tragedy is the absurd separation of man from the course of the world, of the part from the totality. An astute and subtle argument against Reinhardt's interpretation is that of Schmidt, *Sophocles Philoktet* 246–47, who shows that divine will is finally not enacted through *kakoi*; on the contrary, the gods forbid this to happen. The success and impact of the villains (*kakoi*) are broken with Odysseus' defeat, and their help is revealed as a false appearance. Furthermore, even before Heracles' epiphany Philoctetes has already gained the friendship of Neoptolemus: all alone he has emptied Odysseus' plan and succeeded in drawing the young man to his side. Accordingly, as Schmidt argues against Reinhardt, the world is not as Philoctetes sees it. This is powerful reasoning and reading. Yet the friendship of Neoptolemus and Philoctetes is not sufficient to limit and control the *kaka* that Philoctetes imagines the Atreidae will continue to accomplish.

ing to the trials of the hero. This is the normal experience of the Sophoclean hero.<sup>50</sup> I tend closer to the former view, but from a different angle.

In this essay I have elaborated some arguments that may be summarized in two points. (1) The epiphany in *Philoctetes* is a last-minute resort by the gods to salvage a plan that misfired. In this connection the *mēkhanē* of Heracles' epiphany is just like an Odyssean *sophisma*. (2) Heracles' injunction produces an order and a meaning that are not coherent with the tragic premises, since they come from outside, as a language that is external to the world in which the events have occurred. The hero, therefore, does not receive any real explanation and cannot initiate the process of accounting for and absorbing the experience of his past suffering and blindness.

These points need further explanation. (1) The divine origin of Philoctetes' wound remains mysterious,<sup>51</sup> and the oracle wanders around carried by various mouths; while it grows larger in its last account, it remains unheard.<sup>52</sup> The *mēkhanē* of Heracles' appearance makes the will of Zeus unescapable, but has the quality of a trivial contrivance and, metatheatrically, of a *coup de théâtre*.<sup>53</sup> The gods must realize the inefficiency of their oracle and must find some new way to communicate their *meletē*. The epiphanic device shows the complexity of Sophocles' art, for it leaves the audience with a double impression: the appearance of the god produces an awesome, numinous presence on the stage and simultaneously enacts a cheap theatrical trick, which Euripides had used many times to close his plays.

<sup>50</sup>Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* 352, defines this experience perfectly: "As we have seen elsewhere, it is the task of the Sophoclean hero to recognize that his life has shape and place in some larger order that he must fulfill. In the perception and free acceptance of his role in that pattern lies one of the essential qualities of Sophoclean heroism."

<sup>51</sup>Sophocles does not give any motivation for the wound; other sources imply that the biting was due to Hera's rage against Philoctetes for having lighted Heracles' pyre; see Dumézil, *Le crime des Lemniennes* 39–40. Modern interpreters tend to consider Philoctetes' wound as symbolic of his monstrous isolation, and since the bow would represent his greatness, bow and wound together would intimate the suffering and loneliness of the great hero; see, e.g., Hölsle, *Die Vollendung der Tragödie* 129–30.

<sup>52</sup>It comes from a seer who is an enemy of the Greeks and whose motivation is never clear. See, by contrast, the friendly oracle by Calchas, after the *teras* of the snake, in *Il.* 2.284–332.

<sup>53</sup>This contriving quality explains why some critics have felt justified in assuming that there is no epiphany of Heracles, but only an intervention of Odysseus disguised as Heracles.

The inefficient complicity between human and divine *tukhē*, between human contrivance and divine *meletē*, seems to me the real scandal of the world as staged by Sophocles in *Philoctetes*. The play is the staging of human *and* divine confusion. The divine order is, simultaneously and without difference, human disorder. Accordingly, Sophocles' writing spins together in the same language a message which, as an oracle, is both a divine *muthos* and simultaneously a human, drifting *logos*. They are indistinguishable until the oracle is proved to be truthful and inevitable by the god himself speaking out.

(2) The novelty of *Philoctetes* is that the oracle does not prove its truth and inevitability by itself, within the coordinates of the tragic action, as in the other Sophoclean dramas. No, here it must be salvaged from the confusion, inefficiency, and contrivance of human language and motivations by a divine intervention whose generic style and nature contradict the tragic action. The "generic" switch produces an external gesture toward a metaphysical order that should provide meaning to the whole action. "External" is intended here in the same sense in which it could be said that "tragic irony" is external; that is, it is identifiable as an effect of language external to the subjectivity of the characters. They cannot read it, and when finally they find themselves where the tragic irony of their language always suggested to the audience that they already were, even then they fail to recognize that their language always knew it. Analogously, though on a different level, Heracles' order is produced by a representation that is alien to the "logic" of the oracular medium, a logic that avoids just the personal manifestation of the god. Philoctetes accepts Heracles' appearance and Zeus' order as something that comes from elsewhere than his language, experience, and persuasions. For him the epiphany is the desired return of the friendly voice, of a friend, however, to whom he can no longer say anything and ask anything: in three short lines he simply acquiesces in the order.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup>The "tragic hero" in Sophocles is the character that finally recognizes his blindness to the divine *meletē* and to its language and considers himself the test and the monument of this divine (dis)order. Oedipus recalls his trials and recognizes the uniqueness of his standing up to them (*OT* 1414–15). Ajax too considers himself in light of his blindness to divine will, but he cannot sustain that defeat and kills himself. Philoctetes has no time and way to measure Heracles' message within the tragic consciousness that he has already gained when he is reflecting that he is the only man able to stand the horror of his life (536–38). Of course, as soon as the hero accepts the privilege of being the "sign" of the divine *meletē* he begins to see himself as unique and heroic and accordingly risks overstepping human limits and dangerously approaches hubris (1440ff.).

For the audience, the outwardness of such a language sounds literally as another "genre," another *muthos*, a different *eusebeia* than those presented during the tragic action. The audience, therefore, wondering at the outgrowth of this alien language, may realize its expediency and its purpose in channeling the action into its traditional order and course. They may fix their attention on the epic use and abuse of the machinery and consider the various facets of this literary artifact. Simultaneously, the extraordinary peremptoriness of Heracles' appearance communicates a sense of divine urgency. The audience may also feel, in the wake of the epic epiphanies, the power of the numinous. This foreign character of the epiphany may suggest that in Sophocles' writing this explicit metaphysical language does not penetrate the world, does not compound with its language—as the language of the oracle does—but remains an alien language. It resounds from an "elsewhere" that could be a "nowhere," a mere poetic space, alien to this one of tragedy. And yet, though alien, this divine, direct language is hopefully there, and may come—as it does in other generic representations of the divine—someday, from somewhere, if it is not too late.

PIETRO PUCCI

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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## JASON AND ORPHEUS: EURIPIDES *MEDEA* 543

εἴη δ' ἔμοιγε μήτε χρυσοῦς ἐν δόμοις  
μήτ' Ὀρφέως κάλλιον ὑμνῆσαι μέλος,  
εἰ μὴ ἴσισημος ἢ τύχη γένοιτό μοι.  
—*Medea* 542–44

“As far as I’m concerned, I wouldn’t want gold in my house or the ability to sing a lovelier song than Orpheus, if I’m not openly seen to be a success.”<sup>1</sup> With these sentiments the self-righteous Jason concludes the first part of his defence against Medea’s charges (465–519), after pointing out that the service she had rendered was ultimately of greater benefit to herself than to him: her intervention on his behalf had been the occasion of bringing her and her gifts from distant obscurity to the recognition of Greek society (539–41). To Jason, neither riches nor pre-eminence in song is to be preferred above public esteem (542–44).

But the force of 543 has been misunderstood. Page quotes Elmsley’s remarks on 542–44 and inserts his own gloss: “‘Ex suo potius quam ex Iasonis persona locutus est poeta’.” It is Eur., not Jason, who would define happiness in terms of the gift of song: ‘Jason haud dubie ποδῶν ἀρετὴν vel παλαιαιοσύνην maluisset.’”<sup>2</sup> Elliott shares the view that 543 suits Euripides better than Jason.<sup>3</sup> Linforth, however, supposes that the mention of Medea’s powers started an association with Orpheus’ ability to enchant inanimate nature, as well as people and animals, so that “the song of Orpheus” suggests the magical quality of Orpheus’ music.<sup>4</sup> But this interpretation allows too much prominence too early in the play to the idea of Medea’s supernatural powers.

Euripides surely uses the allusion to Orpheus to guide his audience towards a particular response to the dramatic text. Within this “passage of supreme irony” in Jason’s speech,<sup>5</sup> the line functions on two levels. At a superficial level, “the ability to sing more beautifully than Orpheus” may be understood as representing any accomplishment which confers renown on its possessor. It seems that Jason regards

<sup>1</sup>The Greek text is cited from Diggle, *OCT* 1. Translations are my own.

<sup>2</sup>Page, *Medea*, note on 542–44.

<sup>3</sup>Elliott, *Medea*, note on 543.

<sup>4</sup>Linforth, *Arts of Orpheus* 34.

<sup>5</sup>Musurillo, “Euripides’ *Medea*” 57.

musical talent and wealth, both of which increase personal prestige, as desirable attributes of the good life.<sup>6</sup> But on a deeper level, mention of Orpheus and his singing voice would prompt a recollection of that famous event in Orpheus' mythical life in which his musical powers were most convincingly demonstrated, his descent to the Underworld to win back his wife from the dead.<sup>7</sup> The one significant condition shared by Jason and Orpheus is that both are husbands.<sup>8</sup> This common denominator invites the audience to compare and contrast the conduct of Jason and Orpheus towards their respective wives: Jason, who has broken his promises (cf. 17, 20–23, 161–63, 206–9, 488–89, 492–95) and abandoned Medea for a more advantageous union, is compared unfavourably with Orpheus, whose love for his spouse was so great that he was prepared to brave the terrors of Hades in order to recover her. The naming in 543 of Orpheus, the devoted husband, by the faithless Jason provides an example of the use of irony which is characteristic of Euripides' dramatic technique.

Stinton has raised the question of how far the tragic poets expected the audience to pick up allusions and independently to fill in what was not actually stated.<sup>9</sup> He contends that for an allusion to be dramatically important it must be readily understandable. So we need to consider what evidence there is to support the hypothesis that when the first audience heard the actor playing Jason deliver line 543, some at least of its members would have made the connection outlined above.

The reference to Orpheus' descent in search of his wife which Euripides made in his *Alcestis*, produced seven years before *Medea*, clearly shows that the story of how Orpheus used his musical talent in his quest to bring her back from Hades was well known to the audience of *Medea*.<sup>10</sup> Like *Medea*, *Alcestis* examines the subjection of the conjugal relationship to testing pressures and, as he was to do in *Medea*, Euripides incorporates a reference to Orpheus to establish a standard by which ideal husbandly affection may be measured. Admetus attempts to prove his love for his dying wife by declaring that if he had

<sup>6</sup>See Plut. *Cimon* 9 (= FGrH 392 F13).

<sup>7</sup>For discussion of the name of Orpheus' wife—Agriope or Eurydice—see most recently Bremmer, "Orpheus."

<sup>8</sup>The fact that both took part in the Argonautic expedition, noted by Page and Elliott, is not, as Page observes, a significant connection.

<sup>9</sup>Stinton, "Scope and Limits."

<sup>10</sup>For recent discussion on whether or not this version ended happily see Graf, "Orpheus" 81–82.

been endowed with Orpheus' gifts he would have used them to restore her to life:

εἰ δ' Ὀρφέως μοι γλῶσσα καὶ μέλος παρῆν,  
 ὥστ' ἡ κόρην Δήμητρος ἢ κείνης πόσιν  
 ὕμνοισι κηλήσαντά σ' ἔξ Ἄιδου λαβεῖν,  
 κατήλθον ἄν, καὶ μ' οὐθ' ὁ Πλούτωνος κύων  
 οὐθ' οὐπὶ κώπῃ ψυχοπομπὸς ἄν Χάρων  
 ἔσχ' ἄν, πρὶν ἐς φῶς σὸν καταστήσαι βίον. (Alc. 357–62)

"If I had had the words and music of Orpheus, so as to charm with songs Demeter's daughter or her [i.e., Persephone's] husband and take you out of Hades, I would have made the descent, and neither would Pluto's hound have stopped me nor Charon on his oar, guide of souls, until I had restored you to the light." The sketchy listing of the names of those encountered at the various stages of Orpheus' journey is a strong indication that the full details were familiar to the audience.

Archaeological evidence belonging to a period only slightly later than *Alcestis* and *Medea* supports the literary grounds for assuming that Orpheus' love for his wife was known to Euripides' audience. His descent to Hades in search of her is attested in art, in copies of a late fifth-century Attic relief of a group of figures identified as Orpheus, Eurydice, and Hermes. The scene is generally interpreted as being from the episode of Orpheus' quest to rescue his wife from the dead.<sup>11</sup>

Kern's valuable collection of Orphic material provides further welcome support. He lists the passage *Alcestis* 357ff. and the line *Medea* 543 together, under the heading CONTUGES: ANONYMA.<sup>12</sup> Although there is no substantiating discussion, Kern evidently understood *Medea* 543 as an allusion to the same aspect of Orpheus' myth suggested in *Alcestis* 357–62, the use of the singer's musical powers to rescue his wife from death.

If my interpretation of Euripides' intentions is correct, the audience would have understood the mention of Orpheus' singing firstly as an example occurring to Jason of a prestigious accomplishment but also, more profoundly, as an allusion to Orpheus' conjugal devotion. The allusion is ironic as Jason is unaware of the alternative significance

<sup>11</sup> Discussion in Harrison, "Hesperides" 76–77, plate 12d; Graf, "Orpheus" 82, 102 n. 5; *LIMC* IV.1 (1988) s.v. Eurydice 5.

<sup>12</sup> Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta* 17–18, Testimonia 59.

of his words. The validity of Jason's case in this passage (522–44) is therefore further undercut by the reference to Orpheus and his singing.<sup>13</sup>

M. R. MEZZABOTTA

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

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<sup>13</sup>I am indebted to J. E. Atkinson and J. N. Bremmer for helpful advice.

## CONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THUCYDIDES

In his commentary on Thucydides, Gomme expresses an opinion evidently shared by many scholars: "The only form of international law in Greece (as opposed to custom . . . οἱ Ἑλλήνων νόμοι . . .) was that contained in the treaties between states."<sup>1</sup> On its face this statement could mean either of two quite different propositions: (1) the Greeks recognized only the positive provisions of unambiguous treaty terms as the totality of their "international law"; or (2) even if the Greeks may have claimed to recognize customary norms of behavior as legally binding, only the positive provisions of unambiguous treaty terms are truly worthy of being considered "law" in some undefined sense. Although the context of Gomme's remark suggests that something closer to the first of these propositions is meant, certainly the second too is commonly asserted.<sup>2</sup> Since the law of any community both expresses and shapes the institutionalized values of the members of that community, it is really nothing more than a tautology to assert that how we understand Greek international law is crucial to our interpretation of Greek international relations. The essentially circular viewpoint of Gomme's formulation (in either of its meanings) tends to foreclose investigation of the normative dynamics underlying the Greek international order by assuming in effect that none of any significance existed—none, that is,

<sup>1</sup> *Thucydides*, Book 1, 172 ad 1.37.3. Martin Ostwald draws a similar distinction in a different context (*Sovereignty* 119). Bauslaugh's recent book on neutrality in classical Greece is a notable exception to this pattern, but even he seems to equivocate: "Many commentators have dismissed the study of ancient neutrality because of the lack of any well-developed international legal system in classical Greece; and indeed, the absence of a body of statutes ratified by the international community of states is undeniable. . . . It therefore seems fair to conclude—though perhaps it is hard to accept—that the presence or absence of legal definition in the corpus of international law is simply not the most critical requirement for the successful existence of neutrality, ancient or modern" (*Neutrality* 245). Yet "neutrality"—to whatever extent it invoked the immunities and obligations which Bauslaugh imputes to it—already *is* a concept "of legal definition."

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Ostwald (*Autonomia* 3): "The fact that τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ and οἱ Ἑλλήνων νόμοι have no place in any of the treaties between states that have come down to us indicates that their sanction was not a solid enough basis for a compact and lent itself more readily to pious platitudes used by one state in arguing with another." See also the discussion referenced at notes 14 and 23 below.

except whatever can be attributed to self-interest and competitive advantage. My aims in this essay are to expose what I will argue to be the false premises behind this agnosticism, and to sketch the outlines of a model of international law which is both theoretically sounder and empirically better suited to accounting for the phenomena which Thucydides describes.

First some definitions and assumptions. I use the term "international law" as it is generally understood in modern jurisprudence—to mean the rules, doctrines, and policy goals which exert a regulatory effect on international relations. More precisely called "public international law," this body of law is primarily concerned with the behavior of governments as such, rather than with the legal relations between citizens of different nationality in their capacities as individuals.<sup>3</sup> International law raises all of the same conceptual problems as "municipal" (i.e., national) law: the issue of how law differs from morality, for example, and of how it differs from politics. But in addition to these other definitional problems, international law brings into higher relief the especially difficult issues associated with the relationship of law to adjudication and sanctions. It will be necessary to address some of these conceptual problems in the course of my discussion.

Since I will be using evidence primarily drawn from the diplomatic argument in Thucydides, a word about the historicity of the speeches is in order. For the purposes of my analysis it does not matter whether some of the speeches are inaccurate summaries of what was actually said, or even if others are the historian's wholly fictitious creations. We have no reason to doubt Thucydides' candor when he claims (1.22.1) that the arguments of the speeches are either what was said or what was appropriate to the occasion. I take it for granted, therefore, that whatever may be their historicity in absolute terms, the speeches do embody authentic principles and concepts of contemporary international relations. Since this study focuses on the conceptual framework of the international order, rather than on the content and circumstances of specific debates per se, nothing more is required in the way of evidence.

A final point which I take for granted is the international character of the Hellenic community at the time of Thucydides. The city-states of classical Greece exhibited essentially the same characteristics which

<sup>3</sup> Although traditional and convenient, the distinction between public and private law is ultimately specious, since it is the public legal order which legitimates private rights and obligations. See, e.g., Jones, *Historical Introduction* ch. 5.



together constitute the legal criteria of statehood in the modern world. Each independent *polis* had its own territory, its own citizenry and government, and its own defense capacity; each, in theory at least, pursued its own foreign policy, and claimed to enjoy an ostensibly equal standing to other states in the Hellenic community.<sup>4</sup> That community, in turn, was constituted not just by a common culture, but by an intricate web of legal relationships. These ranged in complexity from unilateral and/or reciprocal extensions of citizenship rights, such as those underlying the proxeny system, to bilateral and multilateral treaty relations of diverse kinds and subject matters, to supranational polities structured according to various constitutional schemes of governance.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the community of states described by Thucydides was both tied together and pulled apart by other political dynamics which exhibit at least a quasi-legal character. Examples would be the relationship between a *mētropolis* and its colonies, or the claims upon a state's allegiance which subsisted in feelings of ethnic solidarity (e.g., Dorians versus Ionians)—themselves often reinforced by religious tradition and even shared political ideology (e.g., democratic governments as opposed to oligarchic ones). As will be discussed below, this conglomeration of different and overlapping constituencies of international order is

<sup>4</sup>For the generally recognized criteria of statehood and sovereignty in modern jurisprudence see Brownlie, *Principles* 72–79. It is of course true that Greek international law was relatively (although not entirely) unconcerned with non-Hellenic peoples, the *barbaroi*; but this may be taken as a fact of its self-defined jurisdiction, not as evidence against its international character. “Die Existenz eines ‘interpolitischen’ Völkerrechts in der griechischen Welt könnte . . . nur dann bestritten werden, wenn man die Qualifikation als Völkerrecht auch dem intereuropäischen Staatenrecht des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit vorenthalten wollte” (Preisner, “Völkerrechtsgeschichte” 741). See also Ago, “International Communities.” In assessing the significance of the Hellenocentrism of Greek international law it is well to remember that a species of tribalism underlies the jurisprudence of modern international law too, since the latter expressly recognizes “civilization” as a criterion for defining the source and jurisdiction of that law. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, UN Acts and Documents no. 4, 59 Stat. 1055 (= Brownlie, *Basic Documents* 267–82), Art. 38.1(c): “The Court . . . shall apply . . . the general principles of law recognized by *civilized nations*” (emphasis added).

<sup>5</sup>E.g., formal political confederations (*sympoliteiai*) like the Boeotian and Achaean Leagues; mutual defense organizations of indefinite duration (the multilateral *symmakhiiai*) like the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues; and regional joint governance associations (*amphiktyoneiai*), which possessed a more localized jurisdiction in international peace keeping. See Martin, *La vie internationale*. Treaties are collected in Bengtson, *Verträge*. On the institutional structure of systems to assure legal protections for nationals abroad see Gauthier, *Symbola*; Gewantka, *Isopolitie*.

structurally similar to the composite and multifaceted character of the modern international community, and therefore will warrant comparison with it.

### THE REALITY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Let us return now to Gomme's formulation, and begin by examining the question of whether written treaties constituted the only source of Greek international law. A moment's reflection will reveal that the question mistakes the contract for the law which gives the contract its force. Presumably no state—in antiquity or now—would enter into voluntary treaty relations unless it held at least some expectation that the other side intended to honor its commitments under the treaty. That expectation does not arise from the treaty itself, but from the parties' mutual acceptance of a customary legal order which imposes the reciprocal obligation. This fundamental normative principle of international law—known in modern jurisprudence as the doctrine of *pacta sunt servanda*<sup>6</sup>—is clearly evident in the diplomatic behavior which Thucydides describes.

As an illustration one may refer to the famous distinction which Thucydides draws between the real cause of the war and the ostensible reasons which were asserted by the combatants on each side (1.23.6). While this distinction invites one to discount the publicly asserted reasons as diplomatic posturing, it cannot conceal the fact that the parties to this conflict were concerned with *justifying* their decisions to join it. As Thucydides' subsequent narrative makes clear, these justifications took the form of arguments on each side charging that the other side had acted in violation of a treaty in force.<sup>7</sup> Such arguments would have no diplomatic purpose, nor any exculpatory effect, unless both sides recognized their mutual and reciprocal obligations to abide by the treaty until such time as it was no longer binding upon them. The numerous attested treaties of Greek antiquity are therefore hardly themselves the sum and substance of Greek international law; they are merely its most conspicuous artifacts. More than that, they are the unambiguous proof of a larger juridical order which made such treaties possible at all.

<sup>6</sup>See, e.g., Kelsen, *Principles* 446–47.

<sup>7</sup>E.g., 1.67.1–4, 1.85.2, 1.140.2.

Just as a necessary foundation of treaty relations is some version of the rule of *pacta sunt servanda*, so too the existence of treaties entails a corollary jurisprudence of rules, doctrines, and policy goals which will have defined how to interpret and when to invoke whatever "law" the treaties express. An example of one such doctrine is itself apparent in the diplomatic postures which were assumed by the contending states on the eve of war. It is evidently a customary doctrine that excuses the obligation to perform under a treaty which has been repudiated (whether in fact or constructively) by the other party to that treaty.<sup>8</sup> Like *pacta sunt servanda*, this doctrine too has its counterpart in modern jurisprudence.<sup>9</sup>

The treaty at issue in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was of course the "Thirty Year Truce,"<sup>10</sup> which contained a famous stipulation that any future dispute among the signatories would be settled by judicial process (i.e., arbitration), while the parties held to the status quo.<sup>11</sup> It may be taken as self-evident that this exchange of promises to seek legal, rather than military, redress presupposes a mutual belief in the existence of some system of law capable of adjudicating potential disputes. Moreover, as is well known, this is but one of many references to a well-attested tradition of interstate arbitration in Greek antiquity<sup>12</sup>—an adjudicatory process which will necessarily have been guided by some kind of normative argument, itself presumably relying upon the same unwritten *nomoi* which play so prominent a role in the idiom of Greek diplomacy as reported by Thucydides.

Gomme cannot be right, then, if he means to assert that Greek international law was limited in some formal sense to the provisions of written treaties. Customary norms were also part of the "international

<sup>8</sup>The same doctrine is given explicit form in, and incorporated as a term of, the truce suspending the siege of Sphacteria: εἰρητο ἔαν καὶ ὁτιοῦν παραβῇ, λεῖψοθαι τὰς σπονδὰς (4.23.1).

<sup>9</sup>Now codified in the "Treaty on Treaties" as follows: "A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part." Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, T. S. no. 58, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) (= Brownlie, *Basic Documents* 233–66), Art. 60(1). Cf. Art. 60(2)(b), regarding a parallel right in specially affected parties under multilateral treaties. Of course the doctrine was recognized as customary law long before its modern codification—e.g., Grotius *De Jure* II.xv.15.

<sup>10</sup>Of 446/5 B.C.E. See Gomme, *Thucydides*, Book I, 347ff. ad 1.115.1.

<sup>11</sup>1.78.4, 1.140.2.

<sup>12</sup>Sources are collected in Piccirilli, *Arbitrati*.

law" of the Greeks—something which should cause no surprise on comparative grounds, when one remembers that modern international law too recognizes custom as a source of law.<sup>13</sup> Yet apparently because the *nomoi* of Greek international law remained largely uncoded—in the sense of being reduced to authoritative written expression—scholars are prone to think of them as less substantive than the ostensibly more determinate provisions of written treaties. In the book which he co-authored on Greek diplomacy, for example, D. J. Mosley explains his refusal to discuss "what might be described as 'International Law'" with the following assertion: "[although] there was some developed sense of religious ideals and moral scruples, . . . there was not an accepted body of International Law to which appeal could be made or which defied disobedience or misrepresentation."<sup>14</sup> Leaving aside the questions which are begged by terms like "disobedience" and "misrepresentation"—not to mention the arguably naive presumption that such phenomena constitute valid criteria of "law"—once again, if we are to be guided by Thucydides, the proposition is demonstrably untrue. Let us consider, for example, the famous trial of the Plataeans, which followed the city's capitulation to besieging Spartan and Theban forces in 427.<sup>15</sup>

The Plataeans had agreed to submit to a judgment by Spartan judges/jurors (δικασταί) on the promise that only the "guilty" (οἱ ἄδικοι) would be punished, and none of them without due process (παρὰ δίκην) (3.52.2). Some days after surrendering, the Plataeans had learned that they were to be tried on a single issue: namely, whether they had rendered any service to the Spartans or their allies during the

<sup>13</sup> "The Court . . . shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art.38.1(b) (= Brownlie, *Basic Documents* 276).

<sup>14</sup> Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy* 121.

<sup>15</sup> The rhetorical and literary aspects of the Plataean and Theban speeches have often been admired, but their legal arguments are usually given little credit: e.g., MacLeod, "Plataean Debate" 232–33. Gomme appears to think it likely that most of the content of at least the Plataean speech was mere dramatic invention (*Thucydides*, Books II–III, 346, 354); but even if true, that does not undermine the plausibility of the arguments, or diminish their ostensibly legal character. Ostwald (*Sovereignty* 111–15) takes the speeches as essentially authentic. Consistent with the thesis of his book, however, he distinguishes between the "legal" and "moral" uses of *nomos* and related terms—although he acknowledges (135) that both meanings are often present at the same time. See also Bauslaugh, *Neutrality* 128–32.

present war (3.52.4). Now, after protesting the unfairness of having to speak to this isolated issue without knowing in advance the charge which lay behind it (προκατηγορία), and therefore without having an opportunity to rebut that charge, they address what they nevertheless suspect it to be. They attempt to draw a distinction between their own present situation and that of the Theban captives whom they themselves had executed four years earlier. They argue that the Thebans had been taken while attempting to seize Plataea in peacetime and on a religious holiday; therefore they had been rightly (ὀρθῶς) executed according to a universally recognized customary law (κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα) (3.56.2). This alleged rule of customary law is evidently either a practice permitting the use of force in self-defense, or one permitting the exaction of just punishment for criminal violence. In either case it would not apply to the Plataeans' present circumstances—at least as the Plataeans themselves seek to characterize those circumstances. They claim to have been unwilling adversaries of Sparta.<sup>16</sup> They also claim to have surrendered to the Spartans voluntarily as suppliants. To execute such suppliants, they allege, is expressly prohibited by Greek customary law (ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ κτείνειν τούτους) (3.58.3).<sup>17</sup> This is the law to which I wish to draw particular attention.<sup>18</sup>

The Thebans obtain permission to reply to the Plataeans' arguments. They begin by conceding that those of their countrymen who fell while fighting in the Plataean marketplace were lawfully killed (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τινα ἔπασχον), but they add that the Plataeans' subsequent execution of those who had surrendered was illegal (παρὰ νόμῳ) (3.66.2). It is important to recognize that this argument rests upon a tacit acceptance of the very same rule which the Plataeans themselves have invoked: namely that Greek customary law does indeed prohibit

<sup>16</sup>οὐκ ἐχθροὺς . . . ἀλλ' εἰνους κατ' ἀνάγκην πολεμήσαντας (3.58.2). The point of this argument was presumably to suggest that if the Plataeans' participation in the war was wrongful, it should nevertheless be excused as due to necessity or coercion. Perhaps this argument too was offered in the guise of a plausible legal defense based upon a recognized *nomos*; see notes 18 and 19 below.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. 3.59.1 (such punishment would violate τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ).

<sup>18</sup>It is not clear from the compressed argument whether the Plataeans claim an immunity from punishment under this rule solely because of their status as suppliants, or for that reason and also because they had been "unwilling" combatants. Of course the substance of the alleged rule will vary according to which of the two interpretations is selected, but for our purposes it makes no difference.

the killing of suppliant captives who have voluntarily surrendered.<sup>19</sup> The Thebans now go on to dispute that the Plataean participation in the present war was coerced, and they assert that the rule prohibiting the execution of suppliants is in fact not relevant to the present circumstances. According to the Thebans, the Plataeans are not really suppliant captives, as they claim to be, but lawbreakers (παρενόμησαν) who have voluntarily submitted to judgment (ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες), and who may therefore be lawfully executed (ἐννομα γὰρ πείσονται) (3.67.5).<sup>20</sup> Such punishment will vindicate the very law which the Plataeans have transgressed, and will give just compensation to the Thebans for the criminal behavior of which they were the victims (τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι καὶ ἡμῖν ἔννομα παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν δικαίαν) (3.67.6).

Now the fact that *nomos* and related words can mean "custom" in a nonprescriptive sense, as opposed to "law" (whether written or unwritten, natural or positive, universal or particular, religious or secular),<sup>21</sup> does not create any difficulties of interpretation in this passage. Not only are the present references to *nomos* placed in an expressly judicial setting—this is a trial (δίκη) before a tribunal (δικασταί)—but they are self-evidently concerned with issues of law. When, as here, *nomos* is invoked for the purpose of suggesting not what the parties *usually have done* in the past, but what they were, or are, *obligated to do* in the future, it obviously purports to be a normative rule of behavior. If, as here again, such rules are represented, and apparently accepted, as an authoritative basis for the formal adjudication of a dispute by a duly authorized tribunal, they are clearly functioning as "law" by any

<sup>19</sup>No explicit claim is made that the Theban captives had been unwilling combatants, but, for purposes of reconstructing the rule at issue, it may be significant that the executed Thebans had first attempted to take Plataea without violence, and commenced fighting only after being surrounded and attacked by the outraged Plataeans: . . . γνώμην δ' ἐποιοῦντο κηρύγμασί τε χρῆσασθαι ἐπιτηδεύεις καὶ ἐς ξύμβασιν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλικὴν τὴν πόλιν ἀγαγεῖν (2.2.4).

<sup>20</sup>Gomme (*Thucydides*, Books II–III, 354 ad loc.) notes: "The argument [of the Thebans], though hateful and sophistic, is not entirely empty: it was *wrong* to kill an enemy in battle who offered to surrender; but if he surrendered unconditionally, he could *legally* be executed" (emphasis added). What does Gomme mean by "wrong" and "legally"? How can this statement be reconciled with his proposition that "The only form of international law in Greece . . . was that contained in treaties between states" (note 1 above)?

<sup>21</sup>Sources are collected in Triantaphyllopoulos, *Rechtsdenken* 5ff., 9ff., 14ff.

pragmatic definition of that concept.<sup>22</sup> One should not be misled by the detail that the Thebans and the Plataeans disagree about the applicability of the rule at issue: such disputes are frequently the focus of litigation. Neither that disagreement, nor the fact that each party's interpretation of the putative rule is clearly self-interested, alters the basic fact of their mutual acceptance of the rule as authoritative. The cardinal point is that neither party argues that the tribunal is free to ignore this customary law. On the contrary, they both accept the law as in principle dispositive of the issues before the tribunal, and they strenuously argue that it favors their respective positions. Where they disagree is on each other's representations of the underlying facts, as well as the legal conclusions which flow from those facts. To judge from Thucydides' narrative, then, Mosley cannot be right in suggesting that there was no customary law of sufficient definition and acceptance to be invoked and applied.

Let us now consider the more difficult issue raised by Gomme's formulation: that what purport to be customary rules in the international relations of the Greek states are not properly to be called "law," but actually amount to little more than "pious platitudes," as Martin Ostwald called them (see note 2 above). De Ste. Croix would go even further. He suggests that these alleged *nomoi* only serve as specious excuses for the actions of the powerful, or as ineffectual defenses interposed by the weak—and in both cases are prompted by self-interest, rather than acceptance of some abstract rule of law.<sup>23</sup> At most they are matters of morality or religion, but not of "law" properly so called. According to de Ste. Croix, Thucydides "drew a fundamental distinction—though he never frames it explicitly . . . —between, on the one hand, the relations of *individuals inside the State*, where there are laws, enforced by sanctions, . . . and on the other, the relations *between States*, where it is the strong who decide how they will treat the weak" (*Origins* 16).

In considering these arguments we must begin by admitting that Thucydides himself may have held the views which de Ste. Croix attributes to him. Certainly other Athenians in his narrative can be seen to express a pragmatic, if not cynical, opinion of what international law

<sup>22</sup> See Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* 181–211.

<sup>23</sup> De Ste. Croix, *Origins* 19, 72, 270, and *passim*. He seems (21) to hold the same view of modern international law.

amounts to.<sup>24</sup> It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the contexts in which these sentiments are expressed. Invariably they are voiced in the course of defending an action or policy which would otherwise be open to challenge as being unlawful or immoral. In other words, even as these expressions of skepticism seek to deprecate the substantive reality of whatever constituted the international law of the Greek states, they demonstrate at the same time that the normative pressures of that law could not simply be ignored in the rhetoric of diplomacy.<sup>25</sup> As for the fact that treaties, truces, colonial relationships, and other manifestations of international order were often solemnized by religious ritual, this does not in any way detract from the legal character of those institutions.<sup>26</sup> To be sure, the relationship between law and morality is a vexed philosophical and jurisprudential issue. It is, moreover, an issue which assumes particular prominence in the decentralized legal system of an international community, where—as we shall see—different jurisdictional authorities are equally competent to declare what the law is.<sup>27</sup> There especially, where the law has only consensual norms to sustain it, the law in substance will be seen to be much the same as what “justice” requires. But it would be absurd to infer from the mere fact of that coincidence that it is any less the law. The real point behind de Ste. Croix’s skepticism is this: the problem is not that there were no rules, but that the rules which did exist were not, as he puts it in the passage quoted above, “enforced by sanctions.”

The role of sanctions in the definition of law—or to put it more generally, the issue of how law differs from the enforceable will of the stronger—is an issue at least as old as *Antigone*, and as perennial as hackneyed arguments regarding the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Writers on international law have differed widely in their treatment of the question. In the seventeenth century Hugo de Groot (Gro-

<sup>24</sup>E.g., 1.76.2, Athenian argument to the Peloponnesian congress in 432; 5.89, the Melian debate; 6.85.1, Euphemus at Camarina. On these and other examples of Athenian cynicism see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* ch. 21.

<sup>25</sup>Again the point is true whether one is speaking either of the historicity or of nothing more than the verisimilitude of the arguments as Thucydides reports them. For a more detailed critique of de Ste. Croix’s evidence see Bauslaugh, *Neutrality* 47–54.

<sup>26</sup>*Pace* de Ste. Croix, *Origins* 20. As Phillipson long ago remarked in reference to the legal character of sworn treaties: “It is of no consequence where the sanction lies” (*International Law and Custom* I 51). It may be noted that Grotius insisted that treaties sanctioned by oaths do not rest upon the oath for their legal validity (*De Jure* II.xvi.5).

<sup>27</sup>Hart, *Concept of Law* 7–8 and ch. 9.



tius), the Dutch humanist, theologian, jurist and “father of international law,” conceived of international law as founded upon natural law, with natural law itself being a postulate of the moral order implicit in human society. For Grotius the fact that international law might be disobeyed with apparent impunity in no way undermined its status as law.<sup>28</sup> Two centuries later, in the rationalist age of Bentham and Mill, John Austin maintained that international law was not properly law at all, but mere “positive morality.”<sup>29</sup> Although since discredited in its Austinian form, legal positivism remains influential in the twentieth-century jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen, who has argued that international law is the necessary postulate of every *municipal* legal system. According to Kelsen, the legitimacy of a national government itself is predicated upon international norms which recognize it.<sup>30</sup> Under this “monist” theory of international law, the sanctions of municipal law in a sense *are* the sanctions of international law at one or more stages of remove.

A less rarified level of theoretical abstraction is represented by sociological approaches to understanding the relationship of law and enforcement. These proceed from two empirical observations: (1) compliance with the law is normally voluntary and uncoerced; and (2) the threat of sanctions apparently does not prevent—except in a very limited way—the violation of law.<sup>31</sup> It appears that a society accepts, and in a general sense “obeys,” only those laws which conform to and reinforce its own normative values. As J. L. Brierly wrote in a seminal essay which appeared as continental Europe was beginning to descend into fascism: “The state can bring force to bear at need only because it uses force exceptionally, because normally it rests on something which is not force, and because the society, which alone can furnish it with force to use, approves of it being used in such cases. . . . [Force] is the result, not the cause, of obedience being normal.”<sup>32</sup> Sanctions, therefore, are not a condition of law, but one of its manifestations; they may vindicate a legal order, as in the story of Eden, but they neither create nor perpetuate it. If international law is not truly law, it must be for some reason other than its alleged lack of sanctions.

<sup>28</sup> *De Jure*, “Prolegomena.”

<sup>29</sup> E.g., *Jurisprudence*, “Lecture V” 142.

<sup>30</sup> E.g., Kelsen, *Principles* 553–88, *Pure Theory* 214–17.

<sup>31</sup> E.g., Barkum, *Sanctions* 62–65. For empirical studies demonstrating the limited deterrent effect of sanctions see Zeisel, *Limits* ch. 1; Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*.

<sup>32</sup> “Le fondement” 44.

John Hart's influential book on the "concept of law" shifts the focus away from sanctions and argues instead that international law is lacking in "rules of recognition" to define where its legislative and adjudicatory systems of authority lie.<sup>33</sup> This functional orientation to the problem is reflected also in the writings of Myres S. McDougal and the "New Haven School" of international law—but with an entirely different conclusion, and one which better accounts for the empirical realities of both the modern and ancient systems of international law as social phenomena. The problem with international law, according to McDougal's conceptualization, is not that final authority resides nowhere, but—to overstate the point just a bit—that it resides everywhere. In other words, international law is a system of multiple and overlapping jurisdictions—what has come to be called a "horizontal" rather than a "vertical" legal system, in which authority is decentralized and constituted within multiple community contexts.<sup>34</sup> In the modern world these communities assume many different forms, ranging from the populations of individual nation-states—groups which themselves may be, and in fact usually are, politically fractured in various directions—to the governments of those same nation-states; to supranational governmental organizations like the United Nations or the European Economic Community, multilateral military alliances like NATO, international cartels like OPEC, multinational ethnic solidarities like pan-Arabism, religious communities like Islam—itsself, of course, divided into sects with distinguishable political agendas, and so forth. As noted at the beginning of this essay, the international order of the Hellenic community was similarly structured, even if it may not have been quite as multifaceted. In classical Greece, as in the modern international community, the jurisdictional dynamics of international law were shaped by the interplay of overlapping, sometimes contradictory, often competing, but all ultimately authoritative venues of decision making. Although it may appear to be paradoxical, it is important to recognize that this multiplicity of jurisdictions need not signify that international law *in substance* is any less determinate or stable than municipal law. It does mean that *in application* international law is much more obviously subject to political pressures than municipal law ap-

<sup>33</sup> *Concept of Law* ch. 10.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Gottlieb, "Nature of International Law."

pears to be.<sup>35</sup> It is, however, still one system of law—with as much claim to coherence and consistency as any other—even if constituted within many different forums.

When viewed from this perspective, it becomes immediately evident that sanctions indeed were operating in the legal regime which Thucydides describes, just as they do in the modern international community.<sup>36</sup> As an example one may look to the consequences which flowed from the abortive attempt of Mytilene to defect from the Athenian alliance. According to Thucydides the Mytilenean emissaries to the Olympic festival of 428/7 expressly acknowledged that to abandon an ally and switch sides in the midst of war violated Greek customary norms of behavior.<sup>37</sup> But they go on to offer various reasons why this action should be excused under the particular circumstances of their own case, and for these reasons or others they succeed in persuading the Peloponnesians to admit them into their own alliance.

Olympia, however, was not the only venue where this case would be heard. When the promised Peloponnesian assistance was not speedily forthcoming, Mytilene was forced to capitulate to an Athenian blockade. Now the Athenian Assembly considered the question of punishment for the defection. The story is too familiar to require retelling in detail: how the Assembly first condemned the Mytileneans to a terrible punishment, and then on the following day reopened consideration of their decision (3.36–48). Cleon speaks in support of the proposal passed the day before: to kill all the men of Mytilene, and to enslave the women and children. It is a punishment, Cleon argues, which befits the Mytileneans' crime (ἀξίως τῆς ἀδικίας), and it will serve as a clear deterrent to others (τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφές).<sup>38</sup> Ultimately,

<sup>35</sup> The process of law making (or "interpreting" the law) in the municipal setting is arguably just as contingent and unpredictable, just as subject to political pressures, and, even in the mind of an individual judge, just as beset with imponderables like the factors of personality, moral convictions, life experiences, intelligence, the myriad pressures of external authority, and who knows what. See, e.g., Dworkin, *Law's Empire* ch. 2.

<sup>36</sup> "[T]he habitual observance of international law suggests, what every international lawyer knows to be the case, that there do exist sanctions behind the law. The real difference in this respect between municipal and international law is not that the one is sanctioned and the other is not, but that in the one the sanctions are organized in a systematic procedure and that in the other they are left indeterminate" (Brierly, "Sanctions" 202).

<sup>37</sup> τὸ . . . καθεστὸς τοῖς Ἕλλησι νόμιμον (3.9.1).

<sup>38</sup> 3.39.6, 40.7, and 37–40 *passim*.

however, Diodotus' counterproposal prevails. The Mytileneans were at fault, he acknowledges, and they deserve punishment; but it does not pay to look at the matter from a purely legalistic perspective.<sup>39</sup> The Athenians must consider the utility of the action they take, rather than simply imposing whatever penalty vindicates the narrow legalities of the case.<sup>40</sup> In an argument which would be relevant in any penological context, Diodotus reasons that people do not willfully break the law with the expectation of being caught and punished (3.45). Therefore an extreme punishment is not an incentive to obedience, but a disincentive to accommodation or surrender once the law has been broken (3.46.2).

Here, then, is a rule or norm of international custom—that allies must not defect in wartime—whose violation is acknowledged by both the transgressor (Mytilene) and the party who is injured (Athens). The violation leads to a formal condemnation by an adjudicatory body which has acquired jurisdiction of the matter (the Athenian Assembly), and to the imposition of punishment after due consideration of alternative sentences. Clearly there were sanctions in Greek international law. If the example of Mytilene seems illegitimate, it is only because this is so patently an instance of victor's justice. But arguably all justice is victor's justice—and certainly all justice in a horizontal legal system, where judgments are infinitely appealable, and the execution of judgment is always contingent upon the practical and political difficulties of acquiring jurisdiction and retaining control over the dispute at issue.

#### COMPLYING WITH THE LAW: THE EPIDAMNIAN AFFAIR

The fate of the Mytileneans suggests that the *nomoi* of Greek international relations were not vacuous "platitudes" but, like international law in the modern world, expressions of authentic values and normative ideologies which exerted significant control over the behavior of peoples and of governments. If so, we should expect to see further evidence of that control in Thucydides' narrative. And in fact we do—not only in the diplomatic positions which he models in the speeches, but in the policy decisions which he reports as having been taken by

<sup>39</sup> οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ὄγων, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας (3.44.1).

<sup>40</sup> ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἔξουσιν (3.44.4).

Greek governments. His account of the Epidamnian affair provides several clear examples.

Sometime in or before 436/5 the *dēmos* in Epidamnus rose up and drove out an oligarchy. When the exiled nobles, with the assistance of neighboring non-Greek tribes, attempted to recover control of the city through a series of piratical raids by land and sea, the government of Epidamnus appealed to Corcyra, in its capacity as the *mētropolis* of Epidamnus, to reconcile the two factions and bring the war with the *barbaroi* to an end (1.24.6). Corcyra refused the request. Thucydides does not explain why,<sup>41</sup> but as recent history demonstrates, external powers are often reluctant to involve themselves directly in civil wars. In any event, the Epidamnian government then decided to request assistance from Corinth. Such an appeal over the head of its nominal *mētropolis* (Corcyra) must have constituted a breach of international norms, for the Epidamnians made the request in conjunction with an attempt to “transfer the colony” (παραδοῦναι . . . τὴν ἀποικίαν) from Corcyra to Corinth, and to make the Corinthians their *hēgemones*.<sup>42</sup> The sanction of the international oracle at Delphi had been sought and obtained for this change of status—a procedural step which clearly indicates the desire to formalize and publicize the legitimacy of the new alignment.

An effective transfer of the colonial relationship would presumably have terminated whatever legal basis existed for Corcyra’s continued involvement in the affairs of its (now former) colony; while submission to the *hēgemonia* of Corinth, in turn, might be taken to authorize Corinthian military intervention in Epidamnus.<sup>43</sup> Accordingly Epidam-

<sup>41</sup> A later chapter (1.26.3) implies that the Corcyreans may have felt a greater sense of kinship with the exiled party.

<sup>42</sup> 1.25.1. It will be remembered that Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Corinth were tied together by ethnic and colonial relationships. Corcyra had been founded as a colony from Corinth, and Epidamnus somewhat later as a colony from Corcyra. The colony to Epidamnus, however, had nominally been led by a Corinthian οἰκιστής and included colonists originating from other Dorian states in addition to Corcyra (1.21.2).

<sup>43</sup> Whatever rights and obligations inhered in the relationship expressed by *hēgemonia* is a subject beyond the scope of this study. It is likely that the institution assumed different forms according to the different circumstances surrounding its invocation—compare, e.g., the Spartan, Athenian, and Theban *hēgemoniai*. In referring to the Athenian suppression of Naxos as παρὰ τὸ καθεστῆνός (1.98), Thucydides suggests that the institution of the *hēgemonia* was regulated by custom as well as treaty. It is hardly certain, however, that custom permitted the *hēgemonia* to be renounced by a servient state with-

nus could now afford to harden its position relative to the exiles. Instead of asking for mediation of the dispute with the exiled party, they now asked simply for military assistance in winning the war—a change of position which Classen finds unexplained, but which is perfectly consistent with the altered legal context of the hostilities.<sup>44</sup> The exiled party had been effectively dispossessed of any right to impartial treatment, since it arguably had no relationship to the new *mētropolis*, and in fact might be constructively at war with the new *hēgemōn*.

Corinth accepted the proposal of Epidamnus—not only, according to Thucydides, because it judged that Epidamnus was rightfully (κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον) as much a Corinthian colony as Corcyrean (see note 42), but also because the new alignment would amount to a diplomatic rebuke of its own colony of Corcyra, with which Corinth had long experienced strained relations (1.25.3–4). Nevertheless, apparently in order to give substance to its status as the new *mētropolis* of Epidamnus, Corinth sent not just the requested military aid, but a contingent of settlers as well (1.26.1). Law, or rather the desire to secure law's protections by observing appropriate formalities, will have been the motive for this decision to send settlers.

Refusing to recognize the attempted transfer of the colonial relationship, Corcyra sent a fleet to Epidamnus demanding that the Corinthian garrison and settlers be sent away, and that the exiled nobles be received back into the city (1.26.3). The latter demand signaled the abandonment of Corcyra's previous posture of neutrality in the Epidamnian civil war, but can be readily explained in view of the altered legal context due to Corinth's involvement. First, the Corcyreans might well conclude that the popular party in Epidamnus was no longer the legitimate government of the colony, since it required a foreign power to maintain itself in control. Second, the shifting jurisdictional dynamics of this widening dispute effectively preempted a policy of continued neutrality by transforming Corcyra's own role from that of judge to litigant.

Upon the refusal of their demands, the Corcyreans proceeded to

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out the dominant state's consent (e.g., 1.38.2, Corinthians vis-à-vis the Corcyreans; 3.61.2, Thebans vis-à-vis Plataeans; but cf. 3.10.5, the Mytileneans vis-à-vis the Athenians; and 1.120.1, the Corinthians vis-à-vis the Spartans).

<sup>44</sup> "Man sieht nicht ein, warum Th. sich hier stärker als 24.6 ausgedrückt haben sollte" (*Thukydides* I 75 ad 1.25.2).

lay siege to Epidamnus. Here, as perhaps most of the time when states resort to self-help, hostilities did not necessarily signify the breakdown of international law, but instead reflected mutual attempts to vindicate the colorable claim of right which each party plausibly felt it possessed. In any event, when news of the siege reached Corinth, efforts were immediately undertaken to assemble a relief force from Corinth's closer allies and colonies. More significant for the purposes of this analysis, however, is that the Corinthians gave equal priority to strengthening the legal basis of their involvement in Epidamnus—this by hurriedly and formally founding a new colony there.<sup>45</sup>

Upon learning that the Corinthians were mounting a relief force, Corcyra sent an embassy to Corinth with an offer to negotiate. The Corcyreans argued that Corinth should withdraw its garrison and settlers from Epidamnus, since the Corinthians “had nothing to do with Epidamnus” (1.28.1). Corcyra was willing, however, to submit to arbitration the issue of “whose” the colony was, and to leave the “power over” Epidamnus to the party so adjudged.<sup>46</sup> The Corinthians replied that negotiations were premature until Corcyra lifted its siege. Arbitration might be possible, but only after the Corcyrean forces withdrew. When Corcyra's counterproposal of a mutual withdrawal proved unacceptable to the Corinthians (1.28.4), the result of the impasse was a formal declaration of war by Corinth (1.29). War is a notoriously problematic concept in international law. Depending upon the circumstances it can be variously interpreted as a delict, a sanction, or a legal regime in itself.<sup>47</sup> From Thucydides' account, however, there is no doubt that the Corinthian declaration of war, as well as the later declaration of war by the Peloponnesian League in 433/2, were acts ostensibly taken pursuant to a claim of right. In other words, at least according to the representations of the parties involved, law—not strategic or other interests—was motivating policy.

Was Corinth's intransigence wrong, or even perverse, as one might conclude from the dismissive and tendentious way in which it is

<sup>45</sup> ἀποικίαν . . . ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἰσῇ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ τὸν βουλόμενον ἵναί (1.27.1). The phrase echoes the legal formula solemnifying the inauguration of a new colony (Clasen, *Thucydides* 79).

<sup>46</sup> ὁποτέρων δ' ἂν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν, τούτους κρατεῖν (1.28.2). The substantive law underlying these concepts of ownership and control is worthy of its own separate study; cf. the related issues raised under note 43 above.

<sup>47</sup> See, e.g., Keisen, *Principles* 20–39.

sometimes characterized?<sup>48</sup> Surely if the question has any meaning at all, it does so only within the context of *Hellenic* law and morality. The Corinthians evidently felt—as their ambassadors to Athens would later assert (according to Thucydides)—that Corcyra had illegally resorted to violence by laying siege to what was now claimed to be Corinth's colony (Epidamnus).<sup>49</sup> Only after gaining an advantage from this illegal act had Corcyra sought arbitration, leaving Corinth under no obligation to agree to the proposal (1.39.1–2). Gomme equivocates in characterizing this argument: "It would appear, on the contrary, more honourable for the party which is in a strong position to offer to submit to arbitration— . . . [b]ut there is something to be said for the argument that . . . you should offer arbitration before rather than after successful aggression."<sup>50</sup> It is perhaps captious to quote these observations out of context, but they do illustrate the unabashed subjectivism to which historians who discount the functional significance of Greek international law must resort.<sup>51</sup> Taken on its own terms, the Corinthian argument is not incredible as the statement of law which it purports to be, and in fact it invokes a principle which is similar in substance to the modern doctrine of *ex iniuria non oritur ius*, under which "a State con-

<sup>48</sup> E.g., de Ste Croix: "We can see that Corinth was being quite extraordinarily aggressive towards Corcyra and must bear virtually the whole of the responsibility for the consequences which ensued" (*Origins* 67).

<sup>49</sup> 1.38.6. Gomme is categorical in rejecting the Corinthian position: "[Epidamnus] was not [Corinth's colony] of course, in any sense" (*Thucydides*, Book I, 174 ad 1.38.5). Yet in a legal sense perhaps it was. Certainly the Corinthian and Epidamnian governments were asserting the validity of the new alignment—the former in connection with a series of arguments which they collectively characterize as *δικαιώματα ἑκὰνὰ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμους* (1.41.1)—and presumably the oracle at Delphi would have agreed (1.21.1). It is self-contradictory to assert the opposite while at the same time maintaining, as Gomme does, that there was no customary law capable of determining the issue either way.

<sup>50</sup> *Thucydides*, Book I, 174 ad 39.1.

<sup>51</sup> E.g., Kagan thinks that Corcyra was "technically . . . right" in arguing to the Athenians that its proposed alliance was within the terms of the treaty of 445, but the Corinthians also "appear to be quite right" in asserting that the treaty could not be construed to permit such an alliance under the circumstances then prevailing (*Outbreak* 231–32). One will look in vain for any reference to international law in Kagan's index. Conversely de Ste. Croix, although he acknowledges the nominal existence of Greek international law (see the discussion referenced at notes 23ff. above) asserts that it is "incomprehensible that anyone . . . should find the Corinthian [argument regarding the illegality of the proposed alliance] plausible" (*Origins* 72), and yet he offers no argument for its implausibility *in terms of Greek law*.



fronted [with] an attempt by another State to bring about a new title . . . or situation by means of an illegal act . . . may expressly declare that it will not in the future validate by an act of recognition the fruits of the illegal conduct."<sup>52</sup>

Another reason may be suggested in explanation of Corinth's refusal to arbitrate. In proposing arbitration, Corcyra was implicitly laying claim to an equal standing in the international community with Corinth. Corinth could not concede that status without forfeiting whatever legal privilege or immunity it possessed in virtue of being the *mētropolis* of Corcyra—not merely in connection with this specific dispute, but likewise in connection with whatever other outstanding issues were troubling their difficult relations. If international custom viewed a colony as less than fully independent vis-à-vis its *mētropolis*—and such a notion seems to be implicit in Corcyra's own concept of "ownership" to describe the colonial relationship (see note 45)—then Corinth could maintain that Corcyra did not qualify for full legal personality in the international community of Greek states, and thus the issue of who "owned" Epidamnus was not arbitrable as between equals. Conversely, if a colony was *sui juris*, then presumably Epidamnus was fully competent to repudiate its relationship with Corcyra (as Corcyra was in effect seeking to do with Corinth), as well as to transfer that relationship to Corinth. Either way, in other words, Corinth's argument trumps Corcyra's. Under such circumstances it is perfectly understandable that Corinth would refuse to surrender jurisdiction of this dispute to a third party. To surrender jurisdiction was tantamount to conceding that Corcyra was *sui juris*, while at the same time leaving open the possibility that Epidamnus might not be.

It was the legal significance of the colonial relationship between themselves which accounts for why, in their subsequent speeches to the Athenian Assembly, both the Corcyreans and the Corinthians devote so much importance to the issue. Corcyra maintains that Corinth has forfeited through its overbearing behavior whatever rights inhere in its status as the *mētropolis* of Corcyra (1.34.1). Conversely the Corinthians maintain that Corcyra has acted wrongfully in disregarding and seeking to repudiate the colonial bond. They note that such treatment was not the purpose behind creating the colony, it is unlike the treatment Corinth receives from all its other colonies, and it represents an unjust

<sup>52</sup>Oppenheim, *International Law* I 142–43; cf. Brownlie, *Principles* 511–12.

refusal to honor natural obligations (1.38). Of these points Gomme remarks: "[I]t is not surprising that Athens was not convinced by these arguments."<sup>53</sup> Yet at least from the perspective of modern international law there is nothing frivolous or illegitimate about them. They are respectively invocations of the principles of consent, custom, and natural justice—all of which are recognized as valid sources of contemporary law.<sup>54</sup> My point, however, is not to argue that Corinth was "right" in refusing to arbitrate, but merely that there might be plausible arguments in Greek international law to support its position. Those arguments deserve to be identified and analyzed on their own terms as elements of a functional jurisprudential system.

### CONCLUSION

In this essay I have argued that the legal distinction which Gomme draws between Greek international custom and (written) treaty law is tendentious and misleading—even though one or another form of the same distinction is widely credited in scholarship devoted to the history of the period Thucydides describes. International custom was not only as fully valid a source of law as written treaties, it defined the juridical order which gave meaning and effect to those treaties. I also argued that the *nomoi* of Greek international relations were not, as some scholars have suggested, mere "platitudes" of indeterminate content and negligible authority. On the contrary, they could be expressed in the form of specific rules and doctrines, and they could be invoked as the principled basis for defining issues of disagreement and resolving those issues in an authoritative way. In addition we have seen that notions of lawful order and punitive sanctions which are based upon a vertical model of law are ill suited to describing the horizontal system of law which prevails in the international setting—both in antiquity and now. Lastly I argued that customary law, or rather a consciousness of its norms, shaped policy decisions by the governments of Greek states; and I attempted to document that phenomenon by an analysis of selected aspects of the Epidamnian affair. Recognition of the substantive reality

<sup>53</sup> *Thucydides*, Book I, 173 ad loc. Likewise Kagan: "All this is very weak and unconvincing" (*Outbreak* 231).

<sup>54</sup> Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.1 (a–b), 38.2 (= Brownlie, *Basic Documents* 276).

of Greek customary law is prerequisite to further investigation of its doctrinal content, and of the normative values and political interests which were served by this legal system. Taking the diplomatic argument in Thucydides on its own terms is a starting point for such an inquiry, but of course the Thucydidean data must be assessed against the totality of inscriptional and literary evidence.

GEORGE A. SHEETS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS

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## COMMON SENSE IN CATULLUS 64

In his wide-ranging and illuminating essay "Catullus and the Idea of a Masterpiece" Richard Jenkyns used of poem 64 the memorable phrase "Catullus' eager immersion in the sensuous" (*Three Classical Poets* 109). One of his observations within this theme is the *synaesthesia* of line 284, *quo permulsa domus iucundo risit odore*, "Touched by this pleasant *smell* the house laughed." Synaesthesia is the sensation of a sense other than the one being stimulated. The novelty of making "the scent so gorgeous that it is like a caressing touch" is described by Jenkyns as dazzling.<sup>1</sup> Another detail from the poem that can be termed synaesthetic concerns Ariadne's bed:

quam suavis exspirans castus odores  
lectulus in molli complexu matris alebat  
quales Eurotae progignunt flumina myrtus  
aurave distinctos educit verna colores (87-90)

[Ariadne] whom the untouched little bed used to strengthen in the soft arms of her mother, as it breathed out sweet aromas like the myrtle-trees which the streams of Eurotas produce or the varied colours which the air of spring brings forth.

The "sweet aromas" of the maiden's bed are compared to a tree and to colours: a scent, which stimulates the sense of smell is like a colour, which stimulates the sense of sight.

The purpose of the present essay is to consider Catullus' control of sense evocation throughout the poem. The enquiry includes the sensual responses narrated within the text and, on a different level, the sensual responses demanded by the text. For, as a poem which includes as its "set pieces" an ekphrasis and a song, Catullus 64 clearly shows interest in its own modes of communication with the reader.

<sup>1</sup> Catullus may be playing on the Epicurean notion of smell as the physical sensation of particles touching the nostrils. Another poetic text which treats of this is Lucretius 4.673-74, *nunc age, quo pacto naris adiectus odoris / tangat agam*.

## NEFANDA

The visual qualities of the poem's opening scene have been amply noted.<sup>2</sup> After the marriage of Peleus and Thetis is decided and the big day arrives, Catullus stresses the number of guests at Peleus' house: *domum conventu tota frequentat / Thessalia* (32–33). They are (naturally) pleased to be there (*laetanti . . . coetu*), but what they indulge in is not the regular activities for wedding celebrations.<sup>3</sup> We might reasonably expect these guests to sing, dance, eat, and drink, but instead, they enjoy the view of the house. The splendour of the inside of Peleus' house has also attracted attention. Lines 44–45, for example, with their light, colour, and sheen, make clear demands on the audience's visual imagination: *fulgenti splendent auro atque argento. / candet ebur soliis, collucent pocula mensae*.

The wedding guests next look at the marriage bed of Peleus and Thetis, described in the famous ekphrasis. Classical literature in particular communicated through the ear—that is to say, classical literature was proclaimed and heard.<sup>4</sup> At the most basic level of perception, ancient literature was not for the deaf. Within this convention, ekphrasis holds a unique position: by means of the proclaimed/heard word, it deliberately and formally engages the visual imagination of the audience. In Catullus 64, the coverlet is important in terms of the plot as well as the dialectic. For, once the guests' viewing (and our ekphrasis) is complete, they depart (268).<sup>5</sup> Like all wedding guests, those at Peleus' house are there to bless and celebrate the marriage, but in terms of the poem's framework, they are vital in that they respond to the setting visually. By means of this heightened visual awareness, the guests engage the visual reaction of the poem's audience.

After these guests make way for the immortals, the wedding celebrations continue along far more conventional lines. The gods sit down to feast, according to regular practice (304).<sup>6</sup> Then the entertainment

<sup>2</sup>O'Connell, "Pictorialism and Meaning" 748; Ferguson, *Catullus* 196.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, singing in poems 61 and 62, and feasting, 62.3.

<sup>4</sup>For the original setting for poem 64 see Wiseman, *Catullus and His World* 127–29.

<sup>5</sup>Harmon, "Nostalgia for the Age of Heroes" 323: "There is no suggestion that the Thessalians feel slighted because they must leave after viewing the coverlet to make way for the gods."

<sup>6</sup>In line 45 *pocula* are mentioned, but the mortal guests do not appear to eat or drink at Peleus' house, only to look.



for the gods (and the audience) engages the ear. The Parcae step forward:

haec tum clarisona vellentes vellera voce  
talìa divino fuderunt carmine fata. (320–21)

The song of the Parcae foretells the life of Achilles and forms the focus of the gods' celebration in the poem. With the anaphora of *carmen* (322 and 383) framing their words, the Parcae engage the ear. The mortals view, the gods listen. Ostensibly, therefore, the poem's changing sense appeal, from sight to sound, is in accord with the "diptych" nature of the narrative from mortal to immortal celebration. The departure of the mortals (268) accentuates this change in sense appeal.

The interest in distinct sense appeal seems to be confirmed within the ekphrasis. Ariadne had been hoping for a happy future with Theseus (141), but the sight of his ship departing from Naxos without her leaves her sad:

quae tum prospectans cedentem maesta carinam  
multiplices animo volvebat saucia curas. (249–50)

Her correct view of the circumstances sends her from happiness to despair, although at first she cannot believe what she sees: *nequid etiam sese quae visit visere credit* (55). Ariadne despairs to see Theseus leave Naxos, but Aegeus desperately wants to see his arrival back home in Athens (236–37). Ironically, Ariadne cannot believe the scene which is true, but when Theseus forgets to replace the dark sails with white, Aegeus trusts in a deceitful vision and commits suicide (243–45).<sup>7</sup>

Both Ariadne and Aegeus despair about Theseus, but the poet highlights this feeling in his narration of their response to the sight of the ship. Aegeus strains to see from the citadel, *at pater, ut summa prospectum ex arce petebat* (241). Ariadne's action is very similar in line 249 (quoted above). Both characters view Theseus and react to their

<sup>7</sup> When Jenkyns refers to "Catullus' tactics of ingenious deception" (*Three Classical Poets* 92), he details the poet's tendency to defeat audience expectation. "Deception" is an important theme in the plot too. Furthermore, this "seeing is believing" theme, so important in the plot, fulfils a vital function in the poem's dialectic too. If the eyes of Ariadne and Theseus are deceived, then what confidence can the Thessalian guests and the poem's audience have in their visual response?

view emotionally.<sup>8</sup> Views, both true and false, are the starting points for the private grief of Ariadne and the suicide of Aegeus. Therefore, in the inclusion of an ekphrasis and in the playing out of the plot within the ekphrasis, vision and impaired vision are fundamental.

The eye is, of course, an organ of sensory experience, such as in line 127, *unde aciem in pelagi vastos protenderet aestus*. But the eye is used metaphorically too. Aegeus is inclined to refer to happy experience in terms of the eye. His own eyes are mentioned when he tries to explain his love for Theseus, *cui languida nondum / lumina sunt gnati cara saturata figura* (219–20). He then imagines Theseus' safe return to Athens, a joyful scene, with reference to eyes: *ut simul ac nostros invisent lumina collis* (233). But the eye is also used extensively as a gauge of emotional despair. Soon after we are introduced to Ariadne she watches Theseus depart,

quem procul ex alga maestis Minois ocellis  
saxea ut effigies Bacchantis, prospicit, eheu. (60–61)

Catullus echoes this later, translating the adjective to Ariadne herself (249).

Ariadne's "sad eyes" (60) are balanced early in the first flashback, which describes her initial meeting with Theseus: *cupido conspexit lumine*, "she caught sight [of him] with a longing look" (86).<sup>9</sup> By the easy transfer of epithets, Catullus sharpens our visual awareness. The "longing look" becomes more passionate as Ariadne's desire grows:

non prius ex illo flagrantia declinavit  
lumina quam cuncto concepit corpore flammam  
funditus atque imis exarsit tota medullis. (91–93)

In these lines, the "fire" of Ariadne's love can be seen in stages: it originates in the eyes (*flagrantia lumina*) before moving to the flesh (*cuncto concepit corpore flammam*) and finally raging in her marrow (*exarsit*).

<sup>8</sup>For this similarity see Putnam, "The Art of Catullus 64" 185.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *cupide spectando* (267). The Thessalians, like Ariadne, are impressed by first appearances. Ariadne is deluded. Is the guests' favourable reaction to the coverlet similarly ill-judged? See Bramble, "Structure and Ambiguity."

As Ariadne's pessimism reaches its climax and she mentions her own death, even then the eye is used in a periphrastic euphemism:

non tamen ante mihi languescent lumina morte  
nec prius a fesso secedent corpore sensus. (188–89)

Thus the eye is used within the ekphrasis as an index of emotion and as a marker of life itself. This, of course, serves to enhance the poem's pessimistic tone: we have already noticed that Ariadne, for whom sight and other senses are markers of life, is confused (55) and saddened (60–61) by what she sees. This figurative use of sight immediately suggests that Catullus will conceive of blindness in a potentially equivalent metaphorical manner.

The metaphors of sight as confusion and blindness as profound wisdom had been used extensively before Catullus.<sup>10</sup> Catullus reworks this idea in the ekphrasis. Ariadne indulges in pathetic self-assessment in her address to the Eumenides: *inops, ardens, amenti caeca furore* (197). Only ten lines later, the poet describes Theseus in strikingly similar terms: *ipse autem caeca mentem caligine Theseus / consitus* (207–8). Having established sight as a key motif, the poet makes expressive use of blindness. But unlike sight and blindness, Catullus' figurative usages do not function as corollaries. Vision is a sense easily deceived; blindness is a metaphor for confusion.

It has, I hope, been shown that in a variety of ways, Catullus uses the eye, sight, and the consequences of vision extensively in and around his ekphrasis.<sup>11</sup> However, the "visual pictures" are by no means limited to the coverlet (see Ferguson, *Catullus* 197). The mortals' departure is likened to the motion of the waves in the early morning (269–77). Our formal ekphrasis is over, but our visual imagination is still evoked: *purpureaque procul nantes ab luce refulgent* (275).

J. P. Elder argued ("Conscious and Subconscious Elements" n. 61) that much of Catullus' use of colour in poem 64 is "forced." He came to this conclusion after a statistical survey of Catullus' diction of colour. Of the words denoting colour in the Catullan corpus, 35 percent occur in poem 64. Noteworthy too is that Catullus does not restrict his use of

<sup>10</sup>See, for example, Buxton on Sophocles, "Blindness and Limits."

<sup>11</sup>A summary list of verbs of seeing is telling: 52, 53, 55, 57, 61, 62, 86, 127, 211, 233, 236, 241, 249.

colour to the most obvious place, the ekphrasis. The pictorial nature of lines 269–77, for example, is carefully wrought (see O'Connell, "Pictorialism and Meaning" 752).

The introduction of the Parcae is very graphically rendered.<sup>12</sup> Their appearance and work are described in fine detail. The colouring of their dresses and hair ornamentation is carefully narrated in a neat chiasitic arrangement:

hic corpus tremulum complectens undique vestis  
candida purpurea talos incinxerat ora,  
at roseae niveo residebant vertice vittae. (307–9)

Jenkyns has shown that the juxtaposition of red/pink and white was a common feature of poetic accounts of a girl's appearance (*Three Classical Poets* 141 and n. 58). The frequency of this type of juxtaposition might seem to weaken its force as a pictorial description, but a recent description of a vase suggests otherwise:

Here a stately woman stands on her own, holding a distaff up in her left hand. The upper part of the distaff has been wound with dyed roves of wool which appear as a solid red ball. The thumb and index finger of the right hand hold the thread, while the spindle whirls below.<sup>13</sup>

This is a modern description of the scene on a white-ground jug from Athens, dated to 490–480 B.C., now in the British Museum (Catalogue, Vases D13). It is by no means the only vase painting of home textiles, nor the only one which depicts this particular exercise.<sup>14</sup> If we bear in mind these words and look back to Catullus, we see remarkable similarities:

laeva colum molli lana retinebat amictum;  
dextera tum leviter deducens fila supinis  
formabat digitis, tum prono in pollice torquens  
libratum tereti versabat turbine fusum. (311–14)

<sup>12</sup>O'Connell, "Pictorialism and Meaning" 753, says of lines 305–19: "The most fully pictorial tableaux in the poem." Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 141: "The details in the description . . . compel our eyes towards the Fates' appearance."

<sup>13</sup>Dyfri Williams, "Women on Athenian Vases" 94.

<sup>14</sup>Williams, "Women on Athenian Vases" 94; Keuls, "Attic Vase Painting and the Home Textile Industry" 214.

Of course, I am not suggesting that Catullus saw the British Museum vase, or that the modern description is based on Catullus. What is notable is how close Catullus' poetry is to prosaic description of visual art.<sup>15</sup> If Catullus is not describing a picture or painting he had seen, the graphic detail of these lines is all the more remarkable.

Even as the poem moves on to the song of the Parcae, Catullus maintains his interest in visual response. The short scenes from Achilles' future are decidedly pictorial. Visual recognition will be a theme of his life (339).<sup>16</sup> His footprints will be flame-coloured (341). In the second scene from Achilles' life, the golden line 344 is shocking in its detail. In the third, the Parcae sing of colours:

cum incultum cano solvent a vertice crinem  
putriaque infirmis variabunt pectora palmis. (350–51)

The Trojan mothers have white hair like the Parcae themselves (309) and Aegeus (224). Contrasted with this is the beating "black and blue" suggested by *variabunt*.

From the next scene, Quinn describes line 354 as "vivid" (*The Poems* 344). The visual qualities are accentuated by the juxtaposition of the participle and the adjective: *sole sub ardenti flaventia demetit arva*. The golden sheen of this line, which lends it a sense of health and vigour, is in bleak contrast to the bloody wash of line 344, a line which also describes the Trojan plain.

The fifth and sixth scenes from Achilles' future are linked by *testis* (357 and 362). The waves of Scamander and the "booty" of Polyxena will "bear witness" to Achilles.<sup>17</sup> The use of *testis* continues the theme of spectating. This sixth scene from Achilles' future is the most elaborate in the song of the Parcae, and, once again, it is markedly visual.<sup>18</sup> Again we think of vase painting, where the convention was to use white

<sup>15</sup>One wonders whether Catullus actually witnessed textile production. For his early life see Wiseman, *Catullus and His World*.

<sup>16</sup>Ironically, the Trojans incorrectly identify Patroklos as Achilles, *Il.* 16.278–83.

<sup>17</sup>O'Connell, "Pictorialism and Meaning" 754: "the image of the flood tinged with slaughter goes beyond the merely pictorial or conventional as we learn that the waters grow warm." Here, therefore, the sense of touch is evoked in the midst of a visual word-picture.

<sup>18</sup>Quinn, *The Poems*, describes 368–70 as "gruesomely realistic." Harmon, "Nostalgia for the Age of Heroes" 324, links the white/red effect of *niveos* (364) and *Polyxenia . . . caede* (368) to the white/red of the bridal couch (48–49).

paint for women's flesh, *niveos . . . artus* (364). (See Boardman, *Black Figure Vases* 197.) The slaughter of Polyxena does not seem to have been a common subject in vase painting, but one famous example survives.<sup>19</sup> Greek soldiers hold the Trojan maiden over the heaped tomb as Neoptolemus cuts her throat. Catullus' scene is similar in many details, again confirming the visual qualities of his lines.

The moralising end to the poem is far less visual. However, with his parting phrase, *lumine claro* (408), Catullus concludes his poem with what, I have argued, is a fundamental feature of the narrative and the dialectic (cf. Ferguson, *Catullus* 204; Fordyce, *Catullus* 325). The gods no longer touch the "clear light" of day. The poem ends with the gods' rejection of "clear light," for *lumen clarum* is disfigured throughout the whole poem: *lumen*, "light," "the eye," end up as something not to be trusted and to be avoided.

#### FANDA

It is appropriate that in a description of a visual work of art the eye is constantly engaged and reengaged. However, Catullus also regularly checks this aspect of the ekphrasis by appealing to the ear. The first instance of this is the third line of the ekphrasis: *namque fluentisono prospectans litore Diae* (52). This important line contains the neat juxtaposition which introduces the tension between sight and sound. *Prospectans* here is picked up in lines 241 and 249 to give the poem a narrative structure based on vision. However, the preceding word in line 52 is also significant: *fluentisono* is the first in a series of three rare and similar compound adjectives in the poem.<sup>20</sup> The three adjectives *fluentisonus*, *clarisonus*, and *raucisonus* deliberately engage the aural imagination of the audience, and therefore complicate the status of the ekphrasis.

The repetition of *clarisonus* is interesting. It is first used as Ariadne watches the ship depart, *clarisonas imo fudisse e pectore voces* (125). It appears for the second time as part of the introduction to the song of the Parcae,

<sup>19</sup>Tyrrhenian amphora, Timiades Painter, Athens, 570–60 B.C.; see Dyfri Williams, *Greek Vases* plate 32.

<sup>20</sup>*Fluentisonus* (hap. leg.); *raucisonus* appears once elsewhere, Lucr. 5.1084; *clarisonus* also occurs once elsewhere, Cic. *Arat.* 280.

haec tum clarisona vellentes vellera voce  
 talia divino fuderunt carmine fata. (320–21)

Here *clarisona* . . . *voce* recalls *clarisonas* . . . *voces*, and the common metaphor of “pouring out” creates a further echo. As we *listen* to the song of the Parcae, so too we think we have heard Ariadne.

Perhaps the clearest example of sound in the ekphrasis is in the final scene on the coverlet:

pars obscura cavis celebrabant orgia cistis,  
 orgia quae frustra cupiunt audire profani.  
 plangebant aliae proceris tympana palmis  
 aut tereti tenuis tinnitus aere ciebant.  
 multis raucisonos efflabant cornua bombos  
 barbaraque horribili stridebat tibia cantu. (259–64)

The plethora of words denoting sound and hearing should be obvious: *orgia quae* . . . *cupiunt audire*; *plangebant*; *tympana*; *tinnitus*; *raucisonos*; *efflabant*; *bombos*; *stridebant*; *tibia*; *cantu*.<sup>21</sup> The visual character of Bacchus and his train is suppressed. The graphic description which so inspired our visual imagination in, say, lines 60–67 is not attempted. Here, it is the sound far more than the sight of the arrival which is evoked.

The ekphrasis is subdivided into many sections:<sup>22</sup> the scenes on the coverlet, flashbacks, bridge passages, and set speeches. That set speeches appear at all can cause us surprise. In the shield ekphrasis in *Iliad* 18 a legal quarrel is taking place in one of the cities crafted on the armour for Achilles by Hephaestus (497–500). The poet goes on to relate the full legal proceedings, giving details of judges and supporters, but he does not include any direct speech.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, direct speech forms a major part of Catullus’ ekphrasis in 132–201, where Ariadne addresses Theseus, Jupiter, and the Eumenides, and in 215–37,

<sup>21</sup> O’Connell, “Pictorialism and Meaning” 752: “the scene is hardly pictorial at all.” Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 122: “The first of these lines (261–64) is as much visual as auditory in its effect . . . but eventually sound comes to dominate over sight entirely.”

<sup>22</sup> Quinn, *The Poems* 298–99; Gordon Williams, *Tradition and Originality* 224–25.

<sup>23</sup> There are sonic elements in the Homeric ekphrasis: a wedding song (493), flutes and lyres (495), pipes (526), lyre and Linos song (570–71), cattle mooing (575), and an ox bellowing (583). Catullus’ use of direct speech and mannered adjectives of sound suggests greater self-consciousness.

where Aegeus addresses Theseus.<sup>24</sup> These speeches take the dramatic representation of ekphrasis to the very confines of its applicability; pictures do not speak.

The emotional impact of these speeches is intense, as the audience gains insight into the minds of Ariadne and Aegeus respectively. However, in the course of the speeches we tend to forget that these lines are inset within an ekphrasis. The poet digresses from his appeal to our visual imagination to include direct speech, a far more dramatic approach. Catullus acknowledges the digressive nature of the speeches when he introduces them in indirect speech. For example, Ariadne's lament:

saepe illam perhibent ardenti corde furem  
clarionas imo fudisse e pectore voces . . .  
. . . atque haec extremis maestam dixisse querellis. (124–25, 130)

The indirect speech adds to the poem an element of hearsay.<sup>25</sup> Hearsay introduces the lament and thus distances it from the visual representation of Ariadne on the coverlet.<sup>26</sup> Her long address to Theseus, which evidences her pathetic and desperate love for him; to Jupiter, which shows her wistful and pessimistic state of mind; and to the Eumenides, which heralds her more violent lust for vengeance, leads the audience through a range of emotions as Ariadne experiences the *odi et amo* of the rejected lover. The speech is long, passionate, and consuming. Such is its compelling power that we tend to forget that it is reported speech.

So, it seems, does the poet: *has postquam maesto profudit pectore voces* (202).<sup>27</sup> The words *profudit pectore voces* (202) clearly recall *fudisse e pectore voces* (125), but this similarity highlights an important transition. At the outset, the speech is reported, distanced, and sepa-

<sup>24</sup>O'Connell, "Pictorialism and Meaning" 751: "One might legitimately say that these dramatically conceived speeches stand at the opposite narrative pole from the pictorialism of the tableau which portrays suspended and silent Ariadne's moment of horrified recognition."

<sup>25</sup>Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 99, claims that this and other instances give the story of Ariadne a "distant and perhaps fictional character."

<sup>26</sup>From this naturally arises the question of focalisation. Who sees Ariadne? Catullus (who was not there), or the wedding guests? Who hears her? She herself complains (in 164–66) that her complaints are futile because they reach only the unhearing wind, yet (in 204) Jupiter clearly hears her. On focalisation in ekphrasis see Fowler, "Narrate and Describe."

<sup>27</sup>Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 115.



rate from the coverlet; but such is the force of its emotion that in the course of the lament, the two distinct elements relating to Ariadne (her described image and her reported words) unite.

This same process, by which indirect statement is integrated into the main narrative by means of transition from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta*, can be seen with Aegeus' speech: *ferunt . . . dedisse* (212) is superseded by *lique* (240). Catullus does the same outside of the ekphrasis, for instance at lines 2 and 19. However, as Fordyce points out in his note to the poem's opening, "'dicuntur' (2) emphasizes . . . the traditional source of the story."<sup>28</sup> This reliance on tradition is an Alexandrian characteristic. Yet when the process occurs within an ekphrasis, we are compelled to react not only to a synthesis of stimuli but even to synaesthesia.

### PERMIXTA

It has been argued that in his broad framework, that is, in the move from ekphrasis to wedding song, Catullus directs our sensual response. By departing when they do, the mortal guests, who have acted as spectators (*cupide spectando*), focus our attention on this division between sight and sound. But, as Jenkyns has said, this is "a poem of paradox" (*Three Classical Poets* 92). Catullus overtly demands one sensory response, usually sight or hearing, but contradicts and complements this by demanding the other at the same time. Thus, for example, when we know we are being invited to *see* Ariadne, for much of the time we actually *hear* her. By regularly confirming, shifting, alternating, and undermining its sensory appeal, the poem becomes more elusive.<sup>29</sup> Synaesthesia in the poem is fundamental to Catullus' pleasure in deception.<sup>30</sup> Ferguson identifies "a touch of humour in the way Catullus ends his description of a mute picture with an account of decidedly audible sound" (*Catullus* 202). I have argued that Catullus' ingenuity in playing with established modes of communication is acute and pervasive.

I have deliberately left the Parcae until the end. I argue that their presence—like the mortals' departure—is linked to the poem's syn-

<sup>28</sup>Fordyce, *Catullus* 276; see also Kubiak, "Catullus 64.1-2."

<sup>29</sup>Boucher, "A propos du carmen 64 de Catulle" 196: "C'est une étude de la sensibilité de Catulle, de ses thèmes et de ses moyens d'expression qui constitue la 'clé' du carmen."

<sup>30</sup>See note 7.

aesthetic framework. Their presence requires qualification because of earlier versions of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis.<sup>31</sup> Kinsey claimed that the substitution of the Parcae for the Muses was to give Catullus greater opportunity to revel in the grotesque, which he does in lines 305–22; Fordyce and Gordon Williams saw that the Parcae enabled Catullus to discuss the future doings of Achilles, thereby balancing the heroic past of the poem's earlier lines; Ferguson said that the Parcae were used rather than the Muses or Apollo because they are "gloomy, ominous and truthful"; and Bramble said that the inclusion of the Parcae adds a "darker tone to the wedding."<sup>32</sup> None of these suggestions is entirely satisfactory: Apollo with all his prophetic powers could have fulfilled the role described by Fordyce, Williams, and Ferguson, and Catullus had plenty of opportunity for the grotesque with characters such as Chiron and Prometheus.<sup>33</sup>

There is, I believe, a more important difference between Apollo/Muses and the Parcae. The Parcae spin. This fact gives the poem greater unity than it has normally been accredited.<sup>34</sup> From the help given to Theseus by Ariadne in order to escape from the labyrinth (113), to the coverlet adorning the bridal bed (50), to the actions which accompany the Parcae's introduction and song (307–81), textiles provide a theme and structure for the poem. Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos can be grotesque and gloomy, and they can sing of the future; but they can also spin the future, just as the coverlet weaves the past.

Further, it is surely ironic that the ekphrasis is textile in nature, whereas the refrain, which is taken from the textile industry, punctuates the "vocal" half of the poem. We might reasonably have expected some details of the textures and patterns used to create the coverlet, but from *fluentisano* (52) onwards the coverlet appeals to more than our visual imagination (see Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 125). The poem's de-

<sup>31</sup>Eur. *IA* 1031–79; Hom. *Il.* 24.56–63; Pind. *Nem.* 5.

<sup>32</sup>Kinsey, "Irony and Structure" 924; Fordyce, *Catullus* 317; Gordon Williams, *Tradition and Originality* 227; Bramble, "Structure and Originality" 28; Ferguson, *Catullus* 203.

<sup>33</sup>In Catullus' version of the wedding alone, Apollo is not even present (299). Quinn, *The Poems* 337, accounts for this novelty by looking to the future: his absence is "no doubt an allusion to (his) responsibility for the death of Achilles."

<sup>34</sup>Ellis, *Commentary* 280, claimed that the poem's main weakness is "the loose connexion of its parts." Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets* 85, quotes some similar criticisms from other scholars. His whole essay is concerned with unity, or lack of it; see, in particular 86–98.

scription of textile production is also separate from the ekphrasis, at lines 311–17. In addition, because the Parcae are spinning as they sing and their song follows the description of a textile picture, it may be that they are encouraging us to visualise further textile pictures.<sup>35</sup> As I have shown above, the six scenes from Achilles' future are *visually* rendered; so perhaps, in their song, the Parcae are describing the textile pictures they are in the process of creating. This adds to a synaesthetic reading of the poem: both the ekphrasis and the song can be read "visually" as a series of pictures; yet, at the same time, they can both be read "aurally" too. "And does not a supreme poet blend light and sound into one, calling darkness mute, and light eloquent?"<sup>36</sup> Synaesthesia is, essentially, a paradox, and in poem 64 Catullus revels in it.<sup>37</sup>

ROGER REES

HARROW SCHOOL, LONDON

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<sup>35</sup>My thanks to James Morwood for this suggestion.

<sup>36</sup>George Eliot, *The Mill on the Floss* (1860), book 6, chapter 10.

<sup>37</sup>The ideas which form the basis of this paper were initially presented in an A level lesson in 1991. A later version was read to the Classics Department at Harrow School in 1992. I am grateful to those Sixth Formers and colleagues for their patience and suggestions. My thanks to John Henderson of King's College, Cambridge, and Andrew Laird of Magdalen College, Oxford, who gave me copies of their (as yet) unpublished papers on the poem, and to James Morwood of Harrow School and Gareth Williams then of Churchill College, Cambridge, who commented in detail on various drafts.

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PROPERTIUS 1.21: THE SISTER, THE BONES,  
AND THE WAYFARER

Tu, qui consortem properas evadere casum,  
miles, ab Etruscis saucius aggeribus,  
quid nostro gemitu turgentia lumina torques?  
pars ego sum vestrae proxima militiae.  
sic te servato [ut] possint gaudere parentes,  
ne soror acta tuis sentiat e lacrimis:  
Gallum per medios ereptum Caesaris ensis  
effugere ignotas non potuisse manus.  
at quicumque super dispersa invenerit ossa  
montibus Etruscis, haec sciat esse mea.

5 ut *del. Puccius*      6 ne NAFPDVVo : haec *vel* nec *dett.* : et *Hailer* :  
me *La Penna*      acta *codd.* : *Acca Scaliger*      9 at *Ayrmann* : et *codd.* :  
nec *Butler* : sed *Enk*      quicumque DVVo : quaecumque *cett.*

Propertius 1.21 would be a challenging poem under the best of circumstances. Its difficulties have been considerably increased by uncertainties about the text at certain key points. The second half in particular presents a series of interconnected textual problems, which affect our understanding of the entire poem. These have lately been the subject of a number of studies, none of which fully convinces.<sup>1</sup> The text offered above represents what I believe Propertius wrote. It contains no new emendation but is not printed in this form in any edition. In its main elements (*ne* in line 6 and *quicumque* in 9), it corresponds to Paganelli's Budé text. I would translate lines 5–10 as follows: "May

<sup>1</sup>Richardson, *Propertius* ad loc., holds the unusual view that the soldier addressed is a member of Octavian's forces. Reading *ne* (6) and *quaecumque* (9), he justifies understanding *haec* as the antecedent of *quaecumque* in the last couplet by resorting to the "unknown soldier" interpretation of the bones, as does Stahl ("Love" 111–21). Parker ("Bones") takes issue with Stahl and Richardson, offering detailed arguments why *haec* cannot be the antecedent of *quaecumque*. In general, Parker follows the interpretation of Williams (*Tradition* 172–85). Fedeli's edition with commentary, the most comprehensive and judicious of recent discussions of the poem, is indispensable. For other bibliography see Harrauer, *Bibliography* 49–50, and the editions of Hanslik and Fedeli listed in the Bibliography. I should like to record my thanks to the anonymous reader and, especially, to Joy King of the University of Colorado, for helpful criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.

your parents rejoice in your safe return home on this condition—that my sister not discern from your tears what has happened: that Gallus slipped away from the midst of Caesar’s swords but was unable to escape the violence of unknown hands. But whoever finds bones scattered on an Etruscan hillside, let him know that these are mine.” In the discussion that follows I assume, without further argument, that Gallus, the speaker in the poem, is Propertius’ unburied relative of 1.22, that he is presented as dying rather than already dead, and that the passing soldier is his kinsman.<sup>2</sup>

Sister Acca made her debut in this poem in the sixteenth century, when she was introduced into the text by Scaliger. Like many readers of the poem, Scaliger felt that *soror* in line 6 was ambiguous. Did Gallus mean his own sister or that of the passing soldier? Moreover, *acta* in the sense of “what happened” did not seem natural Latin. Scaliger attempted to solve both problems by emending *acta* to *Acca*. While no doubt identifying the sister for the passing soldier, this still leaves Propertius’ readers in the dark. Spurned by most modern editors, *Acca* found favor with Sluiter and Camps.<sup>3</sup> In a poem where so much remains in doubt, it is a pleasure to record that some genuine progress has been made. Tränkle (“Beiträge” 567) has conclusively refuted this emendation. He has shown that *acta*, without further qualification, is found in epitaphs in the sense of “what happened to the deceased.” It is therefore the *mot juste* and should not be emended. Whose sister then is she? Since the parents in line 5 are clearly those of the passing soldier, one might suppose that the sister must be his too, given the lack of any indication to the contrary. The structure of lines 5 and 6 as two interdependent wishes, however, makes it clear that the reference is to Gallus’ sister. In double wishes of this kind (*sic . . . ut* or *sic . . . ne*), the good fortune wished for the addressee in the *sic* clause is contingent upon the fulfillment of the speaker’s wish for himself in the *ut* (or *ne*) clause.<sup>4</sup> Thus the *ut/ne* signals that we are moving from the addressee’s to the speaker’s realm of interests. Hence, without further indication,

<sup>2</sup>For the view that it is the ghost of the deceased Gallus speaking see Williams, *Tradition* 173–75. Given the vagueness of *proxima* (4), it is impossible to say whether Gallus and the soldier were actually related or merely close comrades in arms.

<sup>3</sup>Sluiter, “Elegia 1,21” 193; Camps, *Propertius* 100.

<sup>4</sup>See Nisbet and Hubbard’s *Commentary* (p. 45) on Horace *Odes* 1.3.1. Sometimes, instead of the *ut* clause, an imperative is substituted, as in Catullus 177 and Horace *Odes* 1.28.23.

*soror* can and should refer to Gallus' sister, as the sense of the poem requires.<sup>5</sup>

The two disputed readings on which all interpretations of the poem hinge are *ne* in line 6 and *quaecumque/quicumque* in line 9. Let us begin with line 9. Housman's dismissal of *quicumque* has been unduly influential: "These lines are a message from the dying Gallus to his sister, so *quicumque* is clearly wrong: Gallus has no concern with 'who-soever finds bones on the Etrurian mountains.'" <sup>6</sup> But this judgment begs the question, for it is predicated on the dubious assumption that the manuscripts' *ne* in line 5 must be emended to *et* or *haec*. What appears to me to be the critical evidence for deciding between *quicumque* and *quaecumque* has been overlooked. It is found in two sepulchral epigrams of Callimachus:<sup>7</sup>

οὔτινες Ἀλείλιον παρέρπετε σᾶμα Κίμωνος  
 ἴστε τὸν Ἰππάλου παῖδα παρερχόμενοι. (AP 7.523 = Pf. 60)

and

δοῖς ἔμὸν παρὰ σῆμα φέρεις πόδα, Καλλιμάχου με  
 ἴσθι Κυρηναίου παῖδά τε καὶ γενέτην. (AP 7.525 = Pf. 21.1-2)

These lines imply the existence of the formula "Whoever you are who pass my tomb, know that I am x." The essentially similar structure of lines 9-10 makes it extremely probable that the editors' preference for the reading *quaecumque* in line 9, with all its attendant difficulties, is misguided.<sup>8</sup> The "whoever" formula has been modified to suit the

<sup>5</sup>If Gallus were married or betrothed to the passing soldier's sister, then she could conceivably be thought of as falling within Gallus' realm of interest, but readers could not be expected to know or infer this fact.

<sup>6</sup>Diggle and Goodyear, *Papers* I 294; quoted approvingly by Parker, "Bones" 328 n. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Fedeli, *Primo Libro* 487, adduces these epigrams as parallels for an opening address to a passerby expressed in a relative clause.

<sup>8</sup>As a corollary, Ayrmann's easy emendation of *et* to *at* should be adopted to signal the change of focus from the sister to the passerby; for exact parallels, compare *at tu, nauta* in Horace *Odes* 1.28.23 and *at tu praeteriens* in Buecheler and Lommatsch, *Carmina* 2127.7. Both Stahl ("Love" 116: "Postgate . . . changes the manuscript text") and Parker ("Bones" 328 n. 5) refer to Postgate's adoption of *quicumque* as if it were an emendation. In fact, it is the reading of D, V, and Vo. Housman thought highly of D, speaking of its "honest and independent witness" (Diggle and Goodyear, *Papers* I 234),

needs of Propertius' poem, which is not, and does not pretend to be, an epitaph. Since the addressee is Gallus' kinsman rather than the wayfarer, Propertius has recast the formula in the third person. Again, since Gallus was not buried (1.22.8), the wayfarer is pictured, strikingly, as chancing upon Gallus' bones rather than simply passing his tomb. Postgate (*Select Elegies* 106), one of the few editors to read *quicumque*, wrongly interprets the concluding couplet to mean that "the soldier is to see that Gallus' bones receive a separate burial." Gallus requests merely that his name be made known to passersby so that if by chance anyone does find his bones he will be able to identify them.<sup>9</sup> What Gallus appears to be requesting is that a cenotaph be set up in the vicinity, perhaps beside the nearest road. It is a reasonable inference that Propertius' family had set up just such a cenotaph.

Reading *quicumque* in line 9 removes the chief objection to the manuscripts' *ne* in line 6. Editors could not see the point of sparing Gallus' sister the details of his death in line 6 if she was expected to go looking for his body in lines 9–10, as *quaecumque* implies, and emended *ne* to *et*, *haec*, or *me*.<sup>10</sup> With *quicumque* in line 9, this inconsistency disappears. A second problem posed by *ne* remains, however. It is highly unusual for any Greek or Roman to wish that details of his or her death be withheld from members of the family. While this second difficulty might suggest that *ne* must be emended, two considerations, namely, the wording of line 6 and the special circumstances surrounding Gallus' death, point strongly to the conclusion that *ne* is correct.

First, consider the phrase *tuis sentiat e lacrimis*. It aptly suggests that the sister might, by intuition, sense the truth from the soldier's tears. It works well as a dramatic equivalent of *cognoscat* in a negative context, where Gallus does not want her to know the truth. It is much less apt if the *ne* is removed and the sentence recast as a positive rather than negative wish.<sup>11</sup> If Gallus wanted his sister to come looking for his

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but modern scholars now tend to dismiss its good readings as humanists' corrections. However, Butrica (*Manuscript Tradition* 125) points out that the origin of D and V "has not been established conclusively."

<sup>9</sup>Perhaps we are intended to think that he will report the discovery to Gallus' family, who could then see to the burial. This clearly had not happened by the time Propertius wrote 1.22.

<sup>10</sup>Recently, *ne* has been adopted in the editions of Richardson and Fedeli. The emendations *haec* and *me* have been refuted by Tränkle ("Beiträge" 568–70), though *haec* has recently been revived by Goold.

<sup>11</sup>This holds true even if we grant that *tuis e lacrimis* can mean *ex te lacrimante*.



body, there could be no holding back on the details. His choice of *tuis sentiat e lacrimis* to describe how he envisaged his sister hearing about his death is difficult to reconcile with the view that he wanted her to receive the clear and full disclosure necessary if she was to retrieve the body.

Secondly, the circumstances behind Gallus' death do not fit the usual patterns. We know that he remained unburied (1.22.7–8) and that this fact weighed heavily on Propertius (1.22.6). In composing a poem that would imaginatively recreate Gallus' last moments, it is *prima facie* unlikely that Propertius would have chosen to put into Gallus' mouth words that might have increased his family's sense of guilt. So we should not be surprised that Gallus makes no explicit request for burial and we should be reluctant to suggest, as Postgate does, that any such request is implied. Nor should we be surprised that Propertius has Gallus specify that his sister, probably the person through whom Propertius was related to Gallus, should not be informed of the details regarding his death. Obviously, however, for such a request to seem plausible to a Roman audience, it would have to be motivated by unusual circumstances. I believe that the manner of Gallus' death provides just such circumstances. Since he died (or is imagined as having died) at the hands of bandits during a civil war in which he had been fighting on the losing side, recovery of the body for burial would have been a dangerous undertaking. Realizing that if his sister knew that his corpse was lying unburied in the hills near Perugia, she would feel obligated to retrieve it and give it a proper burial, Gallus did not want her to know the facts.<sup>12</sup> Exactly what the sister was to be told is not indicated. Presumably, the fact of Gallus' death was not to be kept from her. He could easily have died at Perugia, fighting nobly for a cause he believed in, and been buried by his comrades. Perhaps some such white lie was to be told Gallus' sister to soften the blow of his death. A scenario along these lines would, I believe, make more sense to a Roman audience than the bizarre picture, at once Wagnerian and faintly comic, that the reading *quaecumque* in line 9 conjures up: a respectable Roman woman, searching for her brother's remains, picks her way through piles of bones on a lonely hillside infested with bandits.

While the historically specific setting and the vividness of the

<sup>12</sup>Some commentators have suggested that he may also have wished to spare her the pain of knowing that he escaped the obvious military danger at Perugia only to have had the misfortune of subsequently falling into the hands of bandits.

scene make this sepulchral epigram much more “real” for us than most of those we find in the Greek anthology, Williams is right (*Tradition* 180) to insist that the encounter between the wounded soldier and Gallus is fictitious. A clear indication of this is to be found in lines 7–8, which reflect a standard topos of epigrams of this kind. As Nethercut has pointed out, a number of Greek sepulchral epigrams are focused on the irony that the deceased escaped an obvious danger only to fall prey to an unexpected one.<sup>13</sup> It looks very much as if Gallus’ fate at the hands of brigands has been invented to suit this tradition. At any rate, given the literary background, it would be rash to assume that Propertius is here recounting an actual encounter preserved by oral tradition. The only facts of which we can be reasonably certain are that Gallus fought at Perugia, that he managed to break out through the siege works, that he subsequently disappeared, and that his body was never found.

Why then did Propertius add the detail about the brigands? On the one hand, the Hellenistic literary tradition suggested its inclusion.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, it was a reasonable and no doubt fairly standard view in Propertius’ day to suppose that travelers who had disappeared without trace had been killed by bandits.<sup>15</sup> Brigandage was always a serious problem in Italy, particularly in hilly terrain such as is found around Perugia.<sup>16</sup> Finally, there seems to have been a general expectation that the family of a victim of brigands would not be able to recover the body for burial. A simple Greek epitaph bears testimony to this: “Here I was killed, triply unfortunate, by the violence of a robber, and here I lie, mourned by none” (*AP* 7.737). The family might, of course, be unaware

<sup>13</sup>Nethercut, “Propertius” 143 n. 10, and “*Sphragis*” 469. To the examples cited there I would add *AP* 7.289, where a shipwrecked sailor reaches shore safely but is there killed by a wolf, and *AP* 7.640, where another sailor gets safely through a storm only to be killed in the ensuing calm, when his ship is overtaken by pirates. Clearly, as Nethercut suggests, Vergil’s account of the fate of Palinurus at *Aeneid* 6.350–62, where he is safely washed ashore but killed by a *gens crudelis* seeking booty, is inspired by these epigrams.

<sup>14</sup>Actual Roman epitaphs seem to be comparatively free from these ironic peripeteias.

<sup>15</sup>Compare Pliny *Ep.* 6.25, where Pliny assumes that Metilius Crispus, who along with his slaves disappeared without trace while traveling to Rome, was killed either by bandits or by his own slaves turned bandits. In the same letter he uses the same explanation to account for the disappearance of Robustus.

<sup>16</sup>On brigandage in Italy see Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités* s.v. *latrocinium*.

that the traveler had been killed, or they might not know where to look for the body.<sup>17</sup> Given the literary tradition, the fact of Gallus' disappearance and the reality that the hills near Perugia were infested with bandits, it is not surprising that Propertius chose to include the detail that Gallus had been killed by bandits. It had one further important advantage. It enabled Propertius, with some plausibility, to make Gallus express the wish that his sister (Propertius' mother?) be spared the details of his death, thus making the family's failure to recover the body seem to be in accord with Gallus' wishes. The family's erection of a cenotaph could be cast in a similar light. Thus the poem should be seen not only as a highly original dramatic monologue, in which several traditional elements of the sepulchral epigram have been given new life, but also, more personally, as an attempt to lay a ghost that seems to have intermittently haunted Propertius' family.

DAVID A. TRAILL

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

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<sup>17</sup>Even if they had good information about the general location of the body, the terrain might well have been considered too unsafe to make an attempt to recover it practicable.

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ON A SUPPOSED CONTRADICTION IN OVID  
(*MEDICAMINA FACIEI* 18–22 VS. *ARS AMATORIA* 3.129–32)

Vultis inaurata corpora veste tegi

...

Conspicuum gemmis vultis habere manum

Induitis collo lapides Oriente petitos

Et quantos onus est aure tulisse duos

—*Med.* 18–22

Vos quoque non caris aures onerate lapillis

...

Nec prodite graves insuto vestibus auro

Per quas nos petitis, saepe fugatis, opes

—*Ars* 3.129–32 (cf. 3.169–72)

On the basis of these passages some scholars hold that in *Medicamina Faciei Femineae* Ovid approves of women's wearing luxurious dresses and adorning themselves with sumptuous jewelry, whereas in *Ars Amatoria* he cautions women against such excesses. To explain away the different stances, Fränkel discerned different audiences and maintained that in the former work Ovid "hopes to have respectable ladies for his readers," as the words *vestri mariti* (line 25), *nupta* (26), and *probitas* (49) also—or presumably—suggest.<sup>1</sup>

Lilja adopted Fränkel's opinion and restated the matter in more categorical terms: in *Ars Amatoria* "Ovid is ostensibly criticizing low-born women for their love of money," whereas *Medicamina* "is apparently intended *exclusively* [my emphasis] for respectable matrons"; in a note she adds that *matrona* (line 13) and *virginibus* (32) are also indicative of the status of the audience.<sup>2</sup> Yet *matrona* is obviously required by

<sup>1</sup> Fränkel, *Between Two Worlds*, 63, 204 n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Lilja, *Elegists' Attitude to Women*, 130, 42 (cf. 150 n. 1, 42 n. 3). She also notes that "the difference in the audience accounts for another difference: according to [*Ars*] women adorn themselves to please men"—she supplies no reference, but is probably thinking of 3.380—"whereas in [*Medicamina*] Ovid states *est etiam placuisse sibi quaecumque voluptas* (31)." However, there is no real difference, but only an addition here (*etiam*). Earlier in *Medicamina* women do adorn themselves to please men (23, *sit vobis cura placendi*); earlier in *Ars Amatoria* women take delight in their own beauty (1.624, *virginibus curae grataque forma sua est*).

the context there (Ovid refers to the unrefined country women of old, the ancestresses of Rome's present womenfolk) and has comic rather than solemn overtones (13, *Cum matrona, premens altum rubicunda sedile*).<sup>3</sup> As for *virginibus*, Lilja herself observes that the line in which it occurs (32, *virginibus cordi grataque forma sua est*) is almost identical with *Ars Amatoria* 1.624 (see note 2), where the audience is not, of course, supposed to be respectable ladies. (I mean the audience of *Ars Amatoria* in general, although the *virginibus* of that line does refer to chaste girls—see also 1.623—and not to the demimonde. In both passages it is the immediate context that determines the word usage, not the subject matter of the book.) Furthermore, in *Amores* 2.1.5, where again the audience is the demimonde, Ovid says: *me legat in sponsi facie non frigida virgo*. Consequently the *virginibus* in *Medicamina* 32 should not necessarily imply chaste girls; but even if it does, this line alone cannot be taken to show the character of the audience that the poet is addressing.

What about Fränkel's words? To be sure, *vestri mariti* and *nupta* indeed refer to a wedlock relationship, but did not the demimonde of that period include married women too? The evidence from the elegists suggests strongly that it did (see, e.g., Tib. 1.2.41, 6.15; Ov. *Am.* 1.4, 3.4.33). Thus the most one can make of these terms in the specific context is that *Medicamina*, due to its practical and innocuous content, was also addressed to respectable ladies.<sup>4</sup> Finally, *probitas* does not (despite Heldmann's interesting account)<sup>5</sup> really bear on the matter. As with *matrona* above, this term is similarly called for by the context (49, *sufficit et longum probitas perdurat in aevum*), and one can hardly believe that the *puellae* to be conquered in *Ars Amatoria* (and the addressees of *Medicamina*) were unworthy of this piece of advice, especially when they are also advised to cultivate their intellect (cf. *Ars* 3.329–45). Lilja rightly points out that when Ovid disparages physical beauty in *Ars Amatoria* and advises men to cultivate their minds (2.112–24), he presumes both that women are capable of appreciating mental qualities and that cultivation of the mind has a refining effect on char-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Korzeniewski, "Proömium" 207 and n. 2: "Die *rubicunda coniunx (matrona)* ist eine typisch komische Figur." And for the conventional use of *premens* here (a *torus* can be pressed; an *altum sedile* cannot) see Leary, "Observations" 25.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* 119; Lenz, *Heilmittel* 101; Rosati, *Cosmetici* 31.

<sup>5</sup> Heldmann, "Schönheitspflege" 171–73.

acter.<sup>6</sup> The former presumption is also attested by Ovid's abundant mythological references.<sup>7</sup>

Sabot, who also saw in our passages "une contradiction," accepted Fränkel's suggestion about the two different audiences and proposed a further explanation. *Ars Amatoria*, he says, is addressed to young girls who are still beautiful and can do without extravagant adornment; "au contraire," in *Medicamina* Ovid writes for those who have to "défendre leur beauté," that is, for women of a certain age who resort to luxurious attire and precious stones in order to conceal, among other defects, their wrinkles.<sup>8</sup> To corroborate his suggestion Sabot appeals to *Remedia Amoris* 343–44 (*gemmis auroque teguntur / omnia; pars minima est ipsa puella sui*) and, mainly, to *Ars Amatoria* 3.205–7 (*Est mihi, quo dixi vestrae medicamina formae, / Parvus, sed cura grande, libellus, opus: / Hinc quoque praesidium laesae petitote figurae*), but his hypothesis, let alone his unwarranted equation of youth with beauty, cannot be valid.<sup>9</sup> The *puellae* of *Remedia Amoris* are the same as the *puellae* of *Ars Amatoria*, of course, and *Remedia* 343–44 refers to these girls, not to "femmes . . . moins jeunes." Nor is the closing admonition in the prooemium of *Medicamina*, regarding not the girls' looks, but their ethos (43, *Prima sit in vobis morum tutela, puellae* . . . , through to line 50), suitable for wrinkled women. On the contrary, *Ars Amatoria* 3.205–7 in fact confirms that its audience and that of

<sup>6</sup>Lilja, *Elegists' Attitude to Women* 151 n. 2.

<sup>7</sup>In his excellent book on *Medicamina* Rosati maintains that the latter part of the preface (lines 43–50), with its emphasis on character, is intended to set off the former bold eulogy of *cultus* (1–42) and to fend off possible accusations that Ovid was propounding "un'arte cortigiana, un'arte moralmente eversiva" (*Cosmetici* 31; cf. 35). But in my view this sensitivity is shown too late and makes little sense after the publication of *Amores* and *Ars Amatoria*. Heldmann, on the other hand, baffled by what he regards as a volte face, athetizes lines 43–50—"Der Verdacht, dass die moralisierenden Schlussverse des *Medicamina*-Proömiums unecht sind, ist unabweisbar" ("Schönheitspflege," 166)—as reflecting Christian moral teaching and attributes them, most improbably, to a medieval reader or copyist, "der sich von den frivolen Liebeslehren Ovids zum Widerspruch herausgefordert fühlte" (173). He argues vigorously against Ovidian authorship but is satisfactorily countered by Rosati, *Cosmetici* 29–32. Korzeniewski's interpretation, "Proömium" 207, 212, is perhaps more plausible: the different tone of the two parts is attributed to Ovid's *Musa jocosae*. Indeed, serious tone and sentiment are not rare in Ovid's playful poetry: the most striking example is his attitude toward the gods in *Ars Amatoria* 1.637–44.

<sup>8</sup>Sabot, *Ovide* 402.

<sup>9</sup>Sabot, *Ovide* 403. Ovid is more pragmatic; cf. *Ars* 3.103–4, *Forma dei munus: forma quota quaeque superbi? / Pars vestrum tali munere magna caret*. See also 3.256.

*Medicamina* are the same: Ovid is addressing the *puellae*, not the *matronae*, when he refers them to *Medicamina* in order that they may avail themselves of his recipes and ameliorate their appearance (see above, *vestrae* [!] *medicamina formae*). This identification is further supported not only in that the whole of *Ars Amatoria* 3 is addressed to them but also in what immediately follows these lines: Ovid may supply his prescriptions, but they (the *puellae*, not the *matronae*) should see that their lovers (not their husbands) do not find the paraphernalia on the table (3.209, *Non tamen expositas mensa deprendat amator / pyxidas . . .*, through to line 234).

The initial address in *Medicamina* (*Discite, quae faciem commendet cura, puellae*), repeated in line 43, points unmistakably, I think, to the nature of the audience. Roman matrons, insofar as they could take advantage of Ovid's recipes (and most probably they were welcome to do so), may be included in it, but not to the exclusion of the natural addressees, the girls of the Roman demimonde.

More recently, without mentioning or implying anything about different audiences, Green found nevertheless that in *Medicamina* "Ovid positively revels in the jewellery, rich dresses, and elaborate coiffure (something he was afterwards to condemn in no uncertain terms, [*Ars*] 3.129–30, 169–72)."<sup>10</sup> But does Ovid's affable comment in line 23 (*Nec tamen indignum*) amount to approval and revelry?<sup>11</sup> Why, then, does he hasten to justify this extravagance in the following lines with the remark that men nowadays (*vestri mariti* at that) are as smartly trimmed as women (24–26, *Cum comptos habeant saecula nostra viros / Feminea vestri poliuntur lege mariti / Et vix ad cultus nupta quod addat habet*)?<sup>12</sup> In other words, Ovid says here that men nowadays love elegance, look diligently after their appearance, and are turned out as smartly as women. Women see this and, since they naturally wish to

<sup>10</sup>Green, *The Erotic Poems* 426. His translation of *puellae* in *Medicamina* 1 ("girls") suggests that he does not envision different audiences. Nor do Bornecque, *Remèdes* ad loc. ("jeunes beautés") and Lenz, *Heilmittel* ad loc. ("Mädchen"). According to Heldmann, "Schönheitspflege" 176, *Medicamina* is addressed to "die jungen Römerinnen"; Rosati, *Cosmetici* 65, prefers the somewhat ambiguous "donne," although he accepts that the "protagoniste e destinatarie" of the work are *tenerae puellae*. Mozley (Loeb ed., 1929) translates "women."

<sup>11</sup>Cf. also Rosati, *Cosmetici* 25, 66.

<sup>12</sup>For the homosexual overtones of this description see Green, *The Erotic Poems* 426; for effeminate men in general cf. Herter, "Effeminatus."



please men, try to dress and adorn themselves as luxuriously and sumptuously as they can in order to impress them. This is why their extravagance is not *indignum*: because *sit vobis cura placendi* (23).

However, Green hits the mark in his comments on *Ars Amatoria* 3.129–32, where he writes: “It is interesting to note that the caution against luxurious clothes and ostentatious jewellery does not apply in [*Medicamina Faciei*]. In that fragment (17–26) both are taken for granted. Ovid is simply acknowledging the situation as it already existed in his day: advice does not come into the matter.”<sup>13</sup> Neither does approval, we may add, and therefore no contradiction exists.

Rosati, on the other hand, believes that Ovid’s attitude toward *cultus* in *Medicamina* is deliberate—“operazione della cui consapevole audacia è testimone la correzione moraleggiante dei vv. 43–50”—and serves to bring out his implied equation between “progresso del lusso e progresso civile,” which in turn ridicules the recall of the simple and rough past.<sup>14</sup> And Watson, arguing from a different viewpoint, gives another reason for Ovid’s failure to condemn luxury, etc., in *Medicamina*: “Ovid’s *persona* is that of teacher, but not poor poet, and he does not therefore have cause to deprecate wealth on personal grounds.” Rather improbably, she claims that in *Ars Amatoria* “his *persona* remains that of the *pauper poeta*,” but the evidence adduced (*Ars* 3.531, 533, 551–52) is irrelevant to 3.129–32.<sup>15</sup>

Thus far I have surveyed scholarly opinion and attempted to show that our two passages reveal no real contradiction, and that the addressees of both are virtually the same: the girls and ladies of the Roman demimonde. Yet especially if we consider the several similarities between the two poems,<sup>16</sup> a shift of attitude can be seen, which is in fact a shift of emphasis. Indeed, in *Medicamina* Ovid does not condemn what he later condemns in *Ars Amatoria*. This has to be accounted for somehow, and the explanation I offer is related to Ovid’s urbanity and the character of *Medicamina*.

Whether or not the poet intended to reingratiate himself with Roman womenfolk after having published *Ars Amatoria* 1 and 2 (advising

<sup>13</sup>Green, *The Erotic Poems* 387.

<sup>14</sup>Rosati, *Cosmetici* 35.

<sup>15</sup>Watson, “Ovid and *Cultus*” 239.

<sup>16</sup>See Green, *The Erotic Poems* 426.

only men and thus displeasing women),<sup>17</sup> we cannot know. But when one writes a book on cosmetics<sup>18</sup> giving women advice for preserving and enhancing their beauty as well as for concealing their blemishes by means of artificial aids—in other words, when he eulogizes *cultus*—it would be improper and unkind to rebuke them at the same time by condemning other means, other expressions of *cultus*, with which they tried to improve their looks. Ovid, however, an admirer of women par excellence,<sup>19</sup> a man of good taste and manners, and an expert on female psychology, was too shrewd to commit such an impropriety. When he soon afterward came to write *Ars Amatoria*, the situation was different. There he did not restrict himself to beauty tips and recipes, or to teaching only good manners. He also imparted men's ways and methods to women, in order to protect them; he disclosed male weaknesses in order that women might take advantage of them; he even gave advice for women's cultural refinement. In this general context he did not hesitate to disapprove openly of their luxurious tendencies, which were not only costly but also vulgar and contrary to good taste.<sup>20</sup>

ANASTASIOS G. NIKOLAIDIS

UNIVERSITY OF CRETE, RETHYMO

<sup>17</sup>Thus Bornecque, introduction to *Remède*, after Pohlenz, *De Carminibus Amatoriis* 25. Frécaut, *Esprit et humour* 217 n. 3, disagrees. *Ars* 3.51–52 perhaps justifies Pohlenz: Aphrodite says to Ovid, *Si bene te novi cultas ne laede puellas / Gratia, dum vives, ista petenda tibi est*.

<sup>18</sup>How long was *Medicamina*? Rosati, *Cosmetici* 21, 44, speaks of "le centinaia di versi che si devono esser perduti," and the extent of the prooemium perhaps points in that direction. But Leary, "*Medicamina* Recalled" 140, reiterates the old view that the work is probably a versification of a prose treatise (see Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* 118) and, given the difficulty of the task and the boring subject matter, "cannot have been substantially longer than the hundred lines which survive." Cf. also Lenz, *Heilmittel* 103; for an analysis of the "boring subject matter" see Green, "*Ars gratia cultus*" (and Rosati's criticism, *Cosmetici* 45: "soprattutto viziato da totale disattenzione all'aspetto linguistico-stilistico del componimento").

<sup>19</sup>Mack, *Ovid* 4, rightly observes that only Ovid could have composed the *Heroides*, "giving a woman's perspective on what had always been presented from a man's point of view." Cf. also Lilja, *Elegists' Attitude to Women* 192–93.

<sup>20</sup>Watson is right: "Ovid's use of *cultus* placed the emphasis on artistry rather than extravagance: the *culta puella* must take pains with her appearance, but the desired effect may be achieved without undue expense." Cf. also Heldmann, "Schönheitspflege" 176: "Freilich ist das für ihn eine rein ästhetische Frage . . . übertriebener Luxus ist kein *cultus*."

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## THE BULL AND THE HORSE: ANIMAL THEME AND IMAGERY IN SENECA'S *PHAEDRA*

The bull theme and bull imagery in Seneca's *Phaedra* have received much attention in recent years.<sup>1</sup> The "bull from the sea" is an essential element of the myth of Hippolytus in all its versions. Seneca expanded what stood firmly in the literary tradition by linking it with other mythical bulls which could be incorporated into the thematic texture of the play: the Cretan bull, object of Pasiphaë's love; the Minotaur, their monstrous offspring. These he exploited mainly in relation to the heredity of Phaedra's illicit passion.

Although Hippolytus' horses are also an essential feature of the literary tradition, almost nothing has been produced regarding the role of horses and horse imagery in this play.<sup>2</sup> Nor has there been any discussion at all of the interplay of the bull and the horse, which in this tragedy extends beyond their traditional interrelation in the story of Hippolytus' death.<sup>3</sup> These themes pervade Seneca's *Phaedra* and are visible in his selection of language and imagery.

### I. BULL MYTHS AND BULL NAMES

The first choral ode of Seneca's *Phaedra* comprises a list of mythological exempla illustrating Cupid's power to "transform" gods and heroes (296–329). It has already been shown that these exempla are particularly relevant to the major themes of the play.<sup>4</sup> A further interesting aspect is that they form a sequence of animal references in which the bull plays a prominent part (in stories concerning Apollo and Jupiter). Their primary function is to establish, in a fashion typical of Seneca (who is concerned with the role of heredity),<sup>5</sup> the place of the bull in

<sup>1</sup>See esp. Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1316–20, and Segal, *Language and Desire* passim.

<sup>2</sup>Skovgaard-Hansen, "Fall of Phaëthon" 111–12, has briefly studied the chariot motif in the play, but only in relation to divinities and from a very specific viewpoint.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. the discussion of Hippolytus' death in Euripides' second *Hippolytus*, by Segal, "Tragedy of the *Hippolytus*" 144–47.

<sup>4</sup>See, e.g., Davis, "First Chorus."

<sup>5</sup>On this issue see Davis, "*Vindicat omnes natura sibi*" 117–20; Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1312–20; Segal, *Language and Desire* 35 n. 10; Paschalis, "Minoan Thalassocracy," with reference to other versions.

Phaedra's ancestry, first on mother's side (Pasiphaë) and then on father's side (Minos).

1(a). *Apollo and the Cattle of Admetus*

The first of the amatory exempla concerns Apollo's servitude to Admetus:

Thessali Phoebus pecoris magister  
egit armentum positoque plectro  
impari tauros calamo uocauit.<sup>6</sup> (296–98)

The god is referred to as "keeper of the Thessalian herd" and represented as "driving cattle" (*egit armentum*) and "summoning the bulls" (*tauros . . . uocauit*) with his reed flute. Seneca places the emphasis on cattle and mentions specifically the bulls (*tauros*), whereas he could have preferred the version that the animals tended were horses (Hom. *Il.* 2.763–67) or horses, cattle, goats, and sheep (Call. *Hymn* 2.48–54).<sup>7</sup> That the emphasis on cattle and the mention of bulls in this context was intentional is also shown by *Hercules Furens* 451, the only other occurrence of this story in Seneca's plays. There the dramatist mentions *greges* (pastor *Pheraeos Delius pauit greges*). *Greges* is a rather vague term, but when used without qualification, it commonly applies to sheep.<sup>8</sup>

Davis notes that Apollo, in his capacity as sun god, is the father of Pasiphaë and grandfather of Phaedra, as repeatedly mentioned in the play.<sup>9</sup> In my view, the most important function of the Apollo and Admetus story is that it constitutes the archetype of Phaedra's love on her

<sup>6</sup>Except where otherwise indicated, the text in this study follows the edition of Zwierlein.

<sup>7</sup>It should, however, be noted that in pre-Senecan Roman and Hellenistic literature the most common version was that Apollo had been a cowherd; see Williams, *Hymn to Apollo* on line 48.

<sup>8</sup>*OLD* s.v. *grex* 1b.

<sup>9</sup>Davis, "First Chorus" 398–99, citing 124 (*stirpem . . . Solis*), 126 (*omne Phoebum genus*), and 654 (*Phoebi mei*). The sun god as Phaedra's ancestor is also mentioned at 154–55, 379–80, 678–79, and 889–90. Apollo in *Phaedra* is *Phoebus* (= "bright," "radiant") also in his other capacities, a name which facilitates his association with or assimilation to the sun god.

mother's side. Apollo served Admetus for love,<sup>10</sup> precisely as Phaedra desires to become Hippolytus' *famula*.<sup>11</sup> Apollo abandoned the lyre and tended bulls; Phaedra was attracted to "bull-like" Hippolytus.<sup>12</sup> On the divine level this first exemplum foreshadows the third one (309–16). There the Chorus allude to Diana's love for Endymion, who at 422 is said to have been a *pastor* (a "cowherd," according to [Theocr.] 20.37–39) and at 785–94 allusively fuses with Hippolytus.<sup>13</sup>

1(b). *Jupiter, Disguised as a Young Bull, Abducts Europa*

The list of exempla continues with Jupiter, who transforms himself first into a swan for the sake of Leda (301–2) and then into a young bull (*iuuencus*) for the sake of Europa:

fronte nunc torua petulans iuuencus  
uirginum strauit sua terga ludo,  
perque fraternos, noua regna, fluctus  
ungula lentos imitante remos  
pectore aduerso domuit profundum,  
pro sua uector timidus rapina. (303–8)

In terms of emphasis, Jupiter's transformation into a bull thus receives far greater prominence (six lines) than transformation into a swan (two lines).

Jupiter in bull's guise carried Europa from Phoenicia to Crete, where she bore to him Minos, the husband of Pasiphaë and father of Phaedra. Thus in genealogical terms the story is particularly relevant to the mythological background of the play.<sup>14</sup> But its greatest significance

<sup>10</sup>There was also a version of the myth according to which Apollo's service was punishment for killing the Cyclopes; cf. Williams, *Hymn to Apollo* on lines 49–50.

<sup>11</sup>*Me uel sororem, Hippolyte, uel famulam voca, / famulamque potius: omne seruitium feram* (611–12). On Phaedra's "fantasized *seruitium amoris*" see Segal, "Image and Action" 344.

<sup>12</sup>On Hippolytus' resemblance to the Cretan bull, object of Pasiphaë's love, see Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1316–20, and the discussion in section IV below.

<sup>13</sup>Coffey and Mayer on *Phaedra* 422 remind us that Seneca is the first Latin writer to allude to the tradition that Endymion was a *pastor* and also add that "*pastor* need not specify a shepherd since the word is used of anyone who tended animals, even chickens."

<sup>14</sup>See Davis, "First Chorus" 399.

lies in the theme of erotic attraction to a bull, which makes of this story the archetype, on her father's side, of Phaedra's illicit love for "bull-like" Hippolytus. Seneca is here clearly following Ovid, who lists the Jupiter-Europa story first in a series of *fatales amores* in Phaedra's family (*Iuppiter Euopen—prima est ea gentis origo— / dilexit, tauro dissimulante deum*, *Her.* 4.55–56), followed by Pasiphaë and the Cretan bull, and Ariadne and Theseus. It should also be noted that the epithet *torua* applied to the divine bull is one that this animal shares with the Cretan bull (117) and Hippolytus (416, 798) as well as with the monstrous bull from the sea (1063).<sup>15</sup>

There is also a less obvious though no less important aspect of the story of Jupiter and Europa. The divine bull that ravishes a virgin and then departs by way of the sea bears some analogy to the monstrous bull that is sent from the sea by Neptune and destroys young Hippolytus' life. Three details in Seneca's version of the Europa story support the analogy with the circumstances of Hippolytus' death: (1) Seneca devotes six lines to the Jupiter and Europa story, four of which (305–8) portray the bull in the sea; (2) the sea is referred to as "Neptune's realm" (305),<sup>16</sup> a detail which reminds the reader of Neptune's role in Hippolytus' death; and (3) the present version of the myth in which the bull *swims* in the sea—just as the monstrous bull comes *out of* the sea—differs from major pre-Senecan versions. In these the bull does not commonly immerse itself in the water but either walks on it or dips only its hooves (cf. Mosch. *Eur.* 113–61; Hor. *Od.* 3.27.25–32; Ov. *Met.* 2.870–73).<sup>17</sup> It is true that the idea of the bull's hooves used as oars (Sen. *Phaed.* 306) is found in Moschus (*Eur.* 143, *χηλαὶ δὲ τοῖ εἰσιν ἔρετμά*),<sup>18</sup> but as Coffey and Mayer note,<sup>19</sup> in Moschus "the bull is said to walk upon the water rather than swim: *χηλαῖς ἄβρεκτοῖσιν ἐπ' εὐρέα κύματα βαίνων* (114)."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> See further section IV of this study.

<sup>16</sup> Compare and contrast *HF* 9; *Oed.* 716; *HO* 550–53. Cf. also *Oct.* 206 and 766–67.

<sup>17</sup> An exception is the witty Ovidian version of *Fast.* 5.613–14: *saepe deus prudens tergum demisti in undas, / haereat ut collo fortius illa suo*.

<sup>18</sup> See Bühler, *Europa* ad loc.

<sup>19</sup> Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* ad loc.

<sup>20</sup> On the problem posed by the "contradictory" evidence provided by 114 and 143 see Bühler, *Europa* on 114, with documentation from art.



## 2. *The Unyoked Bull and the Golden Age Ideal*

At 525–39 Hippolytus compares his own life in the countryside with the life enjoyed in the primitive Golden Age. The imagery and phraseology employed in this account reflect Hippolytus' own style of life, character, and aspirations.<sup>21</sup> Toward the end of that passage Seneca touches upon the motif of "self-producing earth," one of the most frequently recurring elements in versions of the Golden Age myth.<sup>22</sup> Seneca's version can be broken down into three components: freedom, the unyoked bull, and pregnancy:

. . . iussa nec dominum pati  
iuncto ferebat terra seruitium boue:  
sed arua per se feta poscentes nihil  
pauere gentes . . . (535–38)

(a) The belief that primitive man did not own property is here presented in terms of the "freedom" primitive earth enjoyed (535–36). She is said to have suffered neither "a master's rule" nor the "slavery of the yoked ox." It is quite obvious that Hippolytus transfers to the earth his own ideal of *uita libera*. As for the idea of *seruitium*, here portrayed as something undesirable, this is consonant with Phaedra's world. The term *seruitium* recurs only at 612, where it is used to describe Phaedra's relation to Hippolytus.<sup>23</sup>

(b) The motif of untilled earth in Golden Age myth is more often presented through images of the absence of plough(share), ploughing, furrows, etc. rather than through reference to the animals themselves.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup>For the general idea see Segal, "Dissonant Sympathy" 244–47 and *Language and Desire* 77–105.

<sup>22</sup>See Gatz, *Weltalter* 203–4, and his index of *loci communes* 229 (BI 1 = *terra sua sponte victum ferens*).

<sup>23</sup>Quoted in note 11 above; cf. Segal, "Image and Action" 344.

<sup>24</sup>Hom. *Od.* 9.108–11; Hes. *Erg.* 117–18; Pl. *Pol.* 272; Lucr. 2.1157–59, 5.933–44; Virg. *Ecl.* 4.18–45 (but 41, *robustus quoque iam tauris iuga soluet arator*); Hor. *Epod.* 16.43; Varr. *LL* 5.108, *RR* 2.1.4; Ov. *Am.* 3.8.39, *Met.* 1.101–2, *Fast.* 4.396 (but 4.403, *illa iugo tauros collum praeberere coegit*, and 2.295, *nullus anhelabat sub adunco uomere taurus*), *Trist.* 3.12.6; Germ. *Arat.* 117–18; pseudo-Sen. *Oct.* 404–6 (but the beginning of decline 413–16, *premere subiectos iugo / tauros feroces* . . .); *Aetna* 9–15; Plut. *Sert.* 8; Claud. 10.60–68, *Rapt. Proserp.* 3.24 Hall; *Orac. Sibl.* 1.297. For more passages see Gatz, *Weltalter* 229.

Anyway, the image of the unyoked bull (*nec . . . iuncto boue*, 535–36) is found neither in Ovid *Metamorphoses* 1.101–102, a text which Seneca must have had in mind in composing the account at 527–38,<sup>25</sup> nor in Seneca's famous account of primitive times, in *Epistle* 90.35–46, nor in Virgil *Georgics* 1.125–28, which Seneca quotes in *Epistle* 90.37.<sup>26</sup>

The image of the unyoked bull is to be linked with Hippolytus' desire to remain free of the "yoke (of love)." The yoke motif in Seneca's *Phaedra* has been studied by Segal<sup>27</sup> but without examination of the present passage. The model is of course Pasiphaë's bull at 117: the Cretan bull is described as *impatiens iugi* in a context which combines the literal and metaphorical meanings of *iugum* = "yoke (of love)."<sup>28</sup> The bull that is "intolerant of the yoke" closely resembles Hippolytus, the object of *Phaedra*'s love.

(c) The "fields that become pregnant of themselves" (*arua per se feta*) are a formulation of the "spontaneity motif" of Golden Age myth that has no parallel in earlier Latin literature, neither in Virgil nor in Ovid, nor elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> It is also absent from Seneca's long account of the Golden Age in *Epistle* 90<sup>30</sup> and from *Georgics* 1.125–28, quoted there.<sup>31</sup> In the present account the notion of spontaneous pregnancy makes sense as a *reply* to the Nurse's argument (466–80) for the necessity of love (Venus), which guarantees reproduction and regeneration in nature.

<sup>25</sup>*Met.* 1.101–2, *ipsa quoque immunis rastroque intacta nec ullis / saucia uomeribus per se dabat omnia tellus*. According to Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* on 527–38, the description of primitive times is "an enterprising conflation of two similar passages in *Ov. Am.* 3.8.41–48 and *Met.* 1.94–102. Seneca has exactly preserved the order of thought as he found it in his model (no boundary stones, no sailing, sea–shore the natural boundary, no defences, no weapons, no ploughing)."

<sup>26</sup>*Ep.* 90.36–43 has many things in common with Hippolytus' account of life in the countryside and in the Golden Age. The image of the "yoked bull" occurs in the account of man's decline from the Golden Age given by the author of *Oct.* 413–16: *premere subiectos iugo / tauros feroces, uomere immunem prius / sulcare terram, laesa quae fruges suas / interius alte condidit sacro sinu*.

<sup>27</sup>Segal, "Image and Action" 343–46.

<sup>28</sup>Cf. Segal, "Image and Action" 344.

<sup>29</sup>Grimal, *Phaedra* ad loc., compares *Lucr.* 2.994: *(terra) feta parit nitidas fruges arbustaque laeta*.

<sup>30</sup>*Ep.* 90.40, *terra ipsa fertilior erat inlaborata*.

<sup>31</sup>*Nulli subigebant arua coloni; / ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum / fas erat: in medium quaerebant, ipsaque tellus / omnia liberius nullo poscente ferebat*. Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* ad loc., observe that 537 amalgamates elements from *Virg. Geo.* 1.128 (*nullo poscente*) and *Ov. Met.* 1.102 (*per se*).

3. *Taurus*

In a well-known simile in poem 64 Catullus compares Theseus' slaying of the Mino-*taurus* to a tree uprooted by a whirlwind on the summit of *Taurus*, the mountain range in southern Asia Minor (105–11). The simile is bracketed by *Taurus* in 105 and *cornua* in 111. This name-play involving Mount Taurus and the Minotaur, offspring of the Cretan bull, prompted me to investigate the function of the place/ethnic name *Taurus* in Seneca's *Phaedra*, where the bull theme (Cretan bull, Minotaur, etc.) plays such a prominent role:

- (a) Compesce amoris impii flammas, precor,  
 nefasque quod non ulla tellus barbara  
 commisit umquam, non uagi campis Getae  
 nec inhospitalis Taurus aut sparsus Scythes;  
 expelle facinus mente castifica horridum  
memorque matris metue concubitus nouos.  
 miscere thalamos patris et gnati apparas  
 uteroque prolem capere confusam impio?  
 perge et nefandis uerte naturam ignibus.  
 cur monstra cessant? aula cur fratris uacat?  
 prodigia totiens orbis insueta audiet,  
 natura totiens legibus cedet suis,  
 quotiens amabit Cressa? (165–77)

- (b) et qui ferebant signa Phoebeae facis  
 oculi nihil gentile nec patrium micant.  
 lacrimae cadunt per ora et assiduo genae  
 rore irrigantur, qualiter Tauri iugis  
 tepido madescunt imbre percussae niues. (379–83)

- (c) hunc Graia tellus aluit an Taurus Scythes  
 Colchusque Phasis? (906–7)

First, three points of general nature.

(1) It is striking that three of the four occurrences of the place/ethnic name *Taurus* in Seneca's tragedies are found in *Phaedra*,<sup>32</sup> given that the essential story of *Phaedra* and Hippolytus has no mythological or geographical connection with it. The fourth occurrence is found in

<sup>32</sup>Cf. also pseudo-Sen. *Oct.* 980, *Taurorum barbara tellus*.

*Medea* (at 683), which is hardly a surprise. In fact one would have expected reverse statistics, considering that the story of Jason and Medea begins in Colchis and that in Seneca's *Medea* the memory of the past persists throughout the play.

(2) *Taurus* in passage (a) is ambiguous. It is not clear whether it is an ethnic name (inhabitants of the Chersonesus Taurica) or a place name (Mount Taurus).<sup>33</sup> It is also significant that Seneca employs the singular form *Taurus* throughout, instead of using the normal plural *Tauri* for the people<sup>34</sup> and the singular *Taurus* for the mountain. The consistently singular form intrigues the reader and makes it easier to visualize *Taurus* as another of the mythical bulls in *Phaedra*.

(3) It is not quite clear why *Taurus Scythes Colchusque Phasis* are mentioned in passage (c). Commentators remind us that Colchis was the home of Medea and that the reference may suggest witchcraft. They further note that *Taurus Scythes* alludes to practices of human sacrifice and to the Amazons. Except for the association of *Colchusque Phasis* with the Amazons, all other suggestions are out of place in this tragedy.

From these general considerations we may now move to the evidence that links the name *Taurus* with the bull theme. All three occurrences of *Taurus* are inserted in contexts which refer to the illicit (unnatural) passion involving Phaedra and her stepson. In passage (a) the Nurse uses the strongest language possible to dissuade Phaedra from the *impius amor* that violates the laws of nature. The simile of passage (b) applies to Phaedra's tears, provoked by unrequited love, and concludes the Nurse's long list of Phaedra's love symptoms (360–83). Passage (c) belongs to Theseus' angry outburst upon learning from Phaedra's lips that his son Hippolytus has attempted to rape her (903–58). All three passages involve the issue of *heredity* in erotic matters, which in *Phaedra* is closely linked with the bull motif.

In passage (a) the Nurse states the case very clearly. No barbarian has ever committed such a dreadful crime; Phaedra should remember Pasiphaë's love for the Cretan bull, the offspring of which was the monstrous Minotaur; her affair with Hippolytus is bound to bring to the world another "Minotaur-like" creature. The association of strong and passionate feelings or criminal deeds with remote lands and barbarians

<sup>33</sup> Grimal, *Phaedra*, and Boyle, *Phaedra ad loc.*, take *Taurus* in passage (a) as a collective singular for *Tauri*, "inhabitants of the Chersonesus Taurica (modern Crimea)," while Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra*, and DeMeo, *Phaedra ad loc.*, refer it to Mount Taurus and understand it as metonymy (the place for its inhabitants).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. pseudo-Sen. *Oct.* 980, *Taurorum barbara tellus*.

is a rhetorical commonplace in Seneca,<sup>35</sup> but *Taurus* in such a context occurs only in passages (a) and (c). It is highly significant that in passage (a), *inhospitalis Taurus* (168) is a modified version of the Horatian phrase *inhospitalis Caucasus*,<sup>36</sup> which Seneca retains verbatim in his other plays and in analogous situations: at *Thyestes* 1048 with reference to the crime of Atreus,<sup>37</sup> and at *Medea* 43 with reference to Medea's vengeance.<sup>38</sup>

The larger context of passage (c)—Theseus' speech accusing Hippolytus of the rape—also dwells on the hereditary nature of illicit and perverse erotic relations.<sup>39</sup> In the opening lines (903–14) Theseus attributes Hippolytus' supposed infamy to his Amazon descent, by specifically denouncing the erotic life of the Amazons, which violates not just Greek but even animal standards for behavior: Hippolytus shows the stain of an unspeakable race; in his degeneracy he reverts to and reproduces the original stock, the abominable race of the Amazons.

At 906–7 the speech contrasts Hippolytus' lineage on his father's side (*Graia tellus*) with his lineage on his mother's side (*Taurus Scythes*). (Contrast 658–60, where Phaedra appreciates both sides of her stepson's lineage and mentions not *Taurus Scythes* but *Scythicus . . . rigor*.)<sup>40</sup> It is also notable that Seneca relates the Amazons specifically to the Chersonesus Taurica *only* in this passage.<sup>41</sup> All these elements suggest that *Taurus* (*Scythes*, adj.) may be alluding to the bull theme of the play, with respect to Hippolytus' illicit and unnatural erotic behavior in his (supposed) attempt to rape his stepmother.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>35</sup>Canter, *Rhetorical Elements* 81–83.

<sup>36</sup>*Ep.* 1.12; *Od.* 1.22.6–7 (according to Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* ad loc.).

<sup>37</sup>*Thy.* 1048, *quis inhospitalis Caucasi rupem asperam . . .*

<sup>38</sup>*Med.* 43, *inhospitalem Caucasum mente induit . . .*

<sup>39</sup>In the broader context of 898–914 we encounter the highest concentration of words for "race" in *Phaedra*: four occurrences of *genus*, two of *gens*, and the compound *degener*.

<sup>40</sup>*Est genitor in te totus et toruae tamen / pars aliqua matris miscet ex aequo decus: / in ore Graio Scythicus apparet rigor.*

<sup>41</sup>In other plays Seneca mentions Scythia or nearby territory or the home of the Amazons by the Thermodon on the north coast of Asia Minor near Themiscyra: *HF* 533–46, *Tro.* 12–13, *Med.* 215, *HF* 246. At *Phaed.* 399–401 Phaedra locates the Amazons on the north coast of the Euxine, around the Maeotis and Tanais; so does Hippolytus at 715–16, where, contrary to Theseus, he views his Amazon descent positively, since he attributes to it his chaste way of life.

<sup>42</sup>From *toruae . . . matris* (658–59) it appears that Antiope, Hippolytus' Amazon mother, shares with her son the epithet *toruus* (416, 798), an essential feature of the bull (117, 303, 1063; see further section IV of this study).

The phrase *Colchusque Phasis*<sup>43</sup> links Hippolytus with Medea, but not in terms of witchcraft. Given the importance Seneca attaches to the role of heredity in this play, Medea was important to him as wife of Aegeus and stepmother of Theseus, whom she attempted to poison through trickery. To Hippolytus she is the "archetypally evil *nouerca* of the play."<sup>44</sup> In reacting with horror to Phaedra's advances he denounces her confessed passion as not only worse than Pasiphaë's love for the bull and its monstrous offspring (687–93) but also as worse than Medea's (*Colchide nouerca*) attempt on his father's life (696–97). It is also highly significant that immediately prior to his own outburst, Theseus has recognized with horror (by the sword he sees in Phaedra's hands) that his son Hippolytus is her supposed ravisher (898–901)—precisely as his own father, Aegeus, had once recognized him by the distinctive family marks on his sword hilt at the very moment when Medea was about to offer him a cup of poisoned wine.<sup>45</sup> In Theseus' speech Hippolytus' "descent" from Medea is probably based on the analogy of two hideous crimes in the same family involving a stepmother and a stepson.<sup>46</sup>

*Iugum* (*iuga*) recurs often in Seneca's *Phaedra* in the sense of "yoke" ([love] bondage) and "mountain ridge," and displays erotic connotations.<sup>47</sup> Context also allusively links these two apparently distinct meanings: at 611–14 *famulam* (twice) and *seruitium* are illustrated through the image of *ingredi Pindi iugis*; at 486–92 the image of life spent *montium . . . iugis* is contrasted with the pursuit of power and specifically with the image of becoming a slave to it (*non ille regno seruit*); and at 233–40 Hippolytus' clinging to *collis . . . iugis* is contrasted with the idea of his "yielding" (. . . *seque mulcendum dabit . . . haud uinci potest*) to Phaedra's love. Passage (b) above tells us that Phaedra's eyes no

<sup>43</sup> Colchis and Phasis are repeatedly named in *Medea* (at 451 they occur together). In two instances Medea herself is antonomastically called *Colchis* (871) and *Phasis* (102); cf. *HO* 950, *Phasiaca coniunx*.

<sup>44</sup> Segal, *Language and Desire* 171, citing *Phaed.* 558 and 563–64 (Hippolytus' words to the Nurse).

<sup>45</sup> Here Seneca echoes *Ov. Met.* 7.419–23; see the discussion in Segal, *Language and Desire* 169–71 and Paschalis, "Parvis or Patriis."

<sup>46</sup> It is likely that the text is also alluding to Medea's other crimes against her kin, e.g., the dismemberment of Absyrtus, which Seneca stresses in *Medea*; cf. *Tro.* 1104–5 (of the murder of Astyanax), *quis Colchus hoc, quis sedis incertae Scythia / commisit . . .*, or the murder of her children; cf. Hippolytus at *Phaed.* 557, *perimuntque fetus impiae matres suos*.

<sup>47</sup> Segal, "Image and Action" 343–46; note esp. the "yoke of Venus" at 577.

longer shine with their ancestral light (because continual weeping has dimmed them); the tears coming down her cheeks are compared to the melting snows on "Taurus' ridges" in the warm rains of spring. *Taurus* occurs again in a context which involves hereditary features and also subjugation to illicit love (see the whole passage, 360–83). Most importantly, Phaedra's situation is marked by a shift from positive hereditary features (379–80) to the image of *Tauri iuga* (381–83), which has the obvious advantage of suggesting *tauri iuga*.<sup>48</sup> In this context *Tauri iuga* seems to evoke either the erotic motifs of the bull and the yoke in a general fashion, or Phaedra's desired subjugation of Hippolytus.

## II. THE ROLE OF THE HORSES IN THE ACCOUNT OF HIPPOLYTUS' DEATH

One aspect of the messenger's account of Hippolytus' death (1000–1114) that differentiates it from its main literary models (Euripides' second *Hippolytus*, 1173–1248 [1254], and *Ov. Met.* 15.506–29)<sup>49</sup> is the different role played by Hippolytus' horses:

tum uero pauida sonipedes mente exciti  
imperia soluunt seque luctantur iugo  
eripere rectique in pedes iactant onus.

Praeceptis in ora fusus implicuit cadens  
laqueo tenaci corpus et quanto magis  
pugnat, sequaces hoc magis nodos ligat.  
sensere pecudes facinus—et curru leui,  
dominante nullo, qua timor iussit ruunt.  
talis per auras non suum agnoscens onus  
Solique falso creditum indignans diem  
Phaethonta currus deuio<sup>50</sup> excussit polo.

(1082–92)

<sup>48</sup>Cf., e.g., Virg. *Ecl.* 4.41, *tauris iuga*. The fourth instance of *Taurus* in the tragedies occurs at *Med.* 681–84, where Medea summons all destructive and monstrous things for the magic potion she is preparing: *pestes uocat quascumque feruentis creat / harena Libyae quasque perpetua nive / Taurus coerces frigore Arctoo rigens, / et omne monstrum. Taurus and Arctoo* in this list could be taken as alluding to *taurus*, "bull," and ἄρκτος, "bear."

<sup>49</sup>On Seneca's narrative in relation to its models see Zintzen, *Hypomnema* 116–24; Liebermann, *Studien* 14–45; and Segal, "Senecan Baroque."

<sup>50</sup>Axelsson's emendation of *deuio* to *deuium*, adopted by Zwierlein *Tragoediae* ad loc., has correctly been rejected by all later editors: Boyle, Coffey and Mayer, and DeMeo.

It is immediately obvious that in Seneca the horses are assigned a more active role in what provokes the youth's death. As I argue below, their role may not be entirely unintentional and seems to exceed what panic alone would have justified.

(a) Liebermann<sup>51</sup> notes that Seneca does not mention the monstrous bull after 1081, whereas in Euripides the bull and the horses disappear together into the rocky earth (1247–48). In Liebermann's view the monstrous animal has played his part; there is no longer reason for his presence. This is not a totally satisfactory explanation. I think that Seneca goes beyond Euripides' hint that the horses eventually relapse into their wild state. What he seems to be suggesting is that from 1082 onward Hippolytus' horses somehow *take the place* of the monstrous bull. Note that *pecudes* of horses at 1088 is unparalleled in Seneca—he employs the word only of cattle and sheep—and may suggest that Hippolytus' horses are being deliberately assimilated to cattle.

(b) In Euripides (1232–33) it is the bull, chasing the frightened animals, that brings down and overturns the chariot, dashing the wheel (actually the “felly”) against a rock; in Ovid (15.522–23) one of the wheels of the speeding chariot breaks upon a tree trunk.<sup>52</sup> In Seneca the horses are seized with terror before the charging monster and “rear up and cast their burden down.”<sup>53</sup>

(c) Another important point is the sense of *facinus* at 1088, *sensere pecudes facinus*. Although some have attempted to treat it as semantically neutral here, it is difficult to disregard its moral side.<sup>54</sup> All other occurrences of the word in this play are invariably negative in sense and display a strong moral dimension: Phaedra's passion for Hippolytus and the attempted “rape” of Phaedra (six instances, 146, 151, 169, 732, 898, 1186) and Theseus' curse of his son (1251). In light of this evidence it

<sup>51</sup>Liebermann, *Studien* 43.

<sup>52</sup>Zintzen, *Hypomnema* on 1083, quotes also Paus. 2.32.10. In this account the reins are caught in a wild olive tree and the chariot is overturned; hence the tree received the name ῥάχος στρεπτός.

<sup>53</sup>Or “cast their burden at their feet,” depending on the sense of *in pedes* (1084). There may be here an echo of Euripides' ἀνέχαισεν (1232), which is normally used of a horse that throws its rider (cf. Barrett, *Hippolytos* ad loc.). Liebermann, *Studien* 43 n. 98, compares Niphaeus' horses at Virg. *Aen.* 10.572–74.

<sup>54</sup>Jakobi, *Einfluss Ovids* 87, takes *facinus* as neutral, in the sense of “event” (*OLD* s.v. *facinus* 1a); Boyle, *Phaedra* translates “deed”; see, however, Liebermann, *Studien* 43 n. 99. *TLL* VI 78.69–70 gives this meaning under I B (“*de malis, quae non homine auctore existunt—calamitas, misera sim*”) and glosses it with *Hippolyti perniciem*.



may not be overbold to assume that 1088 actually means "the horses felt their (wrong) deed."

Points (b) and (c) make better sense if considered together with (d), on Hippolytus' comparison with Phaëthon.

(d) Starting at 1083 the Senecan narrative betrays the influence of Ovid's account of the Fall of Phaëthon in the *Metamorphoses*, which culminates here in a Hippolytus-Phaëthon simile (1090-92). Specifically *iugo eripere* (1083-84) echoes *Metamorphoses* 2.315, *iugo eripiunt*; *onus* at 1084 and *non suum agnoscens onus* at 1090 (in the Phaëthon simile) echo Ovid's Phaëthon story: *sed leue pondus erat, nec quod cognoscere possent* (2.161) and *sic onere adsueto uacuuus* (2.165). Finally (the intervening) lines 1088-89, *sensere pecudes . . . ruunt* echo lines 2.167, 150 and 202-4 of Ovid's Phaëthon story.<sup>55</sup> Even the image of Hippolytus' horses veering from the road (*iamque derrantes uia*, 1069) reproduces in some form the classic version of Phaëthon's horses that leave their accustomed path (*deuio . . . polo*, 1092). The association of Hippolytus with Phaëthon is in keeping with the play's repeated linkage of Hippolytus—and other characters—with celestial bodies<sup>56</sup> and echoes a broader mythical and literary tradition.<sup>57</sup>

In the Phaëthon simile (1090-92) the team *deliberately throw Phaëthon off* because "they do not know their burden" and, mainly, because "they are indignant the day had been entrusted to a false Sun." Seneca differs at this point not only from his immediate model (Ov. *Met.* 2.311-18)<sup>58</sup> but also from the classic version of the myth, according to which the horses first leave their accustomed path because Phaëthon cannot keep control of them and because they sense an unfamiliar driver; next Phaëthon is invariably struck and hurled from the chariot by Jupiter's thunderbolt (= *Phaëthon fulmine ictus* or *fulminatus*).<sup>59</sup> That is pre-

<sup>55</sup>On all these echoes (and more) of Ovid's narrative of the Fall of Phaëthon see Jakobi, *Einfluss Ovids* 86-89.

<sup>56</sup>Skovgaard-Hansen, "Fall of Phaëthon," treats Hippolytus as the likeness of a celestial body in orbit whose radiance affects Phaedra.

<sup>57</sup>Liebermann, *Studien* 43 n. 104. Very useful is Reckford, "Phaëthon," who examines the imagery of horses, yoking, and the wrecked chariot and especially the theme of the "yoke of marriage and destruction" in Euripides' second *Hippolytus* and *Phaëthon*. Cf. further the Hesiodic version of the myth (*Theog.* 986-91), in which Phaëthon is the beautiful son of Eos, loved by Aphrodite, and carried off to guard her temple forever. For a useful survey of the myth see Diggle, *Phaëthon* 3-32.

<sup>58</sup>As noted by Liebermann, *Studien* 43 n. 103.

<sup>59</sup>See esp. *Schol. Hom. Od.* 17.208 (= Aesch. *Heliades* p. 185 Radt); Pl. *Tim.* 22c;

cisely the version Seneca adopts in his other plays, for instance at *Medea* 826–27 (*et uiuacis fulgura flammae / de cognato Phaethonte tuli*).<sup>60</sup> One gets the impression that Seneca has here transferred the reaction of “indignation” from Jupiter to Phaëthon’s horses.<sup>61</sup> From that viewpoint, Seneca’s Phaëthon simile—and consequently all prior reminiscences of the Phaëthon story in the play—would seem to suggest that Hippolytus’ horses deliberately throw off their rider.

The horses also play an unprecedented role in the account of the mangling and mutilation of Hippolytus’ body (1093–1104). Points (e) and (f) address this issue.

(e) As the youth becomes entangled in the reins and is dragged along, rocks, brambles, and stones mangle his flesh and body (1093–96).<sup>62</sup> At some point the chariot wheels, still speeding (*ueloces*), trundle over (*peruoluunt*) his dying limbs (1097). This is clearly a Senecan detail, for in both Euripides and Ovid the chariot has already been wrecked.

(f) Finally, Hippolytus’ body becomes impaled on the burnt stake of a tree stump (1098–1102); this momentarily stops the horses; then, as they start again, they tear Hippolytus’ body apart: *et pariter moram / dominumque rumpunt* (1101–2). The gruesomeness of this description has always attracted attention, but no note has been taken that *pariter moram / dominumque rumpunt* raises the suspicion of an intentional action.

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Apollon. *Argon.* 4.597–600; Diod. Sic. 5.23; Cic. *De Off.* 3.94; Catull. 64.291; Lucr. 5.397–401; Varro Atacinus fr. 10 Morel; Germ. *Arat.* 364–65; Hor. *Od.* 4.11.25; Ov. *Met.* 2.311–13; Hyg. *Fab.* 152a, 154; Plin. *NH* 37.31; Stat. *Theb.* 1.216–21 and Lact. *Plac.* ad loc.; Luc. *Dial. Deor.* 25(24).1; Nemes. *Cyneg.* 34–37; Auson. *Ep.* 27.18–19; Nonn. *Dion.* 38.410–11; Serv. on Virg. *Aen.* 10.189.

<sup>60</sup> Also *Med.* 601–2, *quos polo sparsit furiosus ignes / ipse recepit*; *HO* 853–54, *emitte telum quale in errantem prius / Phaëthonta missum est*.

<sup>61</sup> Cf., e.g., Diod. Sic. 5.23.1, διὸ καὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγανακτήσαντος ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγενημένοις, χειραινῶσαι μὲν τὸν Φαέθοντα . . . ; Lucr. 5.397, *at pater omnipotens ira tum percitus acri*. . . .

<sup>62</sup> Boyle, “Nature’s Bonds” 1302–3, discusses the death of Hippolytus as a manifestation of *natura uindex*. Hippolytus is “ravaged” (*populatur*) by the *natura* he had worshiped. The hunter falls victim to the instruments of hunting: “Diana’s kingdom of field, rock, bramble, bush and tree tears his flesh and his body apart in a grotesque and unambiguous orgy of sexual violence (1093–1104).”

## III. OTHER HORSE IMAGERY AND THEMES

1. *Hippolytus and Horse Imagery*

Both Virgil and Ovid suggest that by name, Hippo-lytus is "the man rent by (his) horses."<sup>63</sup> Seneca hints at this etymology at 1106, *per illa qua distractus Hippolytus loca* (an adaptation of Virg. *Aen.* 7.767). Another instance in *Phaedra* where one may detect a play on the components of the name is 1055, *Hippolytus artis continet frenis equos*. The *Hippo-* ("horse") component of the name at the beginning of the line is glossed by *equos* at the end, and the *-lytus* ("loose," from λύω) component is followed by *artis* ("tight"), an epithet of the opposite sense.<sup>64</sup>

Hippolytus' (excellence in) horsemanship emerges in different parts of the play and, mainly, in the messenger's account of his death (809–11, 1000–1114, 1258–60). In her apostrophe to Hippolytus (435–82) and in their subsequent conversation, the Nurse applies to him an interesting sequence of horse(–riding) metaphors. Initially she urges him to enjoy life, employing metaphors from galloping horses and from horse–riding:<sup>65</sup>

Exultet animus! Cur toro uiduo iaces?  
tristem iuuentam solue; nunc cursus rape,  
effunde habenas . . . (448–50)

Later on, the horse imagery is adapted to a darkening course of argumentation. At 464 the Nurse expresses her disapproval of life spent on horse–breaking (*cursibus domitent equos*). In the end she applies horse–breaking terminology to love: now it is *Hippo-lytus*' turn to be "broken in" like a horse. Specifically she warns the youth that Cupid often puts

<sup>63</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 7.767, *turbatis distractus equis*; Ov. *Fast.* 3.265, *loris [furiis] direptus equorum*; and Met. 15.542–43, *nomenque simul, quod possit equorum / admonuisse iubet deponere*.

<sup>64</sup> The *-lytus/artis* play is an etymology κατ' ἀντιφράσιν. Zintzen, *Hypomnema* 116–24, suggests that *imperia soluunt* (1083, of Hippolytus' horses) also conceals a play on Hippolytus' name.

<sup>65</sup> See Grimal, *Phaedra* ad loc. Segal, "Image and Action" 353–54, discusses the same images as "metaphors of looseness and flowing." Note also *exultet*, which may allude to animal (horse) imagery.

the bridle on stubborn hearts; even his Amazon mother felt the "yoke of Venus":<sup>66</sup>

Saepe obstinatis induit frenos Amor  
et odia mutat. regna materna aspice:  
illae feroces sentiunt Veneris iugum;  
testaris istud unicus gentis puer.

(574–77)

## 2. *Diana's Horses*

The theme of Diana–Luna guiding her chariot through the sky occurs five times in this play, all of them in the lyric parts: once in the first choral ode (309–16), once in Phaedra's (or the Nurse's) invocation of Diana (420–22), and three times in the second choral ode (745–47, 767, 785–94).<sup>67</sup> The connotations are erotic throughout. In two instances the image of Diana abandoning or stopping (losing control of) her horses (309–16, 785–94) functions as a metaphor for her falling in love. Strictly relevant is a third instance (420–22), where exercising control over the horses (literally "over the night sky") implies the opposite, that Diana is not affected by love (422). A fourth instance (745–47) is inserted in the Sapphic encomium of Hippolytus' beauty (743–48). This may be the only passage in classical Greek and Latin poetry<sup>68</sup> where the Sapphic image of the full moon outshining the stars appears in the version of a personified Moon on her chariot. The fifth instance is *et noctes breuibus praecipitat rotis* (767),<sup>69</sup> which is inserted in the (inherently erotic) motif of "fleeing beauty." The image of midday heat raging and causing the nights to hasten on short wheels (766–67) is in essence an adaptation of the image of the Sun taking over the chariot of Diana–Luna (309–16).

<sup>66</sup>For the image of 574–75 see Grimal, *Phaedra* ad loc.; for *iugum* applied to horses in this play see 1002 and 1083. Compare further and contrast the Nurse's advice to Phaedra at 134–37.

<sup>67</sup>There is a remarkable accumulation of horse imagery in this choral ode, which includes also praise of Hippolytus' horsemanship at 809–11.

<sup>68</sup>Compare and contrast *Med.* 93–97; cf. the list of passages given by Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary on Horace* on 1.12.48.

<sup>69</sup>I retain with Grimal, Zwielerlein, and Boyle the manuscript reading *praecipitat* against Grovoni's emendation *praecipitant*.

## IV. THE INTERPLAY OF THE BULL AND THE HORSE

Seneca's *Phaedra* reveals in several passages an interplay (juxtaposition) of bull imagery and horse imagery. The most conspicuous instances are discussed below.

1. *The First Choral Ode*

Earlier my discussion of the mythological exempla of divine amours in the first choral ode noted that they form an interesting sequence of animal references. It is indeed remarkable that in the first two exempla (Apollo and Admetus, Jupiter and Europa) the bull plays a prominent role, and even more remarkable that the third (309–16) deals with horses. Having fallen in love with Endymion, Diana–Luna gives her chariot to her brother to drive it in her place, presumably so that she can go a–lovemaking. Next Seneca describes, in a typically Ovidian fashion,<sup>70</sup> the almost comic situation that arises as Apollo undertakes to drive the chariot in the night sky. In this story seven of the eight lines are devoted to chariot–driving.

The pattern bull–bull–horse observed in the first three exempla is actually more complex than it looks, because in the third story horse imagery is balanced by a possible allusion to bull imagery. As already noted, Endymion, Diana's lover, is in Seneca a *pastor* (422) and in [Theocritus] 20.37–39 specifically a cowherd (βουκόλος).

2. *Hippo–lytus and the Bull*

Boyle has explored in detail the analogy between Hippolytus and the Cretan (Pasiphaë's) bull as well as between Hippolytus and the monstrous bull from the sea and has shown that they share a strikingly common phraseology.<sup>71</sup> And (as seen above in section III.1) Hippolytus

<sup>70</sup>Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* ad loc.

<sup>71</sup>Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1316–20. At 116–18 the bull is described as *pecoris efferum saeui ducem* / . . . *toruus, impatiens iugi* / . . . *ductor indomiti gregis*. Boyle provides the following list of epithets used to describe Hippolytus: *intractabilis* (229, 271, 580), *ferus* (240, 272, 414), *saeuus* (273), *immitis* (231, 273), *rigens* ("unbending," 423; cf. *rigor*, 660, 686), *toruus* (416, 798), *ferox* (416, 1064), *truculentus* (461), *siluester* ("woods–dweller," 461), *efferatus* (923). Skovgaard–Hansen, "Fall of Phaëthon" 104, points out

is also portrayed as a horse-tamer or a horse. There are two instances in *Phaedra* in which *Hippo*-lytus impressively interplays with bull and horse imagery.

The first concerns *Phaedra*'s (or the Nurse's) prayer to *Diana*, in which the goddess's help is invoked for the attempt to win over *Hippolytus*:

animum rigentem tristis Hippolyti doma:  
det facilis aures; mitiga pectus ferum;  
amare discat, mutuos ignes ferat  
innecte mentem: toruus auersus ferox  
in iura Veneris redeat. huc uires tuas  
intende: sic te lucidi uultus ferant  
et nube rupta cornibus puris eas,  
sic te regentem frena nocturni aetheris  
detrahere numquam Thessali cantus queant  
nullus de te gloriam pastor ferat. (413-22)

As noted by Boyle, the vocabulary employed at 413-16 alludes to the taming of a wild animal and conspicuously links *Hippolytus* with the Cretan bull. *Hippolytus*, object of *Phaedra*'s love, resembles the Cretan bull, object of *Pasiphaë*'s love.<sup>72</sup> But *Hippo*(lyti) *doma* also alludes to the taming of horses, and *Diana* is called upon to "subdue" *Hippolytus*' unbending heart in the same way as she exercises control over her horses (419). Finally, as already noted, horse imagery at 420 is balanced by bull imagery concealed in *pastor* (422).

The second instance concerns *Hippo*-lytus' encounter with the monstrous bull:

et torua currus ante trepidantes stetit.  
contra feroci gnatus insurgens minax  
uultu nec ora mutat et magnum intonat:

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that the epithets which associate *Hippolytus* with the bull are employed not just by a single character but by everyone: the Chorus, the Messenger, the Nurse, *Theseus*, *Phaedra*, and *Hippolytus* himself.

<sup>72</sup>Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1316; cf. 116-18, quoted in note 71 above. It is worthy of attention that at 416 Coffey and Mayer, *Phaedra* ad loc., have now reintroduced *Ascensius*' emendation (supported by Koetschau, 1902) of *innecte* to *inflecte* on the grounds that it "better suits the metaphorical field established by *doma* and *mitiga*, since all three verbs look to the management of animals."

"haud frangit animum uanus hic terror meum:  
nam mihi paternus uincere est tauros labor."  
Inobsequentes protinus frenis equi  
rapuere currum . . .

(1063–69)

In this encounter, which is bracketed by references to *Hippo*-lytus' horses (1063–68), man and animal face each other like two bulls.<sup>73</sup> *Hippo*-lytus (ironically) identifies himself with Theseus the "bull-slayer," an allusion to his father's killing of the Minotaur and/or the Marathonian bull.

### 3. *The Horns of the Moon*

Moschus' *Europa* is one of several contexts in the Greek and Latin authors where the horns of the bull are compared to the shape of the crescent moon<sup>74</sup> (here quite eloquently called "horned moon"):

Ισά τε ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι κέρα ἀνέτελλε καρήνου  
ἀντυγος ἡμτόμου, κεραῆς ἅτε κύκλα σελήνης. (Mosch. *Eur.* 87–88)

But while in Greek there is a distinction between κέρας (= "horn of an animal") and κεράλα (= "horn of the crescent moon"), in Latin the same word, *cornu*, is used for both. This could lead to ambiguity, even to subtleties like Valerius Flaccus 4.361–62, *primae referentem cornua Phoebeas / indomitamque bouem* (of Io transformed into a cow). In *Phaedra* the horns of the moon are mentioned twice, and in both instances they significantly precede a reference to the horses of the Moon. The juxtaposition of horns and horses is essentially a variation of the interplay of the bull and the horse.

The first instance is 419–20, *et nube rupta cornibus puris eas, / sic te regentem frena nocturni aetheris*, occurring within the prayer to Diana (413–22, quoted and discussed above). The horns and the horses of the Moon follow an allusive association of Hippolytus with the Cretan bull (413–16). The ambiguous phrasing of 419,<sup>75</sup> in combination with the horse image in the next line (420), gives the impression of Diana–Luna

<sup>73</sup>For *torua* (1063) and *feroci* . . . *uultu* (1064–65) see Boyle, "Nature's Bonds" 1316–20.

<sup>74</sup>Bühler, *Europa* ad loc.; Bömer, *Metamorphosen* on 9.688.

<sup>75</sup>Contrast Virg. *Geo.* 1.433, *pura neque obtunsis per caelum cornibus ibit*.

driving her chariot through the clouds as a bull charges through a barrier.

The second instance is found in the second choral ode:

. . . cum suos ignes coeunte cornu  
iunxit et curru properante pernox  
 exerit uultus rubicunda Phoebe . . . (745–47)

If one looked only at 746–47, it might perhaps seem that the (missing) object of *iunxit* is *equos* or some other Latin term for “horse.” In other words, the text gives for a moment the impression of Diana harnessing (yoking) her horses, though in fact the reference is to the Moon joining the horns of her crescent to form the full disc.

#### 4. *The Horned Animal*

Of the four occurrences of *corniger* in Seneca’s tragedies, one is found at *Oedipus* 810 and refers to goats (*cornigeros greges*). The other three, all in *Phaedra*, apply to bulls: the monstrous bull from the sea, the Minotaur, and Dionysus, the god represented and worshiped as a bull.<sup>76</sup> All three contexts present a juxtaposition of horn (= bull) and horse:

ac mitra cohibens cornigerum caput  
 non uinces rigidas Hippolyti comas. (756–57)

corniger ponti horridus.  
 tum uero pauida sonipedes mente exciti  
 imperia soluunt . . . (1081–83)

Hippolyte . . .  
 . . . membra quis . . .  
 taurus biformis ore cornigero ferox  
 diuulsit? (1168–73)

The monstrous bull from the sea and the Minotaur fit into what we have seen so far. But what connection does Dionysus have with the mythological texture of the play? The link lies in the story of Ariadne, which

<sup>76</sup>See, briefly, Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary on Horace on Od. 2.19.29*.



plays an important role in this tragedy as part of Phaedra's amorous heredity. The reference to Dionysus' "horned head" (756) occurs in a context where Hippolytus' beauty is favorably compared to Bacchus' and where the Chorus remind the god that Phaedra's sister (Ariadne) preferred the youth's father (Theseus) to him (753–60). As for Bacchus's horns, it may not be entirely irrelevant that Ovid provides us with a witty play on the horns of the Cretan bull and the horns of Dionysus: *ceperunt matrem formosa cornua tauri, / me tua*.<sup>77</sup>

Let me now sum up the salient points of this discussion. As far as Phaedra is concerned, I have provided further evidence that Seneca underscores in every possible way the force of heredity that lies behind her unnatural passion. The stories of Apollo and the cattle of Admetus and of Europa and the bull, in the first choral ode, function as the archetypes (on her mother's and father's side respectively) of Phaedra's passion for Hippolytus (section I.1[a–b]). Also a new element has emerged in the Nurse's appeal to Phaedra not to give in to her incestuous love, as well as in her account of Phaedra's love symptoms: in these instances the bull image extends beyond the temporal (hereditary) dimension to the spatial (geographic) one by incorporating the rhetoric of remote lands into a broader allusive system of illicit passion: *inhospitalis Taurus*, section I.3(a); *Tauri iuga*, section I.3(b).

The imagery and language concerning Hippolytus have been studied with reference to the bull, the horse, and the combination of both. In the course of the play *Hippolytus* is portrayed now as a bull (once as a bull-slayer), now as a horse-tamer or a horse to be broken in. The hero is eventually "broken" by his own horses, which then substitute for the monstrous bull from the sea.

Hippolytus shares with the Cretan (Pasiphaë's) bull and the monstrous bull from the sea a strikingly common phraseology. In section I.2 it was shown that Hippolytus depicts the agricultural ideal of Golden Age myth according to his own style of life, by employing the image of the "unyoked bull." (On Hippolytus himself as *impatiens iugi* cf. section IV.2.) And in section I.3(c) I pointed out that Theseus deliberately at-

<sup>77</sup> *Fast.* 3.499–500 (Ariadne's complaint). It may be of some significance that only in this play does Seneca employ the term *cornipes* (a horse as a "horn-footed" animal). The word occurs in a context where Hippolytus is praised for his excellence in horsemanship (811–13).

tributes his son's supposed infamy to his descent not just from the Amazons but specifically from *Taurus* (= "bull") *Scythes*.

The defeat of Hippolytus' horsemanship witnessed in the account of his death is metaphorically foreshadowed on two earlier occasions: in the course of the Nurse's speech to Hippolytus, where the hero is initially portrayed as horse-tamer, to be eventually broken in by Cupid (section III.1); and in Phaedra's (or the Nurse's) prayer to Diana-Luna, where Diana is called upon to "subdue" (*doma*) Hippolytus' unbending heart in the same way that she exercises control over her horses (section IV.2). In part II of this study I have attempted to establish that Hippolytus' horses, contrary to all other known versions, may have intentionally provoked their master's death. Essentially they come to substitute for the monstrous bull.

In addition to Hippolytus and Phaedra we have also been concerned with Diana and with other aspects of bull and horse imagery. Section IV.3 deals with the "horns of the moon" in their interplay with the horses of the Moon. In section III.2 it is shown that the literary image of Diana-Luna driving her chariot through the sky assumes a particular nuance: losing (or abandoning) control of horses becomes equivalent to falling in love, whereas remaining in control of horses implies that the goddess is unaffected by love. If Diana is seen as the divine equivalent of Hippolytus, who dies when he can no longer exercise control over his horses, one is obliged to accept the equation: love (for Diana) = death (for Hippolytus).<sup>78</sup>

MICHAEL PASCHALIS

UNIVERSITY OF CRETE, RETHYMNO

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## BOOK REVIEWS


ROBERT GARLAND. *Introducing New Gods: The Politics of Athenian Religion*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. xvi + 234 pp. 14 figs. 30 pls. Cloth, \$47.95.

By "the politics of Athenian religion" Garland means "the invisible network which made possible the introduction of a new cult" (vii). The main points that he seeks to establish are (1) that the religious authority of the *demos* included approving the entry of all new cults; (2) that persons introducing new cults without official approval were liable to prosecution; and (3) that Athens promoted "new cults throughout the Greek world" and helped elevate them "to the rank of Panhellenic deities" [*sic*] (9).

To substantiate these points Garland discusses the cults of Pan, of the "Intellect," of Theseus, Athena, and Asklepios, and the "New *Daimonia*" and Sokrates. He does not explain his choice of precisely these cults, except to say that they offer "an invaluable insight into the collective religious mentality of the Athenians in the period from the Persian Wars to the trial of Sokrates" (viii). The timespan is puzzling, since on the same page Garland claims that his book covers four hundred years and that "no previous attempt has been made to align Athenian religion with Athenian politics" for this period. He may be including his superficial treatment of the archaic age in his reckoning; the slip is pardonable, as is perhaps the dating of the Persian Wars in the eighth century on the dust jacket. His second claim, however, is curious: although not restricted to Athens, Nilsson's *Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece* (1951) covers much the same ground.

The introduction, entitled "Others and the Other" in homage to the current fad, lists some features of polytheism: its gods could be envious, meddlesome, and undemocratic. New gods were imported for full protection, including eventually the Unknown God as an "all-risk insurance policy" (2). Other motives for admitting new gods were greed, lust for power and glory, and sexual favors. Owing to the arrival of so many gods, Athens had more cults and festivals than other states. A new cult began with the god's epiphany. Next a sponsor rich enough to pay for its establishment argued in the assembly for the cult's admission. If the *demos* and Delphi approved, the cult was accepted.

In chapter 1, on "ancestral" versus "modern" rites, Garland places the beginnings of Attic religion in the eighth century. After that new rites were added, despite Isocrates' and Aristotle's evidence: "we, of course, know better than the Greeks" (25). Synoecism produced common religious and political institutions, and Athena became the patroness of the state, while hero-cult served propagandistic aims. Solon weakened the power of the clans to exploit



ritual for their own ends and used religion to acquire Salamis. Peisistratos may have reformed the Panathenaia and began building the Olympieion.

In chapter 2, "Pheidippides and the Magic Mountain," Garland retells Herodotos' story about the messenger's "mystical experience" (49) when he met the "polite, friendly and only mildly reproachful" Pan (50). At Marathon Pan panicked the Persians, whereupon the Athenians gratefully accepted him into their pantheon. The episode confirms the prerequisites for accepting new cults (epiphany, promise of help, fulfillment). Athena and some "powers of time and place" (55) also helped at Marathon, which was won by gods and heroes or by circumstances favoring the Athenians.

In chapter 3, "Themistokles and the Cult of the Intellect," Garland discusses the double consultation at Delphi in Herodotos, speculating how the Delphic factions produced oracular responses. Themistokles engineered the mission to Delphi, but the emissaries suppressed the first response, which is historical. The second is historical too, but its wording is not genuine, for an "uneducated peasant" (66) like the Pythia Aristonike could not compose hexameters. Themistokles understood the response without the aid of the lucid deconstructionist method which Garland supplies: "there was . . . no transcendental signified, no truth in the absolute sense, and no Apollo as author of determinate meaning. Signifier and signified, oracle and recipient were part of the same floating discourse" (69).

After Salamis Themistokles built a shrine for Artemis Aristoboule in return for the "brainwave" (75) that enabled him to understand the oracle, and perhaps also as a gesture of humility: "I wasn't responsible for this oh-so-brilliant notion, a goddess was" (75). However, "it is uncertain whether Artemis Aristoboule effected the entry of the *bouleuma* into Themistokles' head by enhancing his natural powers of . . . deliberation, or by temporarily abolishing . . . them altogether" (74). Although he was accused of self-worship, Themistokles was not irreligious; his actions were merely a "pious fraud" (79). He "would not have had his 'brainwave,' if he did not possess the kind of brain cells which are capable of lateral thinking" (81).

Kimon retrieved "Theseus' Old Bones" (chapter 4) for personal, familial, and political reasons. The recovery, a metaphor for Athens' naval power and intended to create political consensus, was also partly motivated by piety. Theseus, whom Garland apparently regards as a historical figure, was the author of synoecism, an enlightened monarch, a proto-democrat, and a symbol of nationalism. He was also a charismatic personality, a "serial sex offender" (87) with a taste for young girls, and "one of the most creative religious geniuses" of Athens (93). He was popular because he was anti-Peisistratid, helpful at Marathon, and interested in the navy. The faulty chronology of his career was accepted because it was constructed by a "sincere forger" (89). His cult was promoted by opposing factions, as was the cult of the Tyrannicides, which the Athenians used "to primp themselves upon their . . . self-reliance and . . . attachment to democracy" (96).

Chapter 5, "Transfiguration and the Maiden," explains that while no new gods were admitted during the Pentecontaetia, religion received a "spiritual facelift" then (99). Controlling all public cults, the democracy levied taxes to support them, took over the cult of Athena Nike, "reaffirmed Marathon" (103) with new monuments, and began Perikles' building program. The cults of Athena and the Eleusinian Mysteries became tools of imperial policy, while relations with Thrace were the motive for Bendis' acceptance. We do not know who "championed her cause, first in the *boule* and later in the *ekklesia*" (112), or "what arguments pro and contra were advanced" (113), but they were not "wholly . . . secular" (113).

Asklepios (chapter 6), born at Epidauros, which promoted the export of his cult, was introduced in Athens privately by Telemachos, either because the god had cured him, or, less likely, at the prompting of priests looking for financial gain. Asklepios was accompanied by Hygieia, and by his snake, symbol of healing, and perhaps the god himself in snaky shape. His arrival was not politically motivated but is to be connected with the plague of 430. The objection that he arrived ten years after it began is not "particularly compelling" (131-32). Asklepianism served the needs of the individual and came closest to challenging polytheism, eventually becoming a rival of Christianity.

In chapter 7, "Sokrates and the New *Daimonia*," Garland adduces Sokrates' trial to corroborate his view that persons practicing an unapproved cult were punished. Sokrates' crime was essentially religious: "the neglect of civic and approved gods in fatal combination with the promotion of private and unapproved *daimonia*" (144). Distrusting the objectivity of Plato and Xenophon, Garland backs his thesis with the assembly's increasing possessiveness regarding religion, the recent restoration of its religious authority by Nikomachos' commission, and Diopetithes' law against impiety quoted by Plutarch.

Aetiology, the subject of chapter 8, is "an inexact science" (153). The Athenians eventually invented *aitia* for all their cults to balance the many *aitia* for metic rites. The "authorized versions" (154) of these tales are hard to determine; still, they tell us how Athenians imagined the origins of their cults. *Aitia* were invented (1) to atone for impiety, (2) in gratitude for a god's help, (3) to express wonder at a god's exploit, and (4) to show pride in local cultural advance.

Garland concludes that changes in the human situation caused changes in the superhuman world. The welfare of one sphere was dependent on the other. The workings of the gods were best seen in war; this is why they were thanked after victories. Religion was exploited for various ends, but the Greeks took it seriously, and so should we, despite its shortcomings.

Garland rightly stresses the strong connection, not always fully appreciated, between religion and all other spheres of civic life. He collects useful information about the cults of some less prominent deities and about those belonging to the different forms of a few major gods. The observation that cults rose and declined in popularity is right on the mark. He reminds us, should we

have forgotten Busolt-Swoboda (*Staatskunde* [1926] 1015), Nilsson (*History of Greek Religion* [1964] 243), or Hignett (*History of the Athenian Constitution* [1962] 235), that the authority to debate and decide the admission of new cults belonged to the *demos*. His inference from this authority, however, that the *demos* punished sponsors of unauthorized cults, is shaky and supported by the singular case of Socrates, where the significance and weight given to the charge of introducing strange gods are unclear and disputed. On Garland's own showing, no steps were taken either against Telemachos for introducing Asklepios, or against metics who imported their own cults. His other evidence likewise proves little: Diopieithes' law, of questionable authenticity, says nothing about introducing new gods; the argument that Socrates challenged a newly reaffirmed popular authority is of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* variety.

Nor has Garland proved his thesis that Athens' promotion of cults gave them Panhellenic status. That Athens' reception of it transformed Asklepianism into a "Mediterranean-wide" cult (133) is pure speculation. It was, furthermore, not the only cult attending to personal needs: the mystery and oracular religions did so too (cf. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* [1987]; Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* [1978]). Rewarding deities for helping in war (a main theme) was a perfectly straightforward custom without any trace of Garland's elaborate "invisible network." A chthonic nature of Athena is questionable. Semele was not the sister of either Kadmos, Pentheus, or Dionysos. The name of the old Attic tribe was Hopletes, not Hoplites. Themistokles certainly was not exiled for high-handed conduct in religious matters.

Garland's work is marred by excessive speculation, and by occasional lapses into current commercial and political jargon. To judge from much elementary information in it, the book seems intended as a text for undergraduates. The volume contains a large bibliography, good indexes, and some very nice pictures.

BORIMIR JORDAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

DAVID DAWSON. *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992. xi + 341 pp. Cloth, \$45.

Reading traditional texts in ways which would not have occurred to original audiences yields a new creation of sorts. The deconstruction of the world implicit in such texts involves appropriating the authority of those texts for a remaking of human culture. Such is the interest of David Dawson's study of the uses of allegory in the cultural mix of the Hellenistic and Roman East. By a selective application of the tools of modern (and postmodern) literary theory, he intends to uncover "the social and cultural functions of allegory" (3). The au-



thor's promise of setting aside the prevailing formalist approach to allegory is laudable. To his credit, he brings together much useful information about the theory and practice of allegory in antiquity. The great disappointment of the book lies in its failure to describe a sociology of ancient allegory.

Though clarifying the notions "culture" and "cultural revision" is central to his argument, Dawson never explains what he means by these terms. Culture, as Peter Berger has argued (in *The Sacred Canopy*, cited in Dawson's Introduction, note 31), is the ever-changing product of human activities and interactions. The symbols which a community creates to represent and affirm its world are subject to the same dialectic as shapes all human reality. The place of written texts in the processes of culture is more complex: the importance of texts in the politics of culture resides in their capacity to legitimate a social vision, though by virtue of their relative stability, writings are less susceptible to reform. Missing from Dawson's treatment of the Hellenistic period is a discussion of why the *need* to create legitimacy emerges in relation to traditional texts. A surprising lack of historical perspective constrains him to treat moral abstractions as the *cause* of various cultural phenomena. When, in chapter 1, he considers "the larger social and cultural purposes" (35) for Cornutus' allegorical practices, his only criterion is "morality": *because* the *Compendium* intends to perpetuate the moral values of the "dominant" culture, its author is deemed conservative. Similarly, when Dawson labels Heraclitus the grammarian a cultural conservative *because* he aims to show that Homer is fitting "only if read allegorically" (48), he fails to ask why appropriating poetic narrative as moralistic text should be conservative: does moralizing a priori make one culturally conservative? Dawson's use of morality as the only criterion in the politics of culture is reductive: "the sense of the fitting" (71) becomes the motive for literary composition (in Aristophanes), for textual commentary (by Zenodotus), and for allegory (by Heraclitus). Moreover, his habit of privileging abstractions vitiates the human aspect of culture: everywhere he assumes culture to consist in the content of intellectual products only (hermeneutics, doctrine, moral definitions). But rationalism, and the philosophies of reason, were not the only forms of even literate Hellenistic culture: philology in Alexandria began among poets, not moralists; the Coan *sodalitas* of Philetas, the adherents of Callimachean esthetics, the literary affiliations implied in certain Hellenistic epigrams are evidence of other values. In the one-dimensional Hellenism of Dawson's fancy, culture consists in reading, and reading amounts to glossing offending passages.

Dawson's reductionist treatment invariably creates polarities: historical process becomes an issue of Greek versus Jew, Christian versus Pagan, Hellenistic versus Jewish, conservative versus subversive. Such reductionism leads to rendering complex communities as caricatures: everything non-Christian and non-Jewish is indiscriminately pagan, Greek, Hellenistic, and classical. What distinguishes Greek allegorizers from Jewish is that the former belong to "dominant, Hellenistic culture" (73), whereas the latter do not. Philo is judged a

countercultural radical because, we are told, the culture which Philo revises is Hellenistic, and hence a host culture alien to his own Jewishness, even though Hellenistic Judaism is as much Hellenistic as it is Jewish. Dawson declares the Jewish writers Aristobulus, Pseudo-Aristeas and Philo to be cultural subversives out to "make Greek culture Jewish" (74). The complex issues of citizen status in Roman Alexandria are reduced to a conflict between two abstractions without social context, "Greek nationalism" versus "Jewish nationalism" (115). In calling the Septuagint a "parochial closed book" which only hermeneutics made Hellenic (81), Dawson disregards the fact that the Septuagint was a democratic creation of Hellenistic Judaism. His view of Hellenistic Judaism as exclusively monotheistic leads him into absurd positions. He argues against Moses Hadas's finding of syncretism in the pseudepigraphic *Letter of Aristeas* on the a priori grounds that "strict Jewish monotheism" (82), "proven" by the language of theodicy, disallows such a view: that is, because the author is a Jew and because Hellenistic Judaism was strictly monotheistic (not true), the theology of Pseudo-Aristeas cannot be syncretic and universalist (in spite of such language as "God, the overseer and creator of all things, whom they [the Jews] worship, is he whom all men worship"). The *Letter of Aristeas* was written by an Alexandrian Jew pretending to be a Greek writing objectively about Jews; the intended audience were Alexandrian Jews. The document legitimates the myth about the origins of the Septuagint as a sacred text in Hellenic terms. The politics is assimilationist, the theology is syncretic and universalizing.

The primary structures of Dawson's argument rest upon elaborate metaphors largely of his own devising: Philo re-inscribes reality, Valentinus re-envisages it, Clement re-vocalizes it. The scheme generated by these figures (= chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively) is not justified by the texts considered. To take the second chapter first: Though it is consistent with Philonic usage to say that a Jew writes the sacred text into his life (that is, that the life of an observant Jew becomes the living text of the law), it makes no sense to argue that the Jew inscribes the culture of Gentiles into his sacred book. This metaphor is Dawson's own. It might be sensibly argued that the life into which Philo inscribes his reading of the law is the life of the Hellenistic Jew, and by this avenue Torah becomes Hellenistically relevant. Here a discussion of Philo's position within his community would be helpful: Philo considers Jewish assimilationism and syncretism to be too radical, but extreme separatism (of the Essenes, for example) impracticable. Philo's place is medial between assimilationists and separatists: his treatment of Torah converts exclusion into privilege while also avoiding assimilation: Philo's Torah is a privileged, but not a universal text, which an observant Jew may write into his life. But instead of considering social context, Dawson struggles against his metaphor of a text which reinscribes Hellenistic culture.

In chapter 3 Dawson suggests that Valentinus' perceptions re-envisage the works of his precursors as allegorical commentary. Commentary is Dawson's own term for Valentinus' alleged treatment of generic Jewish Gnostic myths, for

which Dawson can produce no actual source texts. The one paradigm which Dawson adduces to illustrate Valentinus' mode of commentary proves nothing: just as the Gospel of John, we are told, revises Genesis, so Valentinus revises Gnostic myth. Why "In the beginning the Word . . ." should be a revision of Hebrew text, and not an evocation, is unclear. Nothing is said about the rhetorical agenda of this Gospel, namely that (as John Gager has suggested) it may be anti-Jewish polemic directed at observant Jewish Christians: narrative "proof" that the career of Jesus set aside Jewish sacrificial law. For Dawson to speak effusively of "John's allegorical reading of Hebrew scripture as a new story" (131) seems fatuous; to adduce the Gospel of John as a paradigm of Valentinus' "allegorical interpretation of Gnostic myth" (133) is absurd. It would be clearer and simpler to say that Valentinus freely uses myth in original ways to expound an idea. (One wonders whether Dawson would call Plato's evocation of Orphic myth a revision of Orphic culture.)

In his discussion of Clement of Alexandria in chapter 4, Dawson invents the metaphor of a "voice-based hermeneutic" (184) on the assumption that λόγος is synonymous with φωνή. On the strength of this figure, he tries to situate Clement within a tradition of Christian "*logos* theology" (186), beginning with the Pauline epistles and the Gospel of John. Paul and John, we are told, sometimes identify λόγος and σοφία with Jesus, thereby extending the earlier speculations of Jewish Gnosticism that Σοφία is identical to preexistent Torah. Then Justin Martyr, we are told, "combined elements of Jewish speculation" with "Middle Platonic ideas about the *logos*" (188) to lay the groundwork for Clement's later constructions. The problem with such Christian triumphalism is that the evidence does not support it. Paul's conception of λόγος at 1 Cor. 1:18 (adduced by Dawson as evidence) is defiantly apocalyptic, not speculative: to doomed nonbelievers the Christian λόγος is idiocy. The use of λόγος in the Johannine Gospel, on the other hand, is revisionist, aimed at equating a concept of Jewish Gnosticism with the physical person of Jesus. To flatter Justin Martyr as an eclectic philosopher indebted to Middle Platonism is indefensible: the appropriation of philosophic language for apologetic ends no more makes a philosopher than does the use of scientific diction by sectarians today make creationism science. Eclecticism implies a conception of the other as substantively other, whereas the reductionary bent of Justin's thought disallows this: in Justin λόγος is synonymous with truth defined as the content of belief. If anything, such reductionism is a vitiation, and not a reformation, of one's heritage. When Dawson finally considers Clement, the metaphor which has Clement following some divine voice in his writing obscures the truth. The way Clement works is this: in pursuit of a thought he cites passages in free association (often from memory), in a desultory progression which frequently blurs the distinction between lemma and text. Dawson extols such writing as allegorical, revisionary readings "of classical and Hebraic literature" (222) without clarifying how citation differs from commentary, and without stating what exactly Clement is revising. If meaning predetermines the texts which Clement cites ("Clement gives

meaning control over lexical details," 213), then how can his writing be commentary? Clement knows that what he wants to say is right, and the texts he cites simply prove it.

Dawson's use of literary sources is often inept. Third Maccabees is cited, without comment, as historical evidence for the "severe social tensions" (116) in Philo's Alexandria, when the dating of the book is in fact problematic (between 217 B.C and A.D. 70). At one point Dawson appears to mention Ovid's account of Triptolemus (*our* source for the myth) as if Ovid were *Philo's* source: "yet having quickly dispensed with Ovid's tale, Philo then forces Plato to agree with him against Ovid" (108). The authorship of the *Gospel of Truth*, on which Dawson bases the greater part of chapter 3, is doubtful; at best it is only Valentinian in the sense of being penned by a student or imitator of Valentinus. Nor do Dawson's blunders with basic Greek help his cause. Three examples must suffice. First, in transliterating τὰς ἰδιότητας in Philo *Her.* 72 as a nominative (as is his practice) Dawson writes *hai idiotetai* in place of *hai idiotetes*. Second, in discussing Valentinus' fr. D, Dawson renders συνεργεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀόρατον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ πεπλασμένου thus: "And also the invisible [aspect or dimension?] of god contributes toward the faith of the one who has been modeled" (137). Dawson argues that συνεργεῖν here takes the genitive and not the dative, while also holding that it "governs the accusative" (note 10). On purely theological grounds Dawson construes the genitive subjectively with πίστιν and personifies πεπλασμένου, in contravention of the context. Valentinus here raises the epistemological question why the image of reality should hold such conviction; his response is that the senses know nothing else: "The very (καί) invisibility of god works to effect the credibility of that which has been formed." Third, Dawson argues strenuously (chapter 3, note 11) for rendering ἡ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ φανερώσις (in Valentinus' fr. H) as "his manifestation of the son" on the grounds of the alleged equivocality of διὰ with the genitive. Given his subsequent convincing demonstration of Valentinus' "unrelenting Monism" (165), it would have been more helpful had the author explored his recognition of Stoicism in Valentinian Gnosticism: to what extent is Valentinus' treatment of Gnosticism a Hellenization of Jewish speculation? Is anti-Semitism a factor in Valentinus' version of Gnosticism?

T. E. KNIGHT

BOULDER, COLORADO

RICHARD C. BEACHAM. *The Roman Theatre and Its Audience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. xii + 267 pp. Cloth, \$29.95.

The problem of the audience is central to Richard Beacham's provocative book on the Roman theatre. On one level, the chief impediment to the practice of a reception-based or audience-oriented criticism of the ancient theatre is

that the original audience, like the original performance, has vanished. We have no contemporary accounts of a theatrical audience's experiences in third- or second-century B.C. Rome. There are two possible responses to this gap, this missing element in the theatrical equation: one can conjecture an audience and its behavior either from the historical record, spotty as it may be (occasions and patronage of performance, later Roman scholars' accounts of the early theatre and so forth) or from the play texts themselves. Beacham pursues both approaches with sometimes surprising results. He has sought the elusive audience through his own performances, by staging the plays on a reconstructed Roman stage, apparently with notable success. Yet the problem of the audience may thereby simply be transposed to a higher level: how reflective is the narrow and self-selected modern audience of the original Roman audience at an open public festival?

This book may have its own problem of the audience, which this review, written for the narrow and self-selected readership of a scholarly journal, should at least address. The book's originality may at first not be apparent to the specialist. Chapters 1 and 2 tread familiar ground (the pre-literary Roman theatre, the careers of Plautus and Terence). Here gaps appear, places where Beacham's account is not up to date. For example, the very category of *phlyax* drama, in which Beacham still believes, may be dissolving before our eyes, as J. R. Green and Oliver Taplin show that much purported visual evidence for native improvisational farces in South Italy in fact suggests performances of scripted Greek comedy, including Aristophanes. Beacham knows Taplin's first article (in *PCPS*) on the South Italian vase showing *Thesmophoriazusae*, but discussion is now much broader (see E. Csapo, *Phoenix* 40 [1986] 379–92; J. R. Green, *Lustrum* 31 [1989] 75ff.; and Green and Taplin's articles in *NumAntClass* [*Quaderni Ticinesi*] 20 [1991], a number of which—and subsequent—references I owe to the generosity of Green himself). Beacham's use of Hellenistic evidence is sometimes questionable. For example, the frontispiece shows a detail of performance (it is *MNC*<sup>2</sup> n. NP 54), not a small stage, and that performance was Menander's *Theophoroumene* (see E. Handley, *BICS* 16 [1969] 88–101 at 89). Also, Beacham still asserts (29) that all of Plautus' plays are based on Greek originals. Eckard Lefèvre and his student Ekkehard Stärk (most recently in E. Lefèvre, E. Stärk, and G. Vogt–Spira, *Plautus Barbarus* [Tübingen, 1991] and E. Stärk, *Die Menaechmi des Plautus und kein griechisches Original* [Tübingen, 1989]) have painted a much more complex picture of Plautus' compositional practices (references to German scholarship in Beacham are surprisingly few). In fairness one might argue that arcane debates over originality would distract the general reader from an account of how Roman comedy worked in its original performance context, and here Beacham's observations about the relations of drama to oratory, the cultural pluralism of early Rome, the musical element and the use of violence on the Roman stage, and particularly Plautus' skills in dramatic construction are lively contributions.

Not until the third chapter (“Early Roman Stages”) do we encounter the

material and ideas which first engaged Beacham in the study of the Roman theatre and its performance practices. Here his purpose is to trace the evolution of the Roman theatre as an architectural space. The Roman stone theatres which remain dotted over Europe, North Africa, and the Near East represent the end of an evolutionary process. How did the Roman theatre come to differ so greatly from the Greek? The answer obviously lies in the lost wooden theatres, the predecessors of the stone theatres. Beacham's contribution is to argue, in considerable detail and persuasively, that some of this evolutionary process can be recovered from Roman wall painting.

The notion that Roman wall painting at times depicts Roman stages and their scenery is based on a reference in Vitruvius (7.5.1–2). The art historians have by and large not been sympathetic to this notion (to Beacham's 227–28 n. 45, one may add, in favor of the paintings as evidence for the theatres, E. M. Moormann, "Rappresentazioni teatrali su scaenae frontes di quarto stile a Pompeii," *Pompei, Herculaneum, Stabiae* 1 [1983] 73–117, which I have not seen, and, *contra*, E. W. Leach in *Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome*, ed. B. K. Gold, [Austin, 1982] 135–73), in Beacham's view because they were wrongly looking for representations of the final form of the *scaenae frons* as we see it in the permanent stone theatres and not the intermediate steps taken by the evolving wooden theatres. Beacham first traces the literary evidence for the evolution of the temporary stages, as the ever-competitive Roman nobility strove to outdo each other in the construction of more and more elaborate structures. He may or may not be correct in seeing the origin of the *vestibula* before the three doors of the later *scaenae frons* in the *paraskēnia* of the Hellenistic theatre, but when he turns to the evidence of the wall paintings themselves (admittedly a small number of the total now extant), he establishes a plausible evolutionary sequence through well-chosen and well-reproduced illustrations. One sees quite clearly, for example, how painted panel scenery could have been used and how the *angiportum* and the conventions of its use might have originated. One regrets that illustration 10, whose color scheme is essential to Beacham's argument for differentiating an apparently temporary stage front from a permanent background, could not be reproduced in color. On the whole, however, this chapter constitutes one of the book's principal contributions to our understanding of the changing physical realities of performance on the Roman stage.

The fifth chapter returns to literary history with an account of tragedy and mime. Earlier in the book Beacham points to the potential for political disruption inherent in the theatre audience; he sees conservative resistance to the building of a permanent theatre as a recognition of this danger. Here he discusses the Roman audience's penchant (notable in the late Republic but also attested otherwise) for reading contemporary political allusion into performances of (by then) classic plays. One would welcome, from Beacham or others, much more exploration of this phenomenon. Given the atrophy of the

assemblies, the theatre audience of the late Republic becomes a key political sounding board. Beacham even suggests (133) that Sulla and his successors may have favored mime over classical theatre because the former, with its simple plots and lack of a mythic or historical structure susceptible to audience (mis-)readings, was less politically subversive.

The sixth chapter gives us a rapid but still useful survey of theatre under the Empire until its final withering under Christian emperors. The stone theatres are dominant, and the emphasis is on spectacle. Beacham ranges from the still puzzling details of the *periaktoi* and the *scaenae frons* to the machinery of shows in the amphitheatres.

His postlude returns us to the problem of recreating an audience for Roman theatre. Beacham reminds us that it was the performance of Roman plays, especially by Pomponius Laetus and his Roman Academy in the 1480s, that brought about the revival of formal tragedy and comedy in the West (here add to Beacham's bibliography R. Bruce Smith, *Ancient Scripts and Modern Experience on the English Stage 1500–1700* [Princeton, 1988] and Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities* [Cambridge, Mass., 1986]). Roman plays held the stage throughout the Renaissance. The devices of Roman comedy became the stock in trade of Western vernacular comedy. Seneca, not the Greeks directly, produced the final flowering of tragedy in England and France. Yet the performance of Roman drama itself has virtually ceased, while Greek tragedy (or at least a handful of the plays) continues to maintain a foothold on our stages. Beacham clearly wishes to rectify the situation.

Chapter 4, which I passed over above, embodies his attempt to do so. Beacham translated and staged the *Casina* at Warwick on his reconstructed stage. He gives, however, not an account of that production per se but a generalized view of how this play *means* in performance. It is not easy for a director to write about his own work, especially when he is the translator as well. One suspects we have lost much through Beacham's decision to write as though giving an archetypal and therefore timeless account of performing the *Casina* rather than telling us about specific choices, and specific audience reactions to those choices, in his own personal production. The Shakespeare revolution, as John Styan called it, succeeded when Tyrone Guthrie built his thrust stage and demonstrated how that spatial change transformed our understanding of the plays. Beacham's reconstructed Roman stage has the potential to do the same, but its specific contributions to his *Casina* production are not clear from his written account (though he notes that a video is available from Films for the Humanities in Princeton).

This book may attempt to serve too many audiences at once, but that is an amiable flaw in an era when the classical dramatic heritage is virtually inaccessible outside the confines of higher education. Classicists should welcome its contributions to our understanding of the early wooden stages at Rome, and one hopes theatre historians and performers will find its more general accounts

useful. The real test will be to see how productive it is of new performances of Roman drama.

NIAL W. SLATER

EMORY UNIVERSITY

J. P. SULLIVAN. *Martial: The Unexpected Classic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 388 pp.

In contemporary debates about the "canon," even in circles that include classicists, the name of Martial rarely surfaces as a lost text in need of critical rescue. This should hardly surprise. Literary scholarship tends to make heavy going of light verse, or to make nothing of it at all, and Martial's epigrams may seem particularly uninviting in these enlightened times. Few readers can escape a perusal of the epigrams without a feeling that they have been specially targeted: women, the handicapped, homosexuals, heterosexuals, doctors, professors (*nefas!*), and foreigners represent only a selection from the victims of Martial's pungent wit. If any ancient poet stands in need of an escort to enter polite society today, it is Martial. He is fortunate to have been taken in hand by J. P. Sullivan, whose good offices in the service of writers of the so-called Silver Age of Latin literature are well known, and whose own previous contributions to the revaluation of Martial are amply (and modestly) documented in the pages of this volume. His approach to Martial may not satisfy every reader (one of the book's many virtues): while he shows himself conversant with contemporary literary theory, he opts for an essentially traditional literary-historical treatment. Students of Latin literature should be grateful; for what has long been wanted for Martial is here supplied, a study that locates his poetry within the history of his time and its literature.

The first chapter, "Martial's Life and Times," is a workmanlike survey of the contents of each book of the epigrams, which Sullivan places within the broader context of the historical events, both political and personal, that are reflected in the poetry. A reader who is not already familiar with the history of the period will find the going difficult: on page 36, for example, Sabinus' debacle is referred to without explanation, which is deferred to page 132. This part of the book will probably more often be consulted than read, but in the absence of a modern commentary on the whole of Martial's poetry, Sullivan has performed an important service. On specific points it is possible to quibble, of course. It may be, for example, that he takes some of Martial's adulatory epigrams a bit too seriously. The pious elephant of *Spec.* 17 is unlikely to have formed part of a program "to invest the Flavians with the appropriate aura of divinity" (10). Sullivan is overly optimistic about the impact of "final" publication, whatever that might have meant in Rome, in protecting Martial from plagiarism (28). And it is not altogether clear that Martial's departure from Rome for Spain is so



closely related to the changed political scene as Sullivan (with others) suggests (52). Pliny's silence about Martial's encomia for Domitian is hardly surprising when one considers the course of his career, and Martial would hardly have been the only figure, or even among the most prominent, tainted by association with that regime (e.g., Tac. *Hist.* 1.1).

Sullivan's review of Martial's literary aims (chapter 2, "Martial's *Apologia pro opere suo*") covers a great deal of territory in short compass. Its finest aspect is the handling of light verse as a "serious" genre. When he treats Martial's particular accomplishment in this regard, however, he is on occasion unable to free himself from a tendency to fall victim to Martial's rhetoric. He suggests that it was part of Martial's aim "to rid epigram of its taint of amateurism"; but the next chapter illustrates abundantly that this was *not* a genre for amateurs. The status of any genre is relative, and while Sullivan may consider lyric an elevated form along with epic and tragedy (72), Horace could term it *lusus* (*Carm.* 1.32.2). I doubt whether, by Martial's time, "the ancient audience had to be gently seduced into accepting the epigram as anything other than a marginal form of poetry" (63). Some reference to H. Wagenvoort, *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion* (Leiden 1956) 30 ff., might have led to a clearer articulation of the problem. But in general Sullivan overemphasizes the problem of genre for Martial, repeating in the process old clichés about "Callimachus' dethroning of traditional, and now inert, genres such as epic" (58).

The following chapter, on Martial's debt to earlier Greek and Roman epigrammatists, offers a useful survey of the tradition but provokes similar objections about Sullivan's interpretation of the evidence, particularly in his analysis of Martial's stance toward Callimachus and his Roman successors. By accepting virtually at face value the seemingly anti-Callimachean pronouncements of 10.4 (72-73), Sullivan dons a straitjacket that severely limits his ability to sort out Martial's real debts and allusions. For example, 8.3, cited once as an instance of Martial's acknowledgment of the "loftier status of other literary genres" (59), is actually an assertion of the importance of epigram modeled loosely on the opening of the *Aetia*, complete with a chat with one of the Muses. The connections he makes between Martial and Catullus are likewise unclear and shifting, depending upon a false distinction between Catullus' "Alexandrian" poems and his epigrams (96). Sullivan paints himself into a corner by making Martial reject all learned poetry like Callimachus' *Aetia*. So he conjectures that the *Amazonis* of Marsus, mentioned in 4.29.7-8, was an epyllion like Cinna's *Zmyrna* (98), without recognizing that this poem is an imitation of the *Aetia* Prologue (fr. 1.9-12 Pf.) contrasting a "fat lady" *Amazonis* with a short book of poems. Martial's relationship to what it is still popular to refer to as "Callimachean poetics" is more complicated than Sullivan suggests.

Much of the material presented in chapters 4 ("The Coherence of Martial's Themes") and 5 ("Martial's Sexual Attitudes") has been visited earlier in the book, but the more systematic survey in these chapters offers a more coherent picture. Sullivan provides an entertaining tour of Rome (147-55) and Roman

attitudes (160–70) as reflected in Martial. The range of topics covered is as broad as Roman life. His treatment of religion and the imperial cult in particular has a somewhat dated air, but the chief complaint here is that one is left wishing to hear more on subjects like Martial's poetic use of Spain (179) or the Italian countryside (155), on which Sullivan is especially qualified to comment. His treatment of Martial's "sexual attitudes" is a frank discussion of some of the poems least accessible to modern sensibilities. The entire subject raises a question Sullivan does not quite address, namely the extent to which Martial's "misogyny" (197) is not really his, but belongs to Roman antiquity. Sullivan is quite persuasive elsewhere in arguing against a literal and biographical interpretation of Martial's poetry, demonstrating, for example (25–26), that Martial's wife is probably no more than a convenient fiction. But he takes all of Martial's utterances on sexual mores and attitudes at face value, remarking on his "fear and hatred of sexual women" (188) or his "patent fear of rich women" (204). Sullivan has a point to make, and he scores often, but on occasion one may feel that he pushes too far: for example, the translation of 7.67 (205) is far coarser than Martial's Latin, and the point of 12.97 (204) is more critical of Bassus than of his wife. Martial's attitude toward rich women (202–4) probably cannot be separated from similar jabs at wealthy men who are not his patrons; and it is worth noting that surviving eulogies to *uniuirae* also indicate that they *were* eulogized (195).

Perhaps the least successful part of the book is the next chapter, which treats some more technical aspects of Martial's verse, including sections on form, structure, and meter and on language and imagery. Here the treatment is too brief to be useful to the novice, or interesting to the veteran. Much of this material might have been more efficiently integrated into the introductory chapter. In his final chapter ("Survival and Renewal"), Sullivan outlines the history of Martial's poetry since his death. The subject is vast, and he has not sought to limit its boundaries: he documents the influence of Martial on poets and writers from antiquity to the present, as well as the contributions of scholars to the study of his text. Such a survey will inevitably take on a personal air: each reader will miss some particular favorite, while noting, and learning from, Sullivan's own preferences. His familiarity with Hispanic authors is only one of the more impressive contributions of this chapter. Among twentieth-century figures one name that might have merited more prominence is A. E. Housman, who in this chapter is cited only in a footnote (306, n. 106) for his verdict on Heraeus' edition. Housman's own contributions to the elucidation of Martial were substantial, and in some cases, for example on 3.13.19–20 (200), one might well have expected some impact on Sullivan's discussion.

"Standard works" on ancient authors constitute a kind of canon independent of the texts they aim to interpret: this study merits that status. For the student new to Martial, this will be the book to turn to first: the reader will be well served. The veteran scholar or critic will find material here to inform and provoke. Shortly after the completion of this review, news arrived of Sullivan's

untimely death. Students of Latin literature can be grateful that we have this book from his pen as testimony to the wit and humanity of a fine scholar, who lent a sympathetic ear to the less generous soul of Rome's great epigrammatist.

PETER E. KNOX

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER

LIONEL CASSON. *The Periplus Maris Erythraei*: Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. xvii + 320 pp. 17 maps. 5 appendixes. Cloth, \$49.95.

This unique treatise represents a manual for Roman merchants involved in trading voyages from the Egyptian Red Sea coasts to the harbors and emporia of East Africa, South Arabia, and western India, with a running account of the products available therein. Such maritime trading ventures were dependent on substantial capital investments and well-constructed vessels, thereby restricting them to wealthy *naukleroi* who could afford the risk involved in sailing in coordination with the monsoons. The most that can be offered for the identity of the author of the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* is that he was an anonymous Greek sea captain engaged in such enterprises from Egypt probably sometime in the first century A.D., when he composed this guide for merchants in a businessman's *koinē* Greek. The text survives only in a tenth-century manuscript (Codex Palatinus Graecus 398, fols. 40v–54v) in the Universitäts-Bibliothek, Heidelberg, and a fourteenth- or fifteenth-century copy of it (British Museum Add. 19391, fols. 9r–12r). Numerous errors are preserved, indicated by frequent marginalia and several lacunae in the text of the manuscript. Such a textual tradition is to be expected for a document filled with exotic items and remote geographical references.

The previous textual edition of H. Frisk (1927) and the translation with commentary by W. H. Schoff (1912) and G. W. B. Huntingford (1980) can now be considered obsolete. Casson's new edition provides a refined text, an excellent translation, and a lucid fresh commentary that incorporates in general the relevant archaeological contributions and pertinent studies of the past generation, including his own masterly work on ancient commerce and travel. After an introductory discussion of the document's textual history, date, and authorship (5–10), he presents a substantial analysis of ancient trade in the Indian Ocean and political geography of the region (11–47). The text and translation then appear on opposite facing pages, followed by a general commentary. Comments on the Greek text, lexicography, and grammar of the document then follow in a separate commentary, which necessitates consulting at least two sections of the book for any given passage. In my opinion, the usefulness of the volume would have been enhanced by subsuming these brief technical observations in the fuller commentary. Five valuable appendixes then follow on (1) "harbors and

ports," (2) "distances," (3) "voyages to Africa, Arabia, and India," (4) "terms for cloth and clothing," and (5) "India's West Coast." Indexes of the general terms employed in English and the citations from other ancient documents enhance the edition, but a Greek index is missing.

One disappointing part of Casson's excellent discussion is his rather brief treatment of the date of the *Periplus* (6–7), where he seems satisfied to rest on the mention of "Malichus, king of the Nabataeans" (*PME* 19), whose reign is well established by Nabataean epigraphy to be A.D. 40–70. Specialists in East Africa (Huntingford) and South Arabia (Jacqueline Pirenne and others) fasten on other details to argue for a much later date, leading some to suggest the treatise represents a conflation of information from various periods. For Casson, this is mere "scholarly legerdemain." A case in point is René Dussaud's proposal that a putative Malichus III ruled in the Hijāz after the Roman annexation of Arabia in A.D. 106, suggesting the dynasty survived as late as the third century, but there is no justification for the hypothesis. (See my comments in *Géographie historique au Proche-Orient* [Paris, 1988] 176–78.) There still is no evidence for the existence of the Nabataean royal family after the establishment of the Roman province of Arabia. Nevertheless, there is much more that could have been offered to bolster the case for dating the *Periplus* within the reign of Malichus II.

From the archaeological perspective, the current evidence suggests that Mediterranean trade with India reached its apogee in the middle and late first century A.D. (see now *Rome and India: The Ancient Sea Trade*, ed. V. Begley and R. D. De Puma [Madison, 1991]). Finds of second-century Roman coin hoards in India are generally smaller and less significant than those of the first century, reinforcing the impression that trade was dwindling at the time (see P. J. Turner, *Roman Coins from India* [London, 1989]). Furthermore, by the second century, Palmyrene agents were serving as magistrates for the kingdom of Characene and its stations at Forāt, Baḥrayn, and possibly even the islands of Failaka and Kharg in the Persian Gulf, perhaps for facilitating their own merchants' voyages to India (Skythia) and South Arabia. Moreover, at the same time, Palmyrene traders were operating at Coptos on the Nile (see J. Teixidor, *Un port romain du désert: Palmyre et son commerce d'Auguste à Caracalla* [Paris, 1984]). Since the *Periplus* is completely silent about the Palmyrenes, it seems reasonable to assume it was composed prior to the entrance of the Palmyrenes into the trading system of the Indian Ocean.

Discussion of the relationship between the *Periplus* and Pliny could also have elucidated the chronological proposal. Since Pliny began collecting his materials for the *Natural History* in the 50s and presented it to Augustus in A.D. 77, this makes him (in Casson's view) a contemporary of the author of the *Periplus*. Most have regarded the *Periplus* as later than Pliny, but earlier than Ptolemy. The main reason is that Pliny's description of the East African coast ceases at Mosyllon, whereas the *Periplus* extends far beyond Cape Gardafui and is perhaps even more accurate than Ptolemy's description. On the other hand,

Ptolemy's *Geography* gives a more detailed description of China than the *Periplus*, which he attributes to the earlier second-century records of the Syrian merchant Maes Titianus, whose agents were sent as far as Taskkurgan (1.11.40–48). In contrast, Schoff (7–15) suspected that Pliny was dependent on the *Periplus*, and there are in fact a number of striking correlations in the two works that at least suggest the authors were contemporaries who drew from the same sources or milieu. Some related observations on the text and interpretation seem in order.

(1) For the location of the Egyptian Red Sea port of Myos Hormos (“Mussel Harbor”), Casson unfortunately opts for Abu Shaʿr, where the recent excavations indicate only an occupation of the third to seventh centuries A.D. Both the Hellenistic date (Agatharchides of Knidos) and distance (exactly 1,800 stadia) provided by the *Periplus* are better satisfied by the finds at Qusayr al-Qadim, previously considered to be Leukos Limen. J. Desanges (1978), G. Huntingford (1980), M. Reddé and J.-C. Golvin (1987), and most recently D. P. S. Peacock (*Journal of Roman Archaeology* 6 [1993] 226–32, whose references cover these former) have all argued for such a location, and the objections are minimal. Pliny provides only a passing reference to Myos Hormos (*NH* 6.168) but, like the *Periplus*, is silent about Leukos Limen, which is not mentioned until Ptolemy (4.5.8).

(2) For the Nabataean harbor of Leukē Kōmē (“white village”) in Arabia (*PME* 19), Casson accepts identification of the port with ‘Aynūnah in Midian. It receives some confirmation by Idrisi’s location of *al-ḥaurā* (Arabic, “white [village]”) at this location. (See K. Miller, *Weltkarte des Arabers Idrisi vom Jahre 1154* [Stuttgart, 1981], “mittlerer Teil.”) As Casson suggests, the “customs agent” (*paralēptēs*) and “centurion” (*hekatontarchēs*) stationed at the post were Nabataean. Specific reference to the “centurion” (*qntryn*) of the time of Aretas IV (9 B.C.–A.D. 40) at nearby Madaʿin Šālīḥ (Jaussen and Savignac, *Mission archéologique en Arabie* II [1909] no. 31) would have reinforced the argument. It is interesting that “white (village)” appears to have been a popular ancient toponym, especially for port cities, such as the Leukē Kōmē between Berytus and Sidon in Phoenicia (Plut. *Ant.* 51.1). It should be noted that the gates and towers of the Byzantine fort at Abu Shaʿr are all dressed in white stone, perhaps for observation purposes from the sea. Sailing through the Red Sea, the various villages strung along the shores of Midian appear white against the dark granite mountain landscape.

(3) The spelling *anabataiōs* (*PME* 19) is emended by a second hand to *nabataiōn*, to which Casson adds *anabasis* to suggest dittography. It explains the enigmatic spelling (p. 254). But similar orthography to that of the *Periplus* appears in a third-century B.C. papyrus (*PSI* 406, col. i.21–22) and as a variant reading of a manuscript (D) of Diodorus Siculus (at 2.48.6). H. I. MacAdam and I recently proposed that the initial *a* merely represents the Semitic prefix of *al-* used for the article in the Arabic dialect spoken by the Nabataeans. (See our discussion in *ARAM* 2 [1990] 73.) Rather than a copyist’s error, the present

reading then reflects the attempt in Greek to duplicate the pronunciation heard from native speakers.

(4) Casson emends and interprets *Abeirminaia* (24.8.10a) as *Abeir(aia kai) Minaia*, "[G]abeir(ian and) Minaean," based on the Gabirean myrrh mentioned by Dioscorides (1.64.1). There are other possibilities. The "Gebbanites" were a dominant group in Ma'in and are frequently mentioned in Pliny's account, although not in other classical sources. They appear in South Arabian inscriptions as the *Gb'n* and perhaps even earlier in Egyptian New Kingdom hieroglyphic texts as the *Gnbtyw* (A. A. Saleh, *BIFAO* 72 [1972] 245–62). Their center seems to have been Timna (Tmn') and their specialty the dealing of 'Awsarite myrrh. Pliny indicates there were many varieties of Minaean myrrh, including Astramitic, Gebbanitic, and Ausaritic (*NH* 12.69). The select grade of myrrh mentioned in the *Periplus* may have been one of these varieties.

(5) The ancient Hadramaut ports of Kanē and Moscha Limen (*PME* 27, 32) are identified with the ruins at Qanā in Yemen and Khōr Rūri in the Dhofar province of modern Oman. Recent excavations at Qanā by a USSR–Yemeni expedition discovered amphorae inscribed in cursive Palmyrene, East Italian *terra sigillata*, and Nabataean painted pottery from the level dating from the first century B.C. to the middle of the second century A.D. (see A. V. Sedov, *Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy* 3 [1992] 110–37). The American Foundation for the Study of Man excavations directed by Wendell Phillips at Khōr Rūri from 1952 to 1962 also produced some Nabataean painted fine ware of the first century A.D. (I thank J.–F. Salles for calling my attention to the sherds and Marilyn Phillips Hodgson for permission to inspect and mention this unpublished and previously unreported find.) Neither Moscha Limen nor Kanē appears in Pliny. It appears that *L'Arabie et ses mers bordières*, vol. I, *Itinéraires et voisinages*, ed. J.–F. Salles (Lyon, 1988) appeared too late for Casson to use.

(6) "Apologos," at the head of the Persian Gulf (*PME* 35), may represent a corruption of Greek Οὐολογαισία for "Vologesias," the Parthian emporium established by Vologesias I (A.D. 50–80) probably early in his reign after the revolt of Seleucia in A.D. 36–43. It appears as Vologesocerta in Pliny (*NH* 6.122) and Valāshābad in Sassanian sources. In the Han Dynasty records of Kan Ying's expedition to the Persian Gulf in A.D. 97, the toponym *Yū-lo* probably represents Vologesias (s.v. the *Wei-lüeh* section at the end of chapter 30 in the *San Kuo-chih*). In Palmyrene Aramaic texts of A.D. 108–247 it is known as ʾwlgšy' (*Inventaire des inscriptions de Palmyre* III 21 and 29, IX 14, X 112 and 124). If this identification is correct, the *terminus a quo* for the *Periplus* is the Neronian era. Casson's rather confusing discussion of Omana (*PME* 36; cf. Pliny *NH* 6.149) should be clarified by D. Potts's recent analysis in *Araby the Blest* (Copenhagen, 1988) 136–67; he argues that the Gulf was first and foremost Arab, and remained so throughout the Seleucid era. In contrast, the *Periplus* (34–35) knows only of the "Persian" sea (*thalassēs*), "Persian" Gulf (*kolpos*), and "Persian" emporia within it.

(7) Chinese "skins" (*sirika dermatā*) are mentioned with silk cloth and

yarn as products available at Barbarikon on the Indus River (*PME* 39). It is generally recognized that the Seres were merely "middlemen" in the silk trade (see A. Dihle, "Serer und Chinesen," *Antike und Orient*, ed. V. Pöschl and H. Petersmann [Heidelberg, 1984] 201–15), intermediaries such as the Siberian tribes, who may have furnished "furs" in addition to other items. Pliny (*NH* 34.145; cf. 21.11) also speaks of the Seres with their "fabrics and skins" (*vestibus suis pellibusque*) and later observes that the "pelts" (*pellibus*) dyed by the Seres were the most costly of any animal skins available (37.204). It is noteworthy that the only classical sources to associate the Seres with fur trade are Pliny and the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*.

DAVID F. GRAF

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI (FLORIDA)

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## AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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### THE CRETAN ODYSSEY: A LIE TRUER THAN TRUTH

Although Homer is commonly regarded as the progenitor of Western epic poetry, a more balanced perspective may be attained by focusing upon his position as the progeny. As one of the last in a long line of bards, he inherited an epic tradition in a fluid, oral form and in turn bequeathed it to his successors in a relatively fixed, and probably written, form. He drew upon a vast reservoir of inherited myths, legends, and tales, the conflation of which has left traces and sometimes, at least by literary standards, rather glaring anomalies of structure and detail in our inherited versions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Underlying our inherited *Iliad* there were perhaps versions of the tale in which Ajax played a more prominent role, in which the Achaean embassy to Achilles comprised different characters, and in which Patroclus was actually mistaken for Achilles by the Trojans. Underlying our inherited *Odyssey* there were perhaps versions of the tale in which the trick of the weaving of Laertes' shroud held a more immediate function, in which Penelope recognized Odysseus much earlier, perhaps by his scar, and in which husband and wife conspired together in the destruction of the suitors. Such alternative versions of the epics are often hypothesized by modern readers puzzled by an apparently awkward turn of the plot, an inconsistency in detail, or some other inconcinnity that is the natural result of the conflation, so common in truly oral traditions, of disparate tales.

This is a practice that has been woefully abused by generations of analysts, who have attributed each hypothetical version to a different poet and have thus seen in each of Homer's epics a disunified amalgam resulting from multiple authorship. But the recent extreme reaction against this analytic approach, the tendency to regard any perception of inconsistency as a misapplication of modern literary criteria to an orally generated poem (a modern substitute for the excesses of naive unitarianism), is equally fallacious, and it has deprived the Homerist of an

important tool of research. A new form of neoanalysis that is informed by the principles of oral theory seems to me to strike the correct balance between these two extremes, recognizing as it does the existence and influence of previously existing tales and yet appreciating the technique of a single poet in adapting them to his *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.<sup>1</sup> Despite their historical indifference to each other, these two approaches—neoanalysis and oral theory—are not irreconcilable. Both recognize that anomalies of various types exist in our inherited texts. Some are blatant. The epics as we have them may have been composed by a single poet, but this poet drew upon myriad tales, some of which can still be identified, at least in outline, because they are not thoroughly assimilated into their new context. Moreover, the poet himself surely rethought and refashioned his own epics over the course of many years, considering many alternative versions that have left traces in our inherited texts.

I propose one such alternative version of the return of Odysseus—keeping in mind that this very hypothetical version may itself be a conflation of various other versions—that appears to underlie, and to have influenced, Homer's *Odyssey*. In this version Telemachus went in search of news of his father not to Menelaus in Sparta but to Idomeneus in Crete. There he met his father, who, having visited various lands—perhaps Egypt, Phoenicia, and Cyprus—and having had some dealings with Phoenician sailors, had, now in the third or fourth year of his return from Troy, bereft of men and ships, taken refuge from a storm with Idomeneus in Crete. After advising his father of the situation in Ithaca, Telemachus conspired with him about the death of the suitors. As part of that conspiracy, Odysseus was to accompany Telemachus back to Ithaca disguised as a soothsayer—Theoclymenus in Homer's version—and was to reveal himself as the returned master shortly before destroying the suitors. I propose that a tale, or body of tales, of this general nature existed independently of Homer and that it influenced Homer's version of the *Odyssey* at various points, leaving traces that are still discernible. The assumption of such a conflation of tales would explain some of the most notorious oddities in our inherited text of the *Odyssey*.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Kullmann, "Oral Poetry Theory and Neoanalysis"; Edwards, "Neoanalysis and Beyond."



## INTERNAL EVIDENCE

The proem of Homer's *Odyssey* (1.1–10), unlike that of the *Iliad*, is not an informative preview of the main themes that are to follow in the epic as we have it: there is no mention of Telemachus' search for news of his father that constitutes books 1–4; there is no suggestion of the theme of vengeance that constitutes the larger part of books 13–24; and it is not even an accurate prologue to the portion of the *Odyssey*—the wanderings of the hero—that it does describe. Admittedly, proems in oral traditions are often highly generic, serving to introduce not one but many tales, and one should not expect a perfect thematic fit, much less a precise table of contents. Yet even a highly generic proem must have originated as an introduction to a particular type of tale or body of tales, and I suggest that our inherited version of the *Odyssey*, while it is clearly an allomorph of a tale type about the wanderings of a hero returning from war, incorporated many innovative features that caused it to “out-grow” this generic proem of a return tale—perhaps the entire Telemachy in books 1–4, perhaps the centrality of the vengeance theme in books 13–24, surely the complex narrative structure resulting from the elaborate hysteron–proteron of Odysseus' tales in books 9–12—hence the rather stark disjunction between our *Odyssey*'s proem and the narrative that follows.

Particularly odd is the proem's assertion that in his wanderings Odysseus “saw the cities of many men” (1.3, πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα), since men and cities are few and far between in the fantastic voyages of our Odysseus. This assertion seems better suited to the less fantastic voyages to Egypt, Phoenicia, Thesprotia, Cyprus, and, above all, Crete—that land of “many men” and “ninety cities” (19.172–74, ἄνθρωποι πολλοί . . . ἐννήκοντα πόλεις)—that are the subject of Odysseus' “lies” to Athena (13.256–86), Eumaeus (14.199–359), Antinous (17.415–44), and Penelope (19.165–202, 221–48, 262–307). Indeed the phrase πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε' ἁλώμενος, which corresponds closely to the assertion in the proem (1.3), is aptly used to describe the wanderings of Odysseus' “lies” (15.492, 19.170; cf. 16.63).

Was this proem, then, originally attached to a version (or versions) of the *Odyssey* somewhat different from ours, one that narrated more fully the voyages of Odysseus in the real world, one that told of a much shorter return than our ten-year version, one in which Crete played a larger role, perhaps as the terminus of Odysseus' wanderings, where, after having been captured by Phoenicians, he took refuge from

a storm under the protection of the hospitality of Idomeneus? The "lies" of Odysseus contain, though in a very confused form, the outline of just such a version: the war against Troy and the subsequent return of a hero (13.262–64, 14.229–42, 19.182–83, 19.186–87, 19.192–93); an episode involving a storm and/or a shipwreck (13.276–77, 14.299–319, 19.186–89, 19.200–203, 19.277–78); the involvement of Phoenician sailors, who convey the hero by ship, whether with hostile or friendly intentions, from one land to another (13.272–86, 14.288–98); and, most pervasively, the centrality of Crete (13.256–58, 14.199–209, 16.62, 19.172–79) and its ruler Idomeneus (13.259–70, 14.235–42, 19.180–81, 19.190–91). And there are traces of such a version elsewhere in our inherited text as well, most clearly in Eumaeus' story that an Aetolian had once brought him news that Odysseus was in Crete with Idomeneus repairing his ships, which a storm had destroyed (14.378–83). Could Odysseus' "lies," rather than being the ad hoc invention of our poet, be a reflection, albeit a dim one, of a version of the *Odyssey* in which these stories were presented as the truth?<sup>2</sup>

Unexpectedly, the proem is followed in our *Odyssey* not by an account of the homecoming of Odysseus but by an account of a journey abroad by his son Telemachus—a journey, moreover, whose purpose is not fully explained nor its function fully incorporated within the plot of our version of the tale. According to Athena, the journey's purpose is "to learn of his father, and to achieve fame" (1.94–95), but in fact Telemachus learns very little of his father and achieves no particular acclaim; Athena herself has difficulty explaining to a curious, and rather irate, Odysseus exactly why she sent his son abroad (13.417–28). Among the various reasons for the journey proposed by readers of the *Odyssey*, its contribution to the education and maturation of the boy is the most frequently cited.<sup>3</sup> And most readers will readily agree that

<sup>2</sup>For the widespread contention of the analysts that the proem was designed to introduce an earlier version of an *Odyssey*, essentially books 5–13 of our *Odyssey*, see Kirchhoff, *Die homerische Odyssee* 165–66, *passim*. For the notion that the proem originally constituted an exordium of a more realistic saga of Odysseus' return, traces of which are discernible in Odysseus' deceptive tales, see Woodhouse, *Composition* 22–28, 126–36; S. West, "An Alternative Nostos" and *Commentary* 51–52, 68–69. But for the view that the proem is a suitable prologue to the *Odyssey* as we have it see Bassett, "The Proems"; van Groningen, "The Proems"; Rüter, *Odysseeinterpretationen* 28–52.

<sup>3</sup>The educative function of the journey and its contribution to the boy's maturation are cited by the scholia to 1.93, 284; Scott, "The Journey Made by Telemachus"; Schwartz, *Die Odyssee* 253; Woodhouse, *Composition* 210–12; Jaeger, *Paideia* 29–34;



within the epic whole the narrative of Telemachus' journey to Pylos and Sparta is marvelously well crafted, both structurally and thematically, presenting as it does the simultaneous experiences abroad of father and son as they try to overcome the various obstacles to their respective returns.<sup>4</sup> But however well the tale of Telemachus' journey is integrated by Homer into the larger tale of Odysseus' return, it is not an organic part of the widespread and recurrent tale, of which our *Odyssey* is an allomorph, about the return home of a long-awaited husband in disguise just at the moment his wife, beleaguered by suitors, is about to remarry; for in such tales a son normally plays no role in the return of his father.<sup>5</sup> The journey of Telemachus is an allomorph of a different, though no less common, tale: that of a young hero, an only son, whose father has for some reason been long absent, who sets out on his first exploits to "win his spurs"; these exploits often entail the youth's searching for his father, rescuing him, and bringing him home.<sup>6</sup> Such a tale is set in motion in our *Odyssey* by Telemachus' departure for Pylos and Sparta in search of news of his father, but then the tale takes an unusual twist, at least in our *Odyssey*, in having Telemachus return not with his father but with a surrogate, the seer Theoclymenus.

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Reinhardt, *Von Werken und Formen* 47; Millar and Carmichael, "The Growth of Telemachus"; Delebecque, *Télémaque* 137; Kirk, *Songs* 359; Clarke, "Telemachus and the Telemacheia"; Klingner, "Über die vier ersten Bücher"; Austin, *Archery* 181–200.

<sup>4</sup>For the common experiences of father and son see Seitz, *Die Stellung der "Telemachie"* 131–37; Rose, "The Quest of Telemachus"; Rüter, *Odysseeinterpretationen* 141–42, 238–40; Fenik, *Studies* 5–60; Austin, *Archery* 181–200; Powell, *Composition by Theme* 50–56. For the common obstacles to the returns of both father and son specifically, see Apthorp, "The Obstacles to Telemachus' Return" 12–22.

<sup>5</sup>Thompson, *Motif Index* N681; Lord, *Singer* 120–22, 159–61, 242–59 and "The Theme of the Withdrawn Hero"; Coote, "Lying in Passages"; Foley, *Traditional Oral Epic* 359–87.

<sup>6</sup>Thompson, *Motif Index* H1381.2, H1385.7. The Serbo-Croatian epic tradition is very rich in this tale: cf. Lord, *Singer* 120–22, 161–63, 173–74, 260–65 and "The Traditional Song"; Bynum, "Themes of the Young Hero," draws numerous parallels between the common themes of nine Serbo-Croatian "young novice" tales and those of the Telemachy: an absent father, an only son—a solitary figure, reticent and insecure in the presence of a group of lords, who recite his ancestry to him, remark upon his appearance, and instruct him regarding a quest, filled with trials, in search of his father or of his father's potent symbols. But Bynum notes that in the Serbo-Croatian tales the father often remains unretrieved; hence, he suggests, Telemachus would have been expected to fail to retrieve his father, and this confirms the place of the Telemachy in the larger *Odyssey*. Bynum also notes the occurrence of this tale in the Russian *byliny*, and Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition* 102, notes its occurrence in *The Mwindo Epic*.

Theoclymenus, the fugitive seer who takes refuge with Telemachus in Pylos, plays a rather curious role in our *Odyssey*.<sup>7</sup> His elaborate and formal introduction, by far the longest introduction of any character in the *Odyssey*, replete with a description of his life's story and his genealogy (15.223–86), seems entirely out of proportion with the insignificant role that he later plays; that is, his role is not fully worked out in the epic as we know it.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, his involvement in our *Odyssey* is rather

<sup>7</sup> Among the various objections to the role of Theoclymenus are his introduction at a very awkward time, particularly for Telemachus, who is frantically trying to sacrifice before boarding his ship and hastening home (15.217–23); his immediate request for Telemachus' identification—normally it is the suppliant, not the supplicated, who is required to reveal his name (15.263–64); the vagueness and insignificance of his interpretation of a bird omen upon disembarking in Ithaca, and the apparent contradiction in his later recapitulation of the omen to Penelope (15.525–34, 17.152–61); Telemachus' inexplicable change of mind regarding where he should be housed—first he proposes the suitor Eurymachus as a host, but then, after Theoclymenus interprets the bird omen, quickly changes his mind and entrusts him to the hospitality of his faithful friend Peraeus (15.509–46); and the unusual nature of his foresight in predicting the suitors' death after their bout of hysteria (20.345–70). Kirchhoff, *Die homerische Odyssee* 370–71, 376–77, 391–94, 443–44, 527, was the first to hold Theoclymenus up to intense scrutiny, and he concluded that all passages pertaining to him—the episodes in book 15, in 17.31–166, and in 20.347–89—were later additions to an original *Odyssey*. A less radical von Wilamowitz–Moellendorff, *Homerische Untersuchungen* 42–44, 94–95 and *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus* 136–37, following Schwartz, *Die Odyssee* 78–81, 292, did not dispense with the character of Theoclymenus altogether but attributed the various problems to the intrusion of different versions. Merkelbach, *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee* 68–71, 112–13, 237–38, attributed the many problems associated with Theoclymenus to the additions of a *Bearbeiter*. The analytic position is articulately summarized by a sympathetic Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* 83–88, and, surprisingly, it is embraced by Kirk, *Songs* 240–42. But the integrity of Theoclymenus' character has been defended vigorously by others, who see nothing exceptional in his role in terms of the *Odyssey*'s stylistic features and plot development: so Thornton, *People and Themes* 58–62; Erbse, *Beiträge zum Verständnis der Odyssee* 42–54; Fenik, *Studies* 233–44.

<sup>8</sup> Von Wilamowitz–Moellendorff, *Homerische Untersuchungen* 148–49, perplexed that Theoclymenus does not confront the suitors until very late in the epic—at 20.351–57, where he prophesies in the face of their hysteria—reasoned that a *Bearbeiter* had struck out scenes of an original version in which Theoclymenus played a greater role: “musste er eine grössere Rolle spielen” (148). So Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* 84, who focuses on the incongruity of Theoclymenus' elaborate introduction with his later role: “It is natural to presume that a person whose introduction is so long and loudly trumpeted will say or do something of some importance, either now or hereafter, but the truth turns out to be the reverse. His part is very small, and wonderfully unimportant.” Cf. Kirk, *Songs* 240: “the only character in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*—with the possible exception of Phoinix—whom one feels to have arrived there almost by mistake.”

slight: he interprets the bird omen upon arrival in Ithaca (15.531–34); he advises Penelope that Odysseus is already present in Ithaca (17.152–61); he explains the eerie hysteria of the suitors (20.351–57, 364–70); then he goes to the house of Peraeus, never to be heard from again (20.371–72). Admittedly, his prophecies are important to the plot of the *Odyssey*, coming as they do at critical moments. Yet one cannot help but expect more from Theoclymenus. He shows up at critical moments to prophesy and then passes out of the story. Did he in another version of the *Odyssey* play a more developed role, perhaps even as Odysseus himself, whom Telemachus met up with on his journey in search of news of his father, and who accompanied the boy back to Ithaca, uttered his prophecies, and then revealed himself in a dramatic moment as the returned master of the house?<sup>9</sup>

The tale pattern underlying the Telemachy—a “young novice” sets out from home in search of his father—anticipates exactly this outcome, and vestiges of such a tale are discernible in our *Odyssey*’s presentation of the character of Theoclymenus as a virtual doublet of Odysseus. Both men arrive as strangers in Ithaca, where they are treated properly by Telemachus and his servants but suffer abuses at the hands of the suitors, largely because of their repeated prophecies of Odysseus’ imminent return. In Odysseus’ “lie” to Athena—and we have noted that Odysseus’ “lies” seem to preserve traces of a different version of an *Odyssey*—Odysseus says that he is fleeing the vengeance of a powerful family, having killed a nobleman’s son and then sought refuge on a ship in order to escape (13.259–75). This is virtually the situation of Theoclymenus, who, having killed a man, is fleeing the

<sup>9</sup>Cf. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* 88: “Obviously he did something of importance, if the story were known: we can say no more than that, in some other version of the story, his presence was indispensable, particularly at the moment when Telemachus gave Penelope an account of his travels; if, in that version, Theoclymenus were Odysseus himself in disguise, much that is now obscure would be instantly clear as day, but much too would remain inscrutable.” Lord, *Singer* 163: “There were, it would seem, versions in which Telemachus did meet his father and return to Ithaca with him,” 170: “It is not surprising that scholars have sometimes thought that Theoclymenus is a duplication of Odysseus,” and 174: “Suppose, however, that the Theoclymenus episode were really the arrival of Odysseus disguised as Theoclymenus. . . . There seems to be evidence of a version in which Telemachus met his father at Pylos and returned with him, and another version in which he met Odysseus at Eumaeus’ hut.” Kirk, *Songs* 242: “in some other version of the returning-warrior theme he might have represented Odysseus himself in disguise.”

vengeance of a powerful family in Argos and seeks refuge on Telemachus' ship in Pylos (15.223–78).<sup>10</sup>

In two successive scenes Telemachus is faced with the problem of housing these unexpected guests: he entrusts Theoclymenus to the hospitality of his faithful friend Peraeus (15.509–46); he entrusts the disguised Odysseus to the hospitality of his faithful swineherd Eumaeus (16.69–89). In both instances Telemachus instructs the hosts to convey their guests to the palace later, and he himself precedes them into town and awaits their arrival. Upon their arrival at the palace both guests gain an audience with Penelope and predict Odysseus' imminent return (Theoclymenus at 17.152–61, Odysseus at 19.269–307). The action leading up to Theoclymenus' audience is particularly remarkable: upon Telemachus' return from abroad, Penelope asks him specifically how he encountered Odysseus (ὅπως ἦντησας ὀπωπῆς, 17.44), but Telemachus inexplicably puts off her question, bids her to bathe, change her clothes, wait in her bedroom with her maids, and pray to Zeus, while he goes to the assembly to fetch the stranger who accompanied him from abroad (17.46–56). How appropriate if the stranger were her long-awaited husband! But in our version it is Theoclymenus.

Finally, it is noteworthy that in our *Odyssey* Odysseus and Theoclymenus never converse or interact with each other, despite being for a long time simultaneously present in the palace at Ithaca. This is particularly remarkable in view of Odysseus' incessant interaction with almost all the other characters: family members, suitors, maids, herdsmen, and beggars. Was Homer wary of allowing any dialogue or interaction to occur between two characters who had in the inherited tale been one and the same person? Given the overlapping roles of the two characters in Homer's *Odyssey*, it is tempting to hypothesize an underlying version of the tale in which Odysseus played both parts. One can imagine the richly ironic and dramatic moments such a version would have provided: Odysseus, disguised as Theoclymenus, supplicating his own son (15.255–86); interpreting a favorable omen for his son—his

<sup>10</sup>Perhaps in an underlying version of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus took refuge with King Idomeneus in Crete on his way back from Troy; then, as his "lie" to Athena relates, he killed the son of Idomeneus, who "wanted to deprive him of all his booty from Troy" (13.262–63), after which he took refuge with Telemachus, who was in Crete looking for news of his father. But this is pure supposition; one should keep in mind that the motif of a murderer fleeing and becoming a suppliant abroad is very common in Homer: in addition to the abovementioned, one may compare the anonymous Aetolian (14.379–80), Medon (*Il.* 13.694–97), Lycophron (*Il.* 15.430–32), and Patroclus (*Il.* 23.85–90).



house will remain strong in Ithaca (15.531–33); yielding to his son's suggestion that he become a guest of Eurymachus, the most likely suitor to succeed in his suit for Penelope;<sup>11</sup> telling his own wife that her husband is "already here in Ithaca, feeling out the situation and planning evil for the suitors" (17.152–61); and interpreting the eerie hysteria of the suitors as an omen of their bloody death (20.351–57, 364–70).

Adding further weight to my proposition of a version or versions of the *Odyssey* in which Telemachus went in search of his father to Crete rather than to the Peloponnese, and in which Crete played a larger role in Odysseus' wanderings generally, is the remarkable contrast of our poet's vague notion of the topography of the Peloponnese to his quite detailed knowledge of Crete. Homer pictures Nestor's palace in Pylos as near the shore, though the historical Mycenaean palace lies several miles inland at Ano Englianos (3.386–89, 3.423–32, 15.193–216). He describes a two-day chariot ride by Telemachus between Pylos and Sparta, with no consideration of the interlying slopes of Mount Taygetus (3.482–4.2). He seems to envision Sparta and Mycenae in much too close proximity (3.248–61). And he has Agamemnon traverse an impossible route, passing by Cape Malea on return to the Argolid from Troy (4.512–23). In stark contrast is Homer's accurate description of the topography of Crete and his detailed account of the Cretan cities, tribes, and dialects, much of which—with the notable exception of the "Dorians"—seems to reflect the historical reality of the Mycenaean situation (3.291–99, 19.172–202). Of course these details do not imply firsthand knowledge of Crete by our presumably Ionian poet, any more than the catalogue of ships in the *Iliad* (2.494–759) implies firsthand knowledge of the Greek mainland. Rather, just as the detailed and remarkably accurate description of Mycenaean geography in the catalogue of ships appears to rely on an early, perhaps even Mycenaean, account of an organization of Achaean forces, so does this description of Crete point to the existence of an early oral tradition, perhaps even a Mycenaean tradition, in which Crete held a central position in the tale of Odysseus' return. In subsequent versions of the tale, Odysseus' wanderings would have been extended further east and west under the influence of extensive eighth-century Greek colonization. And as Crete

<sup>11</sup>Telemachus' nomination of Eurymachus as a host for Theoclymenus at 15.518–24 is inexplicable in our version of the *Odyssey*, but perhaps it reflects an alternative version in which a disguised Odysseus was to spy on Eurymachus, or at least be in a good position to wreak vengeance as a guest in his home.

began to play a proportionately less important role in the tale, Homer took the liberty of proposing a Peloponnesian tour for Telemachus as an ad hoc replacement for the earlier Cretan version.<sup>12</sup>

### EXTERNAL EVIDENCE

In support of the admittedly hypothetical internal evidence marshaled above, I offer some concrete external evidence that an alternative version of the *Odyssey* of the sort about which I have speculated was actually in circulation at least as early as the Hellenistic period. The scholia to *Odyssey* 3.313 mention that the Alexandrian critic Zenodotus recorded two readings in which Telemachus was to travel not to Sparta but to Crete—once when Athena reveals her plan to Zeus (1.93) and again when she advises Telemachus about his journey abroad (1.285). At 1.93 Zenodotus records πέμψω δ' ἐς Κρήτην τε καὶ ἐς Πύλον ἡμαθόεντα instead of the vulgate πέμψω δ' ἐς Σπάρτην τε καὶ ἐς Πύλον ἡμαθόεντα. At 1.285–86 Zenodotus records κείθεν δ' ἐς Κρήτην τε παρ'

<sup>12</sup>The centrality of Crete in early Greek epic tradition can be inferred from the antiquity of the two Cretan leaders Idomeneus and Meriones. Idomeneus is a grandson of Minos, and he is regularly associated with Ajax, who, with his tower shield, his gigantic stature, and his appearance in linguistically early diction (the dual Αἶαντε, in association with the other Ajax; the dative Αἶαντι, which scans as three longs at *Il.* 14.459, 15.674, and 17.123; the ancient formulas applied to him: ἔρκος Ἀχαιῶν and ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν), clearly belongs to the early Mycenaean period. Meriones is the owner of a Mycenaean boar's-tusk helmet (*Il.* 10.260–71), and he too is found couched in a linguistically early formula—Μηριόνης (τ') ἀτάλαντος Ἐνναλίῳ ἀνδρειφόντῃ (*Il.* 2.651, 7.166, 8.264, 17.259)—that can be explained metrically only by reconstructing its pre-Linear B form (i.e., when syllabic *r* existed). See M. L. West, "The Rise of the Greek Epic" 156–59.

Crete was surely well known throughout the Mycenaean sphere of influence, partly because of its place on the counterclockwise trade circuit of Bronze Age Mediterranean shipping, a circuit that seems to be reflected in the *Odyssey*'s repeated references to Crete, Egypt, Phoenicia, and Cyprus. Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments* 61, was, as far as I am aware, the first to mention the possibility of a round trip of the eastern Mediterranean in a counterclockwise direction by a Mycenaean craft; on the centrality of Crete to Mediterranean trade during the Late Bronze Age generally, see 52–102. The excavators of the Bronze Age trading vessel lost off the coast of Turkey at Ulu Burun, struck by the diverse origins of the ship's cargo, have revived the notion of a counterclockwise trade circuit that connected Crete, North Africa, Egypt, Syria–Palestine, Cyprus, and possibly Rhodes; see Bass, "A Bronze Age Shipwreck at Ulu Burun" 293–96 and "Oldest Known Shipwreck" 697–99; Pulak, "A Bronze Age Shipwreck at Ulu Burun" 33–37.



Ἰδομενῆα ἄνακτα / ὃς γὰρ δεύτατος ἦλθεν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων<sup>13</sup>  
 instead of the vulgate κείθεν δὲ Σπάρτηνδε παρὰ ξανθὸν Μενέλαον /  
 ὃς γὰρ δεύτατος ἦλθεν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων. Very odd indeed! Especially since these are the only two passages in which a Cretan variant is recorded by Zenodotus; that is, it does not appear that he made, or knew of, a wholesale change of the tradition from a Spartan journey to a Cretan journey.<sup>14</sup> How is one to explain Zenodotus' remarkable readings?

The scholia to 3.313—and surely it is Aristarchus responding to Zenodotus here<sup>15</sup>—propose that Nestor's warning to Telemachus not to wander too far from home persuaded Zenodotus that the lad was planning a trip farther afield, causing the critic to alter the text from "Sparta" to "Crete." No more satisfying is van der Valk's theory that at 1.286 Zenodotus wrongly understood δεύτατος to mean "second" instead of "last" and that, since Menelaus was one of the last to return home, the critic was forced to replace Menelaus with the more prompt Idomeneus.<sup>16</sup> Both these proposals, ancient and modern, seem to me to betray an overly pessimistic appraisal of Zenodotus' practices as a textual critic. I should think that for Zenodotus to record a variant so boldly contradictory to the rest of the tale, he must have had some manuscript evidence for it.<sup>17</sup> Did Homer contemplate the possibility of a journey by Telemachus to Crete as well as Sparta, only to change his mind later in his performance? If so, though most rhapsodes and, later, editors would probably have done away with the glaring inconsistency, perhaps Zenodotus had at his disposal an early source that retained it. Or perhaps there existed a pre-Homeric tradition, or perhaps a tradition contemporary with but independent of Homer, designed for a Cretan audience, of

<sup>13</sup>Many manuscripts, apparently in an attempt to combine both versions of the journey—Sparta and Crete—record these same two verses after 1.93 (1.93a–b in Allen).

<sup>14</sup>Twice the scholia note the absence of any mention of Crete or of Idomeneus in passages that refer to Telemachus' itinerary: on 2.359, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα μνήμη τίς ἐστι τῆς Κρήτης; on 4.702, οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ἡ Κρήτη, οὐδὲ Ἰδομενεὺς ὀνομάζεται.

<sup>15</sup>Ludwich, *Aristarchs homerische Textkritik* 510 (on 1.93) and 515 (on 1.285), names the source of the scholia to 3.313 as Aristonicus (who is in turn quoting Aristarchus).

<sup>16</sup>Van der Valk, *Textual Criticism of the Odyssey* 93.

<sup>17</sup>S. West, "An Alternative Nostos" 173–74 and *Commentary* 43, suggests that Zenodotus' readings be given serious attention as *lectiones difficiliores*, and she speculates that he has preserved "an authentic relic of an earlier design for the Telemachy." I sympathize with this view.

a journey by Telemachus to Crete; this tradition could have left traces in the early manuscript tradition of Homer's *Odyssey*, traces that Zenodotus detected and recorded.

Finally, I would be negligent if I failed to mention that such a version also exists in an ancient account of Odysseus' return by Dictys of Crete. In his chronicle of the Trojan War and the subsequent Returns, probably composed during the first or second century A.D. and translated into Latin prose by L. Septimius during the fourth century,<sup>18</sup> Dictys, though agreeing on the whole with the account in the Epic Cycle, puts much more emphasis on the role of Crete: Atreus is the son of Minos, and he dies in Crete; Menelaus is in Crete when Paris visits Sparta and abducts Helen; Orestes seeks refuge with Idomeneus in Crete and leaves from there for Athens and Phocis, eventually to avenge his father; Menelaus stops in Crete with Helen on his return from Egypt and is informed of Orestes' situation; Idomeneus later reconciles a difference between Menelaus and Orestes, and Menelaus then promises Orestes his daughter Hermione. And most remarkably—and most pertinent to the present argument—Dictys reports that Odysseus, having lost most of his ships and men during his return, and then having fallen into the hands of some Phoenician pirates who mercifully saved him, takes refuge in Crete, and he tells the tale of his adventures not, as in Homer's *Odyssey*, to Alcinous in Scheria, where he goes thereafter, but to Idomeneus in Crete (Dictys VI.5). Could these details be derived somehow from an ancient version of the tale, a version that Homer himself knew and whose traces he never entirely eradicated in his own *Odyssey*?

Though the standard view today regarding Dictys is that he refashioned Homer's epics to suit later Greek tastes (suppression of the divine element generally, insertion of a romantic element) and his own political bias (Cretan), even in this century T. W. Allen, albeit rather idiosyncratically, has resuscitated the old-fashioned view that Dictys relied ultimately upon an ancient pre-Homeric source.<sup>19</sup> The mainstay of Allen's argument is that a refashioning and rearranging of events already treated specifically by Homer would be unprecedented: the canonicity of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is everywhere else respected, by

<sup>18</sup> Latin edition by Eisenhut, *Dictyis Cretensis Ephemeridos Belli Troiani Libri*; English translation by Frazer, *The Trojan War: The Chronicles of Dictys of Crete and Dares the Phrygian*.

<sup>19</sup> Allen, *Origins and Transmission* 146–69.



later epic poets, lyric poets, dramatists, mythographers, and rhetoricians. Moreover, the assumption that Dictys is freely refashioning the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* does not correspond well with his close resemblance to the ancient traditions of the Epic Cycle. Hence, Allen argues, Dictys' ultimate source was not Homer, but a pre-Homeric heroic chronicle, which was also the source for the Epic Cycle (hence the similarity with Dictys) and for Homer himself, who modified it and concentrated on a few striking episodes in his innovative *Iliad* and *Odyssey*—that is, Homer is a dramatization of the source of Dictys!

Admittedly, the large role played by Crete in Dictys reads like the deliberate invention of someone with a Cretan bias (even Allen admits this), especially since the Phaeacian story, which the Cretan story virtually replaces, remains in Dictys' version, though in a lesser form. Yet it would be remiss not to consider the possibility that just as we have in Euripides' *Electra* and *Iphigenia at Aulis* an ancient but non-Homeric version of the tale of Achilles' armor,<sup>20</sup> and just as we have in *Rhesus* an ancient but non-Homeric version of the Rhesus myth of *Iliad* 10,<sup>21</sup> so do we have in Dictys at least a vestige of an ancient but non-Homeric version of the *Odyssey* in which Crete played a larger part, a version in which Odysseus fell into the hands of Phoenician pirates and ended up in Crete for an extended visit with Idomeneus during his return. It is not beyond belief that in such a version Telemachus would have met up with his father there and accompanied him back home to Ithaca.

### TRADITION AND INNOVATION

The purpose of this analysis of the *Odyssey* is not, as was that of past generations of analysts, to dissect the epic and then portray the poet of our inherited version as an incapable compiler of its various parts; rather its purpose is to get a glimpse of the rich tradition that lies behind our tale so as to appreciate better what we have inherited. As such, this type of analysis—a neoanalytic approach illuminated by the light of oral theory—is not destructive but constructive. It helps us as modern readers, unfamiliar with the poetic acculturation of Homer's contemporary audience, to elucidate the traditional background and

<sup>20</sup> *El.* 442–51, *IA* 1068–75; contrast *Il.* 17.192–97, 18.79–85; so Johansen, *The Iliad in Early Greek Art* 119–22.

<sup>21</sup> So Fenik, *Iliad X and the Rhesus*.

thereby appreciate the operation of Homer's individual work against this background; here, at the intersection of tradition and innovation, we may hope to find Homer's personal stamp; here we may hope to come into contact with Homer as, dare I say, an individual.

It seems fairly apparent, for example, that Homer departed from his inherited tradition in having Telemachus tour the Peloponnese in a vain search for his father. What does the innovative Telemachy contribute aesthetically to this version of the *Odyssey* tale? Quite a lot, I would argue. For it delays the appearance of Odysseus, the central hero of this epic, until the beginning of book 5. Instead, we see our hero through the eyes of others: the quarreling divinities, the frustrated son Telemachus, the sorrowful wife Penelope, the ambivalent Ithacans, the hostile suitors, the nostalgic former comrades Menelaus and Nestor, and even the semidivine Helen. Four books of anticipation and suspense finally culminate in Odysseus' actual appearance in book 5, a poignant portrayal of him sitting by the seashore and weeping for his homeland.

Further, the tale of Telemachus' wanderings in the Peloponnese is one of the supporting pillars of the sophisticated narratological and chronological structure (surely a Homeric innovation) of the *Odyssey* as a whole. The events of books 1–4 are simultaneous with the events of books 5–8. Both father and son are at the same time wandering far from home, both encountering strangers to whom they cautiously reveal their identities, and both striving to achieve a return home but confronting various obstacles to their expeditious returns: guest–detention, predominately by powerful women hosts; and the temptation of food, drink, drugs, stories, and song to forget their homecoming and enjoy an easy life far from the troubles of Ithaca. The narratological and chronological interaction between these two building blocks of the monumental epic, with their resounding thematic, and even formulaic, echoes, serves to create a sympathetic harmony between father and son as both at the same time enjoy common pleasures and endure common hardships.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, if there ever existed such alternative versions of the *Odyssey* tale as I have proposed, it is natural to assume that Homer's audience knew them and detected them couched in Odysseus' "lies" in this particular performance (our *Odyssey*). Homer surely would have played

<sup>22</sup>On the common experiences of Telemachus and Odysseus, and the thematic and formulaic echoes between these two major sections of the narrative of the *Odyssey*, see Reece, *Stranger's Welcome* 71–99.

upon an informed audience's expectations, for such shared knowledge between poet and audience would have allowed the dramatic irony of the "truth" (such as Odysseus' realistic tales to Athena, Eumaeus, Antinous, and Penelope) being presented as "lies" in this version and therefore not being believed by the recipients of these tales, and the "lies" (such as Odysseus' fantastic tales to the Phaeacians) being presented as "truth" and therefore not only being believed but lavishly rewarded. In effect, in this oral tradition, as in comparative oral traditions,<sup>23</sup> what was told to be believed in one version was told to deceive in another.<sup>24</sup>

STEVE REECE

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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<sup>23</sup> For Serbo-Croatian analogues see Coote, "Lying in Passages."

<sup>24</sup> I wish to express my gratitude to *AJP*'s referees and to my colleagues at four different institutions—Richard Janko, George Bass, John Lenz, John Foley, and William Race—for their advice at various stages in the evolution of this essay.



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
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## ELEMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DATE OF SEMONIDES OF AMORGOS

The date ascribed to the iambic poet Semonides of Amorgos has long been a matter of scholarly uncertainty.<sup>1</sup> Ancient chronographic sources present us with a welter of confused and contradictory statements; for the most part, they associate him closely with Archilochus as a poet of the early seventh century, although one ambiguous testimonium may suggest a late sixth-century date. Modern literary historians seem to favor a date in the second half of the seventh century, although with no real evidence.<sup>2</sup> After reexamining the chronographic sources, I wish to call attention to a passage in Semonides' poetry whose bearing on this question has hitherto been neglected. I argue that Semonides' depiction of the Earth-woman and Sea-woman (fr. 7.21–42 W) reflects a stage in the evolution of elemental theory quite inconceivable for the seventh century, but more consistent with the late sixth century. I then proceed to discuss some other aspects of Semonides' work which confirm this down-dating.

### 1. CHRONOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

For the sake of the following discussion, I first quote in full the relevant testimonia:

- I. Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* 1.21.131 (Dindorf): . . . τὸν Ἀρχίλοχον μετὰ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ἤδη γνωρίζεσθαι ὀλυμπιάδα [= 700–697 B.C.]. . . Σιμωνίδης μὲν οὖν κατὰ Ἀρχίλοχον φέρεται, Καλλίνος δὲ πρεσβύτερος οὐ μακρῶ· τῶν γὰρ Μαγνήτων ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίλοχος ἀπολωλότων, ὁ δὲ εὐήμερῶντων μέμνηται.
- II. (A) Jerome *Chron.* OL. 29.1 = 664 B.C. (p. 94<sup>e</sup> Helm): *Archilochus et Simonides et Aristoxenus musicus inlustres habentur.*

<sup>1</sup> For a review of scholarship on the question see Pellizer, "Sulla cronologia" 17–23.

<sup>2</sup> See Schmid and Stählin, *Geschichte* I.1 398; Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* 184; Gerber, *Euterpe* 53; Easterling, "Semonides" 113. However, Lesky, *History* 114, seems to follow the chronographers in identifying him as "roughly contemporary with Archilochus." For criticism of the very tenuous grounds on which the late seventh-century date is maintained, see Pellizer, "Sulla cronologia" 20–22.

(B) Eusebius *Chron.* (Armenian version) AA 1351 = 665 B.C. (p. 184 Karst): "Archilochus und Simonides wurden gekannt."

III. Cyril of Alexandria *Contra Julianum* 1.14 (Burguière and Evieux): Εἰκοστῇ τρίτῃ ὀλυμπιάδι [= 688–685 B.C.] φασὶ γενέσθαι Ἀρχιλόχον, τὰ Ἰουδαίων κράτη διέποντος Μανασσῆ. Εἰκοστῇ ἐννάτῃ ὀλυμπιάδι [= 664–661 B.C.] Ἰππώνακτα καὶ Σιμωνίδην φασὶ γνωρίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν Ἀριστόξενον.

IV. (A) *Suda* s.v. Σιμωνίδης (σ 446 Adler): Κρίνεω, Ἀμοργῖνος, ἱαμβογράφος. ἔγραψεν ἐλεγείαν ἐν βιβλίοις β', ἱάμβους. γέγονε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ ρ' καὶ υ' ἔτη τῶν Τρωϊκῶν [= 694 B.C.]. ἔγραψεν ἱάμβους πρῶτος αὐτὸς κατὰ τινας.

(B) *Suda* s.v. Σιμμία, Ῥόδιος (σ 431 Adler): . . . ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξαρχῆς Σάμιος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀποικισμῷ τῆς Ἀμοργοῦ ἐστάλη καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγεμὼν ὑπὸ Σαμίων. ἔκτισε δὲ Ἀμοργὸν εἰς τρεῖς πόλεις, Μινώαν, Αἰγιαλόν, Ἀρκεσίμην. γέγονε δὲ μετὰ υς' ἔτη τῶν Τρωϊκῶν [= 778 B.C.]. καὶ ἔγραψε κατὰ τινας πρῶτος ἱάμβους, καὶ ἄλλα διάφορα, Ἀρχαιολογίαν τε τῶν Σαμίων.

V. Proclus ap. Photius *Bibl.* 239, 319b28–31 (Henry): Ἰάμβων δὲ ποιηταὶ Ἀρχιλόχος τε ὁ Πάριος ἄριστος καὶ Σιμωνίδης ὁ Ἀμόργιος ἦ, ὡς ἔνιοι, Σάμιος, καὶ Ἰππῶναξ ὁ Ἐφέσιος· ὧν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἐπὶ Γύγου, ὁ δὲ ἐπ' Ἀνανίου τοῦ Μακεδόνοιο, Ἰππῶναξ δὲ κατὰ Δαρεῖον ἠκμαζε.

The ancient chronographic tradition, particularly in regard to biographical dates of the archaic age, is a veritable morass of confusion, corruption, and conjectural synchronisms, often beset by the worst excesses of Alexandrian *vita* traditions. Nowhere is this more true than in regard to Semonides, whose very name was not even known correctly.<sup>3</sup> The earlier the period, the less precise the information available to the chronographers and their Alexandrian sources, and the greater their tendency to conjecture dates based on comparison with the few historical figures or events whose dates could be determined. Any scholar who has worked very long with this material cannot help but develop considerable skepticism about its reliability and value for dates

<sup>3</sup>The only source to give the form "Semonides" is the late grammarian Choeroboscus, ap. *Et. Magn.* 713.17, who specifically distinguishes him from the lyric poet "Simonides."



prior to the fifth century:<sup>4</sup> the dates which the chronographers transmit for Homer and Hesiod are pure fantasy,<sup>5</sup> and there are serious problems with the dates they record for lyric poets such as Alcman, Theognis, and Ibycus.<sup>6</sup> A reexamination of the testimonia concerning Semonides is warranted in that so many scholars have appealed to them uncritically as providing firm evidence for a seventh-century date.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup>On this tradition generally, see the fundamental works of Diels, "Untersuchungen"; Rohde, "Studien zur Chronologie"; Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*. The most recent study of this tradition is Mosshammer's excellent *Chronicle of Eusebius*; his views are well summarized by the statement that "[Eusebius'] sources and the sources of the *Suda* were collateral branches of a vulgate chronology that derived from the Chronicle of Apollodorus, but transmitted a tradition contaminated by error, confusion, and false combination" (218).

<sup>5</sup>Hesiod's *floruit* is dated to 809 B.C. (Jerome *Chron.* AA1208 [p. 84<sup>c</sup> Helm]; Porphyry ap. *Suda*, s.v. Ἡσίοδος [η 583 Adler]), Homer's to one hundred years earlier (Porphyry *ibid.*). For the sources of this tradition see Mosshammer, *Chronicle of Eusebius* 193–97.

<sup>6</sup>Alcman: *Suda*, s.v. Ἀλκμάν (α 1289 Adler) dates Alcman to the twenty-seventh Olympiad (672–669 B.C.), whereas Eusebius gives two dates for his *floruit*, 659/58 (Jerome *Chron.* OL. 30.3 [p. 94<sup>i</sup> Helm]; Eusebius *Chron.* [Armenian version] AA1358 [p. 185 Karst]) and 609 (Jerome *Chron.* OL. 42.2 [p. 98<sup>c</sup> Helm]). The last date is more likely to be accurate, since as West shows ("Alcmanica" 188–94), 5 fr. 2 col. i *PMG* connects Alcman with Spartan kings in power ca. 600 B.C.

Theognis: Jerome *Chron.* OL. 58.4 (p. 103<sup>i</sup> Helm), Eusebius *Chron.* (Armenian version) AA1471 (p. 189 Karst), and Cyril of Alexandria *Contra Julianum* 1.15 (Burguière and Evieux) date Theognis to OL. 58 (548–545 B.C.). *Suda* s.v. Θεόγνις (θ 136 Adler) dates him to OL. 57 (544–541). But as the founder of a tradition of poetry, Theognis needs to be dated to the period of the tradition's earliest datable texts, which would put him ca. 620 B.C., around the time of Theagenes' rise to tyranny. See West, *Studies* 65–71; Legon, *Megara III*; Figueira and Nagy, *Theognis of Megara* 1.

Ibycus: *Suda* s.v. Ἰβυκος (ι 80 Adler), says that he came to Samos in OL. 54 (564–561), during the reign of Polycrates father of Polycrates. But Herodotus (3.39) gives Polycrates' father a different name and says that Polycrates took power in a revolt. Jerome *Chron.* OL. 60.1 (p. 103<sup>o</sup> Helm), dates Ibycus' *floruit* to 540 B.C., which is closer to the reign of the younger Polycrates and thus more likely to be right. See Mosshammer, *Chronicle of Eusebius* 290–304, for a discussion of the many problems here.

<sup>7</sup>The evidence of the chronographers is defended by Pellizer, "Sulla cronologia" 17–23, and by Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species* 15–18, in a section full of historical errors and miscalculated dates. Trust in the chronographers seems also to be behind the identification of Semonides as "s. vii med." in West, *Iambi et Elegi* II 96. Some residual trust in the chronographers must be the reason for the reluctance to abandon a seventh-century date altogether, even on the part of those who wish to make Semonides a little later than Archilochus (see note 2 above).

Let me make my position clear at the outset. I believe that Testimonia I–IV, despite their differences in exact date, all derive from a common Alexandrian tradition which dated Semonides and other iambic poets in synchrony with Archilochus, whose recognizable historical allusions provided key dates around which to reconstruct a chronological schema. This dating of Semonides is therefore entirely conjectural and is based on no solid historical information within either his own work or that of early logographers. It should be trusted no more than the obviously incorrect dates which the same tradition generates for Hipponax and Aristoxenus of Selinus.

The earliest testimonium (I) is that of Clement of Alexandria, who makes the synchronism with Archilochus explicit, along with a statement that Callinus was not much earlier. The comparison of Archilochus and Callinus is amplified by the observation that Archilochus speaks of the Magnesians as having been destroyed (presumably by the Cimmerians), whereas Callinus has them still flourishing. Here we have an appeal to specific textual evidence of the sort modern scholars use in dating. What is significant for our purposes is that no such evidence is proffered for Semonides; the synchronism with Archilochus merely stands by itself, brief and uncorroborated. Indeed, Archilochus' date is used as a focal point for a number of chronological comparisons in this paragraph—not only with Semonides and Callinus, but also with Terpander and Eumelus.

The *Chronicle* of Eusebius (Test. II) also makes the synchronism with Archilochus explicit and adds a third iambic poet, Aristoxenus of Selinus. Although Epicharmus (fr. 88 Kaibel) calls Aristoxenus the earliest iambic poet, he was probably at least a generation later than Archilochus, since Selinus was not even founded until 625 B.C.<sup>8</sup> In both Jerome's translation and the Armenian version (which omits Aristoxenus), it is Archilochus' name that begins the series and clearly provides the key date (OL. 29.1 = 664 B.C.) to which the lesser iambists are attached.<sup>9</sup> This technique is also evident in Eusebius' dating of Hipponax to OL. 23.1 = 688 B.C. (p. 93<sup>e</sup> Helm); this is an alternative date in the Eusebian tradition for the acme of Archilochus (p. 67<sup>a</sup> Helm ~ p. 174

<sup>8</sup>See Thuc. 6.4. However, Diodorus Siculus 13.59 and even Eusebius himself (Jerome *Chron.* OL. 32.3 [p. 95<sup>f</sup> Helm]) date Selinus' foundation to 650 B.C.; this is still later than the *floruit* given here for Aristoxenus.

<sup>9</sup>See Mosshammer, *Chronicle of Eusebius* 214.



Karst ~ Georg. Syncellus 340).<sup>10</sup> Of course, Hipponax' actual date was at least 150 years later, as is well documented both by internal and by external evidence.<sup>11</sup> The synchronism with Archilochus may have been based on the comedy of Diphilus portraying Hipponax and Archilochus as rival lovers competing for the favor of Sappho (see Athenaeus 13.599d).<sup>12</sup> Or it may have been just another case of synchronizing to the same date poets whose genre and style seemed comparable. In either event, the manifest errors which this synchronistic methodology creates for Aristoxenus and Hipponax should lead us to question its application to Semonides.

We find the same confused synchronisms at work in Cyril's brief chronology of the iambic poets (Test. III). Although Archilochus is here identified with the earlier Eusebian date (OL. 23.1 = 688 B.C.), the three lesser iambists are all brought together at the later Eusebian date for Archilochus (OL. 29.1 = 664 B.C.). Again, the absurdity of the date for Aristoxenus and Hipponax suggests that this notice is also of no value for Semonides.

Although Archilochus does not figure by name anywhere in the notice of the *Suda* (Test. IV), he is probably the basis for the dates therein.<sup>13</sup> The wording γέγονε δὲ καὶ αὐτός . . . indicates a comparison with someone else's date in the *Suda*'s source; the next sentence (ἔγραψεν ἰάμβους πρῶτος αὐτὸς κατὰ τινος) suggests that this date was extrapolated by comparison with the other major iambic poet who was often considered πρῶτος. The date 490 years after the Trojan War would, under Eratosthenes' conventional reckoning, be 694 B.C. However, a section of the entry under Simmias of Rhodes seems to have been derived from an earlier notice on Semonides and misplaced; this notice gives the even more preposterous date of 406 years after the Trojan War (= 778 B.C.). Rohde may be right in believing that the number has been corrupted in both notices from an original 496 (υῑς'), which would yield (lo and behold!) the year 688 B.C., the earlier of the two Eusebian dates for Archilochus.

<sup>10</sup>See Mosshammer, *Chronicle of Eusebius* 211–14, for the sloppy reasoning behind the double dating of Archilochus' acme.

<sup>11</sup>Pliny *NH* 36.11 dates him to OL. 60 (540–537); the Parian marble (*FGrH* 239 A42) dates him ca. 550; Proclus (= Test. V) dates him to the time of Darius, i.e., after 520.

<sup>12</sup>See Jacoby, *Apollodorus Chronik* 146–47.

<sup>13</sup>For much of the following discussion I am indebted to Rohde, "Studien zur Chronologie" 559 n. 1, and Mosshammer, *Chronicle of Eusebius* 340 n. 5.

Many critics have put great faith in the story which is coupled with the date 778 B.C., to the effect that Semonides was sent to Amorgos as the leader of Samian colonists settling the island.<sup>14</sup> However, this story also bears a suspicious analogy to the career of Archilochus, whose poetry makes much of his role in the Parian settlement of Thasos. The date attached to the story is clearly of no authority, whether we accept it as it stands in the manuscripts or adopt Rohde's idea that it was originally 688. The statement about Semonides' founding three cities is also wrong, since only Minoa was a city of Samian foundation; we know that Aegiale and Arkesine were Naxian.<sup>15</sup> Given these manifest historical errors, there is hardly any reason for supposing that this story had its source in any credible logographer.<sup>16</sup> More likely, it is the usual construction of ancient *vita* tradition, perhaps designed to explain by analogy with Archilochus why Semonides was identified in some accounts as Amorgine and in others as Samian (see Test. V).<sup>17</sup> Even if we were to accept that Semonides actually was a leader of Samian colonists, this datum would give no evidence of his date, since the date of Minoa's foundation is unknown and, in any event, nothing guarantees that Semonides emigrated as part of the first wave of colonists: colonization sometimes took place over a space of several generations, as is especially likely in this case, in view of Samos' tumultuous history throughout the sixth century.<sup>18</sup> If Semonides did indeed emigrate from Samos to Amorgos, whether by himself or as part of a group, this is just as likely to have been due to Polycrates' tyranny or the Persian conquest as to any event in the seventh century.

It is not, I think, overstating the case to conclude that Testimonia I–IV are all absolutely worthless for determining the date of Semonides, based as they are on nothing more than an Alexandrian tradition

<sup>14</sup> See particularly Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species* 15–17.

<sup>15</sup> See Ruppel, "Amorginischen Städte" 313–15, who shows that the cities continued to maintain separate ethnic identities even as late as the third century B.C.

<sup>16</sup> The speculation of Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species* 17, that Semonides might have been mentioned by the obscure Samian chronicler Euagon, seems little more than wishful thinking.

<sup>17</sup> It could be that the idea of Semonides' Samian provenance derived entirely from his having written an *Archaeology of the Samians*, as the *Suda* attests (Test. IVB).

<sup>18</sup> On continuing relations between mother-cities and colonies long after the act of foundation, sometimes including the sending of additional settlers, see Graham, *Colony and Mother City*. As Graham notes (74, 162), Samos continued to maintain close ties with the far more distant colony of Perinthus even into the sixth century. There is no reason not to suppose that she would do the same with Amorgos.



synchronizing him with Archilochus. But with Testimonium V, from Proclus' *Chrestomathy*, we see information which seems to be derived from an altogether different tradition: here the three major iambic poets are not synchronized together but are placed at different dates, each defined by association with a monarch. Archilochus is clearly identified as the first temporally (ὁ μὲν πρῶτος) and is associated with Gyges, whom he mentions in his poetry (fr. 19 W). Hipponax is the last in the series and is given his correct date in the late sixth century. Although Darius is not alluded to in our extant fragments of Hipponax, the dating by allusion to prominent monarchs rather than by artificially constructed years of acme does suggest a careful and reliable method based on historical evidence in the texts themselves. Unfortunately, the testimony for Semonides here is obscured by corruption: there was no Macedonian king by the name of Ananius or Ananias. However, Ananias was the name of no fewer than three New Testament characters (Acts 5:1, 9:10, 23:2) and could thus easily be misread into a text by a Byzantine scribe. The easiest emendation paleographically is Sylburg's Ἀμύντου, which is indeed printed in the latest edition of Photius;<sup>19</sup> if correct, this would put Semonides in the late sixth century along with Hipponax, since Amyntas' reign lasted from 540 to 498. But the corruption prevents us from appealing to this testimonium as a certain piece of evidence: the most that we can say in the present state of our knowledge is that Proclus' source *may* have assigned Semonides a late sixth-century date.<sup>20</sup> The question of Semonides' date must, if possible, be decided on the basis of internal evidence.

## 2. SEMONIDES AND ELEMENTAL THEORY

The Earth-woman and Sea-woman have always been considered a surprising disruption in Semonides' poem on the female types, who

<sup>19</sup>Henry, *Photius* V 158. For support of this emendation see also Severyns, *Recherches* I 151–54, II III–12. Clinton's emendation to Ἀργαίου is far less attractive paleographically, but necessary for those who wish to produce a seventh-century date.

<sup>20</sup>Another possible, although in my opinion less likely, explanation of the corruption could be that the minor choliambic poet Ananias originally formed part of this list in Proclus' source and his name somehow became confused with the name of the king attached to Semonides; something similar is suggested by Rohde, "Γέγονε" 197–98 n. 1. This would involve a much earlier and more extensive corruption of the text than under the Byzantine hypothesis I have proposed above.

are otherwise modeled on animal species.<sup>21</sup> Commentators have usually attributed their presence to the influence of Hesiod, *Works and Days* 60–61, where Pandora is created by Hephaestus through mixing earth and water.<sup>22</sup> But Semonides is proposing something quite different here—not a woman made out of the constituent elements of all matter, but two different women, each dominated by a single element which influences her psychic disposition. The Earth–woman is stupid, eats all the time, and is too lazy even to draw her chair near the fire during cold weather; the Sea–woman is beautiful, unpredictable, alternately well disposed and ferocious, impossible to handle. The former is solid and unmoving, the latter liquid and unstable. What is striking here is not that Semonides had a knowledge of earth and sea as elements, but that he makes each element the basis for description of a certain psychological profile. The idea of constituent elements as an influence on human behavior is far too bold and rationalistic to have been the invention of Semonides, not otherwise known as an original thinker. It must reflect the influence of Ionian speculation about elemental interaction and its effects on the human psyche.

Fraenkel is alone among previous commentators in recognizing this passage as a reflection of Ionian elemental theory.<sup>23</sup> But his reluctance to challenge the consensus on a seventh-century date for Semonides led him to misidentify the source of influence as the cosmological doctrine of Thales.<sup>24</sup> None of our information about Thales suggests that he was a dualist or that he had any concept of the elements as determinative for human character.

It is rather with the famous *dikē* fragment of Anaximander (A9, B1 DK) that we first see the idea of nature as a dynamic equilibrium between opposites, particularly as reflected in the elements: if one ele-

<sup>21</sup>For a general appreciation of their significance and place within the poem see Marg, *Der Charakter* 16–18, and Pellizer, “La donna del mare.” There is little support today for Opitz’s idea, “Weiberspiegel” 16–30, that they are interpolated from another poem based on the four elements.

<sup>22</sup>See Marg, *Der Charakter* 17; Kakridis, “Weiberiambus” 5; Verdenius, “Semonides über die Frauen” 138–39; Lloyd–Jones, *Females of the Species* 69.

<sup>23</sup>Fraenkel, “A Thought Pattern” 332–33 and *Early Greek Poetry* 205–6.

<sup>24</sup>Since Thales is generally dated in relation to the solar eclipse of 585, this would put Semonides very late in the seventh century if there at all. At the very least, the traditional chronographic reckoning of his date would have to be abandoned.



ment or quality exists in superabundance, it must pay “justice” to its opposite in a perpetual cycle of readjustment.<sup>25</sup> Later in the sixth century, Xenophanes extends this doctrine into a strong dualism of earth and water as the fundamental elements of all things (B29 DK, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ πάντ’ ἐσθ’ ὅσα γίνοντ[αι] ἥδ’ ἐ φύονται) and all men (B33 DK, πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα). Earth and water do not exist in a static proportion, however, but are constantly changing as the world moves through alternating cycles of dry and wet (A32, 33 DK); this cyclical process, clearly derived from empirical observation of the seasons in Greece, embodies the same principle of compensatory variation as is evident in Anaximander’s *dikē* fragment.

In Xenophanes we see the idea that men are composed out of earth and water, and the concept that these two substances can alternate with each other in quantity. But it is only with Alcmaeon of Croton that we find an explicit theoretical formulation of the consequences of this alternation for the human organism:

. . . τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἐκατέρου μοναρχίαν. καὶ νόσον συμπίπτειν ὥς μὲν ὑφ’ οὗ ὑπερβολῇ θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος, ὥς δὲ ἐξ οὗ διὰ πλῆθος τροφῆς ἢ ἔνδειαν . . . (B4 DK)

Health is generated by the balance and equality (*isonomia*) of contraries, whereas disease is produced by the dominance (*monarchia*) of one quality over the other. Although Alcmaeon does not deal with elements such as earth and water per se, he does emphasize their qualitative correlates “dry” and “wet,” which he puts first in his list of exemplary contraries. Second in his list are “cold” and “hot.” Lloyd has demonstrated at some length that these two linked pairs of qualities form the basis for later cosmological and physiological speculation among the Presocratics and earliest Hippocratic treatises.<sup>26</sup>

The linkage of these four qualities seems to be alluded to in the text of Semonides’ portrayal of the Earth–woman:

<sup>25</sup>On this fragment and the elemental nature of Anaximander’s opposites see Vlastos, “Equality and Justice” 168–76; Kahn, *Anaximander* 166–96; Lloyd, “Hot and Cold” 94–98.

<sup>26</sup>Lloyd, “Hot and Cold.”

τὴν δὲ πλάσαντες γῆνιν Ὀλύμπιοι  
 ἔδωκαν ἀνδρὶ πηρόν· οὔτε γὰρ κακὸν  
 οὔτ' ἐσθλὸν οὐδὲν οἶδε τοιαύτη γυνή·  
 ἔργων δὲ μῦνον ἐσθίειν ἐπίσταται.  
 κοῦδ' ἦν κακὸν χειμῶνα ποιήσῃ θεός,  
 ὀργῶσα δίφρον ἄσσον ἔλκεται πυρός. (fr. 7.21–26 W)

The Earth–woman prefers to freeze rather than draw near the fire. Earth (the “dry” element) is associated with coldness inasmuch as the solid, earthly form of water is of course ice. It is at the opposite end of the elemental spectrum from fire, which is the hottest, most rarefied and unstable of all the elements (cf. Heraclitus B36, 76 DK). Within the polarity of earth and water, earth is the “cold” term and water the “hot”: indeed, the idea that water and warmth are connected as the origin of life goes back to Thales (cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 983b23–24) and Anaximander (A11 DK).<sup>27</sup> Semonides’ detail about the Earth–woman’s indifference to fire and warmth can only be understood in the context of such elemental theories.

Alcmaeon’s date is itself a matter of some controversy, but there is no real reason to doubt Aristotle’s testimony that he was active during the old age of Pythagoras.<sup>28</sup> The chronographic tradition identifies Pythagoras’ *floruit* with the rise to power of Polycrates around 530 B.C.;<sup>29</sup> this is probably not far from the truth and would suggest a *floruit* for Alcmaeon somewhere in the last quarter of the sixth century. Indeed, Alcmaeon’s theory may well have owed something to Pythagorean influence. Although not generally considered a Pythagorean himself, Alcmaeon doubtless came into contact with Pythagoras’ teachings and disciples in Croton. For the Pythagoreans, the soul seems to have been regarded as an “attunement” (ἁρμονία) between opposite qualities which are held in appropriate numerical proportions. As the Pythagorean Simmias of Thebes expresses it in Plato’s *Phaedo*:

<sup>27</sup> For later extensions of this doctrine in the Hippocratic corpus and elsewhere see Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* 57 n. 3. Empedocles (A73 DK) held that sea animals were warm–natured, land animals cold–natured.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle *Metaph.* 986a27–34. See the discussion of Guthrie, *History* I 341–43.

<sup>29</sup> Jerome *Chron.* OL. 62.3 (p. 104<sup>i</sup> Helm); Eusebius *Chron.* (Armenian version) AA1484 (p. 189 Karst). Pythagoras’ death is dated to 497 by Jerome *Chron.* OL. 70.4 (p. 107<sup>f</sup> Helm), to 499 by the Armenian version of Eusebius *Chron.* AA1517 (p. 191 Karst).



. . . τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐν-  
 τεταμένον τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένον ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ  
 καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν  
 αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως  
 κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. (86b-c)

This passage has been a source of controversy, since the doctrine which Simmias goes on to expound about the soul's dissolution cannot be genuinely Pythagorean.<sup>30</sup> But his initial statement that the soul is a *harmonia* of opposites expresses a concept elsewhere attested as Pythagorean.<sup>31</sup> Its similarity to Alcmaeon's formulation of bodily health as the proper *isonomia* of these same opposites (hot and cold, dry and wet) suggests that this doctrine may be quite early in the history of Pythagoreanism, even going back to the founder himself, who, like Semonides, began his career in Samos.

The concept of *harmonia* between opposed forces is taken for granted by Heraclitus (B51 DK), although not specifically in connection with the soul. Heraclitus was, however, interested in the soul and the effects of opposed qualities on it. For Heraclitus, there was constant alternation between dry and wet, cold and hot (B126 DK, τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται). But most important for our purposes are Heraclitus' reflections on wet and dry souls. *Psychē* for Heraclitus is "breath" as well as "soul," and is thus a form of air in elemental terms. Hence Heraclitus, with his usual sense for paradox, can declare that "becoming moist is either pleasure or death for souls" (B77 DK, ψυχῇσι τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι), a pleasure in the form of drunkenness, but a death in the sense of ceasing to be "breath" and instead becoming the heavier element of water (cf. B36, 76 DK). He elaborates the image of the wet soul further in B117 DK: "whenever a man is drunk, he is led stumbling along by a young boy, not understanding where he is going, having a moist soul." Wetness of soul leads to a dulled sense of perception, like drunkenness; lacking his perceptual faculties, the wet man is less of a

<sup>30</sup>For a convenient summary of the controversies surrounding this passage see Guthrie, *History* I 309–17.

<sup>31</sup>This part of Simmias' view is reaffirmed by the Pythagorean Echecrates later in the dialogue (*Phaedo* 88d). In connection with Pythagoras himself see Macrobius *Somn. Scip.* 1.14.19. On Pythagorean *harmonia* doctrine in general see Meyer, *APMONIA*, 9–13.

man, but is conducted even by a small boy. The opposite state of the soul is described in B118 DK (αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη): “a ray of light is the dry soul, wisest and best.” Instead of dulled perceptions, the dry soul is associated with wisdom and clarity: a ray of light, it is closer in form to (though not identical with) the cosmic fire which is at the heart of Heraclitus’ *logos*. We thus see a convergence of the elemental, physiological, psychological, and metaphysical levels in Heraclitus; Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 7.129–30 = A16 DK) attests Heraclitus’ interest in the physiological/psychological dimensions of perceiving the *logos*, and Heraclitus’ fragment on sleeping and waking (B26 DK) gives evidence of the same.

Of course, Heraclitus’ treatment of the wet and dry souls does not correspond in detail to Semonides’ Sea–woman and Earth–woman. But it does suggest a similar mechanism for looking at psychological phenomena in elemental terms. The cryptic and imagistic style of Heraclitus’ aphorisms on this topic indicates that it was a doctrine already familiar to his audience: “the moist–dry contrast in Heraclitus’ psychophysics is not original; he takes it for granted as the theory current in ‘scientific’ circles of his own time and place. What is distinctly Heraclitean is the enrichment of this physical doctrine with figurative and poetic overtones. . . . These images serve not merely as an ornament of style but as the symbolic expression for a rigorous correlation between physical and moral–intellectual states of the psyche.”<sup>32</sup>

The connection between the balance of humors and matters of health and temperament becomes fundamental in fifth–century Hippocratic writings. In a very detailed and exhaustive study of the origins and background of humoral theory, Thivel concludes that the fully developed theory of four humors was preceded by a theory of two basic humors (phlegm and bile), which antedates even our earliest extant medical writings and was probably under formation during the course of the sixth century, *pari passu* with the development of Ionian meteorology and philosophy.<sup>33</sup> In his view, this theory is already presupposed as traditional by Alcmaeon of Croton. The bile/phlegm opposition is certainly comparable in nature to the wet/dry, hot/cold oppositions so fundamental for Xenophanes, Alcmaeon, and Heraclitus. Indeed, bile

<sup>32</sup> Kahn, *Heraclitus* 248. Heraclitus’ valuation of terms is certainly paralleled in the Hippocratic corpus: *Ulc.* 1 clearly defines the dry as healthy, the wet as unhealthy.

<sup>33</sup> Thivel, *Cnide et Cos?* 289–383, esp. 295–96, 305–6, 345–46. Thivel’s views were in some ways adumbrated by Fredrich, *Hippokratische Untersuchungen* 33–50.



is frequently associated with inner heat, phlegm with inner coldness.<sup>34</sup> The early treatise *On Glands*, based on a system of these two humors, describes bile as acrid and viscous (δριμὺ καὶ κολλῶδες), phlegm as abundant and inert (πουλὺ καὶ ἄργόν).<sup>35</sup>

These physical qualities of the humors themselves correspond to their effects on humans. *Airs, Waters, and Places* characterizes phlegmatics as flabby, with soft, loose bellies, while the bilious are slender and of a ferocious disposition; because of their inner coldness, phlegmatics live in cities exposed to hot winds, whereas the inner heat of the bilious causes them to live in cities exposed to cold winds.<sup>36</sup> This distinction is clearly cognate to that which the treatise makes at the end between the inhabitants of mild climates, who are fleshy, indolent, and dull, and the inhabitants of harsh climates, who are slender, clever, industrious, haughty, and fierce.<sup>37</sup> Phlegm is commonly associated with various forms of bodily edema and with immobility of the limbs.<sup>38</sup> The treatise *On Diseases* discusses the “phlegmatic disease,” usually afflicting females, as a life-long state of corpulence and weakness, lack of energy, and a tendency to eat all the time.<sup>39</sup> The treatise *On the Sacred Disease* differentiates the effects of the two humors by declaring that those whose brains are deranged by an excess of phlegm are driven to speechlessness and stupor, whereas those with brains deranged from an excess of bile are vociferous, malignant, and hyperactive; phlegm cools the brain beyond the norm, whereas bile heats it beyond the norm.<sup>40</sup> We can see that these two temperaments bear a remarkable resemblance to Semonides’ two elemental types: the Earth-woman is phlegmatic (quiet, slow-moving, cold-natured, fat), the Sea-woman is bilious (noisy, always in motion, hot-tempered, beautiful).

<sup>34</sup>For the association of bile with heat and fever see *Aer.* 9, *Acut.* app. 1, *Morb.* 1.7, 1.29, 2.40. For the coldness of phlegm see *Morb.* 1.24, 2.8. *Aer.* 7 says that stagnant, marshy waters form bile in the summer, when hot, and phlegm in the winter, when cold. Also see the references in the paragraph below.

<sup>35</sup>*Gland.* 7, and Thivel, *Cnide et Cos?* 304–5.

<sup>36</sup>*Aer.* 3–4, 7.

<sup>37</sup>*Aer.* 24. Verdenius, “Semonides über die Frauen” 139, notes the parallel between these two types and Semonides’ elemental women, but does not make any inferences from the parallel.

<sup>38</sup>Edema: *Morb.* 2.1, 2.71, *Int.* 21, 50. Immobility: *Int.* 20.

<sup>39</sup>*Morb.* 2.70.

<sup>40</sup>*Morb. Sacr.* 10, 18. *Morb.* 2.22 also associates bile with rage and raving. *Int.* 48 says that bile collecting in the liver will induce hallucinations and delirium.

One additional influence which may have contributed to Semonides' identification of character types with the elements was the growth of allegorical exegesis during the late sixth century. In this period, Theagenes of Rhegium was known to have explained the Homeric gods in terms of moral and elemental allegories. The scholiastic notice concerning Theagenes suggests that he was particularly interested in the Theomachia of *Iliad* 20 in these terms:<sup>41</sup> Hephaestus is fire, Poseidon water, Hera air, Apollo the sun, Artemis the moon, Ares madness, Aphrodite desire, Leto forgetfulness. Delatte and Detienne have seen Theagenes' mode of exegesis as derived from the Pythagoreans; Detienne in particular thinks it unlikely that a "grammarian," as Theagenes is identified, could by himself have originated both moral and elemental modes of allegorical exegesis.<sup>42</sup> We have good evidence for this kind of interpretation even in the non-Pythagorean Xenophanes' description of Iris as a multicolored cloud (B32 DK). Whether Pythagorean or not, interpretation of the Homeric gods as elements or forces of nature is fully consistent with the augmented sixth-century interest in the elements as cosmological and psychological principles. It is also significant that elemental allegory is never completely divorced from moral exegesis. This tradition affords a clear precedent for Semonides' idea of using the elements Earth and Sea as a basis for human character types.

To summarize my conclusions, there are at least three interconnected strands of influence which lie behind the concepts of elemental psychology evident in Semonides' Earth-woman and Sea-woman. As we have seen, cosmological speculation beginning with Anaximander emphasized the balance of qualities or elements; this was applied to a dominant dualism of Earth and Water by Xenophanes and extended into the psychological dimension by Heraclitus. Alcmaeon of Croton and early medical theory identified bodily health as an appropriate balance of qualities or humors, sickness as the undue domination of one; character types may be defined by a tendency to prevalence of one humor, with the phlegmatic type being lazy, fat, and dull (like the Earth-woman), the bilious type hyperactive, slender, and fierce-tem-

<sup>41</sup>Σ<sup>B</sup> *Il.* 20.67 (Dindorf). On Theagenes see Delatte, *Etudes* 114–15; Buffière, *Mythes d'Homère* 103–5; Detienne, *Homère, Hésiode* 65–67; Svenbro, *La parole et le marbre* 108–38.

<sup>42</sup>In addition to Delatte, *Etudes* 109–36, and Detienne, *Homère, Hésiode* passim, see Boyancé, *Culte des Muses* 121–31, and Lambertson, *Homer the Theologian* 31–43, for early Pythagorean interest in Homeric allegory.



pered (like the Sea-woman). Finally, allegorical interpretation of Homer may have provided the inspiration for Semonides' conceiving character types specifically in terms of the elements. All three of these intellectual currents seem to have become well developed by the last quarter of the sixth century, and it is within this theoretical context that Semonides' elemental women clearly belong. The critical link among all three may well have been Semonides' fellow Samian Pythagoras, although the uncertain nature of our evidence concerning Pythagoras' doctrines prevents any positive conclusions. As the case of Xenophanes demonstrates, the interconnections between poetry and philosophy in late sixth-century Ionia were intimate. It is far more reasonable to suppose Semonides influenced by these doctrines than to think that he originated the key features of elemental psychology on his own at some point in the seventh century or that these ideas were already implicit in early folk tradition, finding expression in his poetry alone before their theoretical formulation in the late sixth century.

### 3. THE ANIMAL-WOMEN AND TRANSMIGRATION

There is one other aspect of Semonides' poem on women that may connect it to late sixth-century philosophical speculation, although I regard it as less certain. Aside from the Earth-woman and Sea-woman, all the other female types are identified as having been made by the god from a certain animal—pig, fox, dog, ass, weasel, horse, ape, bee. Each paragraph begins with a formula like τὴν δ' ἐκ . . . , with the subject and verb understood from line 7 as θεὸς ἔθηκε. Semonides does not say that these women are *like* the animals (in the manner of a Homeric simile), nor does he present them as actually being animals (in the manner of a fable). Instead, they are human women, set (ἔθηκε) into human form *from* (ἐκ . . . ) an animal through the agency of the god (θεός) and retaining some of that animal's traits. Nowhere in earlier Greek literature or myth do we hear of humans being made or born *from* animals, whether with divine help or not. There is certainly nothing like it in Hesiod. Rather, the inspiration is more likely to have been the one doctrine we can with certainty ascribe to Pythagoras himself: the transmigration of souls between human bodies and animal bodies.<sup>43</sup> It is here and only here in early Greek thought that we have animals changing into

<sup>43</sup>The identification of this doctrine with Pythagoras himself is made certain by Xenophanes (B7 DK).

humans. Semonides' strange formula τὴν δ' ἔκ . . . (θεὸς ἔθηκε) makes sense best if we see the women as humans whose souls formerly occupied animal bodies; the verb τίθημι seems especially appropriate for this divinely supervised movement of the soul. Under any other interpretation, it is difficult to understand why Semonides chose this distinctive formula rather than a more straightforward simile or metaphor.

#### 4. METRICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The most distinctive metrical feature of Semonides' iambic trimeter is his complete avoidance of resolution. This compares with a frequency of about 10 percent (i.e., one resolution every ten lines) in Archilochus, Hipponax, and the earliest plays of Aeschylus.<sup>44</sup> Since we see the same frequency of resolution both in the two major iambic poets of two different centuries and also in our earliest extant Greek tragedies, we may be justified in seeing the 10 percent frequency as a normative rate for the archaic period, crossing generic lines. Was Semonides' complete avoidance of resolution more likely to be a sign of early and primitive metrical technique or of metrical refinement and sophistication? While it is impossible to be certain in such matters, I regard the latter answer as the more likely. Even if we date Semonides to the mid-seventh century, he would have been contemporary with Archilochus, who did employ resolution; it seems unlikely that the technique of using resolution would be unknown to an iambic poet at this time. On the other hand, after two centuries or more of development, one could well imagine poets' fluency with the trimeter form reaching the point that one of them decides that resolution is unneeded for his composition and that a purely iambic flavor is better retained in his verse. That less use of iambic resolution was considered a desirable objective by sophisticated poets is suggested by the development of Aeschylus' style in this regard: his earliest extant play, *Persians* (472 B.C.), has 11.0 percent resolution, the *Seven Against Thebes* (467) 9.3 percent, *Suppliants* (ca. 463) 8.4 percent, and the three plays of the *Oresteia* (458) range between 4.8 and 5.2 percent.<sup>45</sup> Even as talented a versifier as Aeschylus seems to have been unable to get by without some use of resolution (at about a 5

<sup>44</sup>For the iambographers see West, *Studies* 115. Solon's frequency is about 3.4 percent, but his sample (two resolutions in fifty-nine lines) may be too small to bear much statistical significance. For resolution in Aeschylus see Garvie, *Aeschylus' Supplikes* 32–36.

<sup>45</sup>The figures are those of Garvie, *Aeschylus' Supplikes* 33.



percent level), despite his clear desire to minimize its use.<sup>46</sup> Semonides' achievement in purging it from his verse altogether should therefore not be minimized. It is more reasonably seen as the culmination of a long tradition of writing in iambic verse than as its beginning. It is in keeping with the same spirit of late sixth-century experimentation and variation that Hipponax conceived the idea of altering the trimeter's verse end and created the choliambic meter.

## 5. THE DATE OF FRAGMENT 29D

The notice of the *Suda* (Test. IV[A]) tells us that Semonides also wrote elegies in addition to his iambic poetry, but the only elegiac poem commonly attributed to him is fr. 29D, a highly disputed text:

ἐν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χίος ἔειπεν ἀνὴρ·  
 “οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν”·  
 παῦροί μιν θνητῶν οὔασι δεξάμενοι  
 στέρνοις ἐγκατέθεντο· πάρεστι γὰρ ἐλπίς ἐκάστω  
 ἀνδρῶν, ἥ τε νέων στήθεσιν ἐμφύεται.  
 θνητῶν δ' ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχῃ πολυήρατον ἥβης,  
 κοῦφον ἔχων θυμὸν πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ·  
 οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι,  
 οὐδ', ὕγιής ὅταν ᾗ, φροντίδ' ἔχει καμάτου.  
 νήπιοι, οἷς ταύτη κείται νόος, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν  
 ὥς χρόνος ἔσθ' ἥβης καὶ βιότου ὀλίγος  
 θνητοῖς. ἀλλὰ σὺ ταῦτα μαθὼν βιότου ποτὶ τέρμα  
 ψυχῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τλήθι χαριζόμενος.

This poem, like all of Semonides' fragments, is attributed to “Simonides” by Stobaeus. Since Simonides of Ceos also wrote elegies (all funeral epitaphs), there have been those who regard this poem as his.<sup>47</sup> But this poem shows little of the intellectual subtlety and ambiguity

<sup>46</sup>The same appears to have been true of the other two tragedians as well. Sophocles' resolution frequency varies, but averages about 6 percent (*Electra* being the lowest at 3.4 percent). In Euripides' earliest datable plays we see frequencies of 6.2 percent (*Alcestitis*), 6.6 percent (*Medea*), and 4.3 percent (*Hippolytus*); of course, Euripides greatly increased his use of resolution during the last twenty years of his career, but this was a matter of conscious use of resolutions for dramatic effect. The figures are taken from Ceadel, “Resolved Feet” 70, 85 n. 2.

<sup>47</sup>See Crusius, “Zur Kritik” 715, and, more recently, Garner, *From Homer to Tragedy* 2.

which one expects from Simonides. Fraenkel and West have argued that the language is more characteristic of the late sixth century than of the seventh (to which they assign Semonides); accordingly, they have seen the poem as part of a funeral epitaph and have assigned it to an anonymous poet of Simonides' time whose work became part of the "Simoni-dean" collection of epitaphs.<sup>48</sup> However, the problem with both this view and the idea that it is a genuine work of Simonides is that the tone, content, and length of this fragment are not at all consistent with the Simonidean epitaphs. It is far more in keeping with traditional deliberative elegy as practiced by Mimnermus, Archilochus, Solon, Theognis, and others.

Indeed, the relationship between Mimnermus fr. 2W and this poem is highly relevant to the questions of date and authorship. Both poems take as their starting point Glaucus' famous line on the races of men and the leaves (*Il.* 6.146) and elaborate from it a contrast between ignorant youth and painful old age. The two poems are sufficiently close that one must have been meant as a response to the other. Defending Semonidean authorship of fr. 29D (and assuming the usual mid-seventh-century date), Babut has argued that Mimnermus wrote in response to Semonides: he sees Mimnermus' message as more positive, with youthful ignorance of the future being the cause of happiness, whereas Semonides viewed youthful hopes as vain delusions.<sup>49</sup> But this praise of blissful ignorance in the young is not really made explicit in Mimnermus' text and is at most an inference from the cryptic and ambiguous *πρὸς θεῶν εἰδότος οὔτε κακόν / οὔτ' ἀγαθόν* (fr. 2.4–5). Indeed, the end of Mimnermus' poem (fr. 2.15–16) is decidedly fatalistic and pessimistic; it is hardly what we would expect if, as Babut argues, this poem is meant to be more positive than its predecessor.

I believe that the relationship between the two texts makes more sense if we regard the "Semonidean" fr. 29D as the later of the two. While there is nothing polemical in the opening of Mimnermus fr. 2W, Semonides' *παῦροί μιν θνητῶν οὔασι δεξάμενοι / στέρνοις ἐγκατέθεντο* (lines 3–4) clearly implies that the Homeric line he has just quoted is a tag frequently heard and bandied about, but seldom understood in its full implications; this line makes far more sense if the poem

<sup>48</sup>Fraenkel, *Early Greek Poetry* 207 n. 14, and West, *Studies* 179–80. This view is tentatively endorsed by Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species* 97.

<sup>49</sup>Babut, "Sémonide et Mimnerme" 32–40. For a very different conception of Mimnermus' view of youth in this text see Schmiel, "Youth and Age" 289.



is itself a response to an earlier poem using the same tag. Unlike the fatalistic, negative ending of Mimnermus' poem, Semonides' text ends with a positive exhortation to hedonism. Semonides unpacks the cryptic εἰδότες οὔτε κακόν οὔτ' ἀγαθόν of Mimnermus into a fuller description of both sides of what the young ignore: the unpleasantness of old age and death (lines 8–9 = Mimnermus' κακόν) and the brief pleasure granted to them in youth (10–13 = Mimnermus' ἀγαθόν).

The problematic issues surrounding fr. 29D can all be resolved if we accept a late sixth-century date for Semonides. We can preserve the fragment as Semonidean, as suggested by its close match in tone and message with the iambic fr. 1W. We can see it as a response to Mimnermus fr. 2W, as argued above—something impossible under the traditional chronographic reckoning of Semonides' date.<sup>50</sup> And we can meet the one serious objection to Semonidean authorship put forward by modern critics: the feeling that its vocabulary is closer to that of the late sixth or even the fifth century.

## 6. SEMONIDES 7 AND PHOCYLIDES FRAGMENT 2D

Another problematic intertextual issue is the relationship between Semonides' poem on women and Phocylides fr. 2D:

Καὶ τόδε Φωκυλίδεω· τετόρων ἀπὸ τῶνδε γέγοντο  
 φύλα γυναικείων· ἡ μὲν κυνός, ἡ δὲ μελίσσης,  
 ἡ δὲ συὸς βλοσυρῆς, ἡ δ' ἵππου χαιτηέσσης·  
 εὐφορος ἦδε, ταχεῖα, περιδρομος, εἶδος ἀρίστη·  
 ἡ δὲ συὸς βλοσυρῆς οὔτ' ἄρ' κακὴ οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλή·  
 ἡ δὲ κυνός χαλεπὴ τε καὶ ἄγριος· ἡ δὲ μελίσσης  
 οἰκονόμος τ' ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐπίσταται ἐργάζεσθαι·  
 ἧς εὖχευ, φίλ' ἐταῖρε, λαχεῖν γάμον ἰμερόεντα.

Traditional assumptions about the date of Semonides have led scholars to conclude that Phocylides' poem must be a derivative spinoff putting Semonides' idea into a pithy, gnomic formulation.<sup>51</sup> The parallels between the two poems do indeed seem close enough to justify a direct

<sup>50</sup>Mimnermus' poetic activity is generally dated to the second half of the seventh century; see West, *Studies* 72–74. Fr. 2W must have been a work of his old age and thus datable toward the end of the century.

<sup>51</sup>See Marg, *Der Charakter* 40 n. 45, and Gerber, *Euterpe* 257.

connection of influence: both characterize the Horse-woman as beautiful, both list the Bee-woman last and make her an industrious housewife. But one wonders whether the relation of influence does not in fact move in the opposite direction from that which scholars have taken for granted. If Phocylides genuinely had before him Semonides' colorful descriptions of the filthy Pig-woman (7.2–6) and the nosy, meddlesome Dog-woman (7.12–20), it seems that he would have found a more imaginative way to describe the former than as merely "neither bad nor good" and a more apt characteristic of the latter than "difficult and wild." One is also tempted to question whether the relatively neutral tone of Phocylides' poem (two good types, one indifferent, one bad) would be possible after the woman/animal analogies had been used in such a devastating way by Semonides. It makes better sense to suppose that Semonides found in Phocylides' aphorism the inspiration for classifying women as animal types, rephrased the relationship in terms more evocative of Pythagorean metempsychosis (see section 3), borrowed the interesting and apt characterizations of the Horse-woman and Bee-woman, improved upon Phocylides' rather pale characterizations of the Pig-woman and Dog-woman, added several new types, including the two elemental women, and expanded the whole conception into a much longer and more impressive poem reflecting a pervasively pessimistic view. Poems written in imitation of earlier poems aim to be better than their models, not inferior.

The chronographic tradition dates Phocylides of Miletus contemporary with Theognis, giving his *floruit* as 544–541 B.C.<sup>52</sup> This synchronistic dating is itself open to suspicion on grounds similar to those we have advanced for doubting the synchronism of Semonides and Archilochus. Accordingly, it does not help us date Semonides conclusively to know that he followed Phocylides rather than vice versa. But the possibility of Phocylides' influencing Semonides obviously becomes greater the later we place Semonides in archaic poetic tradition.

While none of the arguments I have presented in the last four sections is by itself definitive, I believe that the cumulative effect of all these considerations, taken together with those of sections 1 and 2, is to suggest that there is a serious case for rejecting the traditional date our chronographic sources assign Semonides and instead seeing him as a

<sup>52</sup> *Suda* s.v. Φωκυλίδης (φ 643 Adler).

poet of the late sixth century, coeval with Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Those who have studied the chronographic sources for very long cannot fail to come away from them with profound misgivings about their reliability in cases like this one, where a poet is dated purely by synchronism with another writing in the same genre. Nevertheless, critics have balked at a substantial revision of Semonides' date for want of real evidence. In the words of one, "there seems to be no adequate reason for rejecting a seventh-century date."<sup>53</sup> I hope to have suggested in this essay that there are indeed some adequate reasons for doing so.

THOMAS K. HUBBARD

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, AUSTIN

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<sup>53</sup>Gerber, *Euterpe* 53.



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*HELLAS*

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## PROTAGORAS' HEAD: INTERPRETING PHILOSOPHIC FRAGMENTS IN *THEAETETUS*

Among the many interpretative challenges presented by Plato's *Theaetetus* is the meaning of a brief but striking image in 171d where the interlocutors are interrupted by Protagoras' popping his head up from the underworld to reproach them. The interpretation proposed below claims not only to offer a better account of the details of this passage than previous suggestions but also brings to light a neglected theme of the first half of this dialogue, its persistent and explicit concern with problems of interpreting philosophic texts. To appreciate this theme helps impose coherence on the sequence of arguments up to 171, and makes clear in addition that *Theaetetus* contributes to a recurrent concern in Plato's work that extends beyond the well-known end of *Phaedrus*: How are we to use texts to do philosophy when the author is not present to back up his quotations?

### I

After Socrates has attacked Protagoras' "Man the Measure" dictum (B 1 DK) from a number of points of view, Theodorus objects that they are running down his friend too much. Socrates wants to make sure that he has given the sophist his due, and conjures him up to defend himself in a very peculiar epiphany:

εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ  
αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας  
ληροῦντα ὥς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀπο-  
τρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοί τινές ἐσ-  
μεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. (171c10–d5)

Commentators have offered various suggestions as to why Protagoras should appear in this way, popping up only as far as his neck and then sinking down to run off. Because Protagoras had been dead at least ten years by the dramatic date of this conversation (142c), some have suggested that Plato portrays him here as a kind of stage ghost, rising up on

"Charon's steps."<sup>1</sup> Certainly, Socrates' ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει and καταδύς ἂν οἴχοιτο suggest that Protagoras somehow rises from and returns to the underworld.<sup>2</sup> Yet Charon's steps are first attested only in Pollux (iv.132), and it is not certain that they were ever used in Athens (Taplin, *Stagecraft* 447–48). Moreover, a reference to the theatre has no particular significance in context. Others would have Plato referring to the traditional story (first in Philochorus *apud* Diogenes Laertius 9.55) that Protagoras died by drowning; the point would be that the sophist returns to chide Socrates by sticking his head up out of the waves. Again, the joke seems gratuitous, and neither interpretation can make any sense of Protagoras' running away.

More recent commentators have sought to connect this passage with Socrates' arguments against Protagorean relativism, and in particular with his immediately preceding "very subtle" (171a6) but slippery attempt to make Protagoras' thesis refute itself. It has often been remarked (e.g., Vlastos, "Introduction" xiv n. 27) that Socrates only succeeds here by tacitly converting the thesis from a qualified form—"whatever anyone believes is true and is *for that person*"—to a more vulnerable version in which the qualifying phrase is omitted. From very different analyses of the philosophical argument, Edward N. Lee and Myles Burnyeat have argued that the image in 171d in a sense explains or justifies that move by symbolizing a pragmatic flaw with asserting Protagorean relativism. For Lee ("Ironical and Comic Elements"), Plato's omission of the crucial qualifier is deliberate but ironically appropriate, since Protagoras' relativism gives him no grounds to object to others' twisting his words in any way that "seems best" to them. Protagoras could meet objections to his thesis by insisting that it remains true *for him*, but if he does so he is condemned never to share fully in the human exchange of *logos* and forfeits any claim on others to treat him fairly. Lee interprets the imagery in 171d as suggesting that Protagoras is a plant: this is to be taken as Plato's subtle critique of one who would insist on remaining "rooted" or fixed in such a position; all he might add to a discussion of his views is information on how the world seems to

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Campbell, *Theaetetus* 109. For discussion of nineteenth-century interpretations see Burnyeat, "Protagoras and Self-Refutation" 192 n. 23. I am obliged to David Sedley for this reference and to the anonymous reviewer of *AJP* for suggestions on the argument.

<sup>2</sup> Καταδύω is common for descending to Hades (e.g., *Od.* 10.174).



him; but he cannot “leap out” of his world and join the exchange of other views.

Lee allowed that his suggestion of a plant was “bizarre” on its face, and Burnyeat was happy to confirm this judgment, adding that the interpretation is hard to square with Protagoras’ running off at the end (“Protagoras and Self-Refutation” 193 n. 23). Indeed, nothing in Plato’s language particularly evokes plants.<sup>3</sup> Burnyeat’s own interpretation is part of a complex analysis of the argument designed to be charitable to Plato and to “mend Socrates’ logic.” But despite his different reconstruction of the argument, the merits of which do not concern us here (cf. Waterfield, *Theaetetus* 175–76, and Bostock, *Plato’s Theaetetus* 90–91), Burnyeat ends up with an interpretation of the passage like Lee’s. On his view, Protagoras might have been argued either into dropping the qualifier from his thesis or into taking refuge in the yet more qualified thesis that “It is true *for Protagoras* that every judgment is true for the person who holds it” (“Self-Refutation” 190). It is to forestall this latter way of escape that the image is used in 171d: Burnyeat interprets the fact that Protagoras offers no explicit arguments in this appearance as indicating that none is possible; he runs away to signal that he “is not prepared to stay and defend it in discussion,” for on Burnyeat’s analysis his “only reply left amounts to a refusal to submit to dialectical discussion” (191). The image suggests that if Protagoras were to take this extreme defense, he “does not really leave the underworld. . . . His ‘refutation’ or defense, in other words, just *is* a refusal to enter fully into a common world with his opponents for discussion” (193 n. 23).

These philosophical interpretations rescue Plato’s image from appearing extravagant or irrelevant, but they are open to two general objections. The first is that both views assume that engaging in the exchange of speech is part of being fully human.<sup>4</sup> But this sounds like a humanist rather than Platonic idea; for Plato, an incapacity or distaste

<sup>3</sup>In support of the reference to plants, Lee (“Ironic and Comic Elements” 250) is forced to resort to Anaxagoras A 116 DK (ζῶον ἔγγειον), the *Timaeus* 90a (φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον), and Aristotle, *Met.* 1006a13–15. Further comments on Lee’s interpretation appear in Burnyeat, “Protagoras and Self-Refutation” 176 n. 6, 180 n. 10.

<sup>4</sup>As Burnyeat puts it: “If Protagoras does not speak to the human condition, does not put forward his claim that each of us lives in our own relativistic world as something we can all discuss, and, possibly, come to accept, but simply asserts solipsistically that he, for his part, lives in a world in which this is so, then indeed there is no discussing with him. His world and his theory go to the grave with him, and Socrates is fully entitled to leave them there and get on with his inquiry” (“Protagoras and Self-Refutation” 191–92).

for dialectical argument would disqualify one from being a true philosopher, but hardly from being human. It is not to be assumed that refusing to enter into a philosophical discussion is “naturally” described as being half-dead, and a simpler explanation of this aspect of the image is available in that Protagoras was indeed dead at the time. The second general objection is that one searches in vain for parallels for Plato’s defeating a person’s *argument* only through insinuation. Of course a strong subjectivist position may be unassailable by straightforward arguments, and Plato was at times a rich and subtle caricaturist who could use a telling detail about a person to great effect. But to burden such brushstrokes with the weight of having to fill in the philosophical argument seems to abandon faith in the sufficiency of dialectical argument.

A more particular objection is that these interpretations leave unexplained certain details of the passage, especially its central and most emphatic point that Protagoras pops only up as far as his neck. Indeed, none of the interpretations previously proposed gives a convincing explanation of this detail on which Plato insists with the pleonastic ἀνακύπτει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος.<sup>5</sup> This does not bring plants to mind; and even if we concede to Burnyeat that sticking one’s head out of the ground is a “fair characterization” of the move to Protagoras’ most qualified thesis, it is hardly a very apt one. Why, one may ask, does Protagoras not rise up to his waist, or to his ankles? Perhaps a reply might be that a head is all that is needed to allow the sophist to cast his reproaches; and yet a head is sufficient for real conversation too, so it is not clear how this image epitomizes a reluctance to enter fully into debate.

This detail prompts me to add yet another surprising candidate to a list that includes other such suggestions as frogs (Hussey, “*Theaetetus* 171 D”) and Orpheus’ head (Waterfield, *Theaetetus* 65 n. 1). For the image of Protagoras’ head sticking out of the ground will become intelligible if we call to mind an old and widespread set of Greek words for “top” or “head” that were used metaphorically to name the “summary statement” or “head line” of a speech or text. Already in Hesiod we find the expression ἐκκορυφῶ for “bringing a tale to a peak” in the sense of putting it in summary form (*Erga* 106–7; cf. West, *Works and Days* 178). Empedocles speaks of joining together the “tops,” κορυφαί, or main points of his argument (B 24 DK). In prose, κεφαλαιόω meant

<sup>5</sup> Popping up the *head* is a very frequent connotation of ἀνακύπτω: cf. LSJ s.v. I.



“putting a head on” a story by summing it up, and the main thesis or thrust of a speech was called its κεφάλαιον or “little head.” Plato uses κεφάλαιον frequently in the sense it was to have as a technical term of rhetoric for the “chief or main point, . . . esp. in speaking or writing, *sum, gist of the matter* . . . esp. in an argument, *summing up*.”<sup>6</sup> Perhaps for some Greeks these metaphors were no more alive than our own “chapter” or “heading,” but Plato’s keen sense of the figuration involved appears when he speaks of such summary statements as literal “heads”: τελευτήν ἤδη κεφαλὴν τε τῷ μύθῳ . . . ἐπιθεῖναι (*Tim.* 69b1); ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις (*Phil.* 66d1; cf. *Gorg.* 505d1). At times he evidently delights in playing with the image and its implicit personification: a faulty speech is like a headless body, οὐκ οὐν δήπου λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἐκὼν καταλίπομι· πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φάνοιτο (*Lgg.* 752a2); there is a similar, if more grotesque, image in *Phaedrus*’ injunction that a well-written speech should be constructed like an animal, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν (*Phaedr.* 264c3; *Euthyd.* 297c3).<sup>7</sup> A more complex, but equally sly example may be found in the *Symposium* when Socrates is about to begin his speech: he pretends to have been “scared stiff” by Agathon’s preceding eloquence and says the end of that speech made him afraid that “in concluding Agathon would send up a head of Gorgias, awesome at speaking” (τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν . . . πέμψας, *Symp.* 198c3–4). This “head” suggests both the petrifying Gorgon’s head and the stunning Gorgianic *kephalaion* with which Agathon had concluded his discourse.<sup>8</sup>

If we bring to bear on *Theaetetus* 171d Plato’s vivid and playful sense of a speech’s summary statement as its head, we may conclude that he specifies that Protagoras pops up only as far as his neck to suggest that what returns to the interlocutors is Protagoras’ *kephalaion*,

<sup>6</sup>LSJ s.v. κεφάλαιον II.2. For Plato’s use of the term, cf., in addition to *Theaetetus* itself (190b4), e.g., *Symp.* 223d2, *Phdr.* 228d2. At *Rhet.* 3.14.1415b5–9 Aristotle says the ideal exordium sets out its matter κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν. Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1436a35–b4.

<sup>7</sup>Plato’s use of κεφαλὴ in this sense is not noticed by Ast (who puts all relevant passages under the general *caput*) nor in LSJ, where such passages are cited s.v. V.2: “crown, completion.”

<sup>8</sup>For an analysis of Gorgianic features of Agathon’s peroration see Dover, *Symposium* 123–24. For a similar joke cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 854–55: Dionysus warns Euripides not to press Aeschylus, ἵνα μὴ κεφαλαίῳ τὸν κρόταφόν σου ῥήματι / θένων ὑπ’ ὀργῆς ἐκχέῃ τὸν Τήλεφον. See Stanford, *Frogs* ad loc.

the lead statement of his book encapsulating his thesis.<sup>9</sup> At this point of the argument, the sophist might be defended by reconsidering the purport of the very words that were quoted when the argument began: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν (152a2–4). If Socrates is to be shown to have been abusing Protagoras, it will be through the interpreters' returning to this disembodied phrase and seeing if it can be pressed to say something different from the inadequate theses already extracted from it. It is the meaning of this phrase, after all, that is the main bone of contention throughout the first half of *Theaetetus*, and the long discussion from 152c to 183d is little more than one protracted twisting of these words to generate a meaning for them that will stand up to dialectical examination. From its first full quotation at 152a, the "Man the Measure" dictum is paraphrased or quoted well over a dozen times as the interlocutors repeatedly come back to it and its terms to ask what they mean.<sup>10</sup> And just a few lines before the appearance of Protagoras' head Socrates had reminded his fellows that they are trying to discover Protagoras' position "from what he has written" (ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν, 171b7).

To take Protagoras' appearance at 171d in this way accounts for all the details in the passage: his "head" arises from Hades because, although the sophist himself is deceased, his quotable formula can still come up among those who inquire into the nature of knowledge. It runs off, in part, because these words are about to quit the argument: from this point Socrates will give up trying to decide what Protagoras actually meant by what he said; his next step will be to examine a moderate form of Protagoreanism, one that is not intended to be fully consonant with whatever the sophist may have meant by his provocative line (172b6–7). Protagoras' head also runs off because it will still survive as

<sup>9</sup>Despite differing as to its actual title, Sextus agrees with Plato (161c3–7) that Protagoras' book began with this notorious proclamation: ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν Καταβαλλόντων (*adv. math.* 7.60 = B 1 DK). As attention-getting devices, *kephalaia* were naturally most at home at the beginning or end of a text or speech.

<sup>10</sup>152a8, ἄνθρωπος; 160c9, τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων; 160d9, πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι; 161c4–5, Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὅς; 161e2, μέτρον; 162c5, τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον; 166d2–3, μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ἔοντων καὶ μὴ; 168d3, τὸ πάντων μέτρον; 170a6, ἀνθρώπου; 170d2, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον; 170e8, μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον; 171c2, ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι; 179b2, τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον; 183b8–c1, πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι. The list might be extended.



a kind of *phēmē*. Dismissed but not obliterated, the dead thinker's saying is so well known, even notorious, that it is likely to pop up elsewhere among others interested in philosophy and vex them with the same difficult words.<sup>11</sup>

This unexpected meaning of the image finds support, and is prepared for, in a preceding passage that encourages readers to view "Man the Measure" as a philosophic fragment. When a number of avowedly eristic attacks on Protagoras' thesis have confuted it, Socrates says the eristic approach works because "the father of the story" (πατὴρ τοῦ . . . μύθου) is not alive to "ward off attacks" (ἤμυνε) against it, and the guardians of this "orphan"—the avowed Protagoreans—will not defend it (βοηθεῖν) and stop its unjust abuse (164e2–7). Here the metaphors clearly associate the helpless state of this tag line from Protagoras' book with that of the written text as characterized in *Phaedrus*. There the written word is called the "bastard offspring of thought" and is condemned to be bandied about among those who do not understand it as well as those who do; as a result, "when unjustly reproached, it always needs its father to defend it, since it is unable to ward off attacks or defend itself" (πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς αἰεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ, 275e3–5).

In its immediate context the image is, in effect, a brief allegory, and makes a point about Protagoras' saying not very different from what Hesiod says when he allegorizes *phēmē*: it is "hard to get rid of" and "never dies so long as many people talk about it."<sup>12</sup> But the relevance of the joke is not only local, for this scene caps a series of evocations of Protagoras by which the interlocutors attempt to correct their reconstructions of what he meant in the head of his book. Retracing these explicit and extensive comments on how this philosophic fragment is to be interpreted will support the reading of 171d given here by illustrating how consistently the first half of *Theaetetus* is concerned with problems in interpreting the isolated *ipsissima verba* of a philosopher (that is, what an "older and wiser" man has said). But, taken together, these passages also extend the significance of my interpreta-

<sup>11</sup> We might contrast Homer's description of Achilles' "striding off" after his underworld colloquy with Odysseus, *Od.* 11.538–40.

<sup>12</sup> *Erga* 761–64. Perhaps a distant inspiration for Plato may be found in Homer's brief allegory of *eris* in *Il.* 4.440–43: "at first she has a small top, but then touches heaven with her head and walks upon the earth."

tion and account for the remarkable opening frame of the dialogue with its emphasis on how philosophical texts are composed. For they help us see *Theaetetus* as contributing to the many passages in Plato that reflect on the effects of writing on philosophy.<sup>13</sup> In this text, the problem is specifically: How are we to read a single isolated sentence that survives from a famous philosopher?

## II

Protagoras' "Man the Measure" statement is adduced for the first time when Theaetetus volunteers that knowledge is perception, which Socrates claims is the same idea or "thesis" (λόγος) as Protagoras held, though he expressed it "in a slightly different way" (τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον, 152a1). He then quotes the famous sentence from memory and asks Theaetetus if he has read it (φησὶ γάρ που . . . ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που, 152a2–4). When Theaetetus answers that he has read it "often," we are at least assured that Plato is not misquoting the sophist. One might wish to draw the further implication that the lad is very well versed in Protagorean thought and so counts as an authority on his corpus, but this role belongs rather to Theodorus, Protagoras' "friend" (162a). What Theaetetus and Socrates have to hand, and will repeatedly come back to, is this agreed-upon quotation and not Protagoras' book.

After identifying the theses of Theaetetus and Protagoras, Socrates begins to interpret the latter. His first inference is that "man" must apply to individuals, like Theaetetus and himself, and so Protagoras "seems to be saying" or "seems to mean" (οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, 152a6) that things are for each of them as they seem to each of them.<sup>14</sup> He then assumes—because Protagoras is reputed wise—that this thesis is not pure nonsense, and proposes to "follow him up" (ἐπακολουθήσομεν αὐτῷ, 152b1–2). Following up Protagoras leads Socrates to interpret him as saying that in such matters as deciding whether a wind is cool or

<sup>13</sup>For a recent survey of passages and discussion see Vegetti, "Dynamiques de l'écriture."

<sup>14</sup>Because Plato uses similar wording for this new thesis at *Cratylus* 386a1–3, it is often claimed that λέγει here implies a further quotation of Protagoras; e.g., McDowell, *Theaetetus* 119. Yet the repetition of "man" at 152a8 indicates that Plato is drawing an inference from the quotation itself. Cf. 170a6 for another appeal to this same word to support a different inference.



warm the truth resides in what each individual perceives and not in the wind.

To make sense of this state of affairs, Socrates will assimilate Protagoras to an army of poets and philosophers preaching flux (152c–160e). To do so he must assume that Protagoras uttered this saying as a riddle for the unwashed mob while reserving the truth for secret (or perhaps “unpublished”) remarks confined to his students: τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν (152c9–10). Reading Protagoras’ words as containing a secret message, as an *ainos*, allows Socrates to link them to a new thesis that nothing is one in and of itself (152d–153d). He thus moves well beyond the literal import of the “Man the Measure” statement and follows up this newly formulated thesis (ἐπώμεθα τῷ ᾧτι λόγῳ, 153e4), testing and refining it in a number of ways. Socrates will end up quoting again the first five words of Protagoras (160d9), and pronouncing his view to be the same as that of Homer, Heraclitus, all their followers, and Theaetetus.

This search for the author’s true *dianoia* beneath the surface meaning of words resembles allegorical interpretation,<sup>15</sup> and this attempt to tie a philosopher’s pronouncement to a mystical view of the universe resembles to the point of parody the way a contemporary text like the Derveni papyrus reads “Orpheus.” Indeed, at one point Socrates describes himself as “initiating” Theaetetus into the “mysteries” that lie behind this *muthos* (156a–c). Allegorical interpretation is a practice Plato does not generally commend as leading to certainty (e.g., *Phaedrus* 229e–230a). Hence, throughout this exposition Socrates is tentative about ascribing beliefs to the sophist, attributing arguments in this section to “Protagoras and anyone who argues for same things” (154b8).<sup>16</sup> Drawing implications “from what we claim (φάμεν) Protagoras is saying” (155d6), and weighing objections against what “I think” they would respond (158e7), Socrates remains aware that he is no longer confining himself to explaining Protagoras’ quoted saying; rather, he and Theaetetus are “examining closely together the hidden

<sup>15</sup> Plato often uses *dianoia* for what sophisticated practitioners of allegory (as represented in Xenophon) called *huponoia*: Diller, “Probleme der Ion” 176. Cf. *Ion* 530b–d, and *Prot.* 275a.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. “Protagoras or someone else,” 154c7 and 152e8–9; note too the pregnantly phrased assent of Theaetetus throughout: φαίνεται (152c7); “Ἐμοιγε (sc. δοκεῖ, 152e10); ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (153d6–7).

truth in the thought (διανοία) of the famous man, or I should say men" (155d9–e1). The result of this extended interpretation, "what the *logos* we have gone through means" (160c1–2), turns out to be a radical theory of flux. Positing such a cosmology can justify one in claiming "I am the judge, according to the *logos* of Protagoras, both of what is for me, that they are, and of what is not, that they are not" (160c8–9). At last, Protagoras' "Man is the Measure of all things" (160d9) has yielded its hidden meaning.

This deeper interpretation of Protagoras' words also represents the "birth" of pregnant Theaetetus' first answer (160e), the emergence of all its entailments into the light. Socrates then proceeds to test this offspring by going back once again to Protagoras' exact words. But now he will approach the saying on the contrary assumption that "the truth of Protagoras is true and not a joke pronounced from the inner sanctum of a book" (162a2–3). Now the dictum is to be analyzed literally, as an assertion of a state of affairs rather than as an oracular or mystical text dependent on some hidden myth. Socrates begins with "the beginning of Protagoras' *logos*":

Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἶρηκεν, ὥς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας ὅτι "Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὕς" ἢ "κυνοκέφαλος" ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθῆσιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ (161c)

Zeroing in on the first clause of Protagoras' head, Socrates questions why "Man" should have been said to be the measure of all things, for pigs and baboons are also the best authorities on their own perceptions. Granting the second clause, that things are to each as they appear, Socrates asks why Protagoras did not say that humans are no wiser than pigs, Protagoras no wiser than the rest of humanity, and indeed the gods no wiser than mortals. Such a view, though ridiculous, is flattering to the mob since it overthrows any criteria for intellectual superiority, and so Socrates can only assume that Protagoras was "playing to the gallery" when he said these words (161e4).

If at first Protagoras' saying was taken as having a very private meaning, now it appears to have been a very public utterance, indeed nothing more than insincere flattery of a large audience. The effect of this reversal (162d2) on Theaetetus is so striking that Socrates worries that the boy is merely being swayed by demagoguery (162d3). Accord-



ingly, he invites Theodorus to present the other side in defense of his friend and, when he declines, undertakes to supply himself what “Protagoras or anyone speaking in his behalf” (162d4–5) might reply. This defense will be from the point of view of the Protagorean, as opposed to the earlier attempt to assimilate his thought to that of others.

Speaking in the name of Protagoras, this Protagorean first objects that it is unfair to bring up the gods at all, “whom I exclude from my speaking and writing, not discussing whether they are or are not” (162e1). The Protagorean is presumed to be closely acquainted with the philosopher’s writings and so can command the entire corpus in a debate. To read the “Man the Measure” statement from this perspective would be to draw inferences in keeping with his thought as reconstructed from the totality of his writings. Surprisingly to the philologist, this method of exegesis is not taken up by the interlocutors, none of whom has a text to hand or seems to miss one, and only one of whom (Theodorus) can claim to be even a half-hearted Protagorean. The single proof-text adduced does not widen the inquiry into other Protagorean texts or indeed even make a relevant point (Protagoras’ agnosticism has no bearing on the subsequent argument). In fact, it is just another Protagorean *kephalaion* encapsulating his views “On the Gods”<sup>17</sup> and is inserted simply to show how a committed student of Protagoras’ writings might proceed. What is more effective in this Protagorean rebuttal is the stigmatizing of Socrates’ recent points as “plausibilities” designed to please a mass audience and the subsequent demand for a geometrician’s rigor in expounding his argument (162e). This charge persuades the select audience of geometer and pupil that it is not fair to deduce the meaning of the text through probabilities, and Socrates determines to look at things “in a different way” (163a4–5).

The search for a new way begins with a number of arguments based on the meanings of terms such as seeing, learning, and remembering (163a–164d). They lead Socrates to the conclusion that knowing and perceiving cannot be the same, and so “the Protagorean story (μῦθος) was not saved.”<sup>18</sup> Here he pulls himself up short yet again and

<sup>17</sup>Eusebius calls it the “introduction” (B 4 DK), and Diogenes (D.L. 9.51 = A 2) says, “he began in this way.” Diogenes adds (9.52) that when the “beginning” of his treatise on the gods (B 4 DK) had been spread abroad (ἐξεβλήθη) among the Athenians his books were burned.

<sup>18</sup>Καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο Πρωταγόρειος, 164d8–9. The reference to the end of the *Republic* is unmistakable: καὶ οὕτως, ὃ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν (621d8–9). The allusion may be intended to contrast the hazards of

worries that his argument has descended into antilogic, manipulating the meanings of words to confound inexperienced Theaetetus (164c4–d3). Indeed it has.<sup>19</sup> Yet the way out of this impasse is not easy, for the significant reason noted earlier: Socrates says that it was only possible to pick on Protagoras' thesis in this way because his text is a defenseless orphan; without its author present, and with Theodorus declining to answer for his friend,<sup>20</sup> Socrates can only try to shore up the thesis on the basis of "what Protagoras would say" (165e5). Accordingly, this new defense is no longer phrased as what might be said by "Protagoras or anyone speaking in his behalf" (162d4–5) but is a direct impersonation of Protagoras himself (166a2–168c2).

In this appearance the sophist gives lengthy and admirable instruction on how to interrogate "what I say," or "mean" (166c3): "When you examine something of mine by putting questions, I will stand refuted (ἐλέγχομαι, 166b1) only if the respondent is tripped up when giving the sort of answer I would give; if he answers differently, it is he that is refuted, not I." This is to say that if our inferences about a philosophic text are not consistent with that text and come to grief, it may be our interpretation and not the text that is wrong. Hence Protagoras can charge that Socrates' bringing in pigs was treating his *text* (εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου, 166c8) like a pig, and set a bad example for others. Affirming that "the truth is as I have written it" (166d1–2), Protagoras rephrases his *kephalaion* and adds, in what will be a costly concession, that it is not incompatible with the idea that some of our perceptions are better than others, and that the wise are those able to change perceptions for the better (167c–d).<sup>21</sup> He goes on to demand that they not "hunt down the saying word by word," and explains how they might understand what he means (τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου

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written transmission to which Protagoras' texts were subject (cf. the legend, first in Cicero, of his books' having been burned) with the magical way in which Er's true story managed to come back from death and escape oblivion, finally being incorporated in the *Republic* itself.

<sup>19</sup>Of 163a–165e Burnyeat observes: "It is a model demonstration of how *not* to go about criticizing the thesis that knowledge is perception" (*Theaetetus* of Plato 21–22).

<sup>20</sup>Theodorus declines to help the orphan because "it is not I but Callias the son of Hipponicus who is the guardian of Protagoras' children" (164e–165a); in line with *Phaedrus*' imagery of written thoughts as a deficient kind of offspring (276a), this may suggest that Callias, a wealthy patron of sophists, had full texts of Protagoras.

<sup>21</sup>On Protagoras' concession see Cole, "Apology of Protagoras"; Burnyeat, "Protagoras and Self-Refutation" 222–24; McDowell, *Theaetetus* 172–73.



δίωκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω, 166d8–e1). The proper procedure is either to construct a counterargument from principle<sup>22</sup> or, if using the method of question and answer, always to remember what has been said as the discussion proceeds (167e) and to seek what the text really means rather than contentiously creating perplexities by perverting the ordinary meanings of words (168b–c).

This sounds like a reasonable set of rules, and indeed resembles many of the “rules” for profitable Socratic dialectic. Yet, perhaps still agreeing with *Phaedrus* on the ultimate triviality of writing, Socrates finds all this respect for the text a bit solemn (ἀποσεμνῶν δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, 168d); nevertheless, he and the mature mathematician Theodorus resolve to treat the text seriously, or at least to bear in mind that “someone” may come back to reproach them if they inadvertently abuse it (169c9–d1). Accordingly, they must review the concession they had wrung from Protagoras that some people are wiser than others since it had not been derived from the text (169d1–8): “If Protagoras were present in person (αὐτὸς παρών) to agree to that, instead of our conceding it in our efforts on his behalf, there would be no need to take it up again and make sure of our ground” (169d10–e2). They will ratify the concession from the text itself: “let us therefore come to an agreement as quickly as possible, not through others, but through that man’s *logos*” (ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου, 169e7–170a1). And so they turn again to Protagoras’ head and discuss the meaning of its second part, “that which seems to each also is to the person it seems.”

In the event, this discussion too issues in the conclusion that the truth of Protagoras is not true, and the head of Protagoras rises to reproach his interpreters once more. As Burnyeat notes, in his final appearance Protagoras offers no new arguments; it is only supposed that he would have much to say in refutation (πολλὰ ἂν . . . ἐλέγξας) of the foolish way Socrates and Theaetetus have been interpreting him. Yet even without being articulated, these reproaches perform an important role: they are a concession by Socrates that when one is trying to settle on the interpretation of a philosophical text without its author

<sup>22</sup>Translating ἐξ ἀρχῆς at 167d4 with Cornford. This makes sharper sense as an antithesis to the question–and–answer method than McDowell’s “If you go back to the beginning and dispute it.” For *arkhē* as “principle,” cf. 156a3: “the *arkhē*—from which all of what we were just now discussing is fastened—for them is this, that everything is motion and there is nothing besides this”; see also 179e1, 181c1.

present, it is very often possible that recurring to the text will generate a new and different reading to upset the latest achieved interpretation. These possible reconsiderations are said to be “many” but not infinite: this means that the process of looking at the text anew for different meanings might go on, if not forever, at least long enough that it becomes more profitable to turn away from the hope of getting Protagoras right and to try to get the problem he raised right. Plato abandons the hope of getting an infallible interpretation not in order to declare an infallible hermeneutics impossible (though without showing how it is possible), but in order to turn toward the applied question of how to do philosophy.

When Protagoras’ head runs off, Socrates proposes that the interlocutors carry on by themselves, “such as we are.” In this state they flesh out the strongest thesis possible from what they had “sketched” as if in dictation from Protagoras,<sup>23</sup> even though it is a view of those “who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras” (172b6–7). The result of these sallies in interpretation, then, is to abandon the search for what Protagoras exactly meant to say by these words and to use them as a springboard for examining the interlocutors’ own ideas. This retreat from explicating an authority to pronouncing what one believes oneself has a number of parallels in other occasions when Socrates took up some text or other as part of a philosophical exploration. A similar *non liquet* follows the discussion of Simonides’ idea of excellence in *Protagoras*. There, after a long and fruitless attempt to reach a certifiable interpretation of his poem (quoted from memory, and only in part), Socrates says symposia ought to dispense with discussing poetry, “since it is not possible to ask [the poets] what they mean, though when most people cite them one says they intend one thing and another another, and they talk about a matter one cannot properly examine” (ἐξελέγξαι, 347e). He then suggests to Protagoras that they “put aside” the poets and investigate the topic “by ourselves, with ourselves.”<sup>24</sup> Similarly, in *Meno*, when Meno invokes Gorgias as an authority on virtue, the old sophist’s pronouncements meet the same fate. Socrates says he cannot well remember Gorgias just at present, and suggests that

<sup>23</sup> 171e1, ὑπεγράψαμεν. For this sense of the word cf. *Prot.* 326d.

<sup>24</sup> So too at *Hippias Minor* 365c–d when Socrates wants to turn the discussion away from explicating Homer: “let’s dismiss Homer since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he composed these verses.” Thereupon he asks Hippias—“since you seem to be willing to take up the cause”—to answer for Homer and himself.



Meno remind him if he knows “what Gorgias said”; but he prefers that Meno speak for himself if he has the same views: “let us dismiss Gorgias, since he is not present” (71d).

The problem in all these abortive investigations of the reported doctrines of wise men is that the authority invoked or quoted is not “present in person” to answer attacks on his statements. Whether this be because he is living but not at hand (as in *Meno*) or dead (as in *Theaetetus*), the point is that it is impossible to practice true dialectic on a text or quotation since it is inflexible by nature. This problem had already been partly discussed in *Phaedrus*: without its author present, writing always repeats the same thing when questioned (ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἔν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν αἰεί, 275e8–9), and *Protagoras* had contrasted its title character, a master of brachyology, with some sophistic orators who “like books, are unable to either ask or answer questions and when asked a simple question just keep on ringing like sounding bronze.”<sup>25</sup> *Theaetetus*, however, presents a variation on the theme: Protagoras’ fragment may say the same words repeatedly, but going over it again and again, taking it up with different assumptions about its author’s intent, can make the single, unchanging text yield different meanings. In this case, the “father of the speech” is allowed to come back from the dead and offer a defense; Socrates’ interpretative scruples give Protagoras’ remembered phrase a chance to engage in the elenchus (171d2), albeit vainly. Despite this conjuration of the author, 171d seems to say those interested in this question are better off consulting their own views than in trying to lay this ghost to rest.

When Protagoras’ head runs off, Plato’s self-consciousness about how he draws inferences from theses attributed to notable philosophers gradually recedes. The final dismissal of the philosopher comes in 183b–c, after Socrates has touched on relevant arguments of Heracliteans and of Parmenides on the other side. In these latter discussions there is no such careful quotation and interpretation of representative texts, but the reason is explained in each case. The discussion of flux theorists begins with Theodorus’ observing that there is no point in discussing these doctrines even with the Ephesians themselves, since “they are just like their books: they go here and there, they do not keep fixed on a question” (179e–180a). Heracliteans thus present a different problem with reconstructing belief from stated doctrine: their only re-

<sup>25</sup> *Prot.* 329a. At *Theaet.* 179d Socrates turns to Protagoras’ saying to “strike this doctrine and see how it sounds.”

sponse to questions about what they mean is to pluck from their quivers “enigmatic little sayings” (ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη, 180a4) that are so confusing that one cannot make any progress with them. Accordingly, Socrates and the others feel justified in skipping an examination of their texts and moving immediately to the final stage they had reached with Protagoras: to treat the question among themselves as a problem of mathematics (180c). In a parallel move, Socrates declines to discuss in depth the thesis of Parmenides that all is one, despite the fact that he would seem to be well qualified since he actually met the “deep and noble” philosopher when he was very young. Yet after more or less quoting Parmenides (fr. 8.38 DK), he says he will not go into that, chiefly because the press of opposing arguments would prevent him from giving such an explication its due. Apparently, a full discussion of the import of Parmenidean thought would take up some space. But Socrates also adds that “I am afraid lest we may not even understand the thing he said (τὰ λεγόμενα), still less what he meant (διανοούμενος) when he said them” (184a). So he will confine himself to delivering Theaetetus of his thoughts on knowledge (184b). The final dismissal of the equation of knowledge with perception comes in 187, and Socrates is then able to bid Theaetetus to “erase” from his mind everything from the beginning (ἐξαλείψας, 187b1).

*Theaetetus*, then, incorporates into its first half an extensive illustration of how the thoughts of philosophers may survive them in texts and may continue in conversations. The well-known saying of Protagoras is extended every possible interpretative courtesy, and yet it is finally less useful than examining one’s inner convictions on the question. The texts of the Heracliteans are not even worth discussing, and Parmenides merits an entire exposition to himself. Within this theme, the appearance of Protagoras’ head marks the end of Plato’s demonstration that many meanings may be given to an isolated philosophic thesis, depending on the presuppositions of the interpreters.

### III

It may be asked why Plato brought up this matter at all, when the business of defining knowledge is certainly the main goal of the dialogue. In concluding I suggest three purposes that may have some bearing on how we read the work. The first purpose is pragmatic: it is likely that the young men Plato wanted to attract to his Academy knew about



Protagoras chiefly as a wise man who died before they were born but whose striking views and words were occasionally invoked by contemporaries. As for his texts, they are likely to have often heard the *kephalaia* on the gods and on measure; perhaps they had read these often, like Theaetetus, whether in complete copies of the treatises or in anthologies like the “wise sayings of poets and sophists” that Hippias of Elis prepared.<sup>26</sup> Yet it is quite possible that Plato and his generation only rarely had complete texts from which to reconstruct the thought of their philosophical predecessors. Although the sophists are credited with increasing the use of books in Athens, they lived in a society still accustomed to hearing philosophy in live presentations, and Protagoras’ book is said to have been read out loud in Athens.<sup>27</sup> Certainly, not very much of Protagoras survived after Plato, or the (probably fictitious) story of his book being burned in Athens could not have taken hold.<sup>28</sup>

In addition, the examination of earlier philosophical texts was never a central concern for Plato: when he wanted to take up the views of this very successful teacher from a generation ago (*Meno* 91d), he did not practice commentary in Peripatetic fashion; instead, he chose in *Protagoras* to generate a long, sympathetic speech for him and to undermine it, and in *Theaetetus* to work carefully over one sentence which it is agreed he actually said. A distaste for assiduous cultivation of the letter is harmonious with the excursus in *Theaetetus* on the philosophical life: one of the ways that philosophical conversation is said to be superior to legal proceedings is that in the latter one’s adversary stands there dictating a charge from which one is not allowed to deviate (ὑπογραφήν παραναγιγνωσκομένην, ὅν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον, 172e). This suggests that the question of how far *Theaetetus* goes beyond what Protagoras actually meant is, if vital for the history of philosophy, not important for reading *Theaetetus*: it puts such matters aside, pointing

<sup>26</sup>Hippias 86 B 6 DK. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1. In *Laws* 711a Plato speaks of (poetic) anthologies as containing *kephalaia* and whole speeches for memorization.

<sup>27</sup>Diog. Laert. 9.54. On the limited use of books in the late fifth century see Harris, *Ancient Literacy* 86–87 and Thomas, *Oral and Written* 19–20. Sandbach (*Aristotle and the Stoics* 3) suggests that even in the Hellenistic period philosophical books may not have been very common.

<sup>28</sup>For doubts about this tradition see Dover, “Freedom of the Intellectual” and Finley, “Censura” 613. I note that DK preserve only four sentences from Protagoras, and the two most widely attested are his notorious *kephalaia*.



out just before Protagoras' final return that the essential thing in philosophy is not to miss the truth. Another vital question that *is* relevant to reading *Theaetetus* is how far Plato's arguments are meant to be fair: some of them are avowedly not so and seem to have been included as dead ends to illustrate defective modes of analysis. I suspect that the whole is offered to us not as an attack on the scrupulously reconstructed position of the historical Protagoras but as the best possible response to the best case that could be made out for relativism (cf. Cole, "Relativism"). In a Protagorean perspective, we may say it is a fair response *for Plato's students*, especially those who, like Theaetetus, would have had some acquaintance with and interest in philosophy, who enjoyed "tasting" various theories (157d1), but who were not yet so far along as to be able to wrestle such provocative pronouncements to the ground.

A second reason for highlighting the process of interpreting the text is that it bears on the main argument against Protagoras along the lines previously suggested. For Protagoras to complain repeatedly that Socrates and his interlocutors have got his thesis wrong is, if not a refutation of the claim that it is true for anyone who holds it, still a vivid dramatization of the limits his view commits him to. But beyond this, the failure to get sense from this legible but authorless sentence is another example of perception not being the same as knowledge. As Lee points out ("Ironical and Comic Elements" 242–54), 170a begins the discussion of "second order" judgments, and this includes people making judgments on the truth of Protagoras' own saying. If Socrates and his interlocutors repeatedly fail to discover for certain what Protagoras thought, despite having his exact words plainly in view, the interpretation of a text becomes another example showing that perception of a thing cannot be the same as knowing that thing.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, there are implications for how another philosophic text, *Theaetetus* itself, might be read. Such implications are brought out in one of Plato's more elaborate openings in which the textual nature of the dialogue and its transmission are stressed. Sometime after the death of Socrates, Terpsion asks Euclides<sup>30</sup> to recite a conversation that the

<sup>29</sup>The question of the relation of knowing syllables and letters to knowing what their combinations mean is taken up in 202e–206b.

<sup>30</sup>Euclides of course is historical, but the combination of names is suggestive beyond the fact that both were present at Socrates' death (*Phaedo* 59c). When the son of

master had recounted to him. Euclides cannot recite it from memory (ἀπὸ στόματος), but produces a finished book which he elaborately certifies: it is the result of notes (ὑπομνήματα) he jotted down at the time and later wrote up in consultation with Socrates; he even explains how he has handled such matters as the use of “he said” in converting Socrates’ report into the present document (143a–c). This text, whose status as a reconstructed conversation is so insistently thrust before the reader’s eyes, is then simply read out from start to finish, the only time in the Platonic corpus such a thing happens. Of the many ironies evoked by this text within a text (cf. Loraux, “L’art platonicien”), one relevant implication may be that for the readers of *Theaetetus*, in fourth-century Megara or elsewhere, Socrates will no more be present in person than Protagoras was to Theaetetus; his thought, like that of the sophist, can now be recovered only through reports, including written reports such as *Theaetetus*. Although *Theaetetus* is quite the opposite of a philosophic *kephalaion*, containing as it does explication of its conclusions and commentary on how they are reached, the father of this discourse is not available for cross-examination. There is no way around this, as the reader is warned early on in imagery again harking back to the *Phaedrus*: the Socrates in this text confesses that he has no wisdom “born to me as the offspring of my mind” (150d; cf. 210b); hence even this writing is no better than any other of thought’s bastard offspring and is not itself the fruitful seed of dialectic (*Phaedrus* 276). Warned by such ironies, the reader will take neither the written Socrates nor the text that portrays him as some “bag full of thoughts” (λόγων τινὰ . . . θύλακον, 161a8) as a complete and comprehensive container of his philosophy. Nevertheless, this written Socrates may act as midwife to those who spend time with him and do not abandon him too soon: if he seems to resemble a text in always questioning others but bringing nothing to light himself, he may bring the readers’ own ideas to light or at least refer them to more congenial philosophers (150c–151b). It is well, then, that this text contains within itself instructions on how to read philosophy.

ANDREW FORD

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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“Good Fame” presents a text to “Pleasure,” we may suspect a deliberate revision of traditional oral transmission as represented by Homer where the κλέα ἀνδρῶν are sung by the likes of Φῆμιος Τερπιάδης (*Od.* 22.330).



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## POLITICAL THEMES IN EURIPIDES' *SUPPLIANTS*

*Suppliants*, even more than the other Euripidean plays, tends to include material with strong contemporary overtones.<sup>1</sup> The political slogans and the discursive and argumentative tone everywhere in evidence may create the impression that material from fifth-century prose genres has been grafted onto a tragic form. And this impression is not false, especially in a play that, by importing a triumphant and jingoistic theme from the funeral orations,<sup>2</sup> presents some challenges to the generic constitution of tragedy. In the second half of the fifth century, nonpoetic discourses began to encroach upon poetry's claim to be the voice of Hellenic culture. Seen in this light, Euripides' apparent capitulation to "nontragic" material and forms can appear as a bold attempt to recapture educative and social power for poetry, which a few decades earlier had still remained the dominant vehicle for knowledge and discourse.

Argumentative and reflective talk are central to *Suppliants*: its language is rich in terms and formulations, both sophisticated and popular, that derive from contemporary and archaic social, religious, and political ideology.<sup>3</sup> This almost chaotic abundance of discourses is controlled by a kind of aesthetic juggling act, in which each argument is canceled, or complemented, by its opposite, just as in the scheme of the play human types, male and female, young and old, daring and hope-

<sup>1</sup>Easterling, "Anachronism," argues that few tragic plays create many such overtones, partly because of the tendency for modern elements to be reinscribed in myth (e.g., the invention of voting by Palamedes, 3). In *Suppliants*, however, Euripides "is inviting his audience to notice the mixture of old and new" (9).

<sup>2</sup>The story of Theseus and the Seven is a stock theme, as is the episode that furnished the plot of *Herakleidae*. It is, of course, possible to assume that the plays, because earlier attested, invented the themes. But the monotonous reappearance of these two mythical exempla in funeral rhetoric and their special suitability to the aggressively patriotic mood of those speeches argue otherwise; see Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Griechische Tragödien* 206.

<sup>3</sup>For this use of the term "ideology" see Ober, *Mass and Elite* 35–40. Ober points out the implication that a system of concepts underlies popular thought, and that these concepts possess a certain coherency that can be traced. A further corollary is that artistic discourse derives much of its significance from meanings already available in the culture at large. See also Lanza, *Il tiranno* ix–x.

less, are continually juxtaposed and contrasted.<sup>4</sup> The resulting drama is united, not by the domination of a theme or personality, but by patterns of opposition in balance. The play may be read in a variety of different ways, depending on the themes to be traced; my technique in this essay will be to connect many points in the play's dramatic structure and language to political themes. The test of the success of such a reading is its ability to comprehend much, though certainly not all, of this diverse and complex drama.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to most other Euripidean plays, and in conformity with its borrowing of motifs used in public patriotic celebration, *Suppliants*, as Zuntz pointed out (*Political Plays* 5), is a public play, focusing on the general or political rather than the particular or personal. Its protagonists, Theseus and Adrastus, are rulers who represent their respective cities in a diplomatic relationship: the play begins with a request for aid from Athens to Argos and ends with a promised treaty between the two cities. Throughout, a traditional tragic motif, that of *hubris*, parallels more prosaic and more recent political themes. A pervasive presence in archaic and classical Greek poetry, *hubris* is a fertile and flexible term expressing a tendency to expansive development common to all life forms but extreme in human societies. This economy of abundance and collapse finds many parallels throughout natural and social orders; in concrete terms, *hubris* is a bad consequence of good conditions, typified by abundant nurture resulting in unruly or misdirected growth.<sup>6</sup>

*Hubris* is naturally virulent among the young both because it is endemic to conditions of growth and because in Greek terms the young, at the peak of strength and beauty, are supremely fortunate. The young are most lacking too in the chastened self-awareness (*sōphrosunē*) that is the best antidote to *hubris*: their strength proverbially runs beyond

<sup>4</sup>See Michelini, *Euripides* 114, 121 and "Maze" 29; Burian, "Logos and Pathos" 143.

<sup>5</sup>On the "disunity" of *Suppliants* see the discussion by Heath, *Unity* 3–9. I agree with him that modern concepts of "unity" do not apply to this play—any more, I would add, than they do to the *Iliad* or to any ode of Pindar. I would disagree with his assumption that literary analysis of ancient works must be limited to the ideas voiced by ancient critics or that all attempts to trace continuities in a work of art must necessarily be "centripetal." In an earlier paper ("Maze") I have explored other themes, those of religious speculation and tragic truth, as they appear in the first debate between Adrastus and Theseus.

<sup>6</sup>See Michelini, "Υβρις" 41; Nagy, "Theognis" 51–59.



their wisdom, and their expectations are least limited by experience. The quiet attitude (*hēsuchia*) that is the antithesis of *hubris* is most typical of age and most antipathetic to the young.<sup>7</sup> The contrast between youth and age, a prominent motif in many Euripidean plays, is an important structuring element in *Suppliants*. A number of characters, Aithra, Iphis, and—uniquely in all tragedy—the female chorus, are elderly,<sup>8</sup> while the protagonist Theseus and the subsidiary chorus, sons of the Seven, are characterized as youthful.<sup>9</sup> The dead Seven themselves are treated retrospectively as young men, whose actions are traceable to their immaturity. Adrastus attempts to transfer the blame for his errors to a group of young followers (160); and these *neoi* would naturally include the two sons-in-law for whose sake he had mounted the expedition (δισσοῖσι γαμβροῖς τήνδε πορσύνων χάριν, 132). When Adrastus comes to speak of the lives of his followers, he refers to Eteoklos as *neanias* (873),<sup>10</sup> while Kapaneus is called *neanian* . . . *ariston* by his father, Iphis (1092–93).<sup>11</sup> The word *neanias*, as opposed to more neutral terms such as *neos*, has a particular significance in relation to

<sup>7</sup>See discussion of these terms in Crotty, *Song and Action* 17–18. For *hēsuchia* as the counter to *hubris* see Pindar *Ol.* 4.20 and *Py.* 8.6–12, and discussion of the latter ode in Demont, *Tranquillité* 68–85. That recent book makes important contributions to the study of these themes. Demont's emphasis on quietude, however, sometimes leads to neglect of the activist antithesis, which counters and supplements the first theme at every point. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, who covers much of the same ground, offers more detail on the Athenian political background.

<sup>8</sup>Aithra and the chorus are described as aged, and often linked together, in Aithra's discourse (9, 35), that of the chorus (42–43, 50), and of Theseus (93–96). Later in the play, Iphis' pronouncements on human life are explicitly directed from the perspective of old age.

<sup>9</sup>Theseus is called *neanias* by Adrastus (190) and, in a less respectful tone, by the Theban herald (580). The boys, now mere children, are destined to go off to fight as soon as their beards begin to grow (see discussion of 1213ff. at the end of this essay). Eudne, the daughter of Iphis, who appears in a single scene towards the end of the play, belongs to this group also, if only because her father has much to say about the contrasts of youth and age (see Burian, "Logos and Pathos" 150–52).

<sup>10</sup>Adrastus also describes Hippomedon and Parthenopaios in terms of their early life and rearing: 882, παῖς ὢν and 891, παιδεύεται κατ' Ἄργος. Parthenopaios' male lovers (899) are also an indication of youth; the text, which Collard, *Supplikes* II 332–33, deletes on structural grounds, will be defended below.

<sup>11</sup>Some editors delete lines 1092–93; but see Collard's defense, *Supplikes* II 384–85.

themes of *hubris*, because of its suggestions of rash, daring, and impulsive behavior.<sup>12</sup>

Another motif frequently associated with *hubris*, most notably in the poetry of Solon, but present also in Hesiod, is that of wealth. Solon's great "Hymn to the Muses" is in fact a meditation on the relation between wealth and the hubristic process of unchecked growth and sudden collapse. The second half of Solon's poem, by grounding individual economic motivation in positive expectation (*elpis*) of an unknowable future, links the hubristic process to essential elements of human psychology, ending with the tragic observation that humans by their own efforts cannot hope to escape *atē*, which will come whenever Zeus decides to send it.<sup>13</sup> There is no anchor in the plot of *Suppliants* itself for the theme of wealth—as there is for that of youth—since there is no available contrast between poverty and affluence among the protagonists or the protagonist cities.<sup>14</sup> Instead, the theme flourishes in the symbolic mode, serving various analogical functions. Change from poverty to wealth is treated as a metaphor for the hubristic process; and, in the political discourse of this play, contrasts of wealth, and the human envy and greed that underlie acquisition, are repeatedly characterized as the root of civic discord, the worm at the heart of democracy.

The repeated references to *hubris* thus serve two major structural contrasts. These contrasts are also well adapted for connection with contemporary political themes and ideological battles of the late fifth century in Athens: wealth and poverty are obviously relevant, but youth and age also have clear political correlatives in the period. In the loose and inclusive fabric of *Suppliants*, the language and arguments of contemporary political conflict are interwoven with and paralleled by the traditional theme of *hubris* in a way that ultimately reveals the roots of these nontragic discourses in an older, and thus poetic tradition. A theme so simple that it is dominant in no extant tragedy except *Persians*, *hubris* can be seen as a version of the tragic truth that human striving for

<sup>12</sup>*Neanias* and *neanikon* are early associated with vigor and daring: cf. Pollux 2.20 (= Aristophanes, *PCG* 859) on the verb *neanieuesthai* ("to do something daring"), widely distributed in fourth-century texts; and *neanikon*, e.g., *Wasps* 1205, *Peace* 898. This association forms the basis for later colloquial usage in which *neanikon* becomes a mere intensifier; see Björck, "Das Tragikomische" 68–69, who argues that traces of this usage are to be found even in fifth-century tragedy.

<sup>13</sup>See Michelini, "Maze" 19–20.

<sup>14</sup>In contrast, economic themes are prominent in *Elektra*, as they were in the fragmentary plays, e.g., *Danaë*, *Polyidos* (see frs. 328, 329; 642, 645 N).



achievement holds within itself the elements of its own destruction.<sup>15</sup> From a broader point of view, the *hubris* matrix derives from traditional heroic ideology by an inversion in which the negative side of this ideology is privileged, for example in Hesiod's diatribes against the kings.<sup>16</sup> Moralizing discourse about *hubris* links *Suppliants* both with its own tragic tradition and with the pretragic and prephilosophical moralizing poetry of Hesiod, Solon, and Theognis. This play, a tragic play with a public theme, uses echoes of that earlier poetry to manage a deeper and more sophisticated exploration of contemporary political discourses than was possible from inside the framework of prose. In achieving this, it completes and thus justifies the poet's imperialistic—or capitulatory—move toward the "nonpoetic."

Adrastos, in his first speech to Theseus (162–92), never mentions the word *hubris*; but the moral analysis with which he supports his plea fits the framework described above. Adrastos urges the benefits of mutual contemplation, through which the poor may be spurred to industry and the rich learn caution from the fragility of good fortune. Fear presumably would lead to *sōphrosunē*, restraint through self-awareness, the specific remedy for *hubris*.<sup>17</sup> In his reply, Theseus undertakes to refute the essentially negative view of human life that Adrastos' morality implies. By insisting, however, that human history is a sort of persistent Golden Age produced by divine benevolence, Theseus returns to themes related to *hubris*, since he suggests that human beings are pampered and spoiled: *τρυφῶμεν . . . οἷσιν οὐκ ἄρχει τάδε* (215). Theseus' use of the word *truphan* matches the successive stages of Hesiod's Golden and Silver Ages<sup>18</sup> in its suggestion that if human beings are given divine nurture and protection, the dangers of *hubris* will be considerably increased.

Although Theseus and Adrastos raise several topics marginally associated with *hubris*, the word itself does not appear until the first of Theseus' political excursuses (231–37). After denouncing the Argive for his choice of allies, Theseus picks up Adrastos' own reference to youth-

<sup>15</sup>On *hubris* in tragedy, see Jones, *Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* 72. For parallels between epinician and tragic morality see Crotty, *Song and Action* 42–55, who also points to Solon as a link in the development of this ethic, 36–37.

<sup>16</sup>For the "recessive, dark side" of the epic hero in Hesiodic poetry see Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* 154–59.

<sup>17</sup>North, *Sophrosyne* 16–18, traces this opposition to the Theognidea. For analysis of the *Suppliants* passage see Michelini, "Maze" 16–19.

<sup>18</sup>See Michelini, "Maze" 27.

ful followers (160). A young man, the Athenian asserts, may desire to "act hubristically (ὡς ὑβρίζη), taking power in his hands." His other charges, that young men are too eager for financial gain (*kerdos*) and for powerful positions as military leaders, are themselves instances of hubristic traits. Nagy has shown that *kerdos*, "private gain that entails public detriment," is traditionally associated with the degeneration of the state, into *stasis* and eventually tyranny.<sup>19</sup> A passage in Theognis (43–50) contains almost all the themes of this *Suppliants* passage, including the contrast between public destruction and private profit:

δημόν τε φθείρωσι δίκας τ' ἀδίκοισι διδῶσιν  
οἰκείων κερδέων εἴνεκα καὶ κράτεος. (45–46)

The close parallels indicate that the Euripidean passage is designed to evoke vividly the political themes of elegiac.<sup>20</sup>

Having introduced these generalizing, political and ethical topics, Theseus continues in the same vein. The traditional association between wealth and *hubris*, rather than any logical connection, helps to justify a second excursus (238–45), in which Theseus divides the population into classes according to wealth.<sup>21</sup> The wealthy display the uncontrollable and unbounded greed associated with *hubris* and *koros*, while the poor respond with its counterpart, *phthonos*, resentment of others' gains.<sup>22</sup> The inconsequence with which Theseus passes from the sins of the young men to class conflict complicates the view of Adrastus and justifies some speculation about contemporary political correlatives to his case. Though he is called a *turannos* (1189), Adrastus was overinfluenced by the uproar of his young followers;<sup>23</sup> and such weakness suggests that he can hardly be the sort of autocrat denounced

<sup>19</sup>Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 182, "Theognis" 42–46.

<sup>20</sup>Cf. ἀπώλεσας πόλιν, 231; φθείροντες ἀστούς, 234; οὐκ ἀποσκοπῶν / τὸ πλῆθος εἰ τι βλάπτεται πάσχον τόδε, 236–37.

<sup>21</sup>I have discussed elsewhere assumptions that the rather inconsequent excursus is an interpolation ("Maze" 20 and nn. 67–68). Even Kovacs, who would remove most of the political language from the play, does not argue strongly that the passage is not Euripidean ("Tyrants" 34–35); cf. Goossens, *Euripide et Athènes* 429 n. 230. It is retained in the texts of Collard, *Suppliques* II 171–72, and Diggle, *Euripides Fabulae*.

<sup>22</sup>Michellini, "Maze" 26–27.

<sup>23</sup>See 160, νέων γὰρ ἀνδρῶν θόρυβος ἐξέπλησέ με. The use of the word *thorubos*, "clamor" or "uproar," suggests a large, unruly public meeting. Public speakers, begging audiences not to shout them down, use expressions such as μὴ θορυβήσητε. See Demosth. 5.3, 5.15, 13.3, 13.14, 21.14; Lycurgus *In Leocr.* 52; Plato *Apol.* 20e4, 21a5, 30c2.

by Theseus in his later debate with the Theban herald (399–580). If we attempt to read some Argive political process back into Theseus' previous denunciation of youthful political influence, the resulting picture may be that of an oligarchy, dominated by timocratic and aristocratic young men, who endanger the people, without considering the interests of the many. This picture would match the political conditions of Megarian elegiac poetry, of which the first excursus is reminiscent.

The abrupt introduction of the second excursus, describing class conflict that is more typical of democracy, where the poor are organized and have political rights, than of oligarchy, blurs the distinction between government for the few and government for the many in a way that is typical of other political texts. In the Herodotean debate on constitutions, both democracy and oligarchy follow a similar path to destruction, both driven by the greed of their ruling faction and both ending in monarchy–tyranny.<sup>24</sup> The reason for the similarity may be the tendency for democracy, the later–developing form, to incorporate material from earlier oppositions between “freedom”—i.e., aristocratic government—and the *turannos*.<sup>25</sup> In this instance, the effect of merging the two systems is to emphasize the common thread of greed: in either system and from both high and low backgrounds, leaders are as self-centered as their constituents.

In Theseus' formulation, the two major classes, rich and poor, display the same hubristic greed as the young. There is a saving grace only in the middle group, whose quiet and obedient stance (κόσμον φυλάσσοις' ὄντιν' ἄν τάξη πόλις, 245) contrasts with the dynamism of extremes that seem destined for conflict. The class triad has a negative import, since it suggests that two unstable factors oppose one stable factor and because, as we shall see, the stabilizing factor is problematic. In the case of the youth–age axis, it is unclear where the source of stability might be, although we would naturally expect maturity to provide balance. In a triadic scheme, youth and age, like wealth and poverty, could be treated negatively (as in Aesch. *Ag.* 75–82) and opposed to the “saving middle ground” of maturity; or the two extremes could be seen as a dyad with age providing the corrective to the errors of the

<sup>24</sup>Hdt. 3.82; see Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 182.

<sup>25</sup>In a concomitant movement, democratic fears of oligarchic revolution often expressed themselves as fears of the *turannos* (see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty* 234), while the opponents of the *dēmos* turned the tables by referring to the masses as a collective *turannos* (see Connor, “Tyrannis Polis” 95–97).

young. Adrastus' age is uncertain; but he might seem, as a gray-haired (166) but vigorous warrior, to fall midway between the younger characters, represented by Theseus and the Seven, and the very old, among which we must count Iphis, Aithra, and the chorus. Similarly, as a moderate *turannos*, he may be thought of as forming some sort of political middle point. But in his unbroken dejection and despair he offers few hopes of a strong middle ground, either in public or in private life.

The theme of hubristic activism, and the opposing one of peace and tranquility, can be linked to contemporary political ideologies that are explicitly evoked by the play. Recently Carter and Demont have traced the way in which the Athenian right modified these older concepts to fit the political conflicts of Athenian democracy in the later years of the fifth century.<sup>26</sup> In the Theognis passage discussed above, *hēsuchia* (πολλῇ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, 48) characterizes the ideal, undisturbed state of the *polis* before material luxury (*truphē*, *kerdos*, or *koros*) and the resulting *hubris* has produced the turmoil of *stasis*.<sup>27</sup> Demont, whose work frames the changes of these ideas in a diachronic perspective, shows that the dream of social tranquility was originally linked to praise of a "middle" stance of fairness between the two quarreling extremes in the divided *polis*.

In the fifth century, praise of the tranquil moderate stance shifts to praise of a class identified with these qualities, a class that ideally would intervene between the quarreling ranks of the wealthy and the poor as a stabilizing "middle." The group most often proposed to fill the role of a mean were small farmers who worked their own land.<sup>28</sup> The respect of the aristocrats for a group whose status and power were inferior to their own is also founded in traditional ideology: Loraux has shown that *ponos*, the heroic labor that is a prerequisite to true *hēsuchia*, embraces two kinds of effort, that of the tiller of the soil and that of the warrior-athlete.<sup>29</sup> The *Works and Days* itself suggests such a parallel obligation

<sup>26</sup>See Carter, *Quiet Athenian*, ch. 4, "Peasant Farmer," passim, esp. 92–94, 97; Demont, *Tranquillité* 161–65. For earlier treatments see Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosunē" 46–47; Grossmann, *Politische Schlagwörter*, ch. 1, "Die politische Mitte." On *Suppliants* see Burian, "Logos and Pathos" 136, 142; Demont, 163, who points out that this is the earliest appearance of these Athenian political terms.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Pindar fr. 109–10 Snell, where the "shining light of *Hēsuchia*" is opposed to *stasis* and associated with one who "places the commonality of the people (τὸ κοινὸν ἁπλῶν) in calm weather." See also Demont, *Tranquillité* 16, 62; Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 42.

<sup>28</sup>Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 77, 88–89.

<sup>29</sup>Loraux, "Ponos" 172–73; see also Demont, *Tranquillité* 18.

between classes: just judgments by the rich and hard work by the poor farmer are the complementary elements that sustain the *polis*.<sup>30</sup> Hesiod's wayward brother Perses, the ancestor of the *sukophantai*, ideally focuses this link, since he prefers collusion in unjust and hubristic judgments by the upper class to the honest *ponos* appropriate to his own.<sup>31</sup> Wood has recently argued that independent smallholders were in fact the dominating group in Athenian democracy.<sup>32</sup> Ownership of land, however, was not a prerequisite for citizen rights at Athens; and it would appear that by the late fifth century a poorer class, some of whom were landless, were beginning to have more impact on democratic politics.<sup>33</sup> The elite opponents of democracy, by using the traditional nexus of ideas around *hēsuchia* to eulogize the "moderation" of the smallholder class, could conceal their own disaffection, while expressing uneasiness with the recent development of the democracy.

The elite opposition to extreme democracy extended its praise of *hēsuchia* to external as well as internal affairs. In fifth-century Athenian foreign policy, *hēsuchia* naturally implied opposition to imperialism, with its meddling in the affairs of other states and its policy of growth and expansion.<sup>34</sup> The association between pacifism and aristocratic politics had already been established as early as the days of Pindar.<sup>35</sup> In domestic politics *hēsuchia* had a double aspect. It could stand for the withdrawal by disaffected members of the elite from a democratic state where the "inferior" dominated the "superior." Taken in this way, the slogan may be a "sour grapes" tactic, disguising failure as refusal to compete. But, second, *hēsuchia* could represent the activities of the "good citizen" under a regime that no longer encouraged citizen activism. This meaning of the term correlates with the idealization of the rural smallholder, whose participation in city politics would necessarily

<sup>30</sup>Demont, *Tranquillité*, 99–100.

<sup>31</sup>See Demont, *Tranquillité* 37–38, 90–91, on the image of the lazy beggar in Homer and Hesiod and its link to later objects of political opprobrium.

<sup>32</sup>Wood, *Peasant–Citizen* 9, 54–63; see also Ober, *Mass and Elite* 26–27.

<sup>33</sup>Wood, *Peasant–Citizen* 122; for more on this change see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty*, ch. 5, "The Polarizations of the 420s," 199–290.

<sup>34</sup>Note the connection between farmers and opposition to the war, clear in Aristophanes: Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 97; Demont, *Tranquillité* 108–9. See also Carter, 82–86, on the idealization of country life as a by-product of war conditions in Attica. On the association of Pericles' successors, e.g., Kleon, with the war policy and its concomitant imperialism see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty* 206.

<sup>35</sup>Demont, *Tranquillité* 62; and see note 68 below.

always be limited.<sup>36</sup> This slogan, as Carter shows, was more important as a democratic disguise for elite policies than it was productive of real coalitions: the "middle" that would save the state from hopeless conflict between rich and poor remained even in the fourth century an ideal quite difficult to realize.<sup>37</sup>

The elite's attack on democracy was particularly effective because it could use the traditional *hubris* ideology as a fulcrum. The activism deprecated by the quietist slogan is easily assimilated to *hubris*. The empire, which compelled the state to expand far beyond its original scope and which brought Athens wealth out of proportion to its usual resources, could serve as an emblem of excessive growth and its dangers. The imperialist activity necessary to protect an empire naturally falls within the pattern of unstable and hubristic expansion without fixed boundaries, a pattern familiar from the Aeschylean and Herodotean accounts of Xerxes' invasion.<sup>38</sup> On the domestic front, the participatory effort required by the democracy and increased by the empire could also be seen as hubristic, characterized by public strife and dispute, and encouraging the worst people to insolent pretensions to power.<sup>39</sup> Theseus' two political excursions, without using the language of this political debate, have touched upon both the major charges against the democracy: bellicose and ill-considered foreign policy, and corrupt and disputatious domestic government.

This domestic and foreign hyperactivity was described by the cor-

<sup>36</sup>Wood, *Peasant-Citizen* 57, 62, and, to some extent, Ober, *Mass and Elite* 136, argue that the nature of subsistence farming left the farmer free to relate economically to the city market and gave him the time to attend it; on the other hand, praise of the farmer as *hēsuchos* is specifically based on his remoteness from city politics and thus forms a part of the archetype that I am trying to delineate. The greatest contrast may have been in jury service, which would have been inconvenient for those not resident in the city. For the *dikastēria* as the basis of popular sovereignty and power in the period see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty* 5–7, 70–80.

<sup>37</sup>See Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 97–98; Vannier, "La classe moyenne introuvable" 99, 102, on the ideal rather than real nature of this political group; and Demont, *Tranquillité* 163, who cites Davies, *Democracy* 36. Cf. the admission of Aristotle, *Pol.* 1296a36–38: the *mesoi* rarely rule a city.

<sup>38</sup>See Michelini, "Υβρις" 41–42, for unlimited growth as hubristic. And see Michelini, *Tradition* 95, and del Grande, *Hybris* 236–37, for this theme in Aeschylus and Herodotus.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. the ironic analysis of the "Old Oligarch" (Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.6–7): Athenians prefer *ponēroi* as leaders because such people support their interests, while ἡ τοῦ χρηστοῦ ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία does not.

responding negative terms of *polla pratein* or *polupragmōn/polupragmosunē*. The latter terms are not found often in serious contexts. Their appropriate locus is in comedy, where the *sukophantai* and other nuisances receive their whacks.<sup>40</sup> The term *sukophantēs* is a part of the same polemic, already prefigured in Hesiod, against those who disturb society by meddling in others' affairs.<sup>41</sup> In the eyes of the opponents of democracy, Athens was in English terms a "busybody," poking its nose into the business of other states; while at home, the inferior interfered in the business of their betters. The opposing labels *apragmōn* and *apragmosunē* are more at home in formal language, since they are strictly political terms, generated by their pejorative opposites. The *apragmōn*, leisured and well-bred, scorns the boring and distracting "business" (or "busyness") of democratic political involvement, as he does that of commercial activity.<sup>42</sup> Words like *polupragmōn* serve an aristocratic polemic because they trivialize and diminish the activities deplored. The more traditional terms related to *hubris* would not have worked as political catchwords because they combine broad significances and an old-fashioned, archaic ring with interesting ambivalencies: *hubris* is a negative that emerges from honorific and aristocratic qualities such as strength, health, and power. By a similar process, the traditional counter to *hubris*, *sōphrosunē*, the ability to know and recognize limitations, begins in the late fifth century to split off from *hēsuchia*, as the latter becomes associated with a passive and antiheroic ethic of withdrawal.<sup>43</sup>

We can now locate more accurately the significance of Theseus' second excursus: its hopes for the "middle class" do not indicate strong support for democracy. The economy of the description shows the same

<sup>40</sup> See Allison, "Thucydides" 17. For the rival terms by either side see Kleve, "Two Slogans."

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *polupragmonein* in *Plutus* 913, an attack on a *Sukophantēs*. The Old Oligarch (2.18) remarks that *polupragmosunē* is the only reason why poor men are lampooned in comedy, which otherwise prefers to attack the rich.

<sup>42</sup> I would thus disagree with Demont, whose focus on the tranquility side of the axis leads him to give priority to the negative counterterms (*Tranquillité* 13, 22). That these terms and their cognates are never found outside political contexts, as well as that they are quite weak as terms of abuse, indicates their secondary nature.

<sup>43</sup> Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 131ff., shows its development into later philosophical quietism, although he may underemphasize and underestimate the political objectives and activities of Plato and his followers. See also the much fuller discussion of the ideal of tranquility and *scholē* in Demont, *Tranquillité* 279–395, who carries his study down to the Epicureans and Pyrrhonian skeptics.



slant: a little over a line is expended on the failings of the rich, compared with four on the failings of the poor. It is the latter who are aggressive; and their aggression is produced by the deceiving eloquence of inferior leaders (γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι, 243), who presumably incite the gullible masses to greater greed and greater resentment. Such views may have originated with opponents of the democracy; but, since they are designed to appeal to a majority of well-meaning (or politically innocent) contemporaries, that Theseus voices them serves only to characterize him as a conservative democrat with some considerable suspicions of the masses.

Theseus' decision to support the Argives is made in the second part of the scene, in which he reverses himself under the influence of his mother, Aithra. It is in her speech that the slogans of contemporary politics become prominent; and she stakes out a position considerably to the left of her son. Her first point, briefly stated and not explored in argument, is that Theseus should consider whether he may be wrong in neglecting the claims of the gods (301–2). Her second is given a more expansive development: it will bring great honor to Theseus if he takes risks (305) to punish those who violate pan-Hellenic norms. Aithra bases her argument on human needs rather than divine sanctions;<sup>44</sup> and her rhetoric is framed in terms of honor (*timē* or *doxa*) and fear, and the associated choice between quiet and activity.<sup>45</sup>

This beginning prepares for Aithra's third argument (314), that public opinion awards honor to daring activity, while it stigmatizes quietude as cowardice. Someone, she suggests, will accuse Theseus of unmanliness, claiming that out of fear he lost a chance for glory: "Although you put your hand to the trivial athletic contest (φαῦλον ἀθλήσας πόνον) of a boar hunt, when you had to toil through (*ekponēsai*) and face the helm and spear-point, you were found out a coward. May you never, as my son, do such a thing!" Putting herself in the place of a hostile public, Aithra repeats the scornful and humiliating things that may be said, if Theseus declines to punish Thebes. She twice uses words related to *ponoi* or "labors" to distinguish between "real" efforts and mere showy feats, and the emphasis on this term awakens echoes

<sup>44</sup>Cf. 312, legal sanctions assure social stability: τὸ γὰρ τοι σύνεχον ἀνθρώπων πόλεις / τοῦτ' ἐσθ'. Contrast Antigone's emphasis on the unwritten laws that come from the gods and that are enforced by divine sanctions.

<sup>45</sup>Cf. Aithra's own debate between quietude and action, resolved in favor of the latter (292–300, continued in 305 and 307).

of democratic ideology. By reinterpreting *polla prattein* as a willingness to undertake heroic *ponoi*, the imperialist side could appropriate to itself the heroic self-assertion and daring that had always been the traditional reverse of the *hubris* ethic and that had originally been the prerequisite to *hēsuchia*. To the quietism of the right, the left opposed the modernized heroism of such public-spirited figures as Herakles and Theseus:<sup>46</sup> heroes who went about punishing villains and saving the distressed were undeniably a positive instance of *polupragmosunē*.

Aithra uses the model in reverse, recommending the behavior of Athens to its founding hero: "You see how, when mocked as reckless (*aboulos*), your nation glares back at mockers with a gorgon's eye. For in labors she grows great. The quiet (*hēsuchoi*) cities do dim (*skoteina*) deeds, and they look dimly too, in their caution." The reaction of Athens to mockery only confirms the charge of the mockers, that she acts without thought.<sup>47</sup> The bright glare of the enraged nation is contrasted with the ingloriously dim glance of the meek cities that practice caution and *hēsuchia*.<sup>48</sup> Irrational pride, hasty reactions, and a concomitant fear of mockery and shame would seem to be just the qualities that might send a man or a nation into ill-planned aggressive activity; and Aithra's praise of a rash Athens contrasts very much with the intellectualism of her son, who rebuked Adrastus for neglecting *euboulia* (161).

The correlation of democratic politics and imperialism, patent in the history of the fifth century, is blocked to some extent in Theseus' own case by his rebuke of Adrastus and by his conservative political stance, while the positive defense of imperialist politics is assigned to an old woman, who expresses doubt about her right to self-assertion. Yet Theseus does yield to Aithra's persuasion, and the contemporary political terms in her speech push the question of Athenian imperialism into prominence. In his response, Theseus, though stating explicitly that he was correct in condemning Adrastus, admits that "it is not suitable to my nature to flee from fearful things. For by doing many noble deeds I displayed to the Greeks this character: always to be the

<sup>46</sup>On parallels between the two figures see Davie, "Theseus the King" 25–27. For other discussions of this passage and its relevance to fifth-century politics see Boegehold, "A Dissent at Athens" 151–53; and Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 39–45.

<sup>47</sup>For the theme of Athenian rashness in comedy see Grossmann, *Politische Schlagwörter* 147–48, and 163–73 on impulsiveness and aggression attributed to democratic leaders.

<sup>48</sup>Σκοτεινὰ καὶ βλέπουσιν εὐλαβοῦμεναι (325). For *skoteinon* as the inverse of the bright light of fame see Pindar *Ne.* 7.61 and Plato *Symp.* 197a6, *Laws* 781c6.

scourge of the bad. And so it is not possible for me to abjure labors (*ponoi*)" (339–42). Theseus' explanation has interesting similarities to the Thucydidean speech in which Alcibiades counters the conservative Nicias by urging that imperialist activism is necessary, since Athens is habitually active, and must not now desert her normal character. In the pair of Thucydidean speeches given to Nicias and Alcibiades, the contrasted ethics and characters of youth and age are associated respectively with active and passive foreign policies.<sup>49</sup> Some similarities in the historical and the tragic text reflect the fact that both draw upon the same stream of traditional thought; but it is also true that *Suppliants*, which probably antedates the debates over Sicily by some years, may like other Euripidean plays have contributed substantially to the political discourse of the succeeding decade, and eventually to the work of Thucydides himself.

The interaction with Aithra increases the contradictions in Theseus' role. Himself a young man, he distrusts the volatility of his own kind; himself a democratic *prostatēs*, he sees the danger of this role. Both young men and demagogues are prone to aggressive military adventures; and an aggressive military venture is precisely what Theseus undertakes, when he involves himself in Argos' quarrel with Thebes. Finally, he makes his decision under the influence of unreasonable and irrational arguments that he has himself earlier deplored, arguments that place courage (*eupsuchia*) before reason (*euboulia*, 161). Theseus' views about democracy create significant reverberations in the next scene, when another and explicitly hostile critique is mounted against popular government by the Theban herald, a figure from whom tragic convention would teach the audience to expect aggressive and repellent behavior. Like other patently unpleasant characters in Euripides, the herald makes uncomfortably better sense than we might like him to.<sup>50</sup>

The interchange with the Theban quickly becomes a political de-

<sup>49</sup>Thuc. 6.18.6–7; see discussion in Demont, *Tranquillité* 240–41, and Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 99–100. See also Carter on the association of youthful *sunēgoroi* with the imperialist group (119–25). Ostwald (*Popular Sovereignty* 230) suggests a plausible reason, in addition to the obvious correlation of the old with conservative (in Athens, democratic) views, for the tendency in Aristophanes and elsewhere to associate oligarchic views with the young and support of Cleon with the elderly: the lower-class young were away with the fleet or army, while the cavalry were more likely to be in Athens. Conversely, elderly poor had more reason to participate in the jury system.

<sup>50</sup>For this aspect of Euripidean dramatic technique see Michelini, *Euripides* 211 and n. 123.

bate, in which Theseus defends democracy and denounces tyrants, while the herald pleads for peace and picks up some of the antidemocratic fears expressed by Theseus earlier. Theseus' refusal to be addressed as a *turannos* (403–8) injects anachronistic modern reverberations<sup>51</sup> and draws further attention to his own singular position among the Athenians. His role as functional monarch in a nominal democracy suggests the kind of delicate balance between popular rule and the prestige of a single figure that has frequently been associated with Pericles. As in Aithra's references to the Kalydonian boar, contemporary political alignments are projected back on the mythic originals that had served as their models.<sup>52</sup> Theseus' remarks also cast an interesting light on his denunciation of the bad *prostatēs* (243), since the position that he gives himself vis-à-vis the Athenians is in fact a glorified version of that role.<sup>53</sup>

The herald's attack on democracy is directed specifically at the role claimed by Theseus for himself, that of leadership in a "free" *dēmos*, ruled by persuasion and not by fiat (403–8). Theseus himself has earlier expressed deep concern that the poor may be fooled by the verbal art of inferior leaders, and the herald expands on this theme. The bad leader, by puffing the people up with his words (*ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις*), turns them whichever way he wants for his own advantage, *πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον*. The phrase recalls the young Argives whom Theseus accused of seeking *kerdos* through support of bellicose policies: this motivation is shared by elite and popular leaders as well. The demagogue's habitual use of *diabolē* (415) confirms the truth of Theseus' concern that such a leader might exacerbate the resentments of the poor against the rich. The crux for the democracy, in the herald's view, is the question "How, if it does not direct its discourse right, may a *dēmos* rightly direct a *polis*?"<sup>54</sup> *Logos*, as Burian has shown ("*Logos and Pathos*" 139, 131–33), is an important theme of the play: Theseus is a master of it and prizes it

<sup>51</sup> See Bengt, "Probleme" 60.

<sup>52</sup> For the parallel between Pericles and Theseus see Goossens, "Périclés et Thésée." On comparisons between Pericles and his successors, to the detriment of the latter, see Connor, *The New Politicians*, ch. 3, "The New Democracy."

<sup>53</sup> See Bengt, "Probleme" 23.

<sup>54</sup> Ἄλλως δὲ πῶς ἂν μὴ διορθέων λόγους / ὀρθῶς δύναιτ' ἂν δῆμος εὐθύειν πόλιν; (417–18). On the meaning of the *hapax diortheuein* see Collard, *Suppliques* II 221–22; I have, however, preferred a more transitive sense than his "without straight, honest speaking."

as the key to human success. But *logos*, as the herald points out and as Theseus has already admitted, is easy to misdirect.

The herald closes by attacking the democratic–revisionist political position staked out by Theseus in his earlier speech. Theseus had not specified the nature of his ideal middle class; but, as we have seen, other sources indicate that these people were usually small landowners. The description of the type in *Orestes* strongly evokes the atmosphere of our play. He “seldom touches the city or agora, a self-employed worker (*autourgos*)—they are the only ones who save the country—but intelligent . . .” (919–21).<sup>55</sup> Such a person answers the qualifications of the right-wing ideology discussed above: he is a property-owner of modest means, full of integrity and wisdom, and not prone to meddle in city and governmental life. The herald, however, points out that since it is precisely his political inactivity that recommends him, the farmer would be of little use to the democracy: “Even if he were not ignorant, because of his work he could not pay much attention to public affairs” (420–22). If the savior class is a false dream, then class warfare cannot be mediated: the herald argues that in democracy the elevation of inferior persons to power is poisonous to the better class (νοσῶδες τοῦτο τοῖς ἀμείνοισιν, 423). The fears of Theseus are really the same: inferior people, as the “Old Oligarch” points out (Ps.–Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.6–7, 11), may choose leaders who are like them, with disastrous results for civic unity and rational policy. Theseus himself stands as a bulwark against such dangers: it would be absurd to think of Athens’ hereditary monarch, who has resigned his power in favor of democracy, as equivalent to a low-born demagogue. But we may wonder how Theseus will answer concerns that he seems to share.

In his rebuttal to the herald, Theseus praises legal equality on surprising grounds—as a benefit to the rich. Inverting the normal view of democracy as a system in which the poor benefit from equal treatment, Theseus argues that the rich man can answer any public attack on his reputation (ὅταν κλύη κακῶς, 436) by pointing out that, in court, rich and poor are equal. The survival or avoidance of legal attacks will apparently guarantee the wealthy some security from popular resent-

<sup>55</sup> See Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 91, and discussion in Michelini, “Maze” 26. For the meaning of the term *autourgos* see Ober, *Mass and Elite* 277. Note that the Herald mentions intelligence as a (doubtful) requisite (421), and Theseus refers to the middle group as a savior class, ἡ ’ν μέσῳ σφῆξι πόλεις (244).

ment.<sup>56</sup> Theseus partially conceals the traditional bias of democracy toward the poor, at the cost of reminding us once again of underlying class resentments, with their resultant conflicts and mutual *diabolē*. His second positive point about democracy, that it gives equal shares in public deliberation, is also oddly stated: "This is freedom: 'Who has a useful plan that he wants to bring forward for the city?'—and then the one who cares to<sup>57</sup> is glorious; and the one who doesn't want to is silent. What is more equal than that for a city?" (438–41). Theseus, who elsewhere is a polished and precise framer of arguments, here is reduced to bluster and a kind of awkward shorthand. The abrupt quotation of a stock phrase from the *ekklēsia* substitutes lamely for a description of the democratic process, and normative statements ("This is freedom . . . What is more equal than that?") are offered in place of arguments to prove the value of democratic deliberation.<sup>58</sup>

The word *ison* bears enormous weight in Theseus' formulation of democratic ideology. It appears four times,<sup>59</sup> and twice, in the passage above and at 432, it participates in an interesting rhetoric. At 432, rather than defend *koinoi nomoi* as a good, Theseus simply tacks on the reproach that for the tyrant to have all law to himself is by definition not equal. In both cases, equality, subjected to no analysis, is held up as a standard of good that overrides other terms. Theseus' arguments are vulnerable, since they can be confuted by the simple device of denying that equality is desirable. In fact, the herald has already provided one of the pieces of that confutation in his closing lines: by pointing out that an inferior man (*ponēros*) gets value (ἀξιωμα' . . . ἐξη, 424) in democracy, to the disadvantage of his betters, he evokes the conservative argument that democracy is unfair, since it assigns equal value to people who are

<sup>56</sup>See Ober, *Mass and Elite* 219–20, on the potential in popular juries for hostile feelings toward the wealthy.

<sup>57</sup>Demont, *Tranquillité* 101, points out the invidious quality of references to the legal *ho boulomenos* formula, which provided the opening for public prosecutions by the "busybody" *sukophantai*.

<sup>58</sup>Arguments countering the Socratic complaints about the ability of the many to make effective decisions are presented in Aristotle's *Politics* and surely do not originate with Aristotle, although their source cannot be proved to be fifth-century. Many heads may be better than one or a few (1281b34–38, 1282a17); nonexperts can judge an expert's work (1282a17–23); it is not the individual *phaulos* who rules, but the body to which he belongs (1282a34–41).

<sup>59</sup>Χὼ πέντης ἔχων ἴσον (408), καὶ τόδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον (432), τὴν δίκην ἴσῃ ἐχει (434), τί τοῦτων ἔστ' ἰσάτερον πόλει; (441).

not equal.<sup>60</sup> The issue of equality also returns inevitably to the question of class conflict. Theseus' middle class remained obediently in whatever order the city had assigned them (245); but legal and political equality leaves open the possibility that people may not remain in any assigned rank, and the human tendency to hubristic overreaching suggests that they will not.

Theseus' rhetoric reflects a vulnerability in democratic ideology that extends beyond this play. In Herodotus' account of the three constitutions, a valuable parallel to this text, Otanes begins a brief defense of democracy by saying that it has the most beautiful name of all, *isonomiē* (3.80); again, he does not defend political equality but simply holds it up as a slogan. In the later Euripidean play *Phoinissai*, Iokaste tries to dissuade her son Eteokles from his love of tyranny. Her speech arguing that equality (*isotēs*) brings harmony, while excess on either side leads to conflict, has a similarly repetitive style: words related to *ison* appear five times in a twelve-line span (536–47).<sup>61</sup> Defenses of democracy seem to correlate with attacks on tyranny, supported by unanalyzed praise of equality. The intellectual armature that might have supported a reasoned defense of democratic values has been traced by Vlastos in the work of pre-Socratic thinkers ("Equality and Justice" 156–78); but surviving fifth-century texts that are explicitly political in content show no evidence of such argument. Their stammering repetitions of "equality" suggest an ideological weakness in democratic theory; and the context of Theseus' speech may confirm Loraux's suggestion (*L'invention* 176–83, 198–211, 335–36) that the source of this weakness is the association of democracy with class conflict and division in the body politic.

Theseus' attack on tyranny is more cogent than his defense of democracy. His arguments are traditional ones, founded on the same base of *hubris* and *phthonos* as those of Otanes (Hdt. 3.80). Theseus evokes this theme when he points out that the democratically ruled city rejoices in an abundance of young men (ὑποῦσιν ἄστοις ἥδεται νεανίας, 443), while out of fear the tyrant kills the best and most intel-

<sup>60</sup> See Aristotle *Pol.* 1280a11. Note how, e.g., in the speech of Iokaste mentioned below, terms of precise measurement accompany her praise of *isotēs* (*Phoin.* 539–42).

<sup>61</sup> Iokaste ends, as Theseus does, with a rather feeble rhetorical question: "And where is justice then?" ἄρα ποῦ 'στιν ἡ δίκη; (548). On the feebleness of Otanes' arguments see Flory, *The Archaic Smile* 131.



ligent.<sup>62</sup> "How should a city become strong, when someone cuts off and culls the daring of the young (τόλμας ἀφαιρῇ κάπολωτίῃ νέους, 449) like the standing crop in a spring meadow?" The "bold hendiadys" arranged in strict chiasmus<sup>63</sup> implies a direct equation between the young and their most hubristic trait, daring. Theseus' metaphor suggests another Herodotean passage as well, the famous lesson of Thrasylus, who, by his wanton destruction of a rich field of grain,<sup>64</sup> taught Periander the art of monarchy. Whichever stalks raised their heads highest, were to be knocked off; and whichever citizens were distinguished must die. In acting this way, the tyrant hubristically imitates Zeus, whose lightning strikes the highest peaks and whose vengeance threatens mortals who rise too high.<sup>65</sup>

In our passage it is not just any superior people that the tyrant attacks, but the best and most intelligent of the *young* men, thus reactivating Theseus' earlier references to the young in political life. Young men are a locus of political and military *hubris*; and the tyrant's actions against them may seem almost justified, since even Adrastus, himself nominally a *turannos*, was overmastered by the uproar of his youthful followers. But youthful *hubris*, unlike that of the absolute tyrant, is natural, a phase of human development calling for constraint, not de-

<sup>62</sup> Kovacs ("Tyrants" 38), who wishes to prove the passage inauthentic, protests against this association and argues that *phronein* must be given a meaning ("be proud") that in classical texts would require the addition of *mega*. But Theseus' intellectualism would appropriately lead him to emphasize intelligence. Further, although unidiomatic in the classical period, the connection to *mega phronein* may also be suggested through the blurring of language distinctions typical of poetry. It is only in prose that we can be certain that the two idioms have nothing to do with each other.

<sup>63</sup> See the remarks of Collard (*Supplices* II 230), who rejects emendation (e.g., to νέων; Diggle, *Fabulae*, instead prints Nauck's alteration of the first word to τομαῖς). Or one might combine the two instances of hendiadys (Collard II 230): "takes off the daring by culling the young."

<sup>64</sup> Hdt. 5.92ζ, τοῦ λήλου τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ βαθύτατον διέφθειρε. For the use of plant metaphors with *hubris* see Michelini "'Υβρις" 43.

<sup>65</sup> See Bengt's discussion of the dual view of tyranny, as highly desirable but impossibly dangerous ("Probleme" 58–59); and cf. Connor, *The New Politicians* 98. *Hubris* has two complementary aspects: the arrogance of the powerful, and the insolence of the low. The tyrant participates in both, since, in posing as a kind of Zeus on earth, he is both immeasurably arrogant and, from the divine point of view at least, insufferably insolent. See Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* ch. 10, and Lanza, *Il tiranno* 33–64, who emphasize that the tyrant's links with *hubris* are traditional and ubiquitous.

struction;<sup>66</sup> and the military content of *Suppliants* necessarily reminds us that the daring of young men may also determine a community's survival. Theseus' second argument (452–55), that the tyrant will also harvest the sexual charm of marriageable daughters, thus depriving the parent of the rewards of upbringing, makes the same point for the private sphere. The precious crop of young is a valuable community and family resource that will be devastated by the tyrant.

After the political confrontation, the herald proceeds to the business at hand, warning Theseus to give up his protection of the Argives and ending on an annoyingly parental note: "consider, and do not, angered at my words, because you have a 'free' city, answer me with a swelling speech from your muscles (σφριγῶντ' ἀμείψῃ μῦθον ἐκ βραχιόνων)" (478).<sup>67</sup> The odd language suggests that Theseus, like the young hotheads that the king himself has deplored, will be spurred by his own youthful vigor to respond hubristically, perhaps in the ways that Aithra's speech had encouraged. The Theban goes on to expand his concerns about jingoistic politics in more general and traditional ways, first pointing out that *elpis*, confidence or hope, misleads many cities (479–80) and next extending the moral application to all Greeks. Citizens who vote for war do not weigh the possibility of their own death in the scale; if it were otherwise, "Hellas would never have gone spear-mad to her destruction" (οὐκ ἂν ποθ' Ἑλλὰς δοριμανὴς ἀπώλλυτο, 485).

In a play full of anachronistic references, it is hard not to apply the herald's complaint to the contemporary Peloponnesian conflict, which Thucydides described as the first genuinely pan-Hellenic war (1.18.3). As the herald goes on to praise the obvious advantages of peace, he continues to enlarge his homily by moving into the first plural: "Letting

<sup>66</sup>See Michelini, "Υβρις" 41, 43–44.

<sup>67</sup>The text is puzzling, but there seems to be no alternative to accepting the odd hypallage by which the bulging of Theseus' youthful muscles is transferred to his *logos*. The comparative βραχίων is unknown in tragedy, and Collard (*Supplices* II 236–37) has no parallels even in prose for the meaning he wishes to extract from it. The violent metaphor in σφριγῶντα virtually forces the obvious physical interpretation of βραχιόνων: see the collocations between the two words in Achaïos (*TGF* fr. 4) and Hermippus (*PCG* 5.57.6). For the association with youth see *Suppl.* 738, where Adrastus refers to the hubristic Argives as νέοι βραχίους, and *Androm.* 196; and, for a possible collateral association with "swelling" passion, see *Prom.* 380 (which would help to make the hypallage less violent).

these things go, we fools (οἱ κακοί) take up wars and enslave the weaker, man against man and city against city" (491–93). The continual evocation of political slogans and class conflicts in the democracy infuses the play with contemporary concerns; and this praise of peace in the mouth of a defender of tyranny derives its contemporary allusions from that context. The urge to disregard what is said by a hostile speaker is countered by the generous and universalizing tone of the herald's remarks; and that an antidemocrat says this only ties democracy more tightly to aggressive militarism.

The herald ends with themes that rebut Theseus' fears of the tyrant. He places the love of children even before that of the nation (506–8), recalling his previous praise of peace as rejoicing in an abundance of offspring (τέρπεται δ' εὐπαιδίᾳ, 490) and wealth. The implication there and here is that while tyranny may destroy some young men, war does even more to deprive the city and its families of their children, who are the most basic form of wealth.<sup>68</sup> The debate ends with a sarcastically polite stichomythy that consists almost entirely of simple reformulations of earlier political and moral themes. Theseus affirms his intent always to punish the hubristic (575), echoing the chorus, which has twice called the herald's words a sign of *hubris* (462–63, 512). Theseus brags of his and the city's triumphantly achieved *ponoi* (573, 577), while the herald accuses them both of hyperactivity (*polla prattein*, 576). The hits at Theseus' youth are condensed in the herald's final threat: "You'll find out by experience. Now you're still a boy (*neanias*)" (580).

As usual, when the Athenian king's youth becomes most prominent as a theme, his behavior is most strikingly mature. Theseus breaks off the stichomythy, coolly declining to lose his temper (581–82); but the association of democratic politics with the rash mood of youth and the activist—or imperialist—ethic is not so easily dismissed. Even the strong moral motivations and apparent altruism in Theseus' involvement in the Theban–Argive quarrel are characteristic of imperialism, since high principle is a necessary support for intervention that is not justified by traditional interests or obvious needs. By intervening on

<sup>68</sup>Demont, *Tranquillité* 62, shows the traditionality of such arguments, e.g., in Pindar's key fragment (109, discussed above, note 27), where *stasis* (and apparently the war against the Persians as well) is rejected as *πενίας δότειραν*, *ἐχθρὰν κουροτρόφον*. Note also the herald's praise of the *hēsuchos* as the only wise leader (509).

behalf of Corcyra, Plataea, or Eggesta, Athens took the position of helping the weaker party against a bully, just as Theseus does in helping the unfortunate Argives.<sup>69</sup> While there is something anachronistically compelling to modern Americans in Theseus' conduct of a "limited war," the problems in limiting military objectives and the difficulty of restraint once aggressive action has begun are derivable from the traditional accounts of Xerxes' folly.<sup>70</sup> There is also a striking parallelism between what Theseus does and what Adrastus did, in attempting to make good the "just" claims of Polyneikes (152–54).<sup>71</sup> In order to keep himself clear of the pitfalls, Theseus must make some strong distinctions and achieve miracles of restraint.

The messenger's narrative of the battle at Thebes demonstrates this problem rhetorically: as the fighting reaches its climax, the battle is won by the heroic violence of Theseus, who, with a club like Herakles', harvests and crops off the heads and necks of his enemies (714–17). The image colors Theseus' heroic and legitimate military activity with the darker shades evoked earlier by the allusion to the Periander story. The messenger, perhaps displaying some of the *hubris* associated with his master Kapaneus, dances, claps, and yells with joy, while the Thebans respond with wails and moans, rushing to the shrines in desperate supplication.<sup>72</sup> The emotional contrast—oil and water, as Klytaimnestra put it (Ag. 322–25)—between victors and vanquished sets up the traditional pattern of the sack of the city, only to break it. With a powerful use of enjambment, we are told that "When it was possible to enter the walls, / Theseus held back" (723–24).

Impressed by the restraint of Theseus, the messenger praises him as "one who is valiant in danger and who despises the hubristic masses (μοσεῖ θ' ὑβριστὴν λαόν) who, in good fortune, trying to climb the top rungs of the ladder, destroy the prosperity that was within their grasp" (725). This complex formulation describes the *hubris* of the mob in terms that evoke the messenger's own leader, Kapaneus, who, as the herald told us (496–99), was struck dead on his ladder by Zeus. The

<sup>69</sup> See Loraux, *L'invention* 67–69: the motif of Athens as defender of the weak, very prominent in the funeral orations, has the function of justifying wars by Athens against other Greeks.

<sup>70</sup> For the dangers of war see the forebodings of the king in Aeschylus *Suppl.* 397–401, 468–77, and Michelini, *Tradition* 95.

<sup>71</sup> See Michelini, "Maze" 24–25 and n. 62.

<sup>72</sup> Compare the behavior of the chorus of the *Seven* of Aeschylus, or the description in *Hekabe* 935–36.

hubristic behavior traditionally linked to the antihero Kapaneus<sup>73</sup> is generalized to all human beings, or rather to the lower ranks in particular. It would seem that the only capable democratic leader must restrain in himself the aggressive tendencies typical of the elite, while despising his followers and their own brand of insolent *hubris*, a paradox that already had emerged from the formulations of Theseus about the greed of the upper classes, the ambition of the young, and the vindictiveness of the masses.

Adrastos appeared in the first scene as a foil to Theseus; but he was reduced to silence in the scene with the herald, when his attempt to intervene was sternly repressed by Theseus (513). His comments on the victory bring him back into sharper focus and unite the economic, political, and moral themes swirling through earlier scenes. Adrastos traces a cycle of hubristic error in which Argos and Thebes participate reciprocally. Arrogance in the young and vigorous Argives (νέοι βραχίλοισιν) leads to a fall (ἀπωλόμεσθα), only to inspire the same pattern at Thebes (ὑβρίζ' ὑβρίζων τ' αὖθις ἀνταπώλετο, 738–44). The elated Thebans are compared by Adrastos to one who has made a sudden transition from poverty into wealth (λαβὼν πένης ὥς ἀρτίπλουτα χρήματα, 742), a person presumably afflicted with the hubristic characteristics of both economic classes. The metaphor links *hubris* as a personal or collective moral danger with *hubris* as an economic phenomenon, and thus a motivating force in class conflicts. Like the Theban herald, Adrastos, seeing the futility of war, is moved to rebuke all humanity: "Empty men! . . . You give in, not to words, but to deeds (τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν)" (747; cf. 749, φόνῳ καθαιρεῖσθ', οὐ λόγῳ τὰ πράγματα).

Adrastos' role is enhanced further in the following scene, when Theseus urges him to praise the Seven by explaining the nurture that produced their bravery. Theseus deprecates traditional epic narratives, in which individual deeds of valor in battle are recounted, claiming that such recollections are undependable and unpersuasive. One purpose of this introduction must be to justify the essentially unmilitary direction of the speech; another may be to distinguish it from traditional accounts that, as in Aeschylus' *Seven*, paired each hero with a Theban opponent. The result is a speech that has much in common with the unorthodox *Epitaphios* of Gorgias (DK fr. B6), in which the Athenian dead are given

<sup>73</sup>For associations of this figure with *hubris* see 495–96. Kapaneus elsewhere is a *theomachos* who attempts, like Salmoneus, to imitate the thunder of Zeus (see Hutchinson, *Aeschylus' Seven* p. 113).

the polished and civil qualities of the Sophist's own pupils rather than traits normally associated with warriors.<sup>74</sup> It is appropriate that *Suppliants*, a remarkably public play, should include a funeral speech, another public and formal event. Yet this speech thrusts us into another world, a private and personal one, that has been little seen in the earlier events (and this, of course, is another effect of Theseus' demand that Adrastus avoid traditional military themes). Adrastus' speech is far from being and indeed could not be a conventional Athenian *epitaphios*, given that the latter, as specifically civic utterances, are collective rather than individual; but a major theme of the *epitaphioi*, the *paideia* that produces valor, remains central.<sup>75</sup>

What we learn about the Seven is quite surprising: it turns out that these antiheroes whom we have been mentally opposing to the pious and restrained Theseus showed none of the symptoms traditionally associated with *hubris*. Kapaneus, the worst case of all the Seven, is dealt with first. As would be appropriate for a hubristic hero, he is a man of wealth and power; but there the resemblance stops, for, although wealthy, he showed no more pride than if he had been a poor man (863). He rejected those who value rich feeding and was content with little nourishment (863–66). The emphasis on diet is significant, since overfeeding, and hence excessive body size and vigor, are associated with the hubristic condition.<sup>76</sup> The hero's physical restraint is reflected in a modest and affable personality: honest and faithful to his *philoi* (869–70). Is Adrastus lying? If he is, no one is in a position to contradict him; and such a lie would therefore be dramatically meaningless. We are left with the difficult task of reconciling this exemplary private citizen with the berserker who, according to the Theban herald and to well-established tradition, boasted that he would take Thebes even against the will of Zeus.

Four other heroes (Amphiaraus and Polyneikes are left for Theseus) are described in a similar vein. Eteoklos is framed as Kapaneus' antithesis, bringing both into line with the motif of class contrast that runs throughout the play. Being poor, he "practiced another virtue" (ἄλλην χρησιότιν ἤσκηκότα, 872), one suitable to his station. When

<sup>74</sup>See Loraux, *L'invention* 117, 230–33.

<sup>75</sup>See Loraux, *L'invention* 145. But in the extant speeches, as she points out, this theme is distorted by emphasis on military achievement and is often reduced to the single motif of "autochthony" (153).

<sup>76</sup>See Michelini, "Υβρις" 35–39.

wealthy friends offered money, he refused it, since he valued independence above affluence (877). The remaining three leaders are characterized as disciplined warriors and (at least for the first two) models of civic conduct. Like Zethos in the celebrated debate of the later *Antiope*, Hippomedon avoids poetry and the soft life, preferring vigorous physical activities in a rural setting, thus fitting himself for active soldiery in the service of his city.<sup>77</sup> Parthenopaios offers yet another type of civic virtue, one suitable for the noncitizen or metic: although not born at Argos, he lived there in peace and harmony.<sup>78</sup> The beauty of Parthenopaios (889) offered him special challenges and temptations, to which he responded with the same restraint that he brought to his role as metic.<sup>79</sup> The passage describing Tydeus is textually confused, but 903–6 seem the most specifically suited to context:<sup>80</sup> Tydeus, a second Zethos figure, is provided with an Amphion. Though inferior in intelligence to his brother Meleagros, this quintessential warrior found his intellectual specialty (ἀκριβῆ μουσικῆν) in military skills. Adrastus concludes in the same propaedeutic vein: good nurture leads to shame, which prevents cowardice and vice; courage is teachable, given that language is learned by children;<sup>81</sup> and, like language, this learning will be preserved into old age. Therefore, rear your children well.

Rear your children well, and they too may find the same end as

<sup>77</sup>See Collard, *Supplikes* II 329. In *Antiope* the rival political themes are transposed into a contrast between active and contemplative lives (fr. 193–94 N). For scorn of the Muses and preference for agricultural labor, compare 883 and 885 with fr. 188 N. For the association with philosophical “contemplation” see Carter, *Quiet Athenian* 132ff., and discussion of the Iphis episode below.

<sup>78</sup>He prefers the *lochoi* of the camp to the *logoi* of the contentious agora, 894, 896.

<sup>79</sup>The last two lines (899–900), praising Parthenopaios for his chastity, should probably not be cut (*pace* Collard, *Supplikes* II 232–33): instead of beginning with personal virtue and moving to civic topics, this description moves in reverse order.

<sup>80</sup>There are three doublet sections (see Collard’s discussion, *Supplikes* II 334–35), of which I would prefer to pick the second (904–6). The references to music and to Meleagros that seem inapposite to Collard are what recommend it to me. But it should be noted that all the doublets have the same burden: Tydeus’ specialty was not *logoi*, but *erga*.

<sup>81</sup>See 913–15, εἴτε καὶ βρέφος διδάσκεται / λέγειν τ’ ἀκούειν θ’ ὃν μάθησιν οὐκ ἔχει. The mention of hearing, which Collard sees as illogical (*Supplikes* II 337), emphasizes what it is that children most notably learn by experience, namely to understand and to speak words. The emphasis matches the play’s overall concern with the verbal, but it also highlights the absence of *logos* in the stories of the Seven.



Kapaneus or Tydeus! How can this moral lesson be read?<sup>82</sup> Even Theseus admits that, as soldiers and heroes, the Seven were exemplary for their daring and valor. Yet their valor led them to impiety and to exemplary destruction, in one case at least, by the hand of Zeus himself. The ambiguity of the fate of Kapaneus is symbolized by his separate tomb, marking him as singular in his offense and in his valor. He embodies the paradox of the hero that underlies the concept of *hubris*, an excess and a violence that is somehow both baneful and glorious. Yet the Kapaneus of Adrastus' speech is no such hubristic figure: in private life, he embodied the exact opposite to hubristic traits, in his moderation and his modesty. What value, then, in raising children well? And what connection can be made between the public and the private acts of Kapaneus?

A clue in this moral wilderness seems to be offered by the thread of anti-intellectualism that runs through the descriptions of the last three heroes. May it be that the saving grace of *logos* could have built a bridge between these exemplary individuals and their part in public life? Theseus has shown that it is possible to escape the traps into which the Seven fell, and certainly he is a master of *logos*. The Euripidean Theseus, however, unlike the traditional Theseus of Aeschylus' *Eleusinians*, does solve the Theban problem by violence rather than diplomacy.<sup>83</sup> The Thebans are no doubt culpable; but since we have witnessed the entire verbal negotiation, in which abundant use of *logos* did little to end the troubles, it is hard not to conclude that Theseus too has proved a better fighter than he has a diplomat. Further, Theseus' own intellectual formulations offer no dependable guide; he quickly reversed his own optimistic trust in divine benevolence, and his denunciation of the Seven is not borne out by Adrastus' account of them. The virtue displayed by Kapaneus in his wealth and by Eteoklos in his poverty belie the greed that Theseus saw as the force behind disturbed internal class relations and belligerent external activities.

An element in Eteoklos' portrait stands out, since it is supported by the only logical argument attributed to one of the Seven and since it

<sup>82</sup> Cf. the remarks of Aëlion, *Euripide, héritier d'Eschyle* I 238: Euripides may be hinting that *epitaphioi* are a mere encouragement to further wars. Collard ("The Funeral Oration" 48) sees the funeral speech as a sign that Adrastus has been converted to Theseus' humane point of view; but we still must ask what his speech can be construed to mean.

<sup>83</sup> See Burian, "Logos and Pathos" nn. 19–20. And cf. Plut. *Thes.* 29.4, πείσας καὶ σπείσόμενος.

provides an approach to these very questions. But his idea only exacerbates the confusion. Blaming only those who acted wrongly (τοὺς ἑξαμαρτάνοντας), he argued that a city is not at fault, if it acquires a bad reputation from a bad ruler (διὰ κυβερνήτην κακόν).<sup>84</sup> The political fears of Theseus and the herald might match this, since both seem to distrust the selfish ambitions of leaders and their capacity to mislead the masses. Yet if the masses cannot be responsible, how indeed can they direct rightly (*diortheuein*) the city? And if we should blame the leaders instead of the *polis*, what does this say about the Seven themselves, given that their private virtue could not overcome their public *hubris*?

The scene ends with Adrastus' comment, an extension of the quietism and despair that he displayed after the battle. Again in the second plural, he asks, "O suffering mortals, why do you get spears and do each other to death? Stop! Cease your labors (*ponoi*) and keep to your cities, quiet among the quiet (ἤσυχτοι μεθ' ἡσύχων). Life is a small thing; we should try to pass it through with ease and not with labors (*ponoi*)" (949–55). His words reassemble in a new and broader context the same slogans that appeared in earlier political debate. Adrastus, seeing what has become of his virtuous and valiant friends, may well feel a sense of waste and futility in all human striving; and quietism carries a stronger appeal when presented by him than it did in the mouth of a hostile Theban. In a political universe where the link between public and private is so uncertain, caution and quietude appear in a positive light.

The same note, and the same emphasis on the private, appears in the next scene, a remarkable interlude that inserts a personal tragedy in miniature into this most public of dramas. Euadne, the wife of Kapaneus, throws herself on her husband's pyre before the eyes of her horrified father, Iphis. Her suicide is a product of the same heroic motivations (see 1063) that won Kapaneus his smoldering tomb; and this heroism appears in an even more questionable light when we see it enacted by a woman, to whom Greek culture assigned a private role of service and nurture and for whom self-assertion in public forums was considered inappropriate. Other Euripidean self-sacrificers have strong

<sup>84</sup> Collard (*Supplices* II 328–29) associates these lines with earlier denunciations of bad leaders; but they go beyond, since they apply to Eteoklos' attitude toward other *poleis* than his own. The referent must be the enemies of Argos, since there is no reason for Eteoklos to hate his own city (οὐχὶ τὴν πόλιν / ἡχθαίρ'). It will not do to treat *polis* as equivalent to *dēmos* or *plēthos*, the democratic faction within the *polis*.

altruistic motivations; Alkestis dies to protect her family, Makaria to save her family and their host city; even Iphigeneia sees her decision as a way to prevent needless bloodshed as well as to win glory. Only Euadne throws her life away solely for honor, when she might have lived to help her aged father.<sup>85</sup>

The speech of Iphis forms a perfect aesthetic and intellectual complement, as an extreme expression of aged pessimism, to Theseus' youthful optimism in the opening scene. While Theseus had argued that human beings who complain of life are "spoiled," Iphis demands, in simple justice, a radical rearrangement of life's most basic feature, the irreversible movement from youth to age. Given a second chance at life, human beings could "set right" (ἐξορθοῦσθαι, 1083, 1086) by second thoughts (γνώμαιοισιν ὑστέραιοισιν) the mistakes of the first attempt. Iphis' particular application of this extraordinary idea is limited. He feels that he might have avoided all his present pain, had he never fathered children. His argument is a prosaic correlative to the laments of the chorus, who renounce their day of marriage, since it led to this bereavement (786–93); but presented in the more discursive form of the *rhēsis*, this idea appears more shocking. Both the herald and Theseus have shown an intense concern for youth as a source of individual and collective wealth for the citizens of a *polis*, and to renounce parenthood altogether is a very violent extreme of quietism. On the other hand, the general application of Iphis' demand for a second chance negates Theseus' hope that human lives can be directed by good sense and intelligence. According to this pessimistic and tragic view of human experience, the pattern of youth and age, because it is irreversible, never permits the union of wisdom and action; instead, as in the tragic concept of "late learning," we exchange folly for impotence.

Iphis closes with a denunciation of old age and of any who try to prolong it by diet and medicine. Since life is as it is, a one-way journey, best to die quickly and get out of the way of the young (θανόντας ἔρρειν κάκποδὼν εἶναι νέους, 1113). His speech extends the logic of quietism into areas familiar to us from the philosophical texts, which argued against parenthood as a source of misery and which urged that life not be prolonged by medicine beyond its natural boundaries.<sup>86</sup> The retreat

<sup>85</sup>Iphis' description of a father's love for a daughter also emphasizes the anomaly of Euadne's act: men's souls are greater, while females are formed for charm and fawning caresses (1102–3).

<sup>86</sup>See Antiphon (on parenthood) DK B49, p. 359–60, and Plato (on medicine) *Rep.* 407c7–408b5.

into intellectual quietism is generally seen as a fourth-century offshoot of the political slogans;<sup>87</sup> but our text here indicates that the link, at least for as careful a student of thought as Euripides, was traceable even in the fifth. The person who followed the precepts of Iphis would break down the continuity of generations—and thus the structure of human society as a whole—by abjuring the role of guide to the young at two separate stages in life, first by the refusal of parenthood and finally by the rejection of old age. By “getting out of the way of the young,” Iphis leaves them to their own devices, a bleak prospect indeed. Taken to this final extreme, the quietist withdrawal is revealed as an abdication that leaves human violence and error to continue unchecked.

As it turns out, even Theseus requires the help of Athena in the final scene (σὺ γάρ μ' ἀνορθοῖς . . . μόνον σὺ με / ἐς ὄρθον ἴστη, 1228–30) in order to complete his relations with the Argives. As often in Euripidean drama, the divine intervener goes on to a future prediction. Athena assigns to the youngest Argives, the little sons of the Seven, another mission of war: Aigialeus, a young general, will join Diomedes, child of Tydeus; and, as soon as ever their chins are shadowed with beard, these youths must lead a second and successful expedition against the towers of Thebes (1214–21). The extreme immaturity of these child warriors gathers up in a single image the many suggestions about youth and its tragic impulses. The aggression of Theseus, however fortunate its outcome, has not ended the cycle of Theban and Argive defeat and triumph: another part of that cycle lies ahead.

In *Suppliants* Euripides used the themes of traditional moral poetry such as that of Hesiod and Solon in anachronistic contexts in order to situate the political slogans of the contemporary Athenian right and left in the traditional discourses from which they derived their power. These polemics are reciprocal in structure: *ponos* and *hēsuchia*, like *polupragmosunē* and *apragmosunē*, are terms that depend upon and respond to each other. The forms of debate and polemic in *Suppliants* reproduce this structure, while at another level the balance between opposing sides, and the more complex and inclusive perspective of traditional poetic discourses, suggest the impossibility of reaching closure through the choice of one *logos* over another, or even through the use of *logos* in preference to violence. As I have shown elsewhere for the theological arguments of Theseus in the first scene (“Maze” 23), the play’s apparently elaborate intellectual constructs are not real, in the

<sup>87</sup> See note 43 above.

sense of presenting a coherent and meaningful argument or *logos*, but mimetic. They erect themselves only to dissolve in contradiction or to resolve themselves into older, poetic components. The presentation of Theseus as a paragon of intellect is itself threatened by the gelatinous consistency of these intellectual structures, since his speeches introduce most of the concepts that dominate the play. The traditional "tragic" moral view, which implies the failure of *logos* to control outcomes, is supported by the contradictions revealed in the ideas of this "untragic" and optimistic protagonist.

Theseus' success in the fictional and mythical world of the play is uncontested; but analogies between that world and fifth-century Athens are problematic. Such analogies, in projecting beyond the fictional world, would have to be carried out on the level of real, not mimetic political discourse; and the play resists such a reading in every possible way. It presents a champion of democracy, who distrusts democracy. It presents a triumphant myth of Athenian military and political efficacy, a myth originating from a political discourse of the democracy, the funeral oration. But *Suppliants* contaminates this myth with the class-based conflicts that, as Loraux has shown (*L'invention*), are carefully obscured and mystified by the conventions of funeral oratory. Another possible political analogy is that between Theseus and some contemporary pretender to the status of Pericles, a topic that I intend to discuss elsewhere. Alcibiades is the obvious choice, since he was Pericles' ward and had high claims to social and intellectual prestige. But the play exactly balances its presentation of an ideal youthful leader by its suggestion that youth is fatally prone to hubristic rashness. Negative elements, repressed by effective political discourses, are acceptable material for the traditional poetic discourse, which gains depth by assimilating tensions.

At the same time that *Suppliants* tells us more about the origins and nature of democratic political discourse than is useful for democratic political ideology, it reveals, with the prescient power familiar in Euripides' work, the roots and the future development of an antidemocratic ideology of "quietude." This discourse, as Demont has shown, was amazingly adaptable, moving from the self-presentation of traditional aristocracy in Pindar's day down even to the philosophical pursuit of *ataraxia* in a time when democrats no longer threatened. In *Suppliants*, the representatives of this elite, antidemocratic view are the Argives and the Thebans, flawed and failing in the traditional way of tragedy, even as Theseus surmounts and evades tragic threats. The

play's exploration of these opposing political discourses reveals their relation to and their developing difference from a traditional heroic ethic. Adrastus, the dominant representative of quietism, embodies the relation and the difference: a spokesman for tragic sympathy, he is not a tragic, but a posttragic hero, instructed by women in the ways of grief (771) and broken from his heroic pride. Tragedy depicts a reversal that is explored continually in the speeches of Adrastus, the herald, the messenger, Iphis, and even Theseus himself (549–57); this one-way journey leads from youth to age, daring to suffering, ignorance to “late learning.” The side of heroic activism, however, the ground on which the tragic reversal is built, is deprived of its traditional status through its identification with the opposing political stance: Theseus is critical of the Seven and cautious in helping them, while the advocates of heroic valor on stage are two female figures, Aithra and Euadne, whose pretensions to activist roles are socially inappropriate. The quietism of Iphis and Adrastus, on the other hand, once the original link between *hēsuchia* and valor has been broken, presents us with a dream of escape that is without political reference points and that denies the realities of human life.

*Suppliants* clearly will not work as a “political pageant,” since it remains faithful to the poetic tradition of a more inclusive truth. Yet in its borrowed theme and intellectualized, logocentric structure, as well as by its open contemporary allusions, this play seems to move tragic drama onto alien ground. Theseus is not the only “untragic” hero to confront us: even more startling, because completely unexpected, is Adrastus’ picture of the Seven as models of moral excellence, a picture that renders meaningless the traditional view of their hubristic behavior. The attempt to read some story about human fate and the link between character and action is thus blocked, as the play shifts tragic dilemmas to the public sphere, in which catastrophe acquires a dimension beyond the success or failure of an individual heroic figure. This broader tragic reversal produces a tragic cycle that, like the one in the *Oresteia*, is repeated by successive generations. But unlike the Aeschylean cycle, this repeated doom is not to be transcended by collective solutions; and there is no suggestion that Athenians, through their democracy, can be inoculated against its dangers.

The play presents us with a public and collective tragedy in which the protagonists represent social groups, rich and poor, young and old, male and female. By choosing a location in Attica and foregrounding a favorite Athenian patriotic myth, Euripides problematizes the self-con-

gratulatory elements embedded in and concealed by the tragic festival itself. Under color of performing the traditional contrast described by Zeitlin ("Thebes" 146–47) between Argive or Theban error and Athenian enlightenment, *Suppliants* brings tragedy home to the democracy.<sup>88</sup>

ANN N. MICHELINI

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

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## LUCILIANUS CHARACTER

At *Res Rusticae* 3.2.17 Varro informs us that Lucius Abuccius, the owner of an estate near Alba and a learned man (*homo, ut scitis, ap-prime doctus*), had composed *libelli* in the manner of Lucilius (*cuius Luciliano caractere sunt libelli*). Abuccius' literary work has not survived, and his only significance now is in providing us with the name of one of the *alii* Horace dismisses as inept imitators of Lucilian *satura*.<sup>1</sup> The phrase Varro coined to describe Abuccius' poetry has fared better. In 1912 Wheeler could call *Luciliano caractere libelli* a "much-exploited phrase,"<sup>2</sup> and scholars since have continued to quote it frequently in studies on Roman satire. Surprisingly, there has been no debate over what Varro intended these words to mean. DuQuesnay expresses the consensus of opinion when he states that "the name of Lucilius was synonymous with personal abuse and invective. That was the meaning of *Lucilianus character*."<sup>3</sup> My purpose is to argue for a new reading of Varro's phrase, and to suggest that the question of Lucilius' reputation in the first century B.C.E. is more complicated than has been assumed.

In the third book of *Res Rusticae* Varro turns to the subject of *pastio villatica*, that is, the raising of dormice, fish, bees, boars, and pigeons and other fowl for sale. He notes (3.2.16) that in an age as given

<sup>1</sup> At *Serm.* 1.10.46–47 Horace names only Varro of Atax as an author of *saturae*. From other sources we learn that two *grammatici*, Servius Nicanor and Pompeius Lenaenus, wrote *saturae* (Suet. *De Gramm.* 5 and 15); in Jerome's *Index Librorum Varronis* four books of verse *saturae* are listed; Gaius Trebonius claimed that the *versiculi* he sent to Cicero in 44 were inspired with a Lucilian *libertas* (*Ad Fam.* 12.16.3). It is fair to assume that these were not the only Lucilian imitators writing during the years before Horace published his *Sermones*.

<sup>2</sup> Wheeler, "*Satura*" 473.

<sup>3</sup> DuQuesnay, "Horace and Maecenas" 29. For the same view see Webb, "On the Origin" 181; Fiske, *Lucilius* 105; Anderson, *Pompey* 73; van Rooy, *Studies* 57; Reckford, *Horace* 34; Bramble, *Persius* 195; Coffey, *Roman Satire* 63; LaFleur, "Horace" 1812–13; Scholz, "Der frühe Lucilius" 360. Anderson, "The Roman Socrates" 30, takes *Lucilianus character* to mean "licentious manner" and further suggests that Varro intended the phrase to convey the sense of a certain personality stamped on the verse by the poet. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* 286 n. 6, takes the context of *R.R.* 3.2.17 to imply "social criticism," but rightly notes that "*character* suggests style, not just tone," and points to Varro's characterization of Lucilius as a *gracilis* poet (ap. Gellius 16.4.6).

to luxury as his own, these delicacies found a ready market at Rome, and consequently *pastio villatica* brought in greater profits than conventional farming and animal husbandry, the subjects of the first two books of his treatise. To illustrate this point, Varro names Abuccius and others who had been successful in this enterprise, noting in passing that Abuccius was the author of certain *libelli*.

This context, Hendrickson argued, indicates "that the writings of Abuccius had to do with a censure of Roman luxury, a Lucilian theme."<sup>4</sup> Whether or not censure of culinary luxury was a prominent theme in Lucilius' thirty books, the context of this passage in fact tells us nothing about Abuccius' poetry. Varro here unequivocally endorses the practice of *pastio villatica* on the basis of its profitability; economic good sense, not morality, is the issue. The reference to Abuccius' *libelli* is clearly parenthetical and serves a single purpose: in enumerating the profits Abuccius had made from *pastio villatica*, Varro chose to emphasize that this landowner, in spite of his good business sense, was nevertheless a cultured gentleman; he was learned, and he wrote verse. Nothing here elucidates the meaning of *Lucilianus character*, a phrase Varro expected his readers, familiar as they were with the Lucilian corpus, to understand without further elaboration. We, on the other hand, must ask two questions. First, in what sense does Varro use the term *character*? And, second, was Lucilius' name synonymous with invective in the first century?

In his chapter (6.14) on the *genera dicendi*, or the classification of types of literary styles, Gellius draws on an unnamed Varronian work.<sup>5</sup> He begins by pointing out that *genera dicendi* is a translation of the Greek term *χαρακτήρες*, and then gives both Greek and Latin names for the standard three types of style, the grand, plain, and middle. This is followed by a brief description of each style:

Et in carmine et in soluta oratione genera dicendi probabilia sunt tria, quae Graeci *χαρακτήρες* vocant nominaque eis fecerunt *ἄδρὸν*, *λοχνόν*, *μέσον*. Nos quoque quem primum posuimus uberem vocamus, secundum gracilem, tertium mediocrem. Uberi dignitas atque amplitudo est, gracili venustas et subtilitas, medius in confinio est utriusque modi particeps.

<sup>4</sup>Hendrickson, "*Satura*" 130.

<sup>5</sup>See Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius* 162–63.

After noting the relative vices pertaining to each style, Gellius records that Varro cited Roman poets whose writings provided models of these three literary *characteres*:

Vera autem et propria huiuscemodi formarum exempla in Latina lingua M. Varro esse dicit ubertatis Pacuvium, gracilitatis Lucilium, mediocritatis Terentium.

Varro here, as Gellius notes, is following conventional Greek critical theory, which, perhaps as early as Theophrastus, had employed the notion of stylistic "characters" in discussing differing styles in prose authors and poets.<sup>6</sup> This doctrine of stylistic types played a significant role in Roman critical thinking of the first century, though Roman authors at this time use *χαρακτήρ* or *character* rarely, preferring instead to translate the Greek term as *habitus* (*orationis*), *forma*, or *forma dicendi*, *genus dicendi*, *figura*, *nota* or *formula*.<sup>7</sup> The author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, for example, discusses the *genera dicendi* at length in his fourth book (4.8–11), first defining the three different styles and then offering short prose passages of his own composition to illustrate the virtues and vices of each style. The theory often appears in Cicero's writings.<sup>8</sup> At *Orator* 75–99 he discusses these stylistic classifications in considerable detail; he then illustrates these theoretical principles by pointing to some of his own speeches and those of other orators (102–11). Elsewhere he uses, like Varro, the term *character* in discussing poetry. He inquires of his brother, for example, whether it was the subject matter (*res*) or the style (*χαρακτήρ*) of his verse which Caesar had faulted: *Dic mihi verum, nam aut res eum, aut χαρακτήρ non delectat* (*Ad Q. Fr.* 2.15[16].5). At *Orator* 36 he translates *χαρακτήρ* as *forma*, again in the context of discussing poetry. From the examples he then gives it is clear that he, like the author of the *Ad Herennium*, considers diction and composition as the factors determining the *character* of a

<sup>6</sup>The early history of this doctrine is controversial. See Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion* 278–82 et passim.

<sup>7</sup>Cic. *De Orat.* 3.199, *Orat.* 74, 75; *Ad Her.* 4.8.11. Cf. Quint. 12.10.58.

<sup>8</sup>*De Orat.* 3.177, 199, 212; *Orat.* 20–21, 69, 75–99; *De Opt. Gen. Orat.* 2. At *Brut.* 201 he makes use of the alternate two-style (grand versus plain) doctrine; at *Brut.* 40 he shows his familiarity with the commonplace of taking Homer's Odysseus, Menelaus, and Nestor as representatives respectively of the grand, plain, and middle styles (cf. Quint. 12.10.64 and Varro ap. Gellius 6.14.7). See Douglas, "A Ciceronian Contribution" 18–26.

poet's work, and that he is thinking, albeit loosely, in terms of the conventional stylistic types.<sup>9</sup>

Two Greek critics writing at Rome in the latter half of the first century clearly assumed a familiarity on the part of their readers, both Greek and Roman, with the doctrine of the *χαρακτήρες λόγου*. Caecilius of Calacte wrote a treatise entitled *Περὶ τοῦ χαρακτήρος τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his essay *On Demosthenes* (1–3) refers explicitly to the doctrine of the three styles, and presents Lysias as the exemplar of the plain style, Thucydides of the grand, and Thrasyarchus of the middle.<sup>10</sup> The influence of this system of stylistic classification and the critical term *χαρακτήρ* are found throughout his writings.<sup>11</sup> Quintilian mentions a tradition which classified Greek poets according to the literary “characters.”<sup>12</sup> Finally, Horace attests to the popularity this sort of critical method enjoyed in the schools.<sup>13</sup>

This evidence shows that the doctrine of the *χαρακτήρες λόγου*, or the *genera dicendi*, was a commonplace in Roman critical theory of the first century. The term *χαρακτήρ* meaning “style” or, more specifically, style as defined rather rigidly by what had become the conventional classifications of grand, plain, and middle styles, is found in Varroian material preserved by Gellius. It is likely that the term has this same meaning in the title of Varro’s treatise *Περὶ χαρακτήρων*, now lost.<sup>14</sup> Varro’s designation of Lucilius as the poetic exemplar of *gracilitas*, or the plain style, is clear evidence of his application of the *χαρακτήρες λόγου* in his work on Latin literature. There is no reason to believe, then, that Varro intended *character* in his phrase *Lucilianus character* to have a meaning different from the established meaning of

<sup>9</sup>Orat. 36: *Sed in omni re difficillimum est formam qui χαρακτήρ Graece dicitur exponere optimi, quod aliud aliis videtur optimum. Ennio delector, ait quispiam, quod non discedit a communi more verborum. Pacuvio, inquit alius, omnes apud hunc ornati elaboratique sunt versus, multa apud alterum neglegentius.*

<sup>10</sup>Cf. *On Demosthenes* 8. For a similar characterization of orators’ styles see Cic. *De Orat.* 3.28.

<sup>11</sup>See, e.g., *On Lysias* 11, 15, 20, 26, 31; *On Isocrates* 2, 18, 20; *On Isaeus* 2; *On Demosthenes* 4, 5, 6, 8.

<sup>12</sup>At 10.1.52 Quintilian takes Hesiod as a model of the middle style, Antimachus of the grand. At 10.1.54–55 the style of Apollonius of Rhodes is labelled *mediocris*.

<sup>13</sup>*Ep.* 2.1.55–59.

<sup>14</sup>Rawson, *Intellectual Life* 152 n. 48.

the term. To have Varro, moreover, taking Lucilius as the model of *gracilitas* and, at the same time, defining the *Lucilianus character* as "invective" results in an unworkable contradiction. Whatever else *gracilitas* may mean, no Latin writer uses the word to describe the style or manner of impassioned invective fueled by rage or ad hominem animosity. As every Roman schoolboy knew, the plain style had a very limited range of emotional stops and, consequently, was not considered suitable for polemic or censoriousness.<sup>15</sup>

If we turn now to the adjective *Lucilianus* we find that in the ancient testimonia for Lucilius this word has more than one connotation; that is, it is not simply synonymous with "invective." There is no question, of course, that in antiquity Lucilius was famed for his *libertas* and *acerbitas*. Cicero (*Ad Att.* 16.11.1) clearly had Lucilian vituperation in mind when he made the phrase *sine vallo Luciliano* parallel in meaning to *sine ulla contumelia* in discussing the composition of his Second Philippic.<sup>16</sup> Here, however, it is necessary to note first that Cicero refers to the *vallus Lucilianus* in discussing the composition of a speech; he is not thinking about Lucilian *satura* as a genre, nor is he attempting to characterize something as comprehensive as Lucilius' style. Instead, he refers to a single aspect of some of Lucilius' verse, and may in fact be alluding to a specific poem or poems in the Lucilian corpus. Next, *vallus* qualifies *Lucilianus* as much as the adjective colors the noun. It is the military metaphor in *vallus*, not *Lucilianus* per se, that points to the idea of vituperation or coarseness. It is one thing to say, therefore, that Lucilius was famed for ad hominem invective, quite another to argue that his reputation was based entirely on this, or that his name was a byword for vituperation. There is more to Lucilian poetry than invective. If we look at Cicero's other references to Lucilius, we find a poet very different from the one alluded to in the phrase *vallus Lucilianus*. Of the thirty-five passages in which the orator mentions or quotes Lucilius, the letter to Atticus cited above contains the only reference Cicero makes to the poet's *acerbitas*. Elsewhere he consistently characterizes Lucilius and his verse as *doctus*, *facetis*, *venustus*, *elegantissimus*,

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g., Cicero's discussion of the plain style at *Orat.* 76–90. Cf. Fiske, *Lucilius* 114–16 et passim.

<sup>16</sup> For the text see Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* VI 299. The phrase *vallus Lucilianus* may carry the notion of obscenity, but the important point is that Cicero here clearly is talking about emotionally charged invective, not good-humored ridicule.



and *perurbanus*, adjectives commonly associated with the plain style, and never used to describe scathing invective.<sup>17</sup>

For other instances of *Lucilianus* we must turn to later testimonia. At *Satyricon* 4 Petronius has the rhetorician Agamemnon say: *sed ne me putes improbasse schedium Lucilianae humilitatis*. Agamemnon then improvises a twenty-two-line *schedium*, presumably intended as an imitation or parody of Lucilian verse. Agamemnon's piece addresses the topic of rhetorical training and contains not the slightest hint of invective. *Humilitas*, moreover, is a term closely associated with the plain style,<sup>18</sup> while *schedium*, a word Lucilius apparently used self-mockingly to describe one of his poems or possibly his work as a whole (1279 M), aptly serves as a metaphor for that *neglegentia diligens* which Cicero argued was essential to the impression the plain style should create.<sup>19</sup> This evidence, then, flatly contradicts the image of Lucilius as an *acer* and *tristis* poet of scurrilous invective. Similarly, Porphyry, who draws upon a long exegetical tradition, refers in his gloss on Horace *Sermones* 1.3.40 to *urbanitas Luciliana*, a phrase hardly indicative of fierce polemic: *Luciliana urbanitate usus, in transitu amaritudinem aspersit*. His point is that the *urbanitas Luciliana* which Horace shows in the way he ridicules Balbinus (*Serm.* 1.3) distinguishes the proper type and manner of *sales* from scurrility and buffoonery. This is in perfect accord with the strictures Cicero outlines at *Orator* 87–90 regarding the type of humor appropriate to the plain style.<sup>20</sup>

The last piece of evidence comes from Ausonius, who states that he wrote *De Herediolo*, a poem on his small patrimony, in the style of Lucilius: *his versibus lusit Luciliano stilo*.<sup>21</sup> Here *lusit*, the noun form

<sup>17</sup> Cicero quotes Lucilius at *Orat.* 149, 161; *De Orat.* 2.253, 2.277 (= 421 M), 3.86, 3.171; *De Nat. Deor.* 1.63; *TD* 2.41, 4.48; *De Fin.* 1.9, 2.23, 2.24, 2.25; *De Re Publ.* (ap. Pliny *NH* praef. 7); *Ad Att.* 2.8.1, 6.3.7, 13.21.3, 13.49.2, 13.52.1; *Ad Fam.* 7.24.1. He paraphrases Lucilius at *De Fin.* 1.7, 5.92; *De Opt. Gen.* 17; *Ad Q. Fr.* 3.4.2; *Brut.* 274; *De Orat.* 1.72, 2.25; *TD* 3.31. He refers to Lucilius, without quoting from his work, at *Brut.* 99, 160, 172; *De Orat.* 2.284; *Acad.* 2.102; *Ad Fam.* 9.15.2; *Ad Att.* 16.11.1. For his characterization of Lucilius as *doctus*, *venustus*, *facetis*, and *perurbanus*, see esp. *De Orat.* 1.72 and 2.25; *De Fin.* 1.7 and 1.9. See Ogle, "Horace" 158, for his well-taken comments on Cicero's Lucilian testimonia.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., Cic. *Orat.* 100, 192, 197; Quint. 11.1.6.

<sup>19</sup> *Orat.* 78.

<sup>20</sup> For this important distinction see Rudd, "Libertas" 325–28, and Bramble, *Persius* 190–204.

<sup>21</sup> Prete, *Opuscula* 89. Classen, "Satire" 106, identifies Ausonius' use of the Greek tag γνῶθι σεαυτὸν in line 19 of *De Herediolo* as the most "Lucilian" feature in the poem.

of which Lucilius appears to have used in describing his own poetry (1039–40 M), certainly does not suggest polemic or invective, while Ausonius' poem itself contains no hint of vituperation. *De Herediolo* treats the busy but peaceful life of running an estate; its style is simple, its tone conversational. We could not have clearer evidence to show that in antiquity *Lucilianus* was not synonymous with "invective."

The question remains how Varro intended *Lucilianus* to qualify the meaning of *character*. There are four possibilities, though they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, that at *Res Rusticae* 3.2.17 Varro was not thinking in terms of the conventional stylistic types, but rather was pointing to the unique or particularly individual characteristics of Lucilius' verse. Second, that Varro coined *Lucilianus character* to serve as a periphrastic designation for the genre *satura*. Third, that Varro intended by this phrase to draw a distinction between Lucilian *satura* and other types of verse *satura*. And finally, that Varro meant by *Lucilianus character* "Lucilian style"—a style which, as we have seen, he describes elsewhere as a model of *gracilitas*.

The first possibility is unlikely. The idea that an idiosyncratic style defines the individuality or originality of an author is rare in ancient critical thinking, whereas the practice of taking individual writers as exemplars of certain stylistic types was a well-established convention.<sup>22</sup> Since we know from Gellius that Varro treated Lucilius as the exemplar in early Latin poetry of *gracilitas*, or the plain style, it follows that he judged and classified the style of Lucilius' verse in accordance with the conventional *characters* borrowed from the rhetorical tradition.

The second possibility is more problematic, since Lucilius' name itself was enough to bring to mind the genre he had made famous. *Satura* certainly was already recognized as a generic literary term in the

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The phrase *Luciliano stilo* suggests, however, a more substantial imitation of Lucilian style. Ausonius' reference (Prete 261) to the occurrence of *tmēsis* in Lucilius' poetry and another reference to a specific Lucilian poem (Prete 318) indicate that he had examined Lucilian style in some detail. It is interesting to note that Ausonius also refers to the doctrine of the three styles: *trinum dicendi genus est: sublime, modestum, / et tenui filo* (Prete 156).

<sup>22</sup>This is not to say that ancient critics never recognized an individualistic aspect in style. Dionysius (*On Lysias* 10) speaks, for example, of a special χάρις peculiar to Lysias' prose. This does not mean, however, that a Lysian style exists unto itself. Rather, Dionysius takes the Αυσίου χαρακτήρ as the best model of the plain style. The individuality of Lysias' style, in other words, lies in his excellence as an author in the plain style.

critical vocabulary of the time, as Varro's own treatise *De Compositione Saturarum* clearly shows. We should not, however, find anything odd in the term's absence from Varro's characterization of Abuccius' verse. Varro's readers would have understood immediately from *Lucilianus character* that Abuccius was the author of *saturae*. But this is not quite the same thing as saying that Varro used the phrase simply as a colorful sobriquet for the generic term. All the evidence indicates that Roman authors of the first century used the critical term *character* in a fairly limited sense, always closely associated with the doctrine of stylistic types. In contrast, the examples Wheeler gathered to demonstrate that Roman poets and critics often referred to poetry in nongeneric terms are, as he noted, deliberately vague and imprecise.<sup>23</sup> Lucilius' name was enough to identify the genre; that Varro chose to describe Abuccius' verse as being Lucilian in *character* suggests that he was thinking specifically about style as defined by the doctrine of the *genera dicendi*.

Next, there was no real need for Varro to distinguish Lucilian *satura* from some other type(s) of verse *satura*. It is true that Ennius had written four books of "satires" and his nephew Pacuvius also had composed *saturae*. Unfortunately, we know nothing about Pacuvian *satura* and next to nothing about Ennius' four books, and so have little to compare to the Lucilian fragments. But what is important is that in the first century the fame of Lucilius' *saturae* had completely eclipsed the embryonic *saturae* of Ennius and Pacuvius. Of these three poets Lucilius was the only one to limit his poetic production to a single genre, and it was he who definitively established verse *satura* as a genre in its own right. Horace, completely ignoring Ennius and Pacuvius, recognizes Lucilius as the *inventor* of the genre (*Serm.* 1.10.48), and acknowledges his own very substantial debt to his model in his *Sermones* (1.4.56, 1.10.48, 2.1.28–29, 2.1.34). He clearly implies at 1.10.46–47 that Varro of Atax and the other authors of *saturae* were, like himself, writing in the Lucilian tradition. When Quintilian later summarized the history of the genre (10.1.93–95), he recognized Lucilius as the first author to win fame for writing this type of poetry, while the names of Ennius and Pacuvius are conspicuously absent from his account. For all practical purposes, then, verse *satura* meant Lucilian *satura* to Varro's contemporaries; there was no need for him to distinguish one type of verse *satura* from another.

<sup>23</sup>See Wheeler, "Satura" 457–77.

We are left with the conclusion that Varro intended *Lucilianus character* to denote "Lucilian style." While this phrase naturally carried with it the generic idea of Lucilian *satura*, it referred specifically to the composite of diction, form, and subject matter which characterized Lucilius' thirty books as a whole. It is oversimplification to reduce the Lucilian *character* to any single element such as polemic. We have seen, moreover, that Varro considered Lucilius an excellent representative of the plain style in early Latin poetry. Cicero apparently concurred, and we find Fronto later expressing the same judgment.<sup>24</sup> The testimony we have examined from Petronius, Porphyry, and Ausonius confirms that such an understanding of Lucilius' verse was not rare or idiosyncratic in antiquity. Next, the incompatibility of the plain style with the emotive language of fierce polemic and vituperation was clearly recognized by every ancient writer. While the doctrine of literary *characteres* admitted considerable variation, as witnessed in two-style, three-style, and four-style formulae and in the idea of mixed styles, we find one point constant in all ancient critical writing: the plain and the grand styles stood at opposite poles to one another and could not be mixed.<sup>25</sup> This evidence, taken together, strongly argues for taking Varro's description of Abucius' *libelli* to mean that Abucius' verse was characterized not by bitter invective or censoriousness, but by a plain style.

Having brought together and reconciled two pieces of Varronian testimonia for Lucilius, we can now turn to the question of the significance of this evidence. Scholars have not only expressed surprise at Varro's characterization of Lucilius as a *gracilis* poet, but have even questioned his judgment.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, modern opinion has been quick to point out deficiencies and limitations in the doctrine of stylistic types as a critical method, especially when applied to poetry.<sup>27</sup> It is easy to imagine, of course, how mediocre schoolmasters in antiquity could have reduced this doctrine to a puerile classroom exercise. At the same

<sup>24</sup> Fronto, 113 N: *In poetis autem quis ignorat ut gracilis Lucilius, Albucius aridus, sublimis Lucretius*. . . . If *Albucius* should be emended to *Abucius*, as Warren ("On a Literary Judgment" xlii-xliii) and Bardon (*La littérature* I 335-36) have argued, then Fronto's testimony supports my argument: *aridus* clearly does not describe verse given to impassioned invective.

<sup>25</sup> See Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* 111.

<sup>26</sup> E.g., Baldwin, *Studies* 62-63; Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* 163.

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory* 467-68; Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric* 71.

time we can see in extant treatises that intelligent critics like Dionysius took the doctrine seriously and used it effectively and imaginatively in treating stylistic theory and in analyzing the prose or verse styles of individual authors. The fundamental distinctions between the grand style and the plain style were straightforward and useful. All ancient critics agreed that the emotionally charged language of invective was completely alien to the basic tenets of *gracilitas*. It is wrong, to be sure, to argue that any author wrote consistently within the limits of one literary *character*. But when the doctrine of stylistic types was employed in discussions of the style of an individual author, the critic's purpose clearly was to characterize that author's style as a whole, not to specify a single aspect or element in his work.<sup>28</sup> There apparently were scurrilous poems in the Lucilian corpus, but that corpus comprised thirty books of verse, and the surviving fragments, though they leave many other questions unanswered, strongly suggest that scurrility was not the glue holding Lucilius' *saturae* together.

As for Varro's judgment on Lucilian style, only one point matters here. However we may view Varro as a literary critic, there can be no question that he was perfectly competent to recognize full-blown invective for what it was when he saw it, and that he had a sound understanding of the doctrine of the *genera dicendi*. At the very least, then, his judgment on this specific issue regarding Lucilius' style deserves to be considered seriously and weighed together with the other ancient testimonia on Lucilius.

The view, long held both in handbooks and in more specialized studies on Roman satire, that Lucilius' reputation in the first century B.C.E. rested squarely on his invective verse, and that this, to quote Krenkel, "is what Lucilius' successors thought to be essential in Roman verse-satire: personal attack, bordering on libel, outspokenness and uncompromising boldness in subject-matter and language,"<sup>29</sup> needs to be reexamined. There is no question that Lucilius was famed for his *libertas*. But this statement must be qualified. First, *libertas* in the sense of "outspokenness" has a broad spectrum of meaning, ranging from humorous banter to *contumelia*.<sup>30</sup> When an ancient author

<sup>28</sup> When Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks of ὁ Ἀπολλωνίου χαρακτήρ at *On Lysias* 20 he subsumes under that phrase all the individual features of Lysias' style and treatment of subject matter which he has already discussed point by point in his essay.

<sup>29</sup> Krenkel, "Horace's Approach" 11.

<sup>30</sup> See note 20 above. At *De Orat.* 2.218 Cicero defines humor as being of two basic types: *cavillatio* and *dicacitas*. Here he distinguishes between two different kinds of

refers to Lucilius' *libertas* he is not necessarily pointing to vituperation or censoriousness.<sup>31</sup> Second, the testimonia show that Lucilius' reputation in the first century was a brilliant one, and that this reputation did not depend entirely or even chiefly on his invective verse. The poems were read in the schools and were the subject of public lectures, treatises, and commentaries.<sup>32</sup> New editions of the *saturae* continued to appear over the course of the first century.<sup>33</sup> Cicero, Asinius Pollio, and other orators quoted Lucilius in their speeches.<sup>34</sup> Men like Atticus had their favorite Lucilian lines.<sup>35</sup> There were Lucilian imitators, though we know the names only of a few. Gellius, relying on the testimony of Varro and Nepos, records that Lucilius' fame was greater, if anything, than that of other early Roman poets.<sup>36</sup> Authors who characterized Lucilius as a *gracilis* poet clearly did not consider invective a *sine qua non* of Lucilian *satura*. Others praised Lucilius' impressive learning.<sup>37</sup> Pliny (*NH* praef. 7) attests to his reputation for his literary criticism. Quintilian (10.1.93) notes Lucilius' fame as the author who established a new poetic genre at Rome. Even Horace, who chose to exaggerate the in-

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verbal *libertas*. One overflows with *hilaritas, festivitas, iocus*, and *ludus*; the other is barbed with the *aculei contumeliarum*. Since Cicero argues (*De Orat.* 2.236) that the proper province of the laughable is *turpitude* and *deformitas quaedam*, both types of humor enjoy a freedom from the inhibitions social conventions normally place upon speech. Cf. Quint. 6.3.6–8.

<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., Quintilian's remarks on Lucilius at 10.1.94: *Nam eruditio in eo mira et libertas atque inde acerbitas et abunde salis*. Here *libertas* clearly includes humor (*salis*) as well as sharp vituperation (*acerbitas*).

<sup>32</sup> Suetonius (*De Gramm.* 2) records that two *familiares* of Lucilius, Vettius Philocomus and Laelius Archelaus, gave public lectures on the *saturae* sometime after poet's death in 102, and that Valerius Cato and Pompeius Lenaeus later boasted of their study of Lucilius' work under these two men respectively. He also notes (*De Gramm.* 14) that Curtius Nicias wrote a treatise, *De Lucilio*, which was praised by Santra.

<sup>33</sup> Vettius Philocomus and Laelius Archelaus may have produced the first post-humous edition of Lucilius' *saturae*. The so-called *Anecdoton Parisinum* (see Bonner, "Anecdoton Parisinum") indicates that one or more annotated editions of the poems existed early in the first century B.C.E. From the eight spurious lines prefixed to Horace's *Serm.* 1.10 we know that Valerius Cato produced a new edition of the *saturae* later in the century.

<sup>34</sup> See Quint. 1.8.11.

<sup>35</sup> See *Ad Att.* 6.3.7.

<sup>36</sup> 17.21.49: *Q. Ennius et iuxta Caecilius et Terentius et subinde et Pacuvius et Pacuvio iam sene Accius clariorque tunc in poematis eorum obtrectandis Lucilius fuit*. Cf. Vell. 2.9.4: *celebre et Lucilii nomen fuit*.

<sup>37</sup> See Cic. *De Orat.* 1.72; Quint. 10.1.94. Gellius (18.5.8) described Lucilius as *vir adprime linguae Latinae sciens*. The fourth-century grammarian Diomedes recognized Lucilius as an authority on Attic customs (see Keil, *Grammatici* I 487).

vective element in Lucilian *satura* for his own programmatic purposes in his literary *Sermones* (1.4, 1.10, 2.1), acknowledges that there was a great deal more to Lucilius than vituperation and censoriousness.<sup>38</sup> His own debt to Lucilius was substantial, as ancient commentators recognized.<sup>39</sup> Horace tells us, furthermore, that even in his criticism Lucilius did not always assume a polemic posture, but often voiced his objections in a good-humored and unassuming manner.<sup>40</sup> The fragments of the *saturae* confirm that the poems ranged over a remarkably diverse field of topics and that the Lucilian persona correspondingly had many different voices.

Long before Lucilius began writing there already existed a well-established Greek tradition of invective verse. Fescennine verse attests to a native invective tradition in Italy. There was nothing novel in Lucilius' use of invective; his great achievement was the creation of a new poetic genre. The freedom inherent in this new form allowed him to cast conversational Latin into verse—the *bons mots* of a Scipio, the argot of the uncultured, the repartee of a Granius, his own opinions on a wide range of topics. He did so in a *sermo* style unfettered by the formal and stylistic restraints imposed upon Roman authors who imitated Greek models. The diverse cast of characters in the *saturae* necessitated at times the inclusion of language and diction which violated *Latinitas* and of which a Scipio would not have approved. Nor, we may be sure, did Lucilius. His parody of the language of Roman epic, tragedy, and comedy, and of the *sermo* of his contemporaries, shows a sophisticated sensitivity to language. He clearly was familiar with Hellenistic literary theory.<sup>41</sup> The many fragments which treat literary critical issues consistently show a concern with the idea of *Latinitas* and the basic tenets of *gracilitas*.<sup>42</sup> This evidence from the fragments, taken as a whole, bears out the testimonia we have examined which characterize Lucilius as a *gracilis* poet. To argue, on the other hand, that Lucilius understood and approved the tenets of the plain style, but at the same time frequently

<sup>38</sup>He describes Lucilius as *facetis* and *emunctae naris* at *Serm.* 1.4.7–8; *comis* at *Serm.* 1.10.53 and 65; *urbanus* and *limator* at *Serm.* 1.10.55; *sapiens* at *Serm.* 2.1.17. The phrase *Lucili ritu* at *Serm.* 2.1.28–29 refers loosely to Lucilian style without any explicit or implicit reference to invective.

<sup>39</sup>In Porphyry's commentary on Horace, for example, there are twenty references to Lucilius.

<sup>40</sup>At *Serm.* 1.10.55 Horace depicts Lucilius as a rather modest critic of Ennius' and Pacuvius' verse: *cum de se loquitur non ut maiore reprehens.*

<sup>41</sup>See, e.g., his discussion of *poema* and *poesis* (338–347 M).

<sup>42</sup>See Fiske, *Lucilius* 64–142 for his discussion of this evidence.



violated the basic principles of *gracilitas* because he was swept along by his "Rabelaisian spirit" or pugnacious temperament, is an egregious example of the biographical fallacy.<sup>43</sup> We know very little about Lucilius the man. We cannot, moreover, confidently identify the speaker in many of the fragments, and consequently do not know when Lucilius is speaking *in propria persona* and when the speaker of a line is instead one of the many characters who figure in the *saturae*. Add to this that we owe most of the surviving fragments to the fourth-century grammarian Nonius Marcellus, who in his search for rare and unusual vocabulary for his *De Compendiosa Doctrina* is probably not giving us a representative sampling of Lucilian poetry. To draw conclusions about Lucilius' temperament on the basis of this evidence is a risky business.

In one instance, as we have seen, Varro's critical appraisal of Lucilius has been misinterpreted; in general, his testimony on the second-century poet has received little serious attention. One may, of course, take issue with Varro on some of the finer points of literary criticism, but the important question raised here—to what extent did virulent vituperation inform Lucilian *satura*—is perfectly straightforward and does not hinge upon any subtlety in interpretative skills or in sensibility. There is no *prima facie* reason to doubt Varro's judgment on this issue. He enjoyed, after all, an advantage denied the modern scholar: he had the whole Lucilian corpus at hand. He clearly knew the poems well, as the sixteen quotations from Lucilius in the surviving books of his *De Lingua Latina* attest. He was the author of a treatise, *De Compositione Saturarum*, devoted to this new genre, and wrote four books of verse *satura* himself. His characterization of Lucilius as a *gracilis* poet, moreover, is supported by other ancient authors. In attempting to answer some of the questions that remain concerning the nature of Lucilian *satura*, the early history of the genre, and Lucilius' reputation in the first century and his influence on later Latin literature, we cannot afford to ignore Varro's testimony.<sup>44</sup>

JOHN SVARLIEN

TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY

<sup>43</sup>For this argument see Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* 117; also Fiske, *Lucilius* 94.

<sup>44</sup>A version of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of CAMWS in 1989. For their criticisms and suggestions I thank M. Gwyn Morgan and the referee of this journal. Centre College of Kentucky aided the completion of this work with a summer grant.

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GREX SCIPIONIS IN DE AMICITIA:  
A REPLY TO GARY FORSYTHE

Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis: num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. . . . Quin ipso equo, cujus modo mentionem feci, si nulla res impediatur, nemo est, qui non eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur, quam intractato et novo: . . . Sed maximum est in amicitia, superiorem parem esse inferiori: saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege.

—*De Amicitia* 67–69

In a note which appeared in this journal (112 [1991] 363–64) Gary Forsythe argued that the traditional interpretation of *grege* at *De Amicitia* 69, which scholars had used as the basis for the existence of the supposed Scipionic circle, was wrong. He cited the horse comparison in 67 as the source for *grege* in 69 and stated that in this instance the *grex* simply referred to “the common herd of Roman politicians.” In his view, the clause *ut ita dicam* made clear the extension of the horse metaphor and proved that *grex* did not refer to a group of people. He also cited a similar use of *ut ita dicam* in chapter 55 of *De Amicitia* in support of his contention.

At first glance Forsythe’s argument seems convincing, and there is no question that it is difficult to assert from this passage the existence of “a coterie of philhellenic *literati*” (Forsythe, 363). However, he argues that *grege* has to be understood from context, and when the full context is analyzed, his reading of *grege* cannot be supported, either.

There is one obvious point which Forsythe fails to address: the presence of the word *nostro* modifying *grege*. This is crucial to our understanding of the passage. There is no compelling reason for Laelius to include himself in the “common herd.” *Nostro* would limit the membership in the group, to some extent. It is one thing to praise Scipio, quite another, and quite un-Roman, to belittle oneself.

That, in turn, clarifies the presence of *ut ita dicam*. As OLD notes, this phrase often communicates a sense of faint apology, as one might expect in this context.<sup>1</sup> *Grege* is seldom used in a complimentary sense in

<sup>1</sup> OLD s.v. *ita* 8d. This sense of apology also explains the use of *ut ita dicam* at *De Amicitia* 69, which Forsythe attempts to use in defense of his reading, wrongly, I believe.

Cicero; far more often he employs the word as an insult.<sup>2</sup> Forsythe is probably right that the word was chosen because of the horse comparison in 67, but *ut ita dicam* indicates that Laelius/Cicero felt the term needed justification.

If these were the only objections, Forsythe's interpretation might be allowed to stand. However, context provides a far more serious challenge to his reading. The passage does not end at *nostro . . . grege*. Laelius goes on to name four specific individuals whom Scipio had benefited, by polite treatment or good wishes: L. Furius Philus, *cos.* 136 B.C., who visited Scipio's home shortly before Scipio's death (*De Amic.* 14); P. Rupilius Rufus, whom Scipio had helped to reach the consulship in 132 B.C. (*De Amic.* 73); Spurius Mummius; and Scipio's brother Q. Maximus. Three of the four, at least, enjoyed close connections to Scipio, connections which were emphasized in the text itself, and would far exceed those of the "common herd" of Roman politicians. Moreover, Rufus, Mummius, and Philus all reappear at 101 in the same work, where they share, along with Scipio and Laelius, *benevolentia* in common.

The first sentence in chapter 70 confirms the close relationship between these men and mortally wounds Forsythe's basic contention that *grege* can be dismissed as the "common herd":

Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut si quam praestantiam virtutis ingeni fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis.

Obviously, Scipio's example of goodwill and benefaction extends only to those who are close to the great man, the *suis* and the *proximis*, not the common run of politicians and friends. The passage from 69–70 indicates treatment for a prescribed group, an inner circle of friends, not the ordinary flock, either of Roman aristocrats or any other group. In context, *grege* must refer to a specific set of individuals, and hence the notion of a Scipionic circle cannot be dismissed so easily.

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In 55, Laelius compares friends to the *supellictem* of life. Forsythe claims that *ut ita dicam* underscores the metaphor of *supellex*: this would be a singularly artless move on Cicero's part. What else, after all, could *supellex* be except for a metaphor? The function of *ut ita dicam*, then, would be to mitigate the harshness, or unfamiliarity of the metaphor, borrowed from the Greek *ktēma*. Cf. Powell, *Laelius, On Friendship, and The Dream of Scipio* 105.

<sup>2</sup>E.g., *Cat.* 2.10, 2.23; *De Domo Sua* 24; *Sest.* 112; *Phil.* 8.26, 12.26, 13.10; *Pis.* 22.

However, the question of the nature of that circle remains. While clearly not the "common herd," does *grex* here indicate a group of *literati*? Certainly there is danger of exaggeration. But just as this passage cannot properly be used to demonstrate the existence of a full-blown circle of learned Graecophiles, it cannot argue the idea out of existence. Close friendship existed between these men: literature and learning were common interests. Perhaps the best approach is Powell's balanced judgment in the introduction to his *De Amicitia* (p. 11), in which he recognizes the danger of claiming too much for the Scipionic circle but acknowledges that a number of Greek and Roman literary figures benefited from Scipio's patronage and would, presumably, have been known and admired by Scipio's group of close friends, the *grege* of chapter 69.

JOSEPH P. WILSON

UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON

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## THE PRIESTHOOD OF APULEIUS

Apuleius has long been of central importance to the study of religion in the Roman empire. His writings provide some of the richest and most personal evidence we possess for a number of important religious trends: his discussion of magic in his *Apology*, his short treatise on *daimones* in *De Deo Socratis*, and above all his description of the cult of Isis in his *Metamorphoses*. As a consequence, Apuleius himself is often given a paradigmatic role in discussions of religion in the second century C.E.<sup>1</sup> But these discussions rarely take into account one of the few facts about his life that is well established. Apuleius held an important public priesthood in Carthage, which he mentions in one of the longer selections in his *Florida*, and which on the evidence of Augustine has usually been identified as the provincial priesthood of the imperial cult.<sup>2</sup> Previous scholars of religion have paid relatively little attention to this fact, I think, because of a general assumption that although this office may tell us something about Apuleius' economic and social position, it does not shed much light on his religious interests. In this essay I argue that the identification of this priesthood is not as secure as most people have thought, and that Apuleius may in fact have been a priest in another cult altogether, one to which true religious significance may more readily be conceded. I further suggest that even if the traditional identification is correct, the religious significance of the priesthood should not be dismissed.

### I

The generally accepted identification of this priesthood rests on the following evidence. Apuleius mentions an important public priest-

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Nock, *Conversion* 138–55; Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* 72–77; Beaujeu, “Les dieux”; and Martin, *Hellenistic Religions* 16–29; all but Beaujeu focus on the *Metamorphoses*. Citations to *Florida* and *Apology* refer to the text and numbering in Vallette's edition of 1924.

<sup>2</sup>Thorough accounts of Apuleius' life are given by Schwabe, 246–48; by Butler and Owen in their introduction, vii–xix; and by Vallette in his introduction, v–xiii. All three agree that he was a provincial priest, and are followed by the entries in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*<sup>2</sup> and *Der Kleine Pauly*.

hood, without identifying it, in a speech he delivered in order to thank the Carthaginians for the honor of a public statue. This statue had been erected at personal expense by his friend Aemilianus Strabo, who had requested a public site for that purpose.<sup>3</sup> Strabo included a number of arguments in support of his proposal, citing his own friendship with Apuleius and noting that similar honors had been decreed to him in other cities. His final point, according to Apuleius, was that *argumento suscepti sacerdotii summum mihi honorem Carthaginis adesse* (*Flor.* 16.38). Presumably the identity of this priesthood was familiar to his audience, because Apuleius says nothing more about it. More specific information is provided by Augustine when he describes Apuleius as a man *qui sacerdos provinciae pro magno fuit, ut munera ederet venatoresque vestiret et pro statua sibi apud Oeenses locanda, ex qua civitate habebat uxorem, adversus contradictionem quorundam civium litigaret* (*Ep.* 138.19). It has naturally been assumed that this was the priesthood to which Apuleius himself referred in the *Florida* passage. The provincial priesthood of the imperial cult was indeed a high honor, the highest honor, in fact, that a provincial Roman could obtain without embarking upon the equestrian or senatorial *cursus honorum*. Moreover, the association of the priesthood with public statues by both Apuleius and Augustine is suggestive, for provincial priests were characteristically celebrated in this way. The regulations of the provincial cult of Narbonensis include detailed provisions for the erection of such statues in honor of the chief priests after their year in office.<sup>4</sup> As a result of this evidence, it has been generally accepted that Apuleius was at some point in his career the *sacerdos provinciae Africae*.

Despite its apparent cogency, this argument contains a number of weak points. Since the critical and seemingly decisive evidence is that of Augustine, a digression into the *Nachleben* of Apuleius is necessary in order to evaluate it fully.<sup>5</sup> Augustine, after all, was born almost two centuries after the death of Apuleius, and so it is reasonable to ask how much he actually knew about the earlier writer. The earliest reference to Apuleius in the extant writings of Augustine is in *Epistle* 102, proba-

<sup>3</sup> Apuleius describes him as *vir consularis, brevi votis omnium futurus proconsul* (*Flor.* 16.40); according to the *Acta Arvalium* (*CIL* VI 2086.67), he was suffect consul in 156 C.E.

<sup>4</sup> *CIL* XII 6038 = *ILS* 6964, 9–13; cf. Fishwick, *Imperial Cult* I.1 135–36.

<sup>5</sup> The references to Apuleius in Augustine are collected and discussed by Hagendahl, *Augustine* I 17–28, II 680–89, who notes that Apuleius is cited by Augustine more than by any other postclassical author; on the perception of Apuleius in late antiquity see also Moreschini, "Fama di Apuleio."

bly written in 408/9 C.E. This letter is in fact a short treatise, written at the request of a friend, in which Augustine replies to six of the criticisms raised by a pagan opponent of Christianity. The last of these concerned the prophet Jonah: how could anyone believe that he really spent three days in the belly of a whale? In the course of his response, Augustine notes that if a similar story were told about Apuleius Madaurensis or Apollonius Tyaneus, whom pagans praise as *magi vel philosophi*, their response would be not laughter but pride.<sup>6</sup> This comment indicates that the popular image of Apuleius at the time had much in common with that of Apollonius. The pair appear again in the exchange of letters that led ultimately to the writing of *The City of God*. Flavius Marcellinus, an imperial commissioner in Carthage and a Christian, was so impressed with a letter Augustine had written, refuting certain charges of the pagans, that he asked for a more full exposition. In particular, he wanted to know what Augustine would reply to those who said that Apollonius and Apuleius *aliique magicæ artis homines* had performed as great if not greater miracles than Jesus.<sup>7</sup>

This repeated association of Apuleius with Apollonius should serve as a warning sign, since the latter provides such a clear example of how legendary material could build up around a historical figure. Apollonius lived in the first century C.E. and was apparently very interested in the Pythagoreanism of his day, just as Apuleius was interested in the Platonism of his own time.<sup>8</sup> It is difficult to say a great deal more about the historical Apollonius, however, because after his death he became the subject of a number of stories elaborated by both admirers and detractors. By the early third century, when Philostratus wrote his account of Apollonius for Julia Domna, he was known not only as a sage but also as a wonder worker who could understand the languages of

<sup>6</sup>Ep. 102.32: *Et tamen si hoc, quod de Iona scriptum est, Apuleius Madaurensis vel Apollonius Tyaneus fecisse diceretur, quorum multa mira nullo fideli auctore iactitant . . . , si de istis, ut dixi, quos magos vel philosophos laudabiliter nominant, tale aliquid narraretur, non iam in buccis creparet risus, sed typhus.* For the date of the epistle see Brown, *Augustine* 186; the pagan opponent may have been Porphyry (Wilken, *Christians* 143).

<sup>7</sup>Ep. 136.1: *Sed tamen etiam ego in hac parte, quia plurimis, quicquid rescripseris, profuturum esse confido, precator accesserim, ut ad ea vigilantius respondere digneris, in quibus nihil amplius dominum, quam alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse mentiuntur, Apollonium si quidem suum nobis et Apuleium aliosque magicæ artis homines in medium proferunt, quorum maiora contendunt extitisse miracula.* This series of letters is treated in detail by Moreau, "Le dossier Marcellinus" 49–77.

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., Philostr. *VApoll.* 1.7, 1.32, 6.11. Iamblichus (*VPyth.* 254) cites Apollonius as a source for the life of Pythagoras.

animals and predict the future. He was furthermore thought to have ascended bodily into heaven and then to have reappeared on earth in order to reassure his followers of the afterlife. It was because of the miracles attributed to him that Apollonius was taken up by pagan writers who were looking for a figure to set against Jesus. In particular, Sossianus Hierocles, a leading figure in the administration of Diocletian and an alleged instigator of the Great Persecution, wrote a tract in which he used Philostratus' work to show that Apollonius had displayed just as many signs of divinity as Jesus. This work drew responses both from Eusebius of Caesarea, who devoted a whole treatise to its refutation, and from Lactantius, who included his comments in his *Divine Institutes*. Among other remarks, Lactantius expresses surprise that Hierocles passes over Apuleius, *cuius solent et multa et mira memorari*.<sup>9</sup> This is the earliest extant reference to Apuleius, and it suggests that already by the reign of Diocletian he was widely identified as a wonder worker similar to Apollonius.

By the late fourth century there was certainly a fair amount of interest in Apuleius. He is mentioned by several writers, and appears on the *contorniates*, medallions given away in Rome as part of the New Year's festivities.<sup>10</sup> But none of this indicates any actual knowledge about his life. Most later writers refer to him simply as the author of *Metamorphoses* and *Apology*, and these texts, far from countering the popular perception of Apuleius as a magician, actually encouraged it. *Apology* is of course a defense against an accusation of magic, a charge

<sup>9</sup>*Div. Inst.* 5.3.7; cf. 5.3.21. On Apollonius see Smith, *Jesus the Magician* 84–91, and, most recently, Dzielska, *Apollonius*. On his role in anti-Christian polemic see also de Labriolle, *La réaction* 309–15; and on Hierocles see Speyer, "Sossianus Hierocles."

<sup>10</sup>Writers: *SHA Alb.* 12.12; Auson. *Cent. Nupt.* epilogue; Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* 1.2.8; Sid. *Apol. Ep.* 2.11.5 (where Pudentilla and Apuleius are cited as a classical example of a married couple!) and *Ep.* 4.3.1. More interesting is Jerome, *Tractatus in Psalm.* 81.8: *Non est autem grande facere signa. Nam fecerunt signa et in Aegypto magi contra Moysen. Fecit et Apollonius, fecit et Apuleius: et infinita signa fecerunt.* Contorniates: Alföldi, *Die Kontorniaten*, cat. no. 109, with plate 37.12, and cf. II 101–2. A. Alföldi (II 53–55) argued that both Apollonius and Apuleius were used by the pagan aristocracy of Rome in their fight against Christianity, a position which is apparently supported by the refutation of Augustine; see in general Bloch, "The Pagan Revival." The whole notion of a "pagan opposition," however, has been seriously challenged by Cameron, "Paganism and Literature." It is perhaps more likely that Augustine and his friends were concerned with attacks by earlier critics, such as Porphyry; that his work against the Christians continued to be of concern is indicated in that it was burnt by imperial decree as late as 448 C.E. (*Cod. Just.* 1.1.3).

which was traditionally supposed to have been made by enemies against Apollonius as well. Likewise, there has always been a tendency to identify Apuleius with the hero of his novel, who was clearly a dabbler in the magic arts. By the time of Augustine, then, the available information about Apuleius was probably not much more historically accurate than that which Philostratus provides about Apollonius.

But we should perhaps expect something more from Augustine, who was not only a highly educated rhetorician but also a fellow African. Although he followed the general tendency to identify Apuleius with Lucius, the hero of the *Metamorphoses*, he was more cautious in assuming that the writer was actually telling the truth.<sup>11</sup> Certainly in his response to Marcellinus' question about the comparison of Apuleius with Christ, he casts doubts on Apuleius' alleged magic powers by presenting what we would consider a more reliable historical account. Since this is the critical passage, it is worth quoting in full.

Who would think it worthy even of mockery, the fact that they try to compare Apollonius and Apuleius and other adepts of the magic arts with Christ, or even prefer them to Him? . . . For Apuleius (to speak in particular about him, who as an African is more familiar to us Africans) with all his magic arts was unable to attain, I would not say to a kingdom, but not even to any judicial office in the state, although he was of respectable birth in his hometown and was liberally educated and endowed with great eloquence. Perhaps as a philosopher he intentionally looked down on such things? The same man who made such a fuss as provincial priest, so that he could sponsor games and outfit *venatores*, and take to court certain citizens opposed to the erection of his statue in Oea, the hometown of his wife? He even handed down to posterity a written version of the speech he delivered in that case, so that it would not be hidden from them. Therefore, in regards to success in this world, that man was indeed a magician, as far as he was able. And from this it is apparent that he never achieved a greater position, not because he was unwilling, but because he was unable.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Note CD 18.18: *Apuleius in libris, quos Asini Aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi accidisse, ut accepto veneno humano animo permanente asinus fieret, aut indicavit aut finxit.*

<sup>12</sup>Ep. 138: (18) *Quis autem vel risu dignum putet, quod Apollonium et Apuleium ceterosque magicarum artium peritissimos conferre Christo vel etiam praeferre conantur? . . . (19) Apuleius enim, ut de illo potissimum loquamur, qui nobis Afris Afer est notior, non dico ad regnum sed ne ad aliquam quidem iudiciariam rei publicae potestatem cum omnibus suis magicis artibus potuit pervenire, honesto patriae suae loco natus et*

Augustine then goes on to point out that David, in gaining a kingdom, was much more successful than Apuleius even without the help of magic: this being the case, it is even more absurd to compare Apuleius with Christ.

Augustine makes his case well, but where did he get his information about the career of Apuleius? It is certainly possible that he had access to information not available to us. For one thing, he grew up in Thagaste, some fifteen miles from Apuleius' hometown of Madauros, and actually studied in that town before being sent to Carthage (*Conf.* 2.3). It is possible that his teachers there fondly preserved the memory of their great fellow citizen and spoke of him to their students. There may even have been public monuments to Apuleius in Madauros, for a fragmentary inscription records the dedication of a statue to a *philosophus Platonicus* whose name is unfortunately lost.<sup>13</sup> Likewise, we know that Apuleius published a number of works that are no longer extant, but which Augustine may have read; the speech concerning his statue in Oea was perhaps one of these. Apart from that one citation, however, Augustine mentions only the extant writings of Apuleius: *De Mundo* (CD 4.2), *Apology* (CD 8.19), *Metamorphoses* (CD 18.18), and above all *De Deo Socratis*, which he used as his major source for the Neoplatonic teaching on demons.<sup>14</sup> More importantly, he provides little information about Apuleius that cannot be extracted from these writings. Apuleius himself describes his family background in *Apology* (24.9), and his edu-

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*liberaliter educatus magnaue praeditus eloquentia. An forte ista, ut philosophus, voluntate contempsit, qui sacerdos provinciae pro magno fuit, ut munera ederet, venatoresque vestiret, et pro statua sibi apud Oeenses locanda, ex qua civitate habebat uxorem, adversus contradictionem quorundam civium litigaret? Quod posteros ne lateret, eiusdem litis orationem scriptam memoriae commendavit. Quod ergo ad istam terrenam pertinet felicitatem, fuit magus ille, quod potuit. Unde apparet nihil eum amplius fuisse, non quia noluit, sed quia non potuit.*

<sup>13</sup>ILAlg I 2115: [Ph]ilosopho [Pl]atonico [Ma]daurenses cives ornament[o] suo d(ecreto) d(ecurionum) p(ecunia) p(ublica). The top of the inscription is missing.

<sup>14</sup>CD 8.14–18, 9.3–13. It is not surprising that Apuleius was such a major source for Augustine, since the latter's lack of fluency in Greek no doubt prevented him from reading the major Neoplatonists to any great extent: see Brown, *Augustine* 36, 271–73. Augustine introduces Apuleius in the company of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry as a *Platonicus nobilis*, learned in both Greek and Latin (CD 8.12), and describes him throughout as *Platonicus*.



cation and eloquence were of course apparent from his work in general.<sup>15</sup>

Other than the identity of Apuleius' priesthood, the only information supplied by Augustine that cannot with certainty be found in the extant works of Apuleius is that he was a native of Madauros (CD 8.14, *Ep.* 102.32). In his extant writings, Apuleius makes no clear statement of this, although the reference to Lucius as a *Madaurensis* near the end of the *Metamorphoses* (11.27) has often been taken as an autobiographical slip on the part of the author. Apart from that, there is only the description of Apuleius as *philosophus Platonicus Madaurensis* in the spurious *Peri Hermēneias* (4).<sup>16</sup> But that Apuleius was a native of Madauros was common knowledge among the educated of Augustine's day. Such local epithets as *Madaurensis* were commonly given to famous figures, and that this was true in the case of Apuleius is proved by the manuscript tradition of his works. The sole tradition we possess for *Metamorphoses*, *Apology*, and *Florida* is Laurentiana 68.2, copied at Montecassino in the latter part of the eleventh century. The subscriptions copied by the scribe at that time indicate that the archetype of this copy was "emended" by a certain Sallustius in the late fourth century. The author is described in these subscriptions as *Apuleius Platonicus Madaurensis*, and this title was almost certainly already present in the copy that Sallustius worked on, rather than an addition of his own.<sup>17</sup> If

<sup>15</sup>In this respect Augustine follows the general pattern for the biographies of ancient writers, which derive in large part either from the actual works of an author or from jokes and casual comments in other literary texts; see in general Lefkowitz, *Lives*.

<sup>16</sup>Although Apuleius does not explicitly name his hometown, he provides information that confirms the latter evidence. He describes himself as *seminumida et semigaetulus* and says that his *patria* was on the border of Numidia and Gaetulia (*Apol.* 24.1); he goes on to say that it was originally in the territory of Syphax, then transferred by the Romans to Masinissa, and was finally made a veteran colony (*Apol.* 24.7–8). This description certainly fits Madauros, which was a Flavian veteran colony (Gascou, "La politique municipale" 163).

<sup>17</sup>For Sallustius see the subscription to *Met.* 9: *Ego Sallustius legi et emendavi Romae felix, Olibrio et Probino v.c. cons. [i.e., 395 C.E.] in foro Martis controversiam declamans oratori Edelchio. Rursus Constantinopoli recognovi Caesario et Attico cons. [397 C.E.]. Emendare* in this context means simply to note variant readings and other information in a preexisting manuscript as a tool for private study (Zetzel, "Subscriptions"). Zetzel informs me that the layout of the subscriptions to the text of Apuleius strongly suggests that the name given to Apuleius existed in the form we have it prior to the activity of Sallustius.

this local epithet existed in one fourth-century manuscript, it may have existed in others as well, including the one used by Augustine. But even if not, it shows that the *patria* of Apuleius was common information among the literate, as it was for the pseudonymous author of *Peri Hermēneias*. A fortiori, we would expect it to be known to a fellow African such as Augustine.

In general, then, there is no strong reason to think that Augustine knew much more about Apuleius than we do, apart from such basic facts as his place of birth. We may thus wonder whether he had explicit testimony for the provincial priesthood, or was simply making an inference from something like the *Florida* passage cited above. It would have been easy enough for him, when reading about an important priesthood, to identify it as the provincial priesthood of the imperial cult. While other important pagan priesthoods seem to have died out in the fourth century, that was not true of imperial priesthoods. In fact, during Augustine's youth a proconsul of Africa had taken steps to revive interest in the provincial priesthood, so that it was again eagerly sought by candidates (*ILS* 1256).<sup>18</sup> It is thus possible that Augustine could have identified Apuleius' priesthood as that of the provincial imperial cult without even being aware that he was making an inference.<sup>19</sup> The details (*munera ederet, venatoresque vestiret*) might seem to suggest that he was drawing on a fuller source of information than any we now possess, but this is not necessarily the case, since he could easily have attributed to Apuleius actions he thought typical of a provincial priest.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Note also that the *concilium provinciae Africae* is explicitly attested as late as 329 C.E. (*Cod. Theod.* 11.30.15) and implicitly in 355 (*Cod. Theod.* 12.12.1). In Tripolitania, L. Aemilius Quintus is described as *sacerdotalis provinciae* in an inscription erected under the usurper Maximus in 383–88 (*ILS* 787; cf. *IRT* 111 and 588). Two other fourth-century *sacerdotes provinciae Tripolitaniae* are known (*IRT* 567–68 and 578), and the provincial *concilium* was still meeting annually in 364 or 365 (*Amm. Marc.* 28.6.7–9).

<sup>19</sup>That Augustine deduced the provincial priesthood of Apuleius from the *Florida* passage has already been suggested by Barnes, *Tertullian* 256–57. E. Alföldi–Rosenbaum (*Kontorniaten* II 102 n. 3) suggests that the crown worn by Apuleius in the contorniates is priestly and should thus be connected with the provincial priesthood; this seems improbable, as all the other portraits of literary figures are simply *Porträtfiktionen* with little historical basis.

<sup>20</sup>Whether he was correct in this assumption is another matter. In the Greek East, for example, the giving of games was often a liturgy separate from that of the priesthood, and was the job of a different official, the *agonothetē*. Robert, "Vision," has argued that at a slightly later date games organized on the Greek model were in fact given in Carthage, but see the criticisms in Aronen, "Pythia Carthaginis." On the other hand, Fishwick

The only problematic detail is his reference to the speech against the Oeans, which he is unlikely to have supplied from his own imagination. The circumstances behind this reference, however, are very obscure. While it is true that provincial priests were often honored with statues, official statues would be erected in Carthage, the center of the cult. There is no reason why the Oeans should have been obliged to erect such a statue, especially if, as most people agree, Apuleius was at the time a resident of Carthage. It is more likely that the speech was connected with some dispute that occurred during Apuleius' stormy stay in Oea, and that Augustine, who had no doubt read it many years before, was simply mistaken about its context. He may in fact never have known its full context. Since by this time the selection of passages that we know as *Florida* had already been made, it is quite possible that Augustine knew the speech concerning the statue in Oea only from selections preserved in a similar florilegium. In general, then, it is not too difficult to imagine that Augustine, for the purposes of refuting the comparison of Apuleius with Christ, drew on what he knew of Apuleius' career in order to make an effective point, without bothering to confirm the details.

## II

While Augustine's evidence for the priesthood of Apuleius cannot simply be discounted, it is not as decisive as it appears at first sight. Although he may well have known for a fact that Apuleius was the provincial priest, he may also simply have inferred it from his writings. It is thus important to consider in more detail other types of evidence. We might begin by noting the anomaly in Apuleius' assumption of the priesthood. Most of the men who attained the provincial priesthood had long local careers, ascending through the municipal *cursus honorum* of their hometowns; for them, the provincial priesthood was the crown of their career. In Gaul, the *tituli* attached to the honorific statues of the former provincial priests almost always include the phrase *omnibus honoribus apud suos functus* (Fishwick, *Imperial Cult* I.1 135; cf. Larsen, *Representative Government* 135–38). Although this phrase does not appear in the African inscriptions, the pattern of careers is similar. Of the

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(*Imperial Cult* II.1 579–80) believes that in the West, at least, the games of the provincial cult were the responsibility of the provincial priest.

fourteen provincial priests attested in inscriptions, seven had local careers; three others were *equites* (Duncan-Jones, "Chronology"; Illuminati, "Considerazioni"). Apuleius does not fit this pattern at all, although he came from an eminent family of Madauros. His father held all the local magistracies and capped his career with the duovirate. He left a large sum of money to his son, but apparently not his political ambition. Apuleius was probably coopted into the *ordo* as a *praetextatus* at an early age, but does not mention ever holding any public office.<sup>21</sup> Nor did his career allow much time to pursue a local *cursus honorum*. On his own evidence he went to Carthage for further education while still a boy (*Flor.* 18.15), and from there to Athens. He visited various parts of the empire, including Rome, and was on his way to Alexandria when he stopped in Oea (*Apol.* 72.1). While staying there he married the mother of an old school friend and, in doing so, laid himself open to a charge of magic. The case was tried in Sabratha under the proconsul Claudius Maximus in 158/59. In his defense Apuleius makes no mention of any magistracies, which he may well have cited as an indication of his respectability. By 163 he was in Carthage.<sup>22</sup> If Apuleius was in fact the provincial priest of Africa, he must have gained that position over the heads of more diligent if less talented competitors.<sup>23</sup>

There is a further and more important consideration. As I noted above, the speech in which Apuleius mentions his priesthood was given

<sup>21</sup>The evidence for Apuleius' family comes from *Apology* 24.9: in [*hac*] *colonia patrem habui loco principis duumviralem cunctis honoribus perfunctum; cuius ego locum in illa re publica, exinde ut participare curiam coepi, nequaquam degener pari, spero, honore et existimatione tueor*. The reference to participation in the *curia* must refer to his status as *praetextatus*, a youth of decurial family who was given a place in the *curia* but not allowed to vote: see Mancini, "Decuriones" 1529–30. For wealth, see *Apol.* 23.1: *profiteor mihi ac fratri meo relictum a patre HS viciens paulo secus*. Two million sesterces was a very large sum of money, twice the senatorial census.

<sup>22</sup>Athens: *Apol.* 72.3, where he says that he was a student there *non ita pridem ante multos annos*; cf. *Flor.* 18.42, 20.4. Butler and Owen suggest that he went to Athens ca. 143 and stayed until ca. 150. For the date of Maximus see Syme, "Proconsuls" 316–17. Apuleius delivered *Florida* 9 in Carthage under the proconsul Sex. Cocceius Severianus Honorinus, who held that office in 162/63 (Syme 319).

<sup>23</sup>The provincial priesthood was the object of intense competition among the elite of a province (Price, *Rituals* 122–23), and we can imagine that many of them would not have reacted well if the prize were given to a relative outsider. This was of course not impossible: his contemporary Aelius Aristides was on three separate occasions proposed for the provincial priesthood of Asia. He seems to have been even less interested in public office than Apuleius, however, for he managed on all occasions to avoid it (Price, *Rituals* 64).

in thanks for the honor of a public statue: *vobis occipiam, principes Africae viri, gratias agere ob statuam, quam mihi praesenti honeste postulastis et absenti benigne decrevistis* (Flor. 16.1; cf. 16.35). Who are these men? We might naturally suppose them to be the members of the *concilium provinciae Africae*, which was in charge of the provincial cult of the emperor and elected the annual provincial priest. Because each city and town of importance was represented in this council by a prominent local citizen, it truly did consist of the leading men of Africa. It was normal for such councils to meet in the leading city of the province, and Africa was no exception. We have explicit testimony from Apuleius that the African council met in Carthage: *ita mihi et patria in concilio Africae, id est vestro* (Flor. 18.15). While it is thus perfectly possible that on occasion Apuleius did address the *concilium Africae*, the speech represented by *Florida* 16 was not one of those occasions. In two places he describes this speech as taking place *in curia Carthaginiensium* (16.35, 16.40). The word *curia* would normally denote the meeting place of the *ordo decurionum*, and its qualification here as being the *curia* of the Carthaginians makes that interpretation certain (Mancini, "Curia" 1532–33). "The leading men of Africa" whom Apuleius addresses in this speech, therefore, are not the members of the provincial council, but the local elite of Carthage.

It was likewise the elite of Carthage who gave permission to Strabo to erect the public statue in honor of Apuleius. This is confirmed elsewhere in the same passage (Flor. 16.41), where Apuleius refers to that body as *Carthaginienses omnes, qui in illa sanctissima curia aderant*. Given the intense pride that local elites had in their cities, it is very unlikely that he would ever have described the members of the provincial council, who came from all over Africa, simply as *Carthaginienses*. On the other hand, that he would describe the Carthaginian *ordo* as *principes Africae viri* is not at all surprising. Carthage was by far the most important city in Africa, and the members of its *ordo* served as patrons for cities throughout the province.<sup>24</sup> Thus it was the Carthaginian *ordo* to whom Strabo made his proposal for Apuleius' statue. This is what we would expect, since it was after all the local *ordo*, and not the provincial council, that controlled the use of public space in Carthage. Now all of this does not in itself prove that the priesthood Apuleius

<sup>24</sup>Barnes, "Tertullian" 15, asserts that the *principes Africae* were members of the provincial council; but see, *contra*, Schöllgen, *Ecclesia sordida* 181. On the provincial council of Africa see Fishwick, *Imperial Cult* 1.2 257–68.

mentions was not the provincial priesthood. The statue decreed by the *ordo* is not said to be a direct result of the priesthood, and even if it were, there is no reason why a municipal statue could not commemorate a provincial honor. But the general context of the speech is clearly that of the municipal level of Carthage rather than the provincial level of Africa, and in such a context the emphasis Apuleius puts on the priesthood as being "the highest honor of Carthage" is significant. We should thus think not of the provincial priesthood, which was not after all a peculiarly Carthaginian honor, but rather of a prestigious civic priesthood. There were in fact at least two Carthaginian priesthoods that fit this description.

The more famous of these is the priesthood of Ceres, attested by a series of twenty inscriptions relating to seventeen different priests.<sup>25</sup> This epigraphic material provides a fairly good picture of the priesthood. It was clearly an important municipal office, as indicated by the fact that it is listed in the *cursus honorum* along with magistracies and imperial priesthoods. For example, an honorific dedication to Sex. Pulaienus Florus Caecilianus gives his career as *praefectus iure dicundo, sacerdos Cereris anni CLXX, duovir, flamen perpetuus coloniae Concordiae Iuliae Karthaginis*. In other inscriptions, the name of the city is included as part of the priest's title; a certain P. Iulius Gibba is described as *sacerdos Cereris coloniae Concordiae Iuliae Karthaginis anni CXCVII*. This type of title is a clear indication of a defined public status in the city and its territory, in the same way as *decurio coloniae Iuliae Karthaginis*. The most striking feature of the title, however, is the inclusion of a figure indicating the number of years since the institution of the cult. The date at which this took place has been the subject of much discussion, but was probably at the foundation of the Roman colony of Carthage in 44 B.C.E. All of these facts show that the priesthood of Ceres was a very prestigious municipal office. Unlike the provincial priesthood, however, it does not seem to have capped a career. For one thing, if its place in these *cursus* as they are inscribed is any real indica-

<sup>25</sup>The inscriptions have been studied most recently by Gascou, "Sacerdotes Cere-rum"; see also the earlier work of Fishwick and Shaw, "Era of the Cereres." As these titles indicate, most scholars see the priesthood as that of the Cereres; in fact, in all but two cases the title is abbreviated *Cer.* or *Cerer.* One of the two exceptions reads *sacerdos Cereris* (C. Poinssot, *BCTH*, n.s. 5 [1969] 255), the other *sacerdos Cererum* (ILS 6814). It is more likely that the cult was in general directed towards Ceres rather than the Cereres (Gascou, "Sacerdotes" 113).

tion of when it was held in the actual career, it seems to have belonged to the early part of a municipal career, always before the duovirate and usually earlier.<sup>26</sup> More importantly, in a number of cases (seven out of the seventeen) no other office is given, suggesting that it could be held simply as an honorific position, outside of any municipal career. Such a priesthood is more likely to have been granted to Apuleius than the provincial priesthood, and although not perhaps in fact the *summus honor* of the city, it would certainly have been prestigious enough to bear that description.

But the *sacerdotium Cereris* was not the only prestigious public priesthood in Carthage. There is also evidence that Aesculapius, like Ceres, had an annual public priest. Ten or so *sacerdotes Aesculapii* are attested in inscriptions from the territory of Carthage. In none of these is the office explicitly attributed to Carthage, but the priests often held other offices there. In an inscription from Thuburbo Maius, for example, P. Attius Extricatianus is described as *flamen Divi Titi coloniae Iuliae Karthaginis, sacerdos Aesculapii bis, equo publico, adlectus ab imperatoribus M. Aurelio Antonino et M. Aurelio Commodo Antonino Augustis* (ILAFr 280). Likewise, an inscription from Thignica, a small town in the region of Thugga, attests to two men who were decurions of Carthage as well as priests of Aesculapius (CIL VIII 15205). From Thibar, another small town in the area, there is L. Cornelius Maximus, *magister pagi, quaestor, decurio coloniae Iuliae Karthaginis, sacerdos Aesculapii bis, praefectus iure dicundo* (CIL VIII 26185). The accumulation of examples like these suggests that we have here not a number of local priesthoods, but rather one prestigious priesthood in Carthage. A priesthood of Aesculapius in Carthage is in fact explicitly mentioned by Tertullian.<sup>27</sup> The general picture is thus of a public priesthood very similar to that of Ceres. Like the better-known *sacerdotes Cereris*, the priests of Aesculapius were apparently men of high status connected with Carthage who exercised patronage over towns within its territory.

<sup>26</sup>Caecilianus: ILS 9404; cf. CIL VIII 26267 and 26419. Gibba: CIL VIII 23820; for other examples of the same titulature see ILS 6814 and CIL VIII 23820 and 26255. For the use of a town's name in a priestly title see Ladage, *Städtische Priester* 4, 15. For the date of foundation see Gascoü, "Sacerdotes" 120–28; on the place of the priesthood in the *cursus* see Gascoü, "Sacerdotes" 118–20 and cf. Fishwick and Shaw, "Era" 348–49.

<sup>27</sup>Tert. *Pall.* 1.2: *instar eius [pallii] hodie Aesculapio iam vestro sacerdotium est*. The "you" here clearly refers to the citizens of Carthage, again suggesting that this was a public priesthood; cf. Barnes, *Tertullian* 229–31. The cult of Aesculapius probably has some connection with that of Eshmoun, which played an important role in the Punic city.



It is likely that they also held office for a year or some other defined period, since two of them are described as having been priest twice. And also like the priesthood of Ceres, that of Aesculapius seems to have been prestigious but in some ways outside the normal *cursus* of the Carthaginian elite. None of the attested priests held important public offices such as the duovirate or the aedileship, although an *aedilis designatus* is attested in one uncertain example.<sup>28</sup> Again, it is more likely that an honor like this, rather than the much sought-after provincial priesthood, would have been given to Apuleius.

### III

Owing to the inadequate nature of the evidence, an absolutely certain identification of Apuleius' priesthood is impossible. I thus conclude with some observations on the connections that this minor biographical problem has with larger issues concerning the religious developments of the times in which Apuleius lived. As I noted at the start of this essay, the reason that the priesthood of Apuleius has elicited so little comment from historians of religion is because it was long thought to have had little connection with actual religion. If, however, we suppose that Apuleius was a priest in the civic cult of Aesculapius rather than in the provincial cult of the emperor, there is a much more obvious connection between his priesthood and his personal religious concerns. There is no doubt that Apuleius was greatly interested in religious knowledge, and pursued that interest in a variety of ways. As he himself says, *multiiuga sacra et plurimos ritus et varias ceremonias studio veri et officio erga deos didici* (*Apol.* 55.9). One of the cults in which he took an interest was that of Aesculapius, which as we know from Aelius Aristides could have an intensely personal as well as public aspect. When Apuleius arrived in Oea, for example, he delivered a speech on the majesty of the god, a speech which at the time of his trial he could assert *celebratissima est, vulgo legitur, in omnibus manibus versatur* (*Apol.* 55.10–11). Several years later, he wrote and presented to an audience in


<sup>28</sup> *CIL* VIII 26488. If the supplement suggested in *CIL* VIII 24535 is correct, we have there evidence for the priesthood in Carthage itself. For other examples of the priesthood outside of Carthage see *ILTun* 723, *CIL* VIII 26598 = *ILAf* 535, and *CIL* VIII 26625 = *ILTun* 1439; and another example, less certain, in *CIL* VIII 15475.

Carthage a dialogue and hymn in honor of Aesculapius, of which the prologue is preserved as *Florida* 18. The scenario of the dialogue suggests that this was not the first time he had publicly praised Aesculapius in Carthage, for it begins when an old school friend of his from Athens asks what Apuleius had recently said in the temple of Aesculapius.<sup>29</sup> With all these public performances, we can readily believe Apuleius when he says that he was *non ignotus illi* [i.e., Aesculapio] *sacricola nec recens cultor nec ingratus antistes* (*Flor.* 18.38).<sup>30</sup> In these circumstances, Apuleius' personal interest in Aesculapius would have been closely interwoven with his public position. We can imagine that the decurions of Carthage elected him the public priest of Aesculapius not simply in order to present him with a civic honor, but also to recognize his professed devotion to that deity. Likewise, his private cultivation of Aesculapius would have been an aspect of his public position as the god's priest.

I would not want to argue, however, that the religious significance of the priesthood of Apuleius is due only to this hypothetical personal aspect. We must remember that, whatever his personal interests in the divine world, Apuleius also considered it important to participate in public religious structures. Religion in the ancient Mediterranean world, as in many other cultures including our own, had both public and private aspects. For much of this century, many scholars identified the latter as constituting real religion, defined by the existence of a personal faith such as that which they considered the essential characteristic of Christianity. The public aspects of religion, on the other hand, they explained primarily in terms of nonreligious factors, usually political and social concerns. Such restrictive definitions of "real religion" in the context of ancient Mediterranean cultures, however, have in recent

<sup>29</sup> *Flor.* 18.42. A main speaker in the dialogue is Julius Perseus, described by Apuleius as familiar to the audience because of his benefactions. An inscription from Hammam Lif, across the bay from Carthage, almost certainly refers to the same individual: *Aesculapio; T. Iulius Perseus, cond(uctor) IIII p(ublicorum) A(fricae)* (*CIL* VIII 997); the *aquae Persianae* mentioned by Apuleius (*Flor.* 16.2, 16.23) are undoubtedly part of this shrine. Perseus' position as conductor meant that he was a person of considerable influence: see A. Stein, *RE* X (1910) 753. On the organization of taxation in Africa see de Laet, *Portorium* 247–54 and, on *conductores*, 384–403.

<sup>30</sup> While this may be just a general expression of his devotion, it might also be a modest reference to the priesthood which the Carthaginians had bestowed upon him: cf. Beaujeu, "Dieux" 397.



years been subject to increasing criticism.<sup>31</sup> If Apuleius was in fact a priest of Aesculapius, it is indeed easier for us to see the interrelation between the public and private aspects of his religious life. If, on the other hand, Augustine did have more information than we do, and Apuleius was in fact the provincial priest of the imperial cult, there is nevertheless no reason to deny the religious significance of his priesthood. Regardless of its identification, that Apuleius held a public priesthood tells us just as much about his religious concerns as his speculations concerning the nature of *daimones* or the arguments he used to defend himself against the charge of magic. It is unlikely that he himself would have regarded those intellectual pursuits as having more to do with religion than his priesthood. On the contrary, they were simply different manifestations of that phenomenon which in modern languages we lump together under the general term "religion."<sup>32</sup>

J. B. RIVES

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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<sup>31</sup>For general comments on this reevaluation see in particular North, "Conservatism and Change"; Price, *Rituals and Power* 7–19; Beard and Crawford, *Rome* 25–39.

<sup>32</sup>I thank Richard Billows, Alan Cameron, Maura Lafferty, Suzanne Saïd, James Zetzel, and the anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful advice and criticisms.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

PETER W. ROSE. *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. xiv + 412 pp. Paper, \$14.95.

One of the most promising trends in recent scholarship is surely the interest in setting classical literature in its social and historical contexts. But without meticulous clarity about method and assumptions, historicizing readings involve grave pitfalls. Marxism has long offered a valuable means for rigorously analyzing language, thought, and art as embedded in political processes, of which classicists have been slow to take advantage. One of the several things Peter Rose does admirably in this book is to describe and demonstrate a powerful Marxist approach to historicizing Greek literature that is more than just another method; by nature, it involves a broad interpretation of Greek history and culture through its major literary genres and texts. In fashioning this approach, Rose rejects "traditional" Marxism, with its mechanical distinction between base and superstructure and its view of literature as static "reflection" of society, and draws instead on some of the best Marxist thought of this century: to some extent on Gramsci, Voloshinov (or Bakhtin?), and Althusser, but above all on Fredric Jameson and his synthesis of the Frankfurt School. What emerges is a series of subtle and fruitful readings, some of them partially published before in article form but now thoroughly absorbed into a complex and fascinating argument.

Rose is concerned at once with "the politics of artistic form"—the historical conditions for the emergence of each genre—and with the theme of inherited excellence, which, as he shows, was recurrently a central topic of ideological debate. Thus Homeric epic, far from presenting a homogeneous world view, as its tradition may have done, is riven by contradictions on all levels, from formulae to plot, in a way that matches the instability of any of the periods to which one assigns the society it depicts. In the *Iliad* Achilles' challenge to Agamemnon is a last-ditch defense of inherited excellence and demonstrated prowess against Agamemnon's claim to authority on the basis of wealth and power divorced from merit, in a conflict that may evoke the transition from a symbolic role of property towards a money economy. The *Odyssey* nostalgically evokes traditional monarchy and its inherited excellence in the persons of Odysseus and Telemachos, against the rise of oligarchs, represented by the suitors; but what begins to sound like a political allegory is complicated by Odysseus' disguise as a beggar, which entails the depiction of society for nearly half the poem from the perspective of the marginal and dispossessed. Whatever political success the aristocracy enjoyed through the archaic period was due to their ideo-

logical counterattack against various threats and particularly developments that tended to open to question the equation of excellence with aristocratic birth. Pindar's epinicians, which stress that equation, are of course seen as partisan in the struggle, but Rose goes beyond commonplaces about Pindar as reactionary or "toady."

The crisis of the archaic age issued in the emergence of Athenian democracy and one of its characteristic genres, tragedy, of which the *Oresteia* is a prime text. *Agamemnon* presents a sustained criticism of the aristocratic ethos from the democratic point of view (where inherited excellence becomes inherited guilt), *Choephoroi* the move from monarchy into tyranny; then, in a dialectical move by which negation evokes utopian vision, the *Eumenides* projects the ideal democratic polis. Sophocles, on the other hand, criticizes democratic ideology from within and, in the face of the crises provoked by the Peloponnesian War, recurs to the Pindaric vision of a society dominated by naturally outstanding men. In *Philoctetes* he uses sophistic anthropology, which had led to the disparagement of claims of inherited excellence, to reassert precisely those claims and to condemn the dominance of Sophists in contemporary society. He thus looks ahead to Plato, whose *Republic*, in response to various crises—political, social, economic, and cultural—in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, "gives us at once both the most powerfully articulated defense of aristocratic inherited excellence and the fullest demonstration of its fragility and inadequacy before the ideological apparatuses of the state" (369).

The above is a mere outline of the complicated story Rose tells. The argument as a whole is compelling and succeeds in depicting the texts not as reflections of, but as active elements in, social processes. Inevitably, there are omissions, as Rose recognizes; it would be particularly interesting to know his views on Euripides and Aristophanes (comedy gets unfortunately short shrift).

Rose's discussions of specific texts, though not intended to be complete, are sensitive to nuances as well as broad themes. Most successful, to my mind, are the treatments of *Oresteia* and *Philoctetes*, whereas the chapters on Homer raise significant problems. Rose does not make it entirely clear in what sense he differentiates the *Iliad* from its doubtlessly "conservative" tradition (77), and it seems at least as likely that Achilles insists ruthlessly on the spirit of the heroic ethos even in book 9, and thus represents a deeply traditional ideology, as that he sees through and rends his society's "ideological integument." The *Odyssey* chapter contains a splendid psychoanalytic reading of the hero's wanderings that relates the content of the symbolism to contemporary economic conditions and succeeds in "historicizing Freud," and another section that similarly historicizes the nature/culture antithesis in response to ahistorical structuralist treatments of this theme. But the main argument is more problematical. Certainly Odysseus' disguise as a beggar would seem to open the poem to unusually diverse perspectives. But Rose never considers how far the depiction of non-elite characters is carefully controlled (as opposed to letting their voices authentically be heard), or how far the apparent openness is limited by the facts that



the beggar is a *basileus* in disguise and that the poem ends with a restoration of hierarchy into which the lesser characters are coopted. But these are matters under continuing debate, to which Rose has contributed significantly.

The framework for Rose's arguments is the notion of a "double hermeneutic" (the terminology comes from Ricoeur via Jameson, who significantly modifies the concepts). This involves two operations: a "hermeneutic of suspicion," which emphasizes those elements of a text that are complicit with, and support, structures of power, and which reveals "structured silences" (Macherey's term), so that voices suppressed but implied in the text are allowed to speak; and at the same time a "positive hermeneutic," which concerns elements in the text that negate its ideology by forcing it up against its own contradictions and that point beyond the work in its historical moment to a utopian vision of social conditions that enable human fulfillment.

Rose's handling of the "hermeneutic of suspicion," which occupies the bulk of his discussions, is masterful. It should be added that his treatment is quite balanced, and that although he leaves no doubt as to his sympathies, he takes very seriously the political, ideological, and artistic dilemmas faced by the most apparently reactionary authors.

The "positive hermeneutic" seems to me more difficult. Certainly the idea accords with the utopian strain in Marx's own thought (as Rose shows), and also with the thinking of the Frankfurt School and more generally the Marxist notions of dialectic and immanent critique. But what actually emerges is both meager and transhistorical in a way that brings it curiously close to the ahistorical New Criticism that Rose rejects. For example, the utopian projection he finds in Sophocles' play arises from Philoctetes' integrity; but isn't that what New Critics have been saying about Sophoclean heroes all along? Or to say that the formal perfection of a Pindaric ode distances it from its society, though the concept stems from the Frankfurt School's ideas about art, sounds New Critical in its deliberate (if momentary) decision to ignore the fact that Pindar's vision of community is intensely aristocratic. Now there is a decisive difference between this notion of utopian projection, which is historical insofar as it points toward a future seen as attainable, and the New Critical postulate of timeless essences. But can these visions be extricated from their class-bound character? Can one focus on the "just and affectively bound community" to which the *Odyssey* points and forget its hierarchical nature as though that were a disfiguring husk? Is the *Iliad's* projection of a meritocracy detachable from the dynamics of male competition, violence, and suppression of women through which excellence is demonstrated in Homeric society? To say that it implies a radical separation of form and content, the unity of which is otherwise essential to Rose's approach: "we need not adopt the content of the vision," he says revealingly in connection with Pindar (183).

If there is a wishful element in this part of Rose's critical practice, it seems motivated in part by a desire to explain why anyone, particularly on the political left, would want to read Greek literature nowadays. In fact, he some-

times implies (though he is fuzzy on this point) that what he finds in both steps of his hermeneutic is a given author's conscious critique of his society rather than the result of Rose's own critical operation. He does not need to claim so much. And I would say that there is great positive value in Rose's exercise of the hermeneutic of suspicion itself—as a way of clarifying issues that, as Rose says, are still with us, and as a way of avoiding the evils and learning from the strengths of the past.

Some will no doubt ignore this and similar books on the grounds that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its client states has now discredited Marxism. Aside from its near-absurdity, such smug evasion would be self-defeating. This rich and challenging book should be read and debated and learned from. It offers a badly needed perspective that might change many perceptions of Greek literature and society. And it everywhere asks us to think about why and how we do classics in the late twentieth century in ways that go beyond the eulogies of Western Civilization associated with the names of Bloom and Bennett, whose defense, if it is all we can offer, will only ensure that the discipline has no future.

WILLIAM G. THALMANN

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL LLOYD. *The Agon in Euripides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. ii + 145 pp. \$45.

Everyone familiar with Euripidean drama expects to hear a contest of words between two opposing characters. In this book Michael Lloyd has isolated thirteen such speeches within twelve of Euripides' extant plays and analyzed these within the context of the individual plays. He begins by defining the basic elements of a Euripidean agon (its length, its balance, its influence on the drama's structure) and excluding from the term short statements (e.g., Jason's twenty-eight-line speech at *Med.* 1322–50), supplication, and *epideixis* scenes. As he moves on to describe the function of the agon, he puts forth what will be the most surprising information to result from this detailed study, namely that "the agon in Euripides rarely achieves anything" (15)—an especially unexpected claim since, also, "the agon does, indeed, normally expound the central conflict of the play" (17). Early on, then, the reader's interest is aroused to learn how Lloyd will reconcile these two claims, both with each other and with the more usual understanding of an agon, that is, that one side in the verbal contest must win.

The book is a revision of Lloyd's dissertation, and much about it, even in its present form, reveals that origin. I have found his more recent articles, in *G&R* (1985) and *Phoenix* (1986), to be better written. Chapter 2, "Rhetoric and Euripides' Agones," tells us little that is new, either in the review of rhetoric

itself and its practice in fifth-century B.C. Athens, or in the discussion of the possible relationship between Euripides' plays and the contemporary Athenian law courts and assembly. This is a unit necessary for a dissertation, but not, perhaps, for the book. At other points, Lloyd's writing and grammar are rather stilted, and there are some inconsistencies, such as the argument (apparently) against the anachronism of Tyndareus' speech at *Or.* 494–506 on page 115 and for its importance on page 117. There are several typographical errors; the two most notable occur in the listing of agones on page 3: the agon of *Helen* is 1109–1292, that of *Electra* is 998–1138. These are small details, although somewhat surprising in a book published by Oxford. More distressing is Lloyd's tentative stance, his reluctance to assert rather than suggest the conclusions he has drawn. Perhaps he wishes to stress the ambiguity that underscores much of Euripidean drama—and no one would argue that these plays are without ambiguity—but the very good summation paragraphs that close each discussion are frequently left more speculative than his own analysis should require.

The most interesting and innovative discovery that Lloyd has made is that those familiar agones really have little bearing on the plots of the dramas. Indeed, they are carefully, if subtly, removed from the action so that the outcome of the debate has no effect upon the play's action. Theseus has already activated the curse against Hippolytus before his son appears, and thus we listen to his carefully phrased defense speech knowing that he cannot be saved. As Lloyd affirms, "His use of sophisticated rhetoric, and its inability to save him, reflect the pattern of the whole play" (50). He does not say what he understands this pattern to be, or how it does so; this book is for readers who are well acquainted with Euripidean drama. Again, he points out, in reference to *Electra*, that Clytemnestra's death has been effectively determined before the agon with her daughter (*El.* 998–1138): thus the debate is a portrayal of the play's central conflict, and is "not significant as the words of the characters at a particular moment" (69).

*Orestes* presents, according to Lloyd, "the most subtle and complex of all Euripides' agones" (113). The agon here is not, as might be expected, at the law court, but springs up when Tyndareus intrudes upon Orestes' supplication of Menelaus (470–629). The outcome of this conflict of words will have an effect on the trial, but it is structurally removed from the report of events at the law court. Tyndareus' speech, Lloyd accurately points out, "reflects the social and political dimension which is such a striking feature of the way in which the myth is treated in this play" (117). He also points out the obvious inconsistencies in Orestes' arguments, inconsistencies based upon the contradictory nature of his deed/crime—although it should be noted, *contra* Lloyd (123), that Orestes' changing attitudes, at least in the agon proper, are in response to Tyndareus' charges and not here "provoked in Orestes by the various persons with whom he converses." The result of this agon is to intensify the antagonism between Tyndareus and Orestes, and thus it might seem to influence the outcome of the

Argive assembly; Lloyd asserts, however, that the verdict of death by stoning had been favored even before Orestes and Tyndareus come into the verbal conflict.

Probably the most dramatically exciting agon is that between Helen and Hecuba in *Troades*. Lloyd carefully denies any direct influence on Euripides from Gorgias' *Helen*, then directs his attention to this unusual scene. Both women are rhetorically expert, both are permitted to offer the best possible cases. Helen speaks first, a reversal of the usual order of the law court agon, but "this irregularity in forensic practice has a powerful tragic effect in that Helen must plead for her life against a charge which has not yet been formally expressed" (101). Here her defense depends on the literal truth of the Judgment of Paris myth, while she uses fifth-century rhetorical style to argue her case; "the clash between style and content is central to the paradoxical effect of her speech" (104). Hecuba, Lloyd argues accurately, offers a speech that depends on an idealistic view of the gods that is neither consistent with the myth and the play's divinities nor her own unorthodox view of Zeus put forth earlier in the play (884–88). This inconsistency is not resolved, he affirms, but it adds weight to his claim that Euripides' agones are detached from the play's action, here Menelaus' treatment of Helen: "The agon, which deals in a profound way with the significance of the Trojan War, is too important to be tied down to the comparatively trivial question of whether Helen will be punished" (112).

Throughout his individual analyses, Lloyd finds a basic similarity between the verbal conflicts in all the plays from earliest to most late. He points out again and again that Euripides' agones are so placed that the outcome of the action does not depend upon them, and thus compels the reader to ask why this should be so. In his concluding chapter he provides an answer. The agon functions to express the conflicting issues of the drama; it is one of several possible ways to express dramatic conflict: "The point of the agon is to depict the main conflict of the play, and not to represent the expression of that conflict on a particular occasion" (132). This is a significant interpretation of these typical Euripidean scenes. We might like to tie them more closely with the plots of the plays, but their detachment from the flow of action renders Lloyd's view worthy of consideration.

KARELISA HARTIGAN

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

ELIZABETH BELFIORE. *Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 412 pp. Cloth, \$45.

The *Poetics*, laconic, incomplete, and subject to the most diverse readings, continues to generate hefty volumes, of which this is one. The late Edgar Wind thought that the *Poetics* was unteachable, because any one interpretation

could be contested at will. Just so, it may be that a book on the *Poetics* cannot be reviewed objectively, because each reviewer is bound to differ with the reading offered. Elizabeth Belfiore, like Gerald Else and Stephen Halliwell and others, holds that, with the help of parallels in other Aristotelian works, including *Problemata*, it should be possible to present a coherent picture of how Aristotle wanted *mimēsis*, *muthos*, *ēthos*, *pathos*, *hamartia*, and especially pity, fear, and *katharsis*, to work together. But her inclination is to go further and reconcile and totalize, negating or disregarding gaps and inconcinnities to which Halliwell is only the latest to have alerted us. She deserves much credit for the courage, the learning, and the organizing talent that have gone into her impressive enterprise. The writing is clear, the arguments are conducted lucidly (and hence, because of the nature of the evidence, vulnerable to attack). Slips and misprints are few and unlikely to mislead. By comparison with the pedagogically acute discourse of Halliwell, and with the coruscating venturesomeness of Janko, Belfiore's discussion comes through as careful, conscientious, and sustained. Her text is more conservative than Kassel's; her eagerness to bring variants into agreement makes for maximal acceptance.

My own understanding of most of the crucial issues in the *Poetics* differs radically from Belfiore's. But she deserves to be heard on her own ground. After introductory sections on the background of the role of the fear of wrongdoing in Greek public life, a topic whose importance becomes clearer as the book progresses, she moves into a discussion of plot, with special attention to *mimēsis*, *ēthos*, and *philia*. Under the same heading of plot she takes up the thorny issues of necessity versus probability (see now D. Frede in A. O. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics* [1992]). Chapter 6, on fear, pity, and shame, and chapter 7, on tragic emotion, finally take us into the most important part of the book, the chapters on *katharsis*, which she interprets allopathically rather than homeopathically, as a "removal of shameless emotional extremes, which are carried off as the opposing extremes of tragic fear and pity depart from the soul" (350). Shame, she argues, "provides a specific psychic mechanism that can account for the development of the affective and cognitive aspects of excellence" (203), which in turn explains its implication in the production of *katharsis*, defined along Golden's lines.

Belfiore's rigorous promotion of allopathy, recognized by Renaissance critics but abandoned in post-Bernays times, makes her see tragedy as a "cold drug that produces a fear of wrongdoing" (39) and thereby restores *aidōs* and *sōphrosunē*. This conception comes dangerously close to regarding tragedy as a form of morality play, and it is not surprising that she goes to the later Peripatetics and to the Neoplatonists for confirmation. The full formulation is as follows: "In emotional *katharsis*, a hot emotional extreme of shamelessness is treated by the application of a cold 'drug,' tragic pity and fear, which is too excessive to be 'concocted,' or made part of the soul. Instead it masters its opposite, shamelessness, . . . and its own extreme of cold fear and pity. The result is a *summetria* of emotional extremes, the emotional mean state of *aidōs*,

which is healthy and natural to the human soul" (343). The contrast between hot and cold emotions is maintained with a degree of strain, especially as Belfiore weaves back and forth between the ideas of two emotions in a state of equilibrium and of one emotion overcoming another. Since there is little in the *Poetics* about the soul, her formula must be regarded as a bold reconstruction. It is also not clear how this largely physical process of negotiating emotions can be squared with the concept of cognitive clarification at which in the end she arrives.

The insertion of shame into Aristotle's discussion, brought in from Plato's *Laws*, is one of the more puzzling parts of the book. It looks disconcertingly like a prop necessitated by her espousal of allopathy. In the earlier Platonic dialogues she finds shame, rather than merely *aporia*, in the paralysis Socrates' interlocutors experience as a result of the elenchus. Likewise, "In Aristotle's view . . . *tragic* fear is not the same as fear of pain and death; it is more closely connected with shame and fear of wrongdoing" (273). She correctly assumes that harm to the *philos* relationship involves shame and disgrace, and that therefore tragic fear and pity are concerned with evils that bring disgrace. On these grounds she adds "disgraceful" to "destructive" and "painful" in the definitions of fear and pity in *Rhet.* 2.5 and 2.8. She thinks that by including shame in the anatomy of tragic fear we can understand how the fear can be beneficial. All this is clearly directed at showing how Aristotle resolves the Platonic crux: "While he [Aristotle] does not explicitly say that tragedy produces *aidōs*, this view is not only in accord with Greek traditional views, it also best explains the theory of *katharsis* of pity and fear" (237). Now it is true, as B. Williams has shown in his *Shame and Necessity* (1993), that shame, especially prospective shame, is a form of fear. But the converse is doubtful, and given our ignorance of the precise standing of *katharsis*, the recourse to shame can be no more than an intriguing conjecture.

Fear, according to Belfiore, is goal-directed, seeking safety, and pity arises from a desire and is action-bound; nevertheless they are intimately related. There is no difference, she says, between these emotions as they are felt in the real world and as they register in the experience of tragedy. There is no such thing as aesthetic fear; only the circumstances in which fear is aroused differ. In the dramatic experience judgment and contemplation impede the incentive to flee or pursue; they block action, and produce pleasure. To illustrate the dramatic force of pity and fear Belfiore brings in the scene of Priam and Achilles, in *Iliad* 24: Priam arouses these feelings in Achilles precisely as a rhetorician or dramatist does. There are three problems here. (1) Homer, as Belfiore herself acknowledges, says nothing about fear. She asks us to infer, on the strength of what she considers a virtual consonance of fear and pity, that Achilles feels fear *for* his father, and therefore for himself (corporate person?). Against this it should be said that Achilles' character is so constructed that Homer would not allow fear. (2) The scene hardly bears out Belfiore's general view that fear works to dispel shamelessness and disgrace. (3) Interestingly,

Belfiore here talks about what happens within a work as against what happens between work and audience. So the scene is not well suited to illustrate the fear aroused in spectators. Her assumption that whenever Aristotle mentions pity and fear he has the audience in mind clashes with her own belief that "Aristotle's statements about his goals, and the topics covered in the *Poetics*, show that it is a treatise on the making of poetic compositions, within which detailed discussion of the emotional effects of poetry would be out of place" (337).

It is important to note that *pathēma* at 1449b28 is coordinate with *praxis* and bears the generic sense of "incident" (cf. A. Nehamas, in Rorty, *Essays* 307). As Aristotle defines tragedy in chapter 6 there is no reference to emotions stirred up in the audience. The adjectives *phoberon* (or *deinon*) and *eleeinon* (or *oiktron*) should be Englished as "fearsome" and "pitiable" (rather than "fearful," i.e., "causing fear," as Belfiore has it, and "pitiful"), to bring out their objective status as elements of the plot rather than the emotions of the agents or the audience. Similarly, *philanthrōpon* means something like "ethical" rather than "philanthropic" or Halliwell's "moving." Belfiore herself accepts Schade-waldt's and Carey's demonstration that the *philanthrōpon* is not an emotion but a quality of the plot, but curiously concludes that because it is "neither a tragic emotion, like pity and fear, nor an essential part of the plot structure, it need not detain us further" (163).

As is apparent, Belfiore has much to say about the emotions. She looks upon her work as a "study of the ways in which, according to Aristotle, the tragic plot arouses emotion in the audience" (3). "Arouse" is a locution commonly found in discussions of the *Poetics*, but pertinent Greek terms (forms of *psuchagōgein*, and *ekplēktikon*), on the few occasions that they occur, designate responses to plot developments and stage effects and are not overtly associated with fear and pity. Belfiore's section on *pathos* (134–41), defined as a destructive or painful event, is very good, though her claim that the term has been little discussed seems a bit unfair. That the term in the plural may also designate the passions of the dramatic agents is clear. But the only passage in the *Poetics* where the emotions, specifically pity and fear, are said to be aroused in the audience is 1453b1–15. Here there is no talk of *pathē*, and the discussion veers between the experience of the audience and the properties of the plot. *To pathē paraskeuazein* at 1456a38–b7 refers to the voicing of fear and pity, etc., first in a rhetorical speech, then in a dramatic composition. At 1455a29–34 the subject is indeed emotions, but they are the emotions of the author in relation to the emotions of the agents; the public is ignored. So the exclusive emphasis on the emotions of the audience rests on shaky grounds, as does any explanation of *katharsis* relating to them.

Finally, a few words about Belfiore's discussion of plot. She tends to associate *muthos* and *mimēsis* as if they were equivalents: "The plot is both the process of imitating and the product produced by imitating" (55). Plot as process, rather than movement, seems to me difficult to accept. Her discussion of *ēthos* as closely linked to motivation (197ff.) is of great interest, though I wish



the common translation of *ēthos* as "character" could be avoided; it means something like "specific tendency to act" and does not designate a general quality of the agent, or the agent per se. Belfiore insists that the response triggered by the movement of plot between good and bad fortune "is incompatible with praise or blame, which are responses to character" (110). This sets up a rigid distinction between *ēthos* and *muthos*, which is subsequently overturned: "In Aristotle's ethical theory . . . good fortune and the excellence necessary to it include both social and 'moral' goods"; this "to some extent prevents Aristotle from separating 'moral' and social qualities as his dramatic theory requires" (107). For once Belfiore grants that the uniformity she generally posits is not to be found, but the admission is exploited merely to move into further steps of homogenization.

Belfiore has some fine paragraphs on the difficulties of the notion of *anagnorisis*, and on the ranking of the four plot types in chapter 14. But her listing of six possible combinations of agent types and directions of change in chapter 13 cites *Prometheus* as an example of the change of an excellent person from good to bad fortune, which looks to me like a case of confusing plot with story. And another of the two possibilities merely implied by Aristotle, of an excellent person changing from bad to good fortune, she finds realized in the career of Alcestis, as if the plot assured us that Alcestis had at the end come back into her own. The best thing that can be said about this is that Belfiore accommodates herself to the simplicities of Aristotle's plot types, which anticipate the mechanical distinctions of modern folktale research. At the same time Belfiore's attempt to reconcile the perspectives of chapters 13 and 14 is, I think, quite successful, and symptomatic of the many successes she scores as she advances her larger argument. Her book is a welcome contribution, and those who agree with her general point of view will find in it much to enrich and sharpen their understanding of the *Poetics*.

THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

A. M. KEITH. *The Play of Fictions: Studies in Ovid's Metamorphoses Book 2*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. xii + 164 pp. Cloth, \$29.95. (Michigan Monographs in Classical Antiquity)

Ovid's reputation as a poet has long suffered from critics' hybris; when connections between the episodes of the *Metamorphoses* have not been immediately apparent to the eye of modern critics, or when an episode does not fit into a critic's grand scheme, Ovid has been declared to have failed to achieve perfect clarity or unity. The poet is lacking, not the critic. The episodes in *Met.* 2.531–835, among others, have inspired such abuse. In *The Play of Fictions*, Keith explicitly declines to fit this passage into a grand scheme, but aims to

examine the internal unity of 2.531–835. The passage, she says, is not a failure, not even an intentional one: “This study argues on the contrary that Ovid’s control of, and commitment to, his material did not fail at this point in the poem.” In other words, let us proceed as if we think Ovid knew what he was doing. Such an approach is a refreshing example for critics of other sections of the poem and of Ovid in general.

Keith’s introduction explains why this particular passage of book 2 is worth studying so microscopically: the myths are all concerned with story telling, that most important Ovidian topic. Keith thus provides us with a reminder that book 5’s story of the Muses is not the only significant story-telling section. She is clearly influenced by Hinds’s discussion of book 5 in *The Metamorphosis of Persephone* (1987), but she reads the stories in book 2 as addressing not so much poetic production as narrative in general and the uses of the powers of speech. Hinds’s influence can also be seen in Keith’s frequent comparison of versions of stories in the *Metamorphoses* with similar versions or allusions in the *Fasti*. Although she emphasizes in her introduction the role that narratological theory plays in her analysis (5–6), readers with an aversion to narratology’s jargon will find little of it in the book; the approach, rather than the terminology, is narratological.

The five chapters consider each of the stories in *Met.* 2.531–835. Each chapter follows a pattern of analyzing the logic of the transition from the previous story, the structure of the episode itself and its connection with the ongoing themes, and finally the etymologizing or wordplay which Ovid uses to reinforce these themes. The wordplay analysis follows the example of Ahl and others in reasonable moderation. The raven–crow–Ocyroë sequence is bound together by repetition of words with the consonants *c–r* (*corvus*, *cornix*, *Cecrops*, *Coronis*, *Chiron*, *Chariclo*, *Ocyroë*), and the Ocyroë–Battus–Aglauros sequence repetitively plays on the words *fari* and *fatum*. (These words reflect and support the thematic concern with speech and the gods’ reaction to it.) Most admirable is Keith’s frequent citation of etymologies from Varro et al., which show that these wordplays plausibly could have occurred to Ovid and his ancient readers.

Chapter 1, “The Crow’s Tale,” treats not the first story Ovid mentions in the passage, that of the raven, but the “embedded” story of the crow, who speaks at length to the raven, as the latter journeys to reveal Coronis’ infidelity to Apollo. The most impressive part of this chapter is the analysis of the fragments of Callimachus’ *Hecale* which appear to contain both of these birds’ stories. Keith makes a point of first treating the *Hecale* independently, to avoid a circular comparison of the *Metamorphoses* with an Ovid-influenced reconstruction of Callimachus. From this analysis we see that Callimachus, like Ovid, used the crow as a first-person narrator, who gave an aetiology for Athena’s hatred of crows, told the story of the Cecropids’ illicit peek at the infant Erichthonius, and prophesied the raven’s metamorphosis. Ovid appears, however, to have changed the context of the crow’s speech and to have added a reference to the

owl at the end. The question of the crow's interlocutor in Callimachus is especially troublesome: it is certainly not a raven, as in Ovid, but who is it? The attractive suggestion of Wilamowitz, followed by Lloyd-Jones and Rea, was that Callimachus' crow addresses an owl; then Ovid would have retained the same three birds in his version, but rearranged them for different narrative functions—one of his favorite games. Keith provides no new argument to support this theory and merely cites the work of these august scholars. More of her own discussion of this problem would have been helpful, especially as the matter is so crucial to her narratological parallel between Ovid and Callimachus. It is also disappointing to see her relying so exclusively on the work of previous critics at this point, without absolving them of the circularity against which she was on guard at the beginning of the discussion. (And indeed, Lloyd-Jones and Rea *do* use Ovid to reconstruct the Callimachean story [*HSCPh* 72 (1967) 141–42].) Nevertheless, Keith's observations of the structural similarities between Ovid and Callimachus are striking.

The remainder of chapter 1 analyzes the connections between the various stories told by the crow: all concern the relationship of a royal maiden with her divine patron and all emphasize the use of speech, for proper or improper purposes. Also in chapter 1, Keith notes the crow's tendency to play with words.

Chapter 2, "The Metamorphosis of the Raven," continues along many of the same lines as chapter 1, mainly analyzing the connections between the raven's situation and the crow's, with a particularly stimulating explanation (39–47) of the many birds which Ovid uses in the transition into the raven's story (2.531–41). Wordplay participates in this chapter, too: the crow (κορώνη) notes that she is the daughter of one king Coroneus, while the raven is on his way to report on the actions of Apollo's lover Coronis. Given this similarity between the crow's own name and the subject of the raven's report (a story which we never hear directly), I would have liked to see a little more discussion of Coronis in this chapter. Her story is begun, then interrupted for more than fifty lines, then finished in indirect discourse (*Met.* 2.542–45, 598–99). Why is her story not told more fully? Is the crow's story a proxy for the Coronis story, as Keith seems to suggest? Perhaps Coronis' is one of those tantalizing stories Ovid can never (choose to) get around to telling (see Mack, *Ovid* [1988] 124–25, 135–41).

Chapter 3, "Chiron's Daughter and the Art of Prophecy," contains an especially good explanation of the transition from the bird stories to the story of Chiron's daughter Ocyroë, who becomes a horse. Ocyroë, too, seems to be metamorphosed in punishment for speaking too much, although, like the crow and the raven, she speaks the truth. The discussion of Ovid's etymological games is most fully developed in this chapter.

Chapter 4, "Battus and the Rewards for Telling Tales," continues the same themes: a talkative character, hoping for a reward, tells too much to a god

and is punished by metamorphosis. Keith's analysis of how Ovid may have combined earlier stories of Battus (or someone like him), from the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* to Hesiod to Theocritus to Nicander, is quite impressive (106–14).

Chapter 5, "The Petrification of Aglauros," again sets the metamorphosed character into the sequence of others who reveal the secrets of the gods: Aglauros had not been punished for revealing Erichthonius (back in the crow's narrative), and now she threatens Mercury's furtive visit to Herse. Her metamorphosis by Minerva is punishment for both of these transgressions. Keith analyzes Ovid's extended description of Invidia (*Met.* 2.760–805) as tying together the stories of the crow, the raven, and Aglauros, all of whom saw something forbidden which aroused their envy (with etymological play on the *vid-* root in *invidia*). This chapter surveys the theme of envy in earlier poetry and suggests that Ovid might also be alluding to envious reactions to his own poetry: might his story telling be as risky as that of his mythological characters?

Keith's two-page epilogue proposes a political application of the stories treated in the book. Under the increasingly restrictive Principate, the proper use of speech would naturally have been a topic of concern to the poet. Ovid's eventual fate shows, at least in retrospect, that he was right to worry about the rewards and punishment for telling tales. (This argument, while obvious and uncontroversial to me, raises the murky topic of the Augustan political climate and might cause others to object.)

Appendix 1, "Swans in *Metamorphoses* 2," suggests that both the swan-like *flumineae volucres* at 2.252–53 and Cygnus himself are singing elegiac poetry of the mournful, *tenuis* kind (Cygnus' voice is *tenuata*, 2.373). This argument might have been strengthened by bringing up *Aen.* 10.185–93 earlier. I also want to hear how the other Ovidian swan metamorphoses (*Met.* 7.371–81, 12.71–167) fit into this interpretation. Appendix 2, "The Cercopes," suggests a punning relationship between the Cecropides in book 2 and the Cercopes in 14.91–100. Appendix 3 reproduces the Greek text of the fragments of Callimachus' *Hecale* discussed in chapter 1 (Hollis fr. 70–74).

*The Play of Fictions* admirably and readably achieves its missions—several of which I have longed to see attempted. Its focus on a relatively short section avoids dangerous generalities. It profitably combines our old friend Philology with our new friend Narratology (perhaps they have been sisters all along). It bases its discussion of etymologizing word games on solid ancient evidence. It presents us with an approach which could be a useful model for analysis of other parts of the poem. And most importantly, it restores our enjoyment of a previously slighted section of the *Metamorphoses*.

MARGARET WORSHAM MUSGROVE

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

J. S. ROMM. *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. xvi + 228 pp. Cloth, \$29.95, £22.50.

The relative lack of attention to ancient geography in its many different aspects has for too long been cause for embarrassment. Romm's rich, elegant study is one of several encouraging signs that a sustained rekindling of interest in this vital aspect of ancient culture is under way at last. During the past half-century science and technology have equipped us with a grasp of the earth's appearance far in advance of that available to any previous era. Ironically this new knowledge, now firmly embedded in our consciousness, imposes an unprecedented, irreversible handicap as we seek to penetrate the vision of others such as Greeks and Romans. They recognized how the layers of their knowledge declined in relation to the distance that they moved away from the familiar surroundings of home and local community. At the fringe, explored by Romm, the Homeric notion of Earth as an island land mass encircled by Ocean retained an astonishingly persistent hold. So, too, did the notion (first found in the fifth century B.C.) of a "known world" or "familiar world" within the land mass.

Beyond this *oikoumenē* lay not a void, which could merely be left blank. Rather there were peoples, yet ones so distant and so dimly perceived that theory, myth, and fantasy alone could satisfy the need to create a landscape here. With notable sensitivity and learning (but no general bibliography, alas), the core of Romm's book examines the representation of many such peoples and the motives for it in each case. In chapter 2 the golden-age societies of blameless Ethiopians and fortunate Hyperboreans are contrasted with primitive Arimaspians, Scythians, and *Kunocephaloi*. Chapter 3 turns to the wonders of the East, essentially *ta Indika*, culminating in the Alexander Romance: "the eastern landscape presented itself to western eyes in such disorganized terms that all the resources of scientific and pseudoscientific thought . . . were brought to bear in order to 'conquer' its persistent strangeness" (84). A selection of *alii orbes* occupies chapter 4, some within striking distance (Britain, Germany's North Sea coast, the headwaters of the Nile), others well beyond (the Atlantic and *ultima Thule* to the north, the continent Antichthon to the south). Despite its different character and aims, N. Sitwell's *Outside the Empire: The World the Romans Knew* (rev. ed. 1986) might usefully have been referred to here.

In an important final chapter Romm returns to probe further one of the leading themes with which he introduces his book, the ever-present tension in ancient geographical writing between fact and fiction, and the concern of ancient critics to distinguish the two. By the second century A.D., as he proceeds to demonstrate, the persistence of such controversy—over Odysseus' account of his wanderings, for instance, or the logs of Pytheas and Euhemerus—had in fact encouraged several authors to claim attention for their prose fiction by adopting the format of the explorer's tale. The ending of Plutarch's *On the Face*

of the Moon, Lucian's *True Histories*, and Antonius Diogenes' *Wonders beyond Thule* (as preserved in Photius' summary) are all successful examples discussed in some detail.

Romm's epilogue goes on to underline how Columbus' discovery of the New World not only sparked a reappraisal of certain elements in ancient geographical texts that had previously been regarded as fictional, but also gave Renaissance writers of fiction a fresh impetus to compose explorer's tales: "Whether or not antiquity had actually known of the Americas, it could hardly be denied that the most exotic and idyllic of ancient distant-world myths had there been translated into reality. Never before had ancient geography seemed so potent, nor had fictional literature seemed so pregnant with truth" (222).

What Romm omits to develop, as it happens, is the valuable contribution that his study of worlds beyond the *oikoumenē* in fact also brings to the current debate on the nature of Greeks' and Romans' conception of their surroundings within the *oikoumenē* itself. C. Nicolet's *L'inventaire du monde* (1988) unfortunately reached him only as his own work was going to press (7; cf. 123). To this might now be added, among others, N. Purcell's review of Nicolet, *JRS* 80 (1990) 178–82, and his essay "The Creation of Provincial Landscape" in T. Blagg and M. Millett, eds., *The Early Roman Empire in the West* (1990) 7–29; my own "Rome's Empire and Beyond: The Spatial Aspect" in *Cahiers des Etudes Antiennes* 26 (1990) 215–23; and T. Bekker-Nielsen's "Terra Incognita" in *Studies . . . R. Thomsen* (1987) 148–61.

From a modern perspective, Greeks and Romans were largely "lost" even within their *oikoumenē*: the key question of how they organized their conceptions of space there admits of no easy or single answer. The conclusion to Romm's first chapter acts to reinforce the view that improvements in geographic understanding made little or no impact upon society: "Despite continuing advances in science and exploration the average citizens of Greece and Rome clung to the conceptions of the earth's edges that best suited their imaginative needs" (41). They felt no urge to challenge the supposed impossibility of proceeding far beyond the *oikoumenē* (132). In geographic literature they retained an insatiable appetite for the marvelous rather than the truth: this was a single-mindedness that Strabo of all authors seems sometimes not to have allowed for (cf. 96, 99 n. 39, 109 n. 56).

Even the civil and military authorities of the Roman Empire showed little appreciation of the potential of good maps, so that it was not until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that Ptolemy's work came into its own, as the contributions to D. Buisseret (ed.), *Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe* (1992), now amply demonstrate. Given that a rudimentary cartographic sense of one kind or another was widespread in the classical world (cf. 184–85), the consistent failure to develop it further is remarkable—proof indeed of the "cognitive gap" which always separated specialists from the public at large (4). Romm could fairly have been expected to take into account the coverage of Europe and the Near

East to ca. A.D. 1500 in the first volume of *The History of Cartography* (ed. J. B. Harley and D. Woodward, 1987), despite its overestimation of map consciousness in the classical world as noted, among others, by A. V. Podossinov and L. S. Chekin in *Imago Mundi* 43 (1991) 112–23.

But by definition the *oikoumenē* is not Romm's chosen focus. The edges of the earth and beyond, which he illuminates, are as much (if not more) the landscape of the imagination as of scientific report. One special merit of his revealing study is its timely reminder that this landscape is not merely the shallow construct of Viennese operetta, but rather an absorbing reflection of contemporary intellectual and cultural concerns. In subtly elucidating many of these he makes a superb contribution to the wider quest for a full understanding of how Greeks and Romans perceived their world.

RICHARD J. A. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, HUNTSVILLE

RENATO BADALÌ, ed. *Lucani Opera*. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1992. lxx + 478 pp. Paper, L 45,000. (Scriptores Graeci et Latini)

Badalì has combined sound critical judgment in making textual decisions with painstaking industry in reporting the manuscript tradition to produce an important edition of Lucan's *Bellum Civile*. The salubrious influence of Housman's edition "editorum in usum" (Oxford 1927<sup>2</sup>) is everywhere in evidence. Indeed, one might imagine that this is what Hosius' edition (Leipzig 1913<sup>3</sup>) might have been like had he had the benefit of Housman's tuition. The reader comes away with the impression of a sober recension, based on intimate acquaintance with the author and the manuscripts, which, though it will provoke dissent in many places, will more often invite agreement.

The keynote of the preface (xi–xiii) is the author's conviction that a stemma cannot be constructed and that variants must be considered on an individual basis. Recent work on the manuscripts of Lucan has only confirmed that this is the best approach to editing the poem. Since Badalì devotes much of his preface to explaining the rationale of his edition (descriptions of the manuscripts are given in lengthy footnotes), the reader who wants a detailed discussion of the tradition must turn to the editions of Housman and Hosius and Gotoff's *Transmission of the Text of Lucan in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971). The preface is followed by a conspectus of editions and thirty-seven pages of bibliography which, along with an unnecessary table of abbreviations for periodicals, inconveniently separate the list of manuscript sigla from the beginning of the text. Badalì reports the readings of MZVPQUG, the fragments NII, and occasionally nine other manuscripts, all listed in Hosius, as well as the lemmata (c) and text (c') of the *Commenta Bernensia* and the lemmata (a)



and text (a<sup>1</sup>) of the *Adnotationes super Lucanum*. He has collated all the manuscripts he reports (preface, xx).

Also included in this edition are detailed reports of *inscriptiones* and *subscriptioes*, fragments of Lucan's lost poetry, the Suetonian Life, the Vacca Life, and an extensive appendix of *errores singulares* for MZVPQUGNII, the *Commenta*, and the *Adnotationes*: an ocean of error that would overwhelm a committee of Überlieferungsforscher.

Badali's editorial practice is consistent with the rationale set forth in the preface. He is not hamstrung by allegiance to any manuscript or coalition of manuscripts, and he is not hostile to conjecture. The soundness of his judgment is confirmed by his overall consistency in rejecting the *lectio facilior* that un-Lucans Lucan, whether it be a manuscript variant or a conjecture, and in adopting conjectures that improve the text. Here follows a sample of controversial textual problems in which, in my opinion, he makes the right choice. The reading of his edition is always given to the left of the bracket. I employ his sigla, which are the same as Hosius': O = the consensus of the manuscripts, except those cited; s = the *deteriores*. In some cases I have simplified the reports.

1.227 *fatis* O] *satis* his Housman. Housman's emendation gives a much easier sequence of thought, but that in itself is not sufficient to promote it into the text. It is possible that in 226–27 we have two antithetical pairs, *Fortuna-fatis* and *foedera-bello*, arranged in the interlocking order ab–a<sup>1</sup>b<sup>1</sup>, *Fortuna . . . foedera . . . fatis . . . bello*.

1.304 *transcenderit* MZU] *transcenderet* VPG. There is nothing unusual about a primary tense of the subjunctive in an unreal comparative clause, although secondary tenses are more common in such clauses introduced by *quam si*. *Transcenderit* is rightly retained for two reasons: it is the more difficult reading, and a tense of prior action is required. Fear in Rome could be no greater than if Hannibal *had crossed* (not *were crossing* = *transcenderet*) the Alps.

2.61 *urbi* Ls] *orbi* O. It is clear from the context that Rome is the prize.

2.292 *complosas* Z] *conpressas* O. The trivialization *conpressas* has won general acceptance. But as Housman observed, a reference to folded hands unwilling to help is irrelevant here. The point is not refusal to help but emotional indifference (290 *expers metus*, 297 *seculo me*): striking the hands together is a sign of emotional agitation.

2.387 *maximus* O] *unicus* Bentley. *Maximus* is convincingly defended by Håkanson in *PCPS* 25 (1979) 29.

4.578 *uritur* O] *subditur* Axelsson *angitur* Burman *vincitur* Bentley. *Libertas uritur* is a very difficult phrase. It seems best to give Lucan and the manuscripts the benefit of the doubt; likewise at 7.43 *gemitus edere dolorem* and 8.665 *iratamque deis faciem*.

5.804–5 *vadis . . . fugis* Gs] *vadit . . . fugit* O. The second person is rhetorically more effective, especially in the company of *fida comes Magni*.

6.137 *gemit* GV<sup>2</sup>] *vomit* O *sonat* Håkanson. As Housman noted, *vomit*

needs an object. Håkanson's *sonat* is weaker than *gemit*, which produces a nice sound pattern: *crebros gemit agger ad ictus*.

6.532 *lectum* PGU (–to MZ)] *letum* M<sup>2</sup>V<sup>3</sup>U<sup>3</sup>. Housman defended *letum* with a memorable *sententia*: “*lectum funebrem omnes novimus, Lucanum non omnes*.” But *letum* is too abstract and tame for this inversion of funerary ritual.

6.637 *guttur* O] *pectore* s. Håkanson's vigorous defense of *pectore* in *PCPS* 25 (1979) 32 is undermined by transmissional probability and by his assertion that the corpse's throat must be intact. As Erictho goes about her ghoul-ish autopsy, she has two requirements for a corpse, freshness (621–23) and undamaged lungs (629–30). Therefore, she chooses a corpse that has been wounded in the throat rather than in the chest as a guarantee of undamaged lungs. As for transmissional probability, Housman wrote, speaking of this same pair of variants in Juvenal 1.156, that *guttur* is “superior palaeographically, as the less common word” (Cambridge 1931) xix.

7.20 *venturis* O] *mens curis* Bentley. The appearance of *mens* in the *Commenta*'s note may be nothing more than a piece of scholiastic interpretation prompted by the use of *animus* in the note on line 8. The more difficult construction of supplying *quies* in 22 with *anxia* in 20 is to be preferred.

7.677 *te praesente* O] *parte apse* Bentley. The Fates have decreed that Pompey will die without his wife at his side. Housman and earlier editors detected an inconsistency in the fact that Cornelia witnesses the assassination of Pompey (8.632 and 637). It is clear, however, that from Cornelia's point of view she is being separated from her husband: 8.578, *impatiens desse marito*, cf. 651. If Cornelia and Pompey are each on separate boats and the boats are separated by a stretch of ocean, how can Cornelia be thought of as *praesens* with respect to Pompey in his hour of need?

In general Badali shows a steady hand in his choice of variants and conjectures: 1.209 *iubam et vasto grave* ZG] *iubas et vasto* MUV *iubas et grave* P (the note in the apparatus is unclear). 1.229 *it* PV] *et* ZUG. 1.234 *seu* (prius) O] *sed* Housman. 1.254 *ruentem* G] *furentem* O. 1.260 *tacet* O] *iacet* P. 1.531 *denso* VG] *tenso* O. 2.295 *furorem* O] *pudorem* Håkanson. 2.587 *nusquam* V] *numquam* O. 3.159 *Gallus* Housman] *Pyrrhus* O. 3.188 *Athaman* Bentley] *Athamas* O. 3.190 *unda* Francken] *undas* O. 4.20 *coerces* s] *coercens* O. 4.412 *spoliarat* Guietus] *spoliabat* O. 4.590 *quas* MZ] *quae* O. 5.137 *farique* Burman] *fatigue* O. 6.421 *cui* Heinsius] *qui* ON. 6.663 *praebente* Madvig] *praesente* O. 7.464 *parentum* Housman] *parentes* O. 8.294 *pugnandi* Guietus] *regnandi* O. 9.38 *Graia* Housman] *Creta* O *Graeca* ed. prin.

Readers of Lucan may rehearse with great profit Pope's couplet “‘Tis with our judgments as our watches, none / go just alike, yet each believes his own.” For they will never be completely satisfied with any edition of the *Bellum Civile*. Transmitted variants, augmented by acute conjectures, provide too much fuel for disagreement. Some of my disagreements are listed below; my preference is given to the right of the bracket.

1.8–9 punctuated as a question. This punctuation, defended by Mayer in *Mn* 32 (1979) 338–39, is problematic. What is the construction of *praebere* in 9? It cannot be an adnominal infinitive dependent on *licentia*, because *licentia* is defined by *ferri*. One can say *licentia ferri* or *licentia praebere cruorem* but not *licentia ferri praebere cruorem*. The parallel cited from Seneca, *Nat. Quaes.* 5.15.3, is no help, because *spes* is not accompanied by a dependent genitive and *spes relinquere* is perfectly normal. Nor can *praebere* be appositional: *furor* and *licentia* denote the insanity and lawlessness of fratricidal civil war; *praebere cruorem* introduces a different idea, a by-product of that slaughter, foreign nations glutted with Roman blood. 8 must stand alone as a question. 13–18 are better punctuated with an exclamation mark and 19–20 with a period. (Punctuation ought to be revised at 2.73–74, 3.76–78, 3.114, 638–39 Bentley, 4.719, 823, 5.213–14, 216–17, 8.43 549–50.) 1.103 *franget* MUG] *frangat* ZVM<sup>2</sup>. 1.481 *Alpemque* O] *Albimque* van Jever. 1.602 *festis* s] *festus* O. 1.641 *moventibus* O] *sequentibus* Bentley. 2.165 *tam* O] *tot* UM<sup>2</sup>. 2.262 *ferantur* O] *ferentur* Housman. 2.303 *prosequar* VG] *persequar* O. 2.406 *iuncto Sapis Isauro* PU] *iunctus Apise Pisaurus* J. D. Morgan, anticipated in part by Vossius' *iunctus Sape Pisaurus*. 2.554 *qua . . . hostis* PGUV] *quoi* (Housman) . . . *hosti* ZM. 2.665 *Aegaei* O] *Aeolii* Bentley. 3.249 *Orestas* O] *Oretae* (*Oritae*?) Scaliger. An eastern people is needed. 3.253 *Aethiopumque solum*] compare Housman's exegetical note on pp. 327–29, cited in the apparatus, with his addenda to Manilius 4.804. 3.328 *rerum* O] *scelerum* Schrader *nunc* MZ] *non* O *illis* UV] *ullis* MZ. 3.433 *vibrare* M<sup>2</sup>] *librare* O. 3.588 *pectore* O] *corpore* van Jever. 4.253 *faciem* O] *facie* s. 4.329 *nocturnum* O] *nociturnum* Bentley. 4.746 *tunc* Z] *ut* O. 5.386 *dominis* ON] *dominos* a<sup>1</sup>. 5.443 *rigente* O] *regente* M. 5.489 *medias* O] *medios* Oudendorp. 6.61 *alitur* O] *capitur* Håkanson. 6.585 *averrere* MZ] *avertere* VPG. 6.709 *dedi lavi* O] *deo lavi* V. 6.716 *omina* U<sup>2</sup>] *omnia* O. 6.778 *tactae* U] *tacitae* VG. 6.782 *alii* O] *Latii* Housman. 7.244 *fatis* O] *et fatis* s. 7.658 *voluitque* O] *vovitque* V. 7.843 *avide* MZP] *avidae* VUG. 8.375 *tota* O] *totum* G. 8.767 *succensa* MZPQ] *succense* VG.

Badali prints nine of his own emendations in the text, none of which, in my judgment, makes a real improvement: 2.493 *prolapsus*. 2.678 *caesu*. 5.814 *lenta*. 7.43 *gemitu caruere*. 7.335 *fatum isto*. 7.616 *vinxere*. 7.735 *coactis*. 10.314 *nobis sunt*. 10.518 *rependit* (the line was deleted by Heinsius).

The apparatus is overburdened with extraneous matter, in particular with the ubiquitous names of Hosius and Housman (truly an odd couple), with the variation of *-is/-es* in the accusative plural and of *tum* and *tunc*, and with the much overworked *fort. recte*, which also turns up in the vernaculars (8.224, 9.1033). Although the orthography has been systematically normalized, one finds *tesca* at 2.426 but *tesqua* at 6.41, *quom* at 2.541, *dirigere* for *de-*, and an occasional *haut*. There are misprints at 6.676, 8.42, 9.27; the note in the apparatus at 2.630 appears to belong to 3.630.

Despite these criticisms scholars owe a great debt of gratitude to Badali for his Herculean labors in doing battle with this textual Hydra. His edition will

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
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

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THE GILDERSLEEVE PRIZE  
FOR THE BEST ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN  
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IN 1993 HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO

JOEL B. LIDOV  
QUEENS COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

for his contribution to scholarship in "The Second Stanza of Sappho 31: Another Look," *AJP* 114, no. 4:503–35.

Lidov's article presents a paradigm of the complex approach to a problem that classical philology often aims at but only rarely attains. Applying methods of metrics, morphology, syntax, semantics, and palaeography, the author both criticizes earlier attempts to resolve the textual problem in verse 7 as transmitted and presents a new solution. He addresses first the specific textual issue, then its dramatic context. In particular, he shows how verses 7–8, describing the narrator's inability to project her voice, lead directly to verse 9 and the physiological signs of her ἀμυχάνια that are there described. Lidov thus contributes to the understanding of the poem as a whole. The principles and strictures he outlines, which limit solutions to the several problems of the lines, will guide future editors and commentators.

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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## THE OCCASIONAL CONTEXTUAL APPROPRIATENESS OF FORMULAIC DICTION IN THE HOMERIC POEMS

Through his study of epithets in the Homeric epics Milman Parry made a convincing case that we should understand and evaluate Homeric verse very differently than we do the verse of most other poets. Because the epithet-noun phrases exhibit a strict economy (there is only one way of expressing each essential idea that fills any given portion of the hexameter), Parry argued that when reading Homer we must suppress our presupposition that the poet chooses the words he does on the basis of contextual appropriateness: instead of pertaining to the particular context in which they appear, the epithets ennoble the whole of the poem. When a ship is described as fast, it is not because it is, at that particular moment of the story, moving quickly, but because all ships of the heroic age depicted in epic were fast ships.

Homeric criticism since Parry is an uneasy criticism.<sup>1</sup> Scholars have challenged Parry's thesis in a number of ways: arguing that, historically considered, the formulas are more contextually appropriate than they might seem,<sup>2</sup> that the very concept of a formula is an extremely unstable one,<sup>3</sup> and that many formulas are almost without a doubt chosen for specific poetic or thematic effects.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, many formulas still seem to have been selected, as Parry argued they were, solely on the basis of metrical convenience. Even the most impassioned advocate for Homer's artistry, Norman Austin, admits that some for-

<sup>1</sup>Witness, for example, the emotion Norman Austin exhibits in the opening chapter of *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* regarding the implications for literary criticism of a strict understanding of formulaicity.

<sup>2</sup>See Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*.

<sup>3</sup>See Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition*.

<sup>4</sup>See Austin, *Archery*.

mulas are apparently chosen simply to fill a certain portion of the line (*Archery* 16). Critical anxiety arises in that if even some formulas are chosen on the basis of metrics alone, the possibility remains that the seemingly "artistic" formulas that critics have located—formulas appropriate to their immediate context—were also chosen simply because they fill a certain portion of the hexameter and that such formulas are therefore only, as it were, accidentally artistic. And such a possibility strikes at the core of the critical enterprise, at least insofar as that enterprise involves elucidating a poet's verbal artistry, his choice of the most fitting word or phrase from among many possibilities.

Since the presence of *any* formulas demonstrably chosen on the basis of metrical convenience alone raises the possibility that *all* formulas are so chosen, it is assumed that the ideal refutation of Parry would be to assign a nonmetrical, contextual reason for the poet's choice of each and every formula. Since we can assign a nonmetrical reason for only some of the formulas, the critical uneasiness remains—though it does not, fortunately, stop critics from arguing for the contextual appropriateness of particular epithets. I suggest that in fact we need not feel anxiety at being able to provide contextual explanation for some, but not all, of the epithets. By exposing a fundamental flaw in Parry's reasoning, I hope to justify the practice of treating *some* epithets as appropriate to their immediate context, even though we cannot treat all epithets in this way. My argument has larger implications for our understanding of Homeric composition. That mode of composition is, as Parry argued, significantly different from that of a nontraditional poet—but not, I maintain, in the *way* he argued. Because, as I will show, the bard has a degree of stylistic freedom, the audience is *prepared* to treat as ornamental an epithet that is inappropriate or indifferently appropriate to its context; but the audience is not therefore insensible to contextually appropriate epithets. The distinctive character of Homeric poetry lies not, as Parry claimed, in the ornamental nature of contextually indifferent formulas, but rather in the interplay between contextually indifferent and contextually appropriate formulas.

I should say at the outset a word about my method. I do not seek to refute Parry's thesis, but to complement and extend it. At two critical points, therefore, I advance my own argument by drawing out the implications of comments that Parry himself made in his seminal dissertation "The Traditional Epithet in Homer," comments whose disruptive power he seemingly failed to recognize. A note also on terminology:

frequently in order to illustrate my points I refer to the lines employed to introduce direct discourse (e.g., "Swift-footed Achilles then said") with a term employed in criticism of modern novels and short stories: "tag lines."

### THE OTHER HALF OF THE LINE

Let me begin by stating briefly my fundamental thesis, which is a simple one. If we restrict our analysis of Homeric diction to the level of the phrase, as Parry by and large did, the diction is every bit as economical as he claimed; with very few exceptions, there is only one way of expressing any given essential idea so as to fill a particular portion of the line. But if we broaden our focus and examine Homeric diction at the level of the full line or of the passage, we find that the principle of economy no longer holds true.

For the sake of simplicity, Parry begins his demonstration of Homeric formulas by examining a special case: sentences that fill up exactly one line, a predicate in the first portion of the line and a subject in the second portion. What he showed is that no matter how much space the predicate takes up, there exists a way of expressing any subject so as to fill up the remainder of the line. So if the subject of the sentence is to be Odysseus and the predicate runs to the feminine caesura, the poet will finish the line with the phrase *πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς*, whereas if the predicate extends to the hephthemimeral caesura, he will finish the line with the phrase *πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς*, and if it extends as far as the bucolic diaeresis, the poet will finish the line with the phrase *δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς*. What Parry failed to consider, though, is the possibility that for the predicate portion of the line, too, there might be a set of formulas all expressing the same essential idea, but filling different portions of the line.

Although he failed to consider this possibility, he demonstrated, seemingly despite himself, that such a set of formulas does in fact exist. As the first sample sentence in his exposition, Parry chose a common tag line:

τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.

The predicate—τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα—fills the line to the feminine caesura. Parry then demonstrated that the bard, since he had for every

character in the epic a subject formula filling the space from the feminine caesura to the end of the line, was able to make the sentence "then X answered him" for any character.

The next step in Parry's argument was to show that another series of subject formulas exists for occasions in which the bard had to fill the portion of the line extending from the hephthemimeral caesura to the end of the line. The formula for Odysseus in such a case is πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς, and Parry illustrated its operation with the following line:

τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς.

What he seemingly failed to realize is that the predicate hemistich of this line (τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη) communicates the same essential idea as τὸν δ' ἡμείβεται ἔπειτα. Accordingly there are two ways of using a full line to say "Odysseus replied," either

τὸν δ' ἡμείβεται ἔπειτα πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς

or

τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς.

In fact there is a third, in *Odyssey* 15.485:

τὸν δ' αὖ διογενῆς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἡμείβετο μῦθω.<sup>5</sup>

What I object to in Parry's analysis, then, is the impression that in the process of composition the epic bard simply finds himself, as if by accident, at some spot in the line and must then fill out the line with a formula of the appropriate length. Parry conveyed such an impression by statements like the following: "with very few exceptions the poet makes use of one type of formula to complete a sentence of which the predicate extends only to the feminine caesura" (*Collected Works* 15). True, but the poet himself controls, to some degree at least, how far the

<sup>5</sup> Austin (*Archery* 29) and Edwards ("Answering Expressions" 81) both note this apparent violation of the principle of economy, but neither draws from it the conclusions I will. Edwards, in fact, works hard to recuperate such violations into a strictly Parrian economy.



predicate will extend and therefore can deliberately choose to create a sentence which uses a desired subject formula.

If we examine the matter at the level of the whole line, then, we see that the traditional bard does possess, in some degree, the sort of stylistic freedom that Parry granted only to the nontraditional bard: he has the freedom, that is, to choose (from what is admittedly a restricted range of options, an issue I will address later) the way of expressing "then X answered him" most appropriate to the context.

Let us examine briefly how he exercises that freedom. In the argument between Achilles and Agamemnon in book 1, the poet uses two different tag lines to introduce the speeches of each hero. Agamemnon's first reply to Achilles, at line 130, is prefaced by the line

τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων.

This is what we might refer to as the standard way for the poet to say "Agamemnon replied," for there are three other occasions in which this line appears (*Il.* 1.285, 2.369, 4.188). But in the same exchange, at line 172, the poet says "Agamemnon replied" in a different way:

τὸν δ' ἡμείβεται ἔπειτα ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων.

This is the only time in the entire epic when a reply of Agamemnon is narrated using the formula τὸν δ' ἡμείβεται ἔπειτα and therefore the only time that, in replying, Agamemnon is called ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν (though he is of course described as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν in connection with other actions). And the appropriateness of arranging to employ this epithet at this particular moment can be seen in two facts. First, the speech that this line introduces is the pivotal one in confirming the break between the two Achaean heroes (this is the speech in which Agamemnon threatens to take Briseis and after which Achilles contemplates killing Agamemnon and must be restrained by Athena), so the unique tag line underscores the importance of what is about to be said. Second, it is precisely his role as *king* that Agamemnon stresses in the speech that follows, for when he says, ὄφρ' ἐὺ εἰδῆς / ὅσσον φέρτερός εἰμι σέθεν, he knows as well as anyone else that it is only in his capacity as commander of many men, as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, that he is stronger than Achilles.

In describing Achilles' replies, the poet also makes use of both a standard tag line and an unusual one. Line 84 provides an example of a standard tag line:

τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς.

This line is used eleven other times in the epic (counting lines addressed to female characters, which differ only by beginning with τὴν instead of τὸν). The unusual tag line appears at line 121, when Achilles first addresses Agamemnon directly (having previously been talking with Chalcas):

τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα ποδάρεκς δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

This line appears only one other time in the epic, at 18.181, when Iris urges Achilles to enter the war on behalf of the slain Patroclus, and he hesitates only about how he will arm himself. The two appearances of the line, then, frame Achilles' absence from battle by marking the point where he first defies Agamemnon and the point where another concern overrides his dispute with the king and he prepares to reenter the conflict. The poet is able to reserve one tag line for special thematic effects such as this only because he has another of the same metrical value that he can use in other instances. His choice of formula is therefore (to some degree) contextually motivated—as that of a nontraditional poet.

When I claim that the epic bard could choose specific epithets, I am disputing only the extent to which Parry took his argument about the virtual meaninglessness of the epithet:

It is not, then, only in cases where no relation between the idea of the epithet and that of the sentence is possible that the reader acquires this insensibility [to any particularized meaning of the epithet]. He soon comes to acquire it just as much in passages where special reasons, sometimes very good reasons, could be adduced for the choice of the epithet. (*Collected Works* 127)

I want to contest this point by a closer examination of the very passage that Parry adduced to illustrate it:

The novice in the study of Homer, whether he begins with the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*, rapidly becomes familiar with certain set ways of speaking of ships, and one of the most frequent of these is the expression "swift ship," θοή. He comes across this expression so often when the ship is at anchor, or drawn up on the beach, or wrecked, that he soon learns not to expect any particularized meaning from it. Hence when he comes to v 168, where the Phaeacians speak of the ship which Poseidon has turned to

stone, and reads the expression "swift ship," it does not occur to him to look for the particular reason why this epithet was used. He will find in the phrase no statement of pity for the fate of this ship, so swift when it bore Odysseus to his home. He has invested the epithet *θοή*, wherever it modifies the substantive *νηῦς*, with a purely ornamental quality. He no longer reads "swift ship"; he reads "fast-sailing-ship." Having encountered so many times this single combination of words, this unity of diction, he at last attributes to it a unity of thought. The expression awakens in him a single idea, that of a hero's ship which possesses the speed characteristic of the finest ships; but in the world of epic poetry he knows only the finest ships—there are no others. *So he thinks simply of ship*, in the genre of epic poetry, the only kind as it seems, that there was in the heroic age. (*Collected Works* 127–28)

I quote at length because this is the central point in Parry's thesis that I aim to challenge. Parry here suggested that as readers grow accustomed to the fact that the poet's choice of words is governed by metrical convenience, they become indifferent to the denotative force of those words. The passage he mentions reads as follows:

Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔπεα πτερόεντ' ἀγόρευον  
 Φαίηκες δολιχῆρετμοι, ναυσίκλυτοι ἄνδρες.  
 ὦδε δέ τις εἶπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·  
 "ὦ μοι, τίς δὴ νῆα θοὴν ἐπέδησ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ  
 οἴκαδ' ἐλαυνομένην;"

(*Od.* 13.165–69)

One's familiarity with the epic diction, Parry argued, leads one to realize that in order to fill this particular segment of the line (from the beginning of the third foot to the hephthemimeral caesura) and express the essential idea of "ship," the poet could not have chosen any epithet except *θοήν*; therefore it is not worth asking whether he chose the word to convey some subtle nuance of meaning, some "statement of pity for the fate of this ship, so swift when it bore Odysseus to his home." What Parry did not seem to realize, though, is that it is not by necessity that the poet had just that portion of the line to fill. He had a degree of control over how much of the line he would need to fill, as is evident when one realizes that he could have composed the line otherwise. He could, for instance, have said:

ὦ μοι, τίς δὴ νῆ ἐπέδησ' ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ;

Ah me, who was it fastened our ship on the wine-dark sea?

In other words, the poet has several essential ideas in this line—the ideas of “ship” and “sea” in particular—and he can expand the formula used to express one by contracting the formula used to express the other. When they appear in the positions that they do in this line, both words, *ship* and *sea*, normally appear with an epithet (νῆα appears at this position twenty-one times with the epithet θοῇν and twelve times with no epithet; πόντῳ appears in this position six times with the epithet οἶνοπι and four times with no epithet). But as this particular line is constructed, there is only room for one of the nouns to have an epithet. The poet, I would argue, considers his options. He can say either “the swift ship was bound to the sea” or “the ship was bound to the wine-dark sea.” He realizes that by choosing to say “swift ship,” he can produce two striking poetic effects: an elegiac “statement of pity for the fate of this ship, so swift when it bore Odysseus to his home” (precisely what Parry argued against) and (a significance Parry did not consider, but would dismiss on the same grounds) the provocative paradox of something swift being bound. By contrast, for the poet to say “wine-dark sea” will in this context achieve no equally compelling effect. So he chooses a swift ship over a wine-dark sea, for that is the phrase most appropriate to this particular context.

In a different context, of course, to speak of a wine-dark sea might be the more effective choice. Consider, for instance, the passage in which Odysseus, eager to leave Calypso’s island, states his resolve to endure the perils of the voyage:

εἰ δ’ αὖ τις ῥαίησι θεῶν ἐνὶ οἶνοπι πόντῳ. (Od. 5.221)

This line could as easily have had an epithet describing the gods rather than the sea, for example,

εἰ δ’ αὖ τις ῥαίησι θεῶν μακάρων ἐνὶ πόντῳ.

But to speak of the dark sea is an effective way to heighten the sense of danger Odysseus faces, while to speak of some god smiting him on the sea as blessed is absurd. So the poet chooses the more contextually apt of the two phrases at his disposal.

Before continuing, I need to be clear about two points. First, by arguing that Homer was capable of arranging his lines so as to be able to employ a particular formula appropriate to the context, I am not arguing

that he could—as a nontraditional poet can—make *all* of his language context-specific. On the contrary, in order to facilitate just a single phrase appropriate to the context in which it appears, the poet might have to sing several lines in which he uses formulas precisely as Parry argued they are always used: without regard to immediate context. The contextual appropriateness of several lines would be sacrificed, so to speak, in order to insure that one particularly apt expression might be used. Second, while I have for the sake of rapid illustration been using (and will continue to use) single lines as my examples, the principle I am describing pertains as well or better to whole passages. The general picture I am trying to paint is one of a bard who in the passage he is about to narrate has a number of (in Parry's term) essential ideas that he wants to express; and since he wants to express some limited number of these essential ideas in a particular way, he uses whatever version of the other essential ideas will leave him in a position to express his favored ideas in just the way he wants. The bard makes some formulas appropriate at the cost of others' being inappropriate or indifferently appropriate to the immediate situation.<sup>6</sup>

Two more examples will help substantiate (and qualify) my argument. In book 1 of the *Iliad*, Chryses is described praying to Apollo:

ἡρᾶθ' ὁ γεραῖος  
Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητώ. (II. 1.35–36)

Here, in contrast with the lines I have examined up to this point, both Apollo and Leto are modified by an epithet. But I would claim that only the epithet describing Apollo is meant to convey its full denotative force. Apollo is appropriately called a king at this moment, for that denomination effectively underscores the purpose for which Chryses

<sup>6</sup>Egbert Bakker and Florence Fabbricotti, following Edzard Visser, have advanced a similar argument by contending that in a given verse there is "nuclear" and "peripheral" material. They have shown that in verses that describe one character killing another, the phrase used to describe the spear is "peripheral" in that it varies depending on what portion of the line is left over when the ("nuclear") names of killer and victim have been placed. Such terminology may prove misleading, if it leads us to believe that certain elements of a verse are always nuclear, others always peripheral. (I can imagine instances in which the poet would want to insist on a sharp or shining spear and would modify the names of killer and victim to insure the proper epithet for "spear.") Accordingly, I prefer to continue using *formula*, a term whose limitations are already well established.

approaches him. Having failed to persuade *king* Agamemnon to release his daughter, the priest turns to Agamemnon's superior, *king* Apollo. There is no special reason for us to think of Leto at this time as fair-haired, so we treat this epithet as Parry would treat all ornamental epithets. In fact, a possible recast of the line,

Ἀπόλλωνι Λυκηγενεῖ, δν τέκε πότνια Λητώ,

demonstrates that Leto is described by Homer as ἡῤκομος rather than πότνια solely so that Achilles can be described as a king, rather than the far less appropriate "wolf-born." This is what I mean when I claim that the poet, in order to employ a specific formula, uses whatever version of formulas nearby will allow the favored formula. We should treat those "set up" formulas, I would argue, precisely as Parry argued that we should treat all formulas: without regard to their particular denotative force.

It is possible, finally, that in some instances both portions of a line will be contextually appropriate. This is what I consider to be the case in 1.8:

Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

Son of Atreus, ruler of men and divine Achilles.

The antithesis of ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν and δῖος sketches in bold strokes the conflict to come—a conflict in which Agamemnon pulls his rank as king *of men* on Achilles, who in turn relies on his *goddess*-mother to set into action on his behalf a *divinely* orchestrated chain of events. Usually, though, half of the line will have to be, as I put it, sacrificed for the sake of the other half.

Again this argument is an extension, not a refutation, of Parry's. I believe that the audience is, as Parry argued, *prepared* to ignore the significance of a given epithet; I diverge from Parry only when he claims that the audience *always* does so. I believe instead that the flexibility of the various formulas allows the bard to make some appropriate to their context—at the expense, though, of having some others be inappropriate or indifferently appropriate. But since his audience is prepared to ignore the inappropriate ones, those formulas simply form the ground or foil against which the contextually motivated formulas manifest themselves.

# AVOIDING A FORMULA—BOHN ΑΓΑΘΟΣ ΔΙΟΜΗΔΗΣ

The seeds of my expansion of Parry's theory, as I noted, are present in his own argument—though he did not seem to realize it. My first example was the way in which Parry himself unwittingly demonstrated that there are multiple metrically equivalent ways of saying "X replied." Exploring the second example of how Parry implicitly refuted his own argument will provide the opportunity for drawing out some of the implications of my view of formulaic diction.

Before beginning his discussion of generic epithets, Parry summed up his argument to that point:

The poet (or poets) of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was so thoroughly steeped in traditional formulas that he never once . . . created of his own accord an epithet revealing the personal stamp of his thought. Traces of originality remain, perhaps; but of an originality that does no more than rearrange the words and expressions of the tradition without important modifications. The poet's greatest originality in the handling of epithets would have been to use some noun-epithet formulas a little more or a little less frequently than other poets. (*Collected Works* 82-83)

The early portions of this quotation simply restate his fundamental thesis concerning the traditional character of epic diction. But the claim that one poet could use some formulas more or less frequently than another poet runs counter to the impression which Parry usually gives, of the bard's simply finding himself in a position in which he must use one or another epithet. Indeed, the claim that a poet could deliberately use one epithet more or less frequently supports instead the understanding of formulaic diction that I have been outlining. For how could the bard avoid (or use especially often) a particular subject formula except by deliberately controlling, through the lengthening and shortening of other formulas, the spot in the line at which he began the subject formula?

One implication that I am interested in drawing out of this argument concerns audience expectation. Parry at one point in his argument suggested that as we study Homer's diction, we should always keep in mind the apprentice bard and the process by which he masters his storytelling craft (*Collected Works* 56). I would suggest that we might do better to keep in mind the audience. Considering audience expectation

will help show how a poet's choosing to use a particular epithet more or less often can have important contextual ramifications.

The epithet most frequently used to describe Diomedes is *βοῆν ἄγαθός*. Yet during his raid on the Trojan camp, narrated in book 10 of the *Iliad*, when silence is of the essence, he is not once referred to with this epithet. One can imagine the suspense for the audience when this episode was sung. Knowing that if the poet was not careful about where he ended up in the line, he might have to describe Diomedes as *βοῆν ἄγαθός*, and realizing that to have a great shout is a liability at this moment, they listened carefully to see if he would slip up and so describe Diomedes. The narration, in fact, parallels the event being narrated, for just as within the world of the story Diomedes must avoid making noise, so too in the real world must the poet avoid dooming him, as it were, by using that epithet.

This suspenseful poetic effect, moreover, in which the poet deliberately avoids using a particular epithet, is heightened by the frequency with which he uses that same epithet just before the episode. In the opening 283 lines of book 10, the poet describes Diomedes as *βοῆν ἄγαθός* no fewer than four times, or roughly once in every seventy lines of verse. Although this is, as I mentioned, the most common epithet for Diomedes, it is never used with quite this degree of frequency. Even in book 5, where his *aristeia* is narrated, Diomedes is only described as *βοῆν ἄγαθός* about once every ninety-five lines. Thus in the opening of book 10 the poet is taunting his audience, reminding them that Diomedes has a loud voice which might be a liability in the coming mission. Moreover, the poet does this right up to the moment when silence is necessary; even immediately before embarking on the raid. When Diomedes begins his prayer to Athena, he is described as *βοῆν ἄγαθός*. Once the raid begins, though, the epithet is not used. (In this connection it is worth noting the only other time in the epics in which silence is critical: the Trojan Horse episode. Diomedes and Odysseus are the only two heroes mentioned by name in that scene, and appropriately Diomedes is again without the *βοῆν ἄγαθός*.)

The reading I have just advanced assumes that the members of the bard's audience were so familiar with the formulaic diction as to have in the back of their minds a sort of rough thesaurus or catalog of the various ways in which each essential idea could be expressed—like the tables that Parry lays out in his dissertation. Such a thesaurus would allow the audience, on some level of awareness at least, to compare the poet's actual words with a number of other ways in which he could have



said the same thing. Of course, their mental thesauri would not be as complete as the poet's, so they might on occasion need to be reminded of a certain epithet—as I have shown the poet reminding them of βοῆν ἄγαθὸς Διομήδης in the opening of book 10—but once they were so reminded, they could hear (as in line 446) κρατερὸς Διομήδης and recognize the appropriateness of the poet's avoiding, in this moment when silence is so critical, the standard epithet.

### THE BARD'S STYLISTIC LIMITATIONS

Though I have shown that the oral-formulaic bard had a degree of stylistic freedom in the use of his formulas, it must be admitted that that freedom is fairly limited. For example, I have shown that one can fill an entire line saying "Odysseus replied" in at least three ways:

- (1) τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς
- (2) τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς
- (3) τὸν δ' αὖ διογενὴς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἡμείβετο μῦθον.

So, depending on the context, one can stress Odysseus' scheming (πολύμητις), his endurance (πολύτλας), or his divine lineage (διογενής). But this is still not very many choices—certainly not the range available to the nontraditional poet to whom Parry contrasts Homer, who has perhaps dozens of alternative ways of expressing any given essential idea, and whose audience, also aware of those alternate expressions, can judge how appropriate a choice he made from among them, and thus evaluate his style. Take, for example, a passage from *Paradise Lost* in which Milton describes Satan preparing to rouse the host of fallen angels:

He [Beelzebub] scarce had ceased when the superior Fiend  
 Was moving toward the shore; his ponderous shield  
 Ethereal temper, massy, large and round,  
 Behind him cast; the broad circumference  
 Hung on his shoulders like the Moon. (1.283–86)

One might admire in this passage Milton's choice of the word *ponderous* to describe Satan's shield. The basis of one's admiration would be a comparison, conscious or unconscious, between the word *ponderous* and the other words Milton might have chosen: *heavy*, *bulky*, *weighty*,

*massive*, etc. And because Milton had more choices than a Greek oral poet had, we can more easily grant that he chose *le mot juste*, the word that of all words best captures what we presume to be the desired nuance. Since we cannot look in the Homeric poems for one word or phrase selected for its particular nuance from a large number of similar alternatives, we might conclude that, even given my modifications of Parry's thesis, the poet is still really a traditional poet in Parry's sense of that term.

Yes and no. For if we again broaden our focus from single words to whole lines or passages, we find that the several options which the nontraditional poet has for each word make for an almost infinite number of permutations for the line as a whole; the reader of the text has the opportunity to pause and reflect on those choices and their alternatives, and thus to evaluate the stylistic skill of the poet. The oral poet had fewer options, but on some level his audience was aware of those options. The result was that the oral poet might actually impress his audience with his stylistic skills during performance, for given the bard's restricted range of possibilities, his audience could, arguably, feel the effect of his choice of a particular formula even at the speed of the bard's performance. Thus the more limited stylistic range was eminently suited to that particular mode of presentation.

#### THE EFFECT ON THE FORMULA OF OCCASIONAL LOCAL SIGNIFICANCE

I summarize, conclude, and extend my remarks by reversing my perspective. I have so far considered the way a line or phrase can be suited to its context. Now I would like to consider what suiting a given phrase to the context does for the phrase itself. Parry's understanding of Homeric diction suggests that a given epithet, by being repeated in contexts where it fits more or less well, relinquishes its denotative force and becomes merely ornamental. But I would argue that this drift into ornamentality is by no means an irreversible, one-way process. For the more contexts in which a formula is repeated, the more opportunities it has so appropriately to fit one of those contexts as to have its meaning suddenly renewed.

Nor need such a process seem foreign to our own experience. We often say in parting, "I'll see you later," meaning simply "I'm sure I'll meet you again soon." But if one inadvertently says "I'll see you later"

to a blind person, the phrase might suddenly become charged with a meaning it has long ceased to hold, and might sustain that resonance the next several times one used the phrase.

I submit that the occasional appropriateness of Homeric formulas insures their renewal as well as their fading. We accordingly ought not simply to watch, as Parry argued we should, their drift into meaninglessness (or, more precisely, we ought not to grant that almost all epithets have already drifted into meaninglessness). Instead, we ought to attend to their oscillation into ornamentality and back out again into contextually appropriate vividness. And, since (as I have shown) the bard has the ability to use a formula where he wants to and thus deliberately to jolt that formula back into significance, I suggest that we ought to attend to this oscillation as an artfully controlled process. I suggest, finally, that this particular poetic mode, in which the poet sparks back into vividness something that is drifting away into oblivion, perfectly suits the Homeric bard, whose purpose it is to grant *κλεος*, that is, to spark back into vividness the memory of the hero, lest it fade into the oblivion of human forgetfulness.

GREGORY MACHACEK

MARIST COLLEGE, POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y.

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
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# HERACLES, DEIANEIRA, AND NESSUS: REVERSE CHRONOLOGY AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN BACCHYLIDES 16

Bacchylides 16 consists of a single triad, of which the introductory strophe (1–12) sets the occasion for the song.<sup>1</sup> The antistrophe and the epode are closely linked. Lines 13–22 concern the arrival of Heracles at Caeneum and the sacrifices he performs there. Lines 23–35 shift the focus to Deianeira and her reaction to the news that Heracles has returned with Iole. This epode concludes with a dramatic flashback to the encounter of Heracles and Deianeira with Nessus, which coincides with the realization that it was this event and no other that determined the course of later events.

- ... ]μου . ιο . . . . ]πει  
 όλκ[άδ' ]πεμψεν ]μοι χρυσέαν  
 Πιερ[ίαθεν ][ύθ]ρογος [Ο]ύρανία,  
 πολυφ]άτων γέμουσαν ύμων  
 5 . . . . . ]γειρις ]π' άνθεμόεντι Έβρωι  
 . . . . . ]γάλλεται ή δολιχαύχενι κύ[κνωι  
 . . . . . ]δείαν φρένα τερπόμενος  
 . . . . . ]δ' ]κηι παηόνων  
 άνθεα πεδοιχνεΐν,  
 10 Πύθι' Άπολλον,  
 τόσα χοροΐ Δελφών  
 σόν κελάδησαν παρ' άγαυάεα ναόν,  
 πρίν γε κλέομεν λιπεΐν  
 Οίχαλιαν πυρϊ δαπτομέναν  
 15 Άμφιτρωνιάδαν θρασυμηδέα φώ-  
 θ', ]κετο δ' άμφικύμον' άκτάν·  
 ένθ' άπό λαΐδος εύρυνεφεΐ Κηναΐωι

<sup>1</sup>The precise genre is unclear. For a discussion of the possibilities see Burnett, *Art of Bacchylides* 193–94 n. 14, which attempts to suggest that Bacchylides' treatment of the story of Heracles and Deianeira implies dependence on Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, but the arguments are not convincing. See, e.g., March, *The Creative Poet* 64, who argues that "the idea of apparently right and well-motivated action in the past finally bringing man in some way to ruin or death" is Sophoclean and thus indicates the priority of *Trachiniae*, despite the appearance of the same technique in Bacchylides 5 (476 B.C.). For the most recent appraisal of this position see Davies, *Sophocles' Trachiniae* xxxii–xxxiii. See also the discussion in Burnett, *Art of Bacchylides* 194–95 n. 27.

- Ζηνὶ θύεν βαρυαχέας ἐννέα ταύρους  
 δύο τ' ὀρσιάλωι δαμασίχθονι μέλ-  
 20 λε κόραι τ' ὀβριμοδερχεῖ ἄζυγα  
 παρθένωι Ἀθάναι  
 ὑψικέραν βοῦν.  
 τότε ἄμαχος δαίμων  
 Δαϊανείραι πολύδακρυν ὕφα[νε  
 25 μῆτιν ἐπίφρον' ἐπεὶ  
 πύθετ' ἀγγελίαν ταλαπενθέα,  
 Ἴόλαν ὅτι λευκώλενον  
 Διὸς υἱὸς ἀταρβομάχας  
 ἄλοχον λιπαρὸ[ν] ποτὶ δόμον πέμ[π]οι.  
 30 ἃ δῦσμορος, ἃ τάλ[α]ιν', ὅλον ἐμήσατ[ο].  
 φθόνος εὐρυβίας νιν ἀπώλεσεν,  
 δνόφεόν τε κάλυμμα τῶν  
 ὕστερον ἐρχομένων,  
 ὅτ' ἐπὶ ῥοδόεντι Λυκόρμαι  
 35 δέξατο Νέσσου πάρα δαιμόνιον τέρ[ας].<sup>2</sup>

Wide-throned Urania sent me a golden ship loaded with many-voiced songs from Pieria . . . whether beside the banks of blooming Hebrus . . . or he delights in a long-necked swan to cheer his spirit . . . and you come, Pythian Apollo, to seek the blooms of paeans which the chorus of Delphians sing beside your famous temple, but first I will sing how that bold man, the son of Amphitryon, left Oechalia consumed with fire and reached the sea-wrapped promontory. Then, from his largess he was about to sacrifice nine bellowing bulls to Caenean Zeus, lord of the wide clouds, and two to the sea-churning lord of the earth, and a long-horned unyoked cow to dark-eyed virgin Athena. Then an irresistible power wove a sorrowful canny scheme for Deianeira when she perceived the grievous message that the son of Zeus, unshakable in battle, was sending white-armed Iole to his bright house to be his wife. O ill-fated, o wretched woman! What a thing she devised! Wide-ruling envy destroyed her and a dark veil of future things, when on the banks of rosy Lycormus she received from Nessus the divine portent.

The extreme brevity and allusiveness of the narrative present various interpretative problems.<sup>3</sup> In less than two dozen lines we are

<sup>2</sup>The text used throughout this paper is that of Snell and Maehler, *Bacchylidis Carmina*. The translations are my own.

<sup>3</sup>It has been argued, for example, that the spareness of the poem is evidence of its dependence on another source. The most common suggestion is the lost epic *Sack of*

whisked from an image of Heracles, fresh from his capture of Oechalia, sacrificing at Caeneum, to the machinations of Deianeira, then suddenly back to the encounter of Heracles and Deianeira with Nessus. The poem's most salient feature, however, is its ominous conclusion, as it breaks off abruptly just as the "gift" of the dying centaur to Deianeira is mentioned, leaving the sequel to be imagined. This dramatic technique is common in Bacchylides, particularly in the dithyrambs, but in this poem it has the effect of forcing the reader to thoroughly reevaluate the actions of Heracles and Deianeira.<sup>4</sup> Throughout the narrative they are presented as independent actors whose decisions are meaningful and consequential. We discover, however, that the outcome of these actions has been determined all along. Moreover, their fate was somehow signaled long in advance, for the gift of Nessus is described as a *teras* (35). Literally the word describes a monster, but as early as Homer it had come to mean a portent or sign whose provenance is the gods.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, according to the narrator the significance of Deianeira's actions was unforeseeable, due to the *κάλυμμα τῶν ὕστερον ἐρχομένων* (32–33) woven by the *amachos daimōn* (23) that deceived her. We are left to ponder whether the sign is a veil or whether the veil itself is somehow a sign, for within the impossible combination of veil and sign lies the fate of Heracles and Deianeira. This essay first looks at the Bacchylidean representation of Heracles and Deianeira and compares it with Pindar's. This analysis will reveal that Heracles in Bacchylides is more important as a figure for human limitation rather than for human achievement, as in other authors.<sup>6</sup>

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*Oechalia*. For the testimonia attributing this poem to Creophylus of Samos see Davies, *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 149–53.

<sup>4</sup>Five dithyrambs are substantially complete, of which three (15, 16, 18) end abruptly. Ode 15 concerns the embassy of Menelaus and Odysseus to King Priam to demand the restitution of Helen and breaks off at the end of Menelaus' speech, leaving the incomparable speech of Odysseus (reported by Antenor, *Il.* 3.216–24) and the unfavorable decision of the Trojans to follow. Likewise, Ode 18 concerns Theseus (still unrecognized) on the road from Troezen to Athens, as the report of his deeds and approach cause great anxiety for Aegeus and the messenger with whom he speaks.

<sup>5</sup>*Il.* 3.24; 4.76, 398, 408; 5.742; 6.183; 11.4, 28; 12.209, 229, 256; 17.548; *Od.* 3.173; 12.394; 15.168; 16.320; 20.101, 114; 21.415. All Homeric *τέρατα* have a divine origin or are assumed to by those who observe them.

<sup>6</sup>Segal ("Croesus on the Pyre") has contrasted the representation of the Croesus story in Bacchylides 3 with Herodotus' version (1.86–87). Herodotus' version is unintelligible except in the light of the king's previous conversation with Solon on the character of human fortune. It is Croesus' final recognition of Solon's wisdom as he is about to be burnt alive that causes him to call aloud the name of Solon and, inadvertently, to save

Bacchylides 13, written to celebrate the Nemean victory of Pytheas of Aegina, begins with forty-three very fragmentary lines. At the point where the text becomes readable an unnamed speaker (perhaps Athena) is describing the great deeds of Heracles:

ὑβριος ὑψινόου  
παύσει δίκας θνατοῖσι κραίνων·  
οἷαν τινὰ δύσλοφον ὤ-  
μησται λέοντι  
Περσείδας ἐφίησι  
χεῖρα παντοίαισι τέχναις·  
οὐ γὰρ] δαμασίμβροτος αἰθων  
χαλ]κὸς ἀπλάτου θέλει  
χωρε]ῖν διὰ σώματος, ἐ-  
γνάμ]φθη δ' ὀπίσσω  
φάσγ]ανον· ἥ ποτέ φαμι  
ταῖδε] περὶ στεφάνοισι  
παγκ]ρατίου πόνον ἔλ-  
λάνεσσιν] ἰδρῶεντ' ἔσεσθαι.

(13.44–57)

He will put an end to [acts of] arrogant insolence and establish justice for mortals. How great a hand the scion of Perseus lets loose with great skill upon the flesh-eating lion. For the bright bronze, the slayer of men, cannot pierce its body, and his sword is turned backward. One day, I say, in this place Hellenes seeking the crowns of victory will engage in the sweating toil of the pancratium.

In Bacchylides 13 Heracles' battle with the Nemean lion is linked explicitly both to the institution of the Nemean games and to the development of civilization.<sup>7</sup> This interpretation of Heracles as civilizer is

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himself. In Ode 3 Croesus goes to the pyre of his own free will, lamenting his misfortune and blaming Apollo for his ingratitude. He calls for the fire to be lit, but is saved by the god himself *di' eusebeian* (61). Segal concludes that "the two treatments . . . exemplify basic differences between archaic and classical art" (49–50). While for Segal Bacchylides is still archaic in thought, the characters of Herodotus bear the stamp of Sophoclean tragedy. While these statements are true for epinician poetry in general, they do not adequately account for Bacchylides' representation of Heracles in Ode 5, particularly in view of Ode 16.

<sup>7</sup>By removing radical injustice and repressing savagery in others Heracles creates the minimum conditions for a reasonably just civilization, without being particularly just or civilized himself. For the Pindaric treatment of this paradox see P.Oxy. 2450 fr. 1 and discussion in Ostwald, "Pindar, *Nomos*, and Heracles"; Silk, "Heracles in Greek Tragedy."



characteristic of Pindar, for example, in the prophecy of Teiresias concerning the future of Heracles in *Nemean* 1:

ὁ δέ οἱ  
φράζε καὶ παντὶ στρατῷ, ποίαις ὁμλήσει τύχαις,  
δοσσοὺς μὲν ἐν χέρσῳ κτανῶν,  
δοσσοὺς δὲ πόντῳ θήρας αἰδροδίκας,  
καὶ τίνα σὺν πλαγίῳ  
ἀνδρῶν κόρῳ στείχοντα τὸν ἐχθρότατον  
φᾶσέ νιν δώσειν μόρφ. (Nem. 1.61–66)

And he spoke to Amphitryon and to the entire company and told them what fate Heracles would encounter, and how many lawless beasts he would kill on land and in the ocean, and that he would give over to him a hateful man who from the glut of other men goes craftily.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, the use of Heracles' labors as paradigmatic for the *athla* of the competitors at the Great Games is also found in *Olympian* 10, where Pindar mentions the contest which Heracles founded:

ἀρχαίῳ σάματι παρ' Πέλοπος  
πόνων ἐξάριθμον ἐκτίσσαιτο,  
ἐπεὶ Ποσειδάνιον  
πέφνε Κτέατον ἀμύμονα,  
πέφνε δ' Εὐρυτον, ὡς Αὐγέαν λάτριον  
ἀέκονθ' ἐκὼν μισθὸν ὑπέρβιον  
πράσσοιτο (Ol. 10.24–29)

he established it beside the ancient tomb of Pelops, when he killed Kteatus, the blameless son of Poseidon and Eurytus, willingly, to make violent, unwilling Augeas pay his servile wage.

Thus, the twofold representation of Heracles as a paradigm for establishment of the Great Games and as civilizer of a dangerous world, illustrated by the foregoing examples, is common to both Pindar and Bacchylides. Indeed, for Pindar this representation of the Theban hero is largely unambiguous and consistent. For Bacchylides, however, Heracles is far more ambivalent.

In Bacchylides this positive representation of Heracles appears

<sup>8</sup>For further discussion of Heracles in Pindar and bibliography see Pike, "Pindar's Treatment of the Heracles Myths"; Mullen, "The Herakles Theme in Pindar" 29–34; Galinsky, *The Herakles Theme* 23–39.

only in Ode 13. The two other places in the corpus where Heracles makes a major appearance both emphasize the tragic aspect of his fate.<sup>9</sup> In particular, they both concern the events that contribute to Heracles' death. Ode 5, the most elaborate of Bacchylides' epinicians, was composed in honor of Hieron's Olympic victory of 476. The importance of this victory to the tyrant can be gauged by the lavish attention that was given to its celebration. For in addition to Bacchylides' poem, Hieron's victory commanded a second tribute, Pindar's *Olympian* 1. Yet unlike Pindar's contribution, which, after the famous priamel in praise of the Olympic games, uses the myth of Pelops to link Hieron's victory to the one embedded in his mythic narrative (that of the young Pelops over Oenomaus), Bacchylides' ode is much less sanguine about human achievement. Although it represents Heracles at the zenith of his accomplishments, about to complete the harrowing of Hades itself, the emphasis is instead upon human limitations.<sup>10</sup> Bacchylides represents the meeting and subsequent conversation between Heracles and Meleager, the bulk of which is devoted to Meleager's narrative of his miserable death and to Heracles' empathetic response.

Heracles is able to see his human fate prefigured in the story of Meleager. The conclusions he draws from the story are both universal and particular. Thus, he weeps for Meleager but concludes that for all mortals it is best never to have lived. This conclusion, however, is not allowed to stand. Heracles has reached the height of his accomplishments and is offered Meleager's insight into the problem of human helplessness, yet he chooses not to avoid the fate of Meleager, but to follow it. For Heracles the only consolation for man's dolorous mortality is achievement. As he says, there is no *praxis* in lament; one must

<sup>9</sup>A possible fragment of Bacchylides also concerns the confrontation with Nessus (P.Berol. 16140 = Snell and Maehler 64). As March points out (*The Creative Poet* 55–66), its remains seem to indicate a narrative harmonious with the representation of the scene on several vase paintings where Deianeira stands by as Heracles beats Nessus with a club. The attribution of the poem to Bacchylides is uncertain (Snell and Maehler 64 = Pindar [Bowra 341]), but for arguments in favor of Bacchylidean authorship see Snell, "Drei Berliner Papyri," esp. 182–83. At any rate, the remains of the poem are too exiguous to deduce much about the treatment of the myth. In view of the existence of Ode 5 and Ode 16 it seems difficult to believe that Bacchylides could tell a story of Heracles and Deianeira that did not involve a glance into the future, but it is impossible to say more.

<sup>10</sup>Pindar takes some trouble to suppress elements of his story that are unseemly in an epinician context. In *Ol.* 1 one might think primarily of the version that includes the bribing of Myrtilus, Oenomaus' charioteer. On variation in the Pelops story see Köhnken, "Pindar as Innovator."

say instead what he intends to bring about (5.162–64). The conversation concludes with his solicitation of a bride σοῖ (sc. Μελεάγρῳι) φυὰν ἀλιγλία (5.168), but the marriage he seeks is with none other than Deianeira, who will inadvertently be his killer. True to her name,<sup>11</sup> she will later destroy Heracles in a fateful attempt to win back his affection.<sup>12</sup> Bacchylides breaks off the myth at this point and leaves Heracles standing in Hades, the name of his chosen destroyer still hanging in his ears.

In his most extensive appearance in the Bacchylidean corpus, Heracles' recognition of human limitation is juxtaposed with his inability to apply that knowledge with profit to his own life. Although at the height of his career as he carries out his most brilliant exploit, he is already in the process of self-destruction. For him success and destruction seem inextricably connected. In fact both are perhaps inadvertently suggested by his use of *telein* (5.164), if we are justified in attributing a further irony to this highly ironical speech. Heracles uses the word to mean "complete" or "accomplish," but it also suggests the completion of one's life.<sup>13</sup> In any case, we are far from the Heracles of Pindar's *Olympian* 3, who returns triumphantly from the land of the Hyperboreans with an olive shoot for Zeus' Olympian grove (11–19).

With the contrast between the Heracles of Pindar and of Bacchylides' Ode 5 in mind we can now return to Ode 16, a sequel to Ode 5, continuing the tragic portrayal of Heracles' and Deianeira's mortal blindness. As in Ode 5, here too the barrier of human ignorance is insurmountable. The unlucky mortals never find out how things stand

<sup>11</sup>For the significance of Deianeira's name see Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* 63; Burnett, *Art of Bacchylides* 143–44. The same motif appears in *Bacchylides* fr. 64 (P.Oxy. 6.860), which treats the confrontation between Heracles and Nessus in detail. At the place where Deianeira's name presumably occurs we also find περιδαῖς ὄμμα (21) and ἐν δαί (24).

<sup>12</sup>In the course of Ode 5 we encounter several man-destroying females. Artemis and Althaea are both described as δαίφρων and together *destroy* Meleager. Deianeira will likewise destroy Heracles, a fact that the irony of the abrupt conclusion to the Heracles–Meleager interview seems designed to highlight. March (*The Creative Poet* 49–60) has assembled the evidence for a far more dangerous Deianeira than the heroine of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*. A poem more concerned with the essential innocence of Deianeira could have exploited this alternate possibility. The present discussion of folk etymology should not be taken to imply anything about the historical evolution of the words involved. It is generally believed that there are different origins for δαίφρων (from \*δα(σ)ι-) and δαῖω, κτλ. (probably from \*δαF-yo via δαί-Fω). See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* I 246, 248–49, 271.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1114. I owe this reference to Alysia Ward.

until it is too late. Heracles concludes from Meleager's paradigmatic tale that in the face of an unknowable future, what is important is to say what one intends to accomplish (ὅτι καὶ μέλλει τελεῖν, 5.164) and continues by blithely asking Meleager for his sister Deianeira in marriage. In Ode 16 the sequence of human intention undercut by the fatality of events is repeated. Heracles and Deianeira act as independent agents intent on "accomplishing" their desires, as if in obedience to the Heraclan maxim quoted above. An intricate series of events is narrated, only to be undermined by the concluding lines, which explain everything that has happened as the working out of fate.<sup>14</sup>

Further, this fate is both impersonal and unforeseeable. It is executed by a *daimōn* (23) and had been signaled by a *daimonion teras* (35), a divine portent.<sup>15</sup> The phrase itself deserves comment, for it has no direct parallel. *Teras* is a standard word in Homer to describe a sign from the gods (*Il.* 2.324, 4.408, 5.742, etc.). The word appears once elsewhere in Bacchylides, where Zeus delivers a lightning flash, described as a θυμάρμενον . . . τέρας (17.72) in response to a request from his son Minos. So also in Pindar (*Ol.* 8.41, 13.73) its divine associations are clear, and, as a result, when coupled with the epithet *daimonion*, "divine," the phrase might appear redundant. Bacchylides, however, apparently wants to emphasize the invisible hand of divine fate in the lives of Heracles and Deianeira. He therefore describes the superhuman provenance of the sign as *daimonion*.

Thus, the poem presents to us a double structure of irony. The grim purposefulness of Heracles' and Deianeira's actions are at odds with their ultimate irrelevance. At the same time the poet insists on the presence of divine signaling, which anticipates the denouement of their

<sup>14</sup>Burnett evidently believes that Heracles has offended Athena with the "invidious moderation" (*Art of Bacchylides* 125) of his sacrifice (16.18–22). But it is unclear that there is any special significance to the list. For example, in Nestor's description of a sacrifice in *Il.* 11.727–29 the divinities appear in the same order (with the addition of the River Alpheus). The *hiera kala* dedicated to Zeus appear to be most substantial, but no clear inference can be made concerning the respective status of the other recipients based on the number of victims offered.

<sup>15</sup>In this respect Ode 16 accords well with the cosmic structure of Ode 5. Compare particularly the abundance of impersonal powers there: εὔμοιρε (1), μοῖρ' (121, 143), θεός (36, 50), μοῖραν (51), ὠκύμορον (141), πότμον (158), κακόποτος (138), δαίμων (113, 135), εὐδαίμων (55). As such, the conclusion of Ode 16 functions as a corrective to the representation of Heracles in Ode 5. There his persistent blindness is underscored. Here we learn that even a fuller insight is unproductive against impersonal fate.




Figure 1.

fates but is veiled from their mortal eyes (cf. κάλυμμα τῶν ὕστερον ἐρχομένων, 32–33).<sup>16</sup>

The irony that derives from the co-presence of imagery suggesting blindness and insight is heightened by the poet's use of temporal words to structure the narrative. This tactic suggests that the narrative consists of a highly determined sequence of causes and effects, but the effect of the sequence is undermined by the final lines of the poem, which force the listener to reevaluate radically the chronology of its events.

"Before" (πρίν, 13) the arrival of Apollo in Delphi the poet will sing his story. "Next" (ἐνθ', 17) Heracles journeys to Caeneum, and selects from his property a number of sacrificial victims. "Then" (τότ', 23) the *daimōn* intercedes with its plan "when" (ἐπεί, 25) Deianeira hears about Iole. To this point it appears that the narrative can be plotted simply with the vertical axis representing sequential action and the horizontal axis contemporaneous action (figure 1).

This orderly chronology unravels in the final two lines. The poet links the destruction of Deianeira and Heracles temporally with the events of long ago. Their fates were set "*when* beside rosy Lycormus she received the divine sign from Nessus" (34–35). The final ὅτε clause forces us to reinterpret the other temporal clauses discussed above. The

<sup>16</sup>Contrast the semantics of recognition in Homer discussed by Nagy, *Greek Mythology and Poetics* 202–22. There the *sēmata* are always potentially recognizable by someone with *noos*, though nevertheless in danger of being ignored or forgotten (forms of *lēth-*). On the confluence of *sēma* and *teras* in Bacchylides see Ode 17, where Minos, in order to intimidate the young Theseus, asks for and receives from Zeus a *sām' ἄρλγworon* (57). Wishing to honor his son, Zeus sends a thunderbolt, which Minos describes to Theseus as a θυμάρμενον . . . τέρας (71–72).

poet initially represents the weaving of the *mētis* as contemporaneous with the reception of the message about Iole. Οἶον ἐμῆσατ[ο] (30), the narrator exclaims, and goes on to explain: φθόνος εὐρυβίης νιν ἀπώλεσεν, δνόφεόν τε κάλυμμα τῶν ὕστερον ἐρχομένων (31–33). The source of her destruction is twofold: resentment and a dark veil of future things. One belongs to the Centaur Nessus, the other to her. Φθόνος εὐρυβίης is not always correctly understood, in my view. *Phthonos* is often taken to mean “envy” and thus to refer to Deianeira’s jealousy of Iole, but such an understanding is a departure from its usual meaning of “resentment” or “blame.” So understood, the resentment properly belongs to Nessus, who long ago tricked Deianeira into preserving some of his poisoned blood in order to avenge himself upon his killer, Heracles. This association seems confirmed by the final line of the poem, and I cannot agree with Burnett that understanding the word as having some application to Nessus is “an excessively modern sentimentalization of the centaur.”<sup>17</sup> In fact, Nagy’s discussion of the word reveals no erotic connotations at all.<sup>18</sup> Even if *phthonos* could refer to Deianeira’s jealousy, the connotations of the word would remain clearly hostile. She would have to be perceived as responding to Heracles’ infidelity as an avenging Medea figure. Yet there is no trace of this representation in the Deianeira of Ode 16. The poet stresses her ignorance concerning the effects of her actions. This ignorance is the second cause of her destruction, the “dark veil of future things” (33–34).<sup>19</sup>

The double structure of Deianeira’s destruction arises from the inseparable interconnection of the events that make up her story. Yet the web of ignorance and fatality into which Heracles and Deianeira have been woven (*huphane*, 24) by the *daimōn* remains completely un-

<sup>17</sup>Burnett, *Art of Bacchylides* 195 n. 25. Jebb (*Bacchylides* 373) also understands it to refer to Deianeira.

<sup>18</sup>For a detailed discussion of the word and its semantic associations see Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* 222–42.

<sup>19</sup>Yet this is not necessarily the case throughout Bacchylides. See note 12 above. March (*The Creative Poet* 49–59) discusses the development of the Deianeira story, particularly Hesiod’s representation of her in his *Catalogue of Women* (Merkelbach and West fr. 25.14–33), where she is a formidable figure. As March points out (52), there is perhaps a suggestion of this Deianeira in Heracles’ odd question to Meleager in Ode 5, where he asks for a bride σοὶ φύαν ἀλιγδα (168). Maehler notes the homoerotic subtext of the remark, but it is perhaps a vestige of the older representation of a jealous and vengeful Deianeira: cf. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides* 118–19. Nevertheless, any case for the vengeful *phthonos* attributed to Deianeira must account for the fact that the poem emphasizes her ignorance and lack of control.

seen by them.<sup>20</sup> Directly before their eyes, the workings of fate are nevertheless invisible. The series of temporal clauses that relate the acts of Deianeira encourages the audience to believe what she herself believed, that at any given point in the story she had the capacity to act significantly. Just the opposite turns out to be true. Deianeira was not destroyed when she reacted in anger to the messenger's speech, nor when she sent the fateful robe to Heracles. She was destroyed long ago on her wedding day when she received from Nessus his poisoned blood (34–35). This is the last bit of information the audience receives, although it is the most crucial point for understanding the events in which Deianeira, Heracles, and Nessus are participants. This belated discovery by the audience parallels the way in which the participants themselves come to understand their fate.

By the end of the poem everything in the story of Heracles and Deianeira seems to have been predetermined and placed outside of human influence. The *daimonion teras* (35) now recalls the *amachos daimōn* (23), and the combination of these two phrases seems to bind the narrative together on a superhuman level. The blood Deianeira receives from Nessus is a "portent," but at the same time it is completely unrecognizable as such. In fact, we are asked to see it simultaneously as a "portent" and as a "veil."<sup>21</sup> This problem is one of the central features of tragedy: one must simultaneously respect all the proper boundaries between god and man, between human desire and divine dispensation, while being forced to exist with only the most limited understanding of things. Bacchylides in like manner relates the situation of Heracles and Deianeira, where, he insists, there was a sign, yet one that was no more humanly recognizable for all its divine origin. To Deianeira the *daimonion teras* appeared as something else, or as nothing at all. Her love for Heracles, the enmity of Nessus, and the ineffable workings of fate together turned divine sign into darkest veil.

Thus in Bacchylides 16 the solution of the paradox never lies

<sup>20</sup>For the association of the weaving metaphor with the woven veil see Renehan, "Conscious Ambiguities."

<sup>21</sup>The use of *kalumma* as something that deceives or obscures the future is not found in early Greek poetry. The closest parallel would be Aesch. *Ch.* 494, ἀλοχρῶς τε βουλευτοῖσιν ἐν καλύμμασιν, where the *kalummata* are literal. The word is interesting in this context because of its wide semantic range. The only time *kalumma* appears in the *Iliad* it is a mourning veil worn by Thetis (24.94). So in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter 42: κύνειον δὲ κάλυμμα κατ' ἀμφοτέρων βάλει' ὦμων. For the association with mourning see Richardson, *Hymn to Demeter* 163.

within the powers of the human participants. But when properly understood, that is, understood from a divine perspective, or from that of the audience, the poisoned blood of Nessus becomes a graphic symbol of the impending destruction that awaits Heracles, and is therefore accurately called a *daimonion teras*, a "daemonic portent" (35). At the same time the *mētis* of Nessus, his lying story to Deianeira, is truly the instrument of her blinding. It is the δνόφρον . . . κάλυμμα τῶν ὕστερον ἐρχομένων (32–33). Thus the δνόφρον κάλυμμα and δαιμόνιον τέρας function as a unit, the former preventing the true appreciation of the latter. Both converge upon the blood of the dying centaur, making him simultaneously the vehicle for revelation (*teras*) and concealment (*kalumma*).<sup>22</sup> Only to the audience, standing outside this divine configuration, and to the gods who engender it is the mystery apparent, but the revelation itself is not a cure for the limitations of mortality. By seeing the hand of the gods at work in the lives of Heracles and Deianeira the audience will be no more able to observe the permutations of their own individual fates than before. At best, the poet offers the familiar consolation that this mortal blindness before the gods unmans even the greatest hero.

It is in this sense that we should probably understand the chronological displacement mentioned earlier: the narrative begins in the middle, and its first chronological event, the encounter with Nessus, is told last. The audience, like the characters in the narrative, are prepared to believe that the true purposes of the gods are hidden and that the future is veiled utterly; it is only the final scene that reveals to each the plan according to which all this has come about. At times, as in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, this knowledge is unbearable, and darkness instead becomes the choice (*OT* 1182–85); at others, as here and with Heracles and Meleager in Bacchylides' Ode 5, the "darkness" points not only to destruction, but to the ultimate unintelligibility of human events and the irony of human intentions.<sup>23</sup>

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UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

<sup>22</sup>To trace the original causes that lie behind human fate is not possible in this poem, although the poet indicates that the chain of responsibility goes beyond Nessus to the *amachos daimōn*.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. also Aesch. A. 1485–87. I would like to thank Barbara Gold and Alysa Ward for reading a previous draft of this paper and for offering many helpful suggestions.



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## ATHEISM, IMPIETY AND THE *LIMOS MĒLIOS* IN ARISTOPHANES' *BIRDS*

In Aristophanes' *Birds*, which was produced in 414 at the City Dionysia, Peisetairos tells the birds that if they adopt his *bouleuma*, they "will destroy the gods with a *limos Mēlios*" (186). Peisetairos' plan is to starve Olympus into submission and thereby to compel the old gods to acknowledge the birds as their superiors. From the scholiasts on, commentators refer *limos Mēlios* to the Athenians' brutal invasion of the island of Melos in 416, and modern commentators typically point the reader to the narrative of the siege in Thucydides' *Xyngraphē* (5.84–116), just as Photius did.<sup>1</sup> It may be more helpful, however, to listen for a wider resonance.

The phrase *limos Mēlios* rarely receives more than passing notice, if that, even from critics who emphasize the play's connections to the Athenian political landscape. A remark of Zanetto's brings out both the subtlety and the force of the allusion: "Questa vicenda lasciò certo una traccia profonda nella coscienza pubblica ateniese e la battuta di Aristofane—che ha il sapore di una risata liberatoria—ne è probabilmente una prova" (*Uccelli* 199 ad 186).

Aristophanes' seemingly offhand barb about the "Melian fast" addressed the Athenian social conscience, but whether it was effective we cannot tell.<sup>2</sup> Its effectiveness depended directly on the sharpness of the insight as well as on the sensibilities of the audience. But as we shall see, in this play—once considered Aristophanes' most "impious"<sup>3</sup>—

<sup>1</sup>For the scholiasts see White, *Scholia* 50–53. One scholiast seems to confuse an earlier Athenian expedition in 426 (cf. Thuc. 3.91) with the one in 416, but the salient details emerge. See also Photius' note (White ad 186) which probably originated as a comment ad loc.: παροιμία· ἔπειλ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκάκωσαν Μηλίους πολιορκκοῦντες λιμῷ ὡς Θουκυδίδης ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ.

<sup>2</sup>For the skeptical view see Storey, "Dates" 78 n. 21: "I have never been convinced that Melos created any sensation at Athens"; he takes line 186 simply as a joke. Whether Melos created a sensation at Athens or not, it certainly affected Aristophanes, as I hope to show, when he was composing *Birds*.

<sup>3</sup>So Zanetto, *Uccelli* 199 ad 186. See, e.g., Murray, *Aristophanes* 155 (on 1765): "Δαυμόνων ὑπέγρονε: actually 'Highest of the Gods.' One would have thought such words impossible. Greek doctrine is full of the punishments of those who make themselves equal to even the lowest orders of the gods, yet Peithetairos dances off in triumph. We cannot tell how the audience felt about it."

the concept "Melian" is nevertheless deeply programmatic: (1) it recalls relevant events outside the play (the sack of Melos, recent religious scandals, and the public *ara* against Diagoras the Melian); (2) it illuminates at least three political events in the play (the decree against Philokrates, the Prometheus scene, and Peisetairos' barbecue); and (3) it informs both the play's strategy (that is, depriving the gods of the sacrificial *knisa*) and its central stratagem (the walling off of Nephelokokkugia).

My argument hinges on the shadowy figure of Diagoras the Melian and his elusive presence in *Birds*. I shall argue that Diagoras the Melian and the *limos Mēlios* are inseparable ideas here and that mention of either recalls the other. Contrary to Dover's principle of "one thing at a time," Aristophanes can, should, and does work at more than one level of meaning whenever he so desires. Moreover, as a metaphor for the play's central device, the "Melian fast" remains present throughout this drama, and its elusiveness to critics is therefore baffling.

The "Melian fast" is an act of anti-sacrifice as far as the Olympians are concerned. Since neither the birds nor Peisetairos derives sustenance from the *knisa* per se (unlike the Olympians who do), stripping the benefits of sacrifice from the gods is a naked act of power and aggression, like taking Basileia from Zeus later in the play. Our attention is directed to the "politics" of sacrifice by the proposal to wall off Olympus, and the nature of sacrifice again becomes an issue when Prometheus, the inventor of the form here inverted, appears onstage. But first, we must look at the "presence" of Diagoras in *Birds*.

# I

In 414 "Melos" and "Melian" had two primary political echoes for the Athenian audience, and both resonances contributed significantly to the play's theme and plot. The most literal came, of course, from the Athenian invasion of 416. Yet two years later, in 414, at Athens, and in a dramatic context of hostility to the traditional gods, "Melian" also resonated from the recent expulsion of Diagoras the Melian for *asebeia*—an event which the chorus highlights in the epirrhema of its second parabasis (1072–74).<sup>4</sup> At *Clouds* 830 Aristophanes already had used simply *ô*

<sup>4</sup>On Diagoras in general see Jacoby, *Diagoras* 16–24, still considered by many as the definitive treatment, although surely wrong, virtually everyone now agrees, about

Μῆλιος, without apparent ambiguity, to stamp Socrates with an allusion to Diagoras and his atheism.<sup>5</sup> Thus Diagoras was, at least, “ungodly” (*atheos*) in one familiar Athenian sense, when *Clouds* was being written. Since the reference in *Clouds* II (our text) occurs in a passage not known to have been revised, it is likely that Diagoras was already well known for his atheism in 423, when *Clouds* I failed on the stage. The Melian *limos* in *Birds* rang with Diagoras’ brand of “atheism” which was already synonymous in our text of *Clouds* with his epichoric epithet.<sup>6</sup>

To the ordinary Athenian, *atheos* meant an individual who did not believe in the gods worshiped by the city, as we know from Plato (*Apol.* 26c); but the same passage shows that in Plato’s day the word also had a narrower and more literal application, for the individual who believed that gods did not exist at all.<sup>7</sup> For our purposes *atheos* need have no more than its common application. The evidence suggests, in fact, that far from being a radical atheist (as Cicero, for example, later thought he was), Diagoras exemplified the more conventional philosophical skepticism of the late fifth century, which merely called the traditional religion into question; Diagoras’ literary and philosophical influence is much more restricted than is commonly believed.<sup>8</sup> But one aspect of his presence in Athenian literature has been underappreciated, and that is his importance to the plot and theme of *Birds*.

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Diagoras’ expulsion being in 433/32 under the decrees of Diopieithes (see Woodbury, “Diagoras” 192–95, who dates it to 415). Sommerstein, *Birds* 271–72 ad 1073, puts the expulsion at “no later than about 417”; and the scholium ad 14 which preserves Craterus’ remarks (*FGrH* 342 F16) certainly allows dates of “no later than about 417,” or 416, or possibly even 415 for the decree and Diagoras’ expulsion.

<sup>5</sup> See Ar. *Clouds* 825–31 and cf. 1468–74 for the context; also Dover, *Clouds* 200–201 ad 830. *Clouds* 830 obviates all discussion of whether Diagoras was already called ὁ ἄθεος at the time of either version of *Clouds*. It simply does not matter what he was called. His “atheism” was transparent to Aristophanes’ intended audience.

<sup>6</sup> See too, though much later, Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* 1.2, 1.63, and 3.89, where the terms *Melius* and *atheos* are interchangeable. (I note also 1.117, without any epithet but with an otherwise familiar description of Diagoras’ atheism.)

<sup>7</sup> Contra Woodbury, “Diagoras” 208, whose argument about the meaning of *atheos* contradicts Plato *Apol.* 26c (Guthrie, *Greek Philosophy* III 237 n. 2).

<sup>8</sup> So Winiarczyk, “Wahrheit und Legende.” On the other hand, Barnes, *Presocratic Philosophers* II 151–54, takes Diagoras’ atheism rather more seriously but does not balance his argument with strict attention to the very limited evidence. Winiarczyk, *Diagorae Melii Reliquiae*, now collects the evidence. On atheism in antiquity see Obbink, “Atheism” 189–90, for an introduction and relevant bibliography.

Almost every point of Diagoras' chronology has been disputed at one time or another; nevertheless something of a *communis opinio* has emerged: Diagoras was presumably resident at Athens as early as 430, if he is the man Hermippus referred to as "Diagoras of Quibbleton" (fr. 43 K-A, Διαιγόρου τοῦ Τερθρέως).<sup>9</sup> The casual allusion to Diagoras in *Clouds* II assures that he was, or was still, a familiar figure in Athens between 420 and 417, the likely dates when the revision was in progress.<sup>10</sup> According to one fourth-century writer, Diagoras was prosecuted for impiety (*to asebes*) because he had debunked the Eleusinian Mysteries by arguing openly and actively against them (Craterus, *FGrH* 342 F16). One scholiast says firmly that Diagoras resided at Athens "after the sack of Melos," which may simply be a deduction, albeit not a necessary one, from this play, and which need not, in any case, also mean that Diagoras was still living in Athens when the mysteries were profaned and the herms mutilated in 415.<sup>11</sup> Diagoras eventually fled his condemnation at Athens and took refuge at Pellene in the Peloponnese.

After the Pellenians had refused to extradite him, the Athenians decreed a reward for Diagoras—dead or alive, 1 talent or 2, respectively (according to a bronze stele quoted by Melanthius, *FGrH* 326 F3). A more cautious, and perhaps even a better informed, scholiast notes that the decree against Diagoras came "more or less (*malista*) at the time of

<sup>9</sup>So Jacoby, *Diagoras* 10, contradicting the scholia. His idea is rejected by Woodbury, "Diagoras" 187, but accepted by Sommerstein, *Birds* 271 ad 1073 (the translation "Quibbleton" is his).

<sup>10</sup>Dover, *Clouds* lxxx, states the canonical view, which seems secure: on the basis of references to Eupolis' *Marikas* and to Hyperbolos, "the limits for the composition of *Nu.* 518–62 are the spring of 420 and the winter of 417." We do not know exactly when Aristophanes began to revise the play nor when he ceased, but the revision was certainly in progress during these years. Kopff, "Date," recently argued, unsuccessfully, to lower the date of second *Clouds* to 414–13, but his special pleading has been refuted now by Storey, "Dates," and from another point of view by Henderson, "Problems."

<sup>11</sup>Since Diagoras is named in this play, it is virtually certain that whether he was living at Athens in 415 or not, his attack on the Eleusinian Mysteries was not part of their profanation in that year (Sommerstein, "Syrakosios" 107 n. 47). Sommerstein is persuasive: the decree of Syrakosios limited the freedom of comic satire and specifically prevented writers of comedy from *naming* any of those convicted in either religious scandal of 415. (See also Henderson, "*Dēmos*" 288–90, and "Problems" 593–94.) This decree apparently allowed allusions to these individuals in general terms (see *Birds* 145–47, with its broad, but anonymous, allusion to Alcibiades' arrest, and 766, for another probable allusion to Alcibiades), but not in direct terms of the crimes for which they were convicted.

Melos' sack," and he adds that "nothing precludes an earlier date."<sup>12</sup> The original decree against Diagoras was passed probably not later than 417, or just possibly 416 (cf. Sommerstein, *Birds* 271–72 ad 1073). Its historicity has been challenged from time to time but never decisively and never very strongly,<sup>13</sup> and the crucial fact remains that Melanthius quoted the decree from a bronze stele. Line 1072 of *Birds* is clear: the proclamation against Diagoras was read out at the City Dionysia that very day (τῇδε . . . θῆμέρῳ), and not for the first time, as the coryphaeus' verb shows (ἐπαναγορεύεται, a *hapax*).<sup>14</sup>

Aristophanes was referring, then, to the repetition of a real decree, just as he says he was: "the proclamation about Diagoras would be for [Aristophanes'] audience, almost as standard a feature of the Dionysia programme as the proclamation offering a reward to the killer of a tyrant (and of equally little practical significance)."<sup>15</sup> *Mēlios* at 186 thus *echoes* this public announcement if it was made earlier in the day, and the resonance goes, then, from the actual decree against Diagoras (as proclaimed beforehand) to *Mēlios* in 186. In this way the reference at 186 is not an undefined prolepsis for Diagoras, who will not be named for almost nine hundred lines (during which time the *limos Mēlios* is in effect against the Olympians). Aristophanes connects subliminally for his audience at least two events which they might not otherwise have put together.

Diagoras' flight to Pellene is also alluded to later in this play. When the Sukophantes enters looking for wings, Peisetairos replies, "You're not planning to fly straight to Pellene, are you?" (1420–21). The scholia

<sup>12</sup>It is not certain whether the scholiast made this observation on his own authority or whether it comes from Craterus' remarks, for which this scholiast is the source.

<sup>13</sup>Rosenmeyer, "Notes" 235–36, suggests that the public proclamation against Diagoras may be an invention of the scholiastic tradition. He thinks *Birds* 1072–78 is the only source for this information, and on the basis of Aristophanes' use of language he cannot make up his own mind about the historicity of the decree. But he is certainly wrong about the sources, as [Lys.] 6.17–18 shows (Ostwald, *Sovereignty* 275 n. 287).

<sup>14</sup>Rosenmeyer, "Notes" 233: "'today,' in Aristophanes, always means 'on this very day,' usually with reference to the portion of the day that is still ahead." Our evidence does not let us understand how the Athenians packed all the dramatic performances into four or five days, much less at what point these public proclamations were made. Hence *Birds* 1072 may be important evidence on this last point.

<sup>15</sup>Sommerstein, *Birds* 272 ad 1074–75. See also Hubbard, *Mask* 175: "In the *Birds*' view Diagoras' atheism is no more a threat to the city than the long-dead tyrants, since Diagoras' denial applies only to the Olympian gods against whom the *Birds* themselves are in revolt."

ad 1421 are unsatisfying and uninformative: they mumble about athletic contests, prizes of woollen *khlainai*, and a manufacturing center for cloaks in Pellene. It would certainly be possible at Pellene for the Sukophantes to replace his raggedy *himation* (1416–17) with a more serviceable new one.<sup>16</sup> Recent commentators and critics, however, ignore this possibility and divide on whether line 1421 alludes to Diagoras' escape or not.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, the function of the decree against Diagoras in the festival and also in the play reinforces both the *limos Mēlios* and Diagoras' importance for the plot, and thus makes the allusion to him at line 1421 not merely "tempting" (Woodbury, "Diagoras" 191) but irresistible. A needy Sukophantes wants not only a new cloak but also the money on Diagoras' head to pay for it. Moreover, the scholiast ad 1073 adds the telling point: the decree as described by Melanthius was against *both* Diagoras *and* the Pellenians, though the scholiast quotes only a portion of that decree as it bears on Diagoras. It is hard to know what kind of a decree the Athenians made against Pellene, but of the Argive cities only Pellene sided against Athens throughout the entire Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.9.2, 5.58.4, 8.3.2). What more likely hive for an overzealous comic Sukophantes to seek out?

Peisetairos' jibe about the *limos Mēlios* at 186 nevertheless did anticipate the naming of Diagoras later in the play, just as it also resounded from his name if the official proclamation was made before the play, and it therefore confronted, in the audience, religious feelings

<sup>16</sup>The scholia do not make the connection for us, but cf. Merry, *Birds* II 71 ad 1421: Peisetairos "suggests that the only reason why the Informer desires wings is that he may visit Pellene and change his threadbare cloak for a warm one." This functional explanation of the immediate circumstances does not eliminate a second-level reference to the decree. See note 17 below.

<sup>17</sup>Katz, "Politics" 371 with n. 58, who supports the possibility, correctly characterizes his predecessors: Van Leeuwen, *Aves* 218–19 ad 1421, accepts the allusion; Woodbury, "Diagoras" 191, finds the allusion "tempting"; Derenne, *Procès* 68–69, is "more confident"; Lana, "Diagora" 183 n. 2, and Jacoby, *Diagoras* 42–43 n. 180, are disbelievers (though Jacoby's reasons are "surprisingly weak"). Of the allusion to Diagoras, van Leeuwen says, "Simplicior haec mihi videtur explicatio quam quod dicunt scholia." The scholia here mention athletic games, prizes of woollen *khlainai*, and the manufacture of various *khlainai*. Both Zanetto, *Uccelli*, and Sommerstein, *Birds*, repeat the unsatisfying scholia ad 1421 and are silent about even the possibility of an allusion to Diagoras; likewise Taillardat, *Images* 137, § 267. Rosenmeyer, "Notes" 236–37 n. 28, straddles the line again: he (a) rejects the scholia, (b) believes that the references to Pellene here and at *Lys.* 996 "are topical allusions to which we have lost the key," and (c) thinks that Diagoras may have spent time at Pellene whether there was a decree or not.



pricked by the scandals in the previous year. The mutilation of the herms and especially the profaned mysteries in 415 highlighted the annually repeated proclamation against Diagoras with its reference, stated or implied, both to his well-known debunking of the mysteries and also to his familiar "atheism." At the performance in 414, when Diagoras was finally named in *Birds*, his name fed on his own relatively recent infamy and on the aftershock of the religious scandals in 415. This juxtaposition and the confrontation of ideas exist whether Diagoras' debunking of the mysteries was part and parcel of what had happened in 415, as Diodorus Siculus (13.6.7) may have thought,<sup>18</sup> or whether it had occurred a year or two before, as most now think more likely.

Diagoras had been condemned at Athens because "he was impious . . . in *logos*" ([Lys.] 6.17). The pamphlet in which Diagoras had criticized the Eleusinian Mysteries—apparently more manifesto than apologia—bore the title (from its first words) of *Apopurgizontes Logoi*, literally "Words [or Arguments] That Wall Off."<sup>19</sup> Its title suggests his thesis: there is no direct connection between the world of the gods and that of humans, and the two worlds are, as it were, "walled off" from one another. Diagoras' arguments drew the line. Such a proto-Epicurean view is not atheistic in the strictest sense and befits a man whom one ancient source calls the slave of Democritus (DK II 864). But such a view does attack the gods of the state, who are cajoled at regular intervals by public sacrifices precisely because it is believed that they can and will intervene in human affairs.<sup>20</sup> In effect, though, Diagoras' treatise was the theological equivalent of the Athenian wall at Melos, their

<sup>18</sup>Diodorus associates Diagoras' expulsion from Athens with the events of 415, but this connection may be either merely an inference from what is said in *Birds* or a flaw of the annalistic method. An annalistic writer may list an event under a neighboring year if its mention is prompted by related events that have a greater claim on the writer's attention. Kopff, "Date" 323–26, accepts both the decree and a date of 415, in large part on the basis of a too credulous reading of Diod. Sic. 13.6.7. Henderson, "Problems" 596–97, adapts Kopff's hypothesis to explain how Diodorus' sources may have inferred 415 (wrongly) as the date of the decree.

<sup>19</sup>The title is found in *Suda* (s.v. Diagoras) and may also be played on in *Clouds* 1024 (so Jacoby, *Diagoras* 30): *kallipurgon sophian*. I believe Jacoby (24–31) that *Apopurgizontes Logoi* is the book that brought Diagoras into danger, though he exaggerates the degree of its atheism. That *apopurgizontes* is also a *hapax* reinforces the observation of Katz, "Politics" 370–73, and my own argument.

<sup>20</sup>Thuc. 2.47.4 indicates that this communal belief broke down during the plague that struck Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

*periteichisis* as Thucydides calls it (5.114.1, 115.1, 116.2), and the birds' wall, their comic *apoteichisis* here (cf. 1576 for the term).<sup>21</sup>

When Peisetairos invited the birds to destroy the gods "with a Melian fast," in reality he was asking them to destroy the gods with a two-edged *limos*, one which was both "Diagoran," that is, *atheos*, and also like the Athenian *limos* at Melos. But in 416 it was the Athenian *dēmos* who (like Peisetairos) had been both *atheos* and *turannikos*, for, in that year the Athenians' *Realpolitik* had defeated not only the Melians' trust in the Spartans but also their trust in the gods (Thuc. 5.104). Peisetairos' *limos* is *atheos* precisely because it is an assault on the established gods by those who no longer credit the gods' power. Because that attack takes the form of a *limos*, it will be aimed at the gods through the human institution most dear to them: through sacrifice, which nourishes and supports the gods. The gods will be deprived of the most concrete proof that humans revere them and their power.

## II

The comic twist in the play is underlined when the avian dissenters substitute their own power for that of the old gods, instead of substituting a kind of mechanistic physics, as Aristophanes elsewhere lampoons both Diagoras and Socrates for doing (*Clouds* 825–31).<sup>22</sup> Peisetairos' new theology reflects the birds' true place in the universe as transcending both Olympians and *anthrōpoi*; and because this liberation theology also restructures the act of sacrifice, it again points ahead to the Prometheus episode later in the play.

The epirrhema of the second parabasis draws attention to the public announcement that probably had preceded this performance, because here the birds wish to make a new proclamation of their own. The bird chorus recalls the Athenian public curse (its *ara*) against Diagoras (1072–74). The chorus also restates the annual public curse against "the long-dead tyrants" (1074–75). The birds' own proclamation (1076–78) will protect birds from tyrannical acts by Philokrates ὁ Στρούθιος

<sup>21</sup>Katz, "Politics" 370–73, first noticed the great relevance of Diagoras' title to the plot of *Birds*. See Jacoby, *Diagoras* 30, 48 n. 250, for the translation of *Apopurgizontes Logoi* as "Fortifying Arguments."

<sup>22</sup>In *Clouds* Aristophanes associates the theory of the vortex with Socrates ὁ Μήλιος, but there it is already a clear case of tarring birds of a feather, that is, all dangerous philosophers, with a single brush.

("the Sparrovian"),<sup>23</sup> a birdseller whose high crimes are listed at 1079–82. As a name, "Philokrates the Sparrovian" parallels "Diagoras the Melian," and this make-believe name thereby plays on Diagoras' familiar epichoric epithet. (Note too that 1073 and 1077, which contain the names, are otherwise identical, so that the echo is a strong one.) The birds combine both Athenian decrees into a single decree of their own: Philokrates ("lover of raw power") is like Diagoras in his attitude to birds (now gods) and like the tyrants in abusing those subject to him.

But who is this Philokrates—a real birdseller, as one scholiast (ad 14) is thought to have meant,<sup>24</sup> or a purely comic invention of the poet, as some moderns now believe?<sup>25</sup> I have yet to find a single commentator, ancient or modern, who has even noted that when the Athenian efforts at Melos had begun to flag in 416, they were buoyed up by the work of a new commander, Philokrates, the son of Demeas, who drove the Athenian *periteichisis* to its brutal conclusion (Thuc. 5.116.2–3). It is this Philokrates whose name resonates in the fictive Philokrates the Sparrovian, and his role as a seller of birds echoes the victorious Athenians' role as enslavers and murderers of the Melians. The historical Philokrates—the hero of Melos (if hero is the right word)—here becomes a bird-dealer in the same way that Peisetairos, Euelpides, and other Athenians become or want to become birds in the course of the comedy. Whatever else the historical Philokrates may have been, his name provided an irresistible pun for the poet.

To return now to my main line of argument, Peisetairos' proposed "fast" will, by design, undo the sacrificial arrangements which Prometheus had duped Zeus into accepting (as we learn from Hesiod in the *Theogony*), arrangements to which Prometheus alludes in lines 1517–18 of this play. Prometheus proclaims himself to be *misotheos* (cf. 1547, and Peisetairos' *theomisés*, 1548, with the scholium pointing out that *theo-*

<sup>23</sup>B. B. Rogers' clever translation of Στρούθιος deserves to be perpetuated (Sommerstein, *Birds* 272 ad 1077).

<sup>24</sup>Whence this Philokrates, attested only in *Birds*, made it as a birdseller into Kirchner's *Prosopographia* (14571) and, likewise, into Truesdale, *Comic Prosopographia* 50. The Philokrates engaged in a related commercial activity at line 14 ought to be the same fellow later described as "the Sparrovian." But see White, *Scholia* 14 ad 14, who takes the scholiast as *merely* pointing ahead to line 1077. Nothing much ever depended on this identification.

<sup>25</sup>See Hubbard, *Mask* 175 n. 50: "Philokrates is a common enough name in Athens; in this case the name fits so well that he is likely to be a character of Aristophanes' invention."

*misēs* means both "hateful to the gods" and "hateful of the gods"). Prometheus also calls himself "well-disposed to humans" (*anthrōpois eunous*, 1545), not "well-disposed" to birds, as the plot requires. Thus despite his external transformation into a bird, Peisetairos remains, in Prometheus' eyes, an *anthrōpos* (as, for the birds, Peisetairos also remains Athenian). In Greek the semantic fields of *theomisēs* and *misotheos* overlap one another and also overlap that of *atheos*. Needless to say, like Peisetairos, Prometheus wants to end forever Zeus' reign, which Aristophanes described, in Aeschylean terms (cf. Herington, "*Birds* and *Prometheia*"), as a *tyrannis* (1605, 1643). It is Prometheus who reveals the secret of Zeus' power as the divine Basileia, whom Peisetairos then takes for himself.

Since the allusions to the *limos Mēlios* and to Diagoras are linked by their mutual appeal to events outside the play, it only makes sense that these connections should illuminate an important political event inside the play which is otherwise hard to understand. Thematically the most extraordinary event in *Birds* occurs when Poseidon, Herakles, and the unnamed Triballian god come on a mission of peace and find Peisetairos at the barbecue with his favorite recipe (1579–80, 1637; and see 533–38 for the rest of the ingredients). When Herakles asks what's cooking, Peisetairos answers in a roundabout way. "Some birds," he says, "were judged guilty while in the midst of a rebellion against τοῖς δημοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις" (1583–85). This phrase is often translated as "the bird democracy" or some such, but in this play the birds had no democracy.<sup>26</sup> Earlier, in fact, Tereus had considered aristocracy as the natural outcome of Euelpides and Peisetairos' ambitions, though Peisetairos denied it up and down (125–26). The protagonist's name also offers a clue to his own political identity: "Peisetairos" means "persuader of aristocratic companions/club-men" (Hubbard, *Mask* 162) and is distinctly oligarchic in tone. And near the end of the play, the chorus hails Peisetairos as a tyrant (1708).<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps the problem lies in the word *dēmotikos*. While it can mean

<sup>26</sup>See Sommerstein, *Birds* 181, for the translation. Hubbard, *Masks* 161, misses the mark in taking these lines to mean that Peisetairos was "*presuming* to create a new democracy in the interest of the Birds" (my italics); there is no evidence of such presumption. (To the extent that Nephelokokkugia represents Athens, we are probably dealing with a variant of the Athens/*tyrannis* theme.) Oddly, the post-Peisetairan Olympians seem to have had a democracy, to judge from Poseidon's exclamation about a breakdown in the electoral process (1570–71).

<sup>27</sup>Reckford, *Aristophanes' Old-and-New Comedy* 333, also suggests that Peisetairos' name deliberately echoes that of the tyrant Peisistratos.

"democratic" or even "democratizing," it also has the natural Athenian extension of "belonging to a deme," in contrast to *dēmosios*, which means "belonging to the people [as a whole]" (cf. Dem. 1074.20). The only "birds" who, technically speaking, belong to a deme are the Athenian schemers Peisetairos and Euelpides, who are again being shown up for what they are: Athenian schemers desperate to escape the Athens that has shaped them. Appearances deceive, and the world these schemers have created is a vicious circle. Peisetairos' subjects were punished at the barbecue for rebelling against the new regime Euelpides and he had established. Peisetairos quashed the rebellious birds like Melians, and, in the power metaphor of his new *bouleuma*, these cooked birds become at once his dinner and his sacrificial victims. At the same time, these birds are being roasted at the whim of an arbitrary new political leader who is himself a Zeus-like tyrant and who will be hailed as *turannos* (1708) when he has finally displaced Zeus.

Prometheus is the most prominent victim of Zeus' tyranny treated in this play, and both his appearance onstage and his words remind the audience of the Greek paradigm for sacrifice which he had established. This paradigm was already a *limos* in its essence: by Prometheus' trick, mortal men—women did not yet exist—received the desirable nutritious parts of the sacrificial victim, the gods got only the savory *knisa* of the less delectable parts. Peisetairos heightened this sense of deprivation by taking from the gods even the *knisa* which had been their due.

Peisetairos attacked the gods on the same belief that the Athenians had held when they attacked Melos in 416, namely that by some natural compulsion (ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκάλας) divine agency (τὸ θεῖον), like human agency (τὸ ἀνθρώπειον), always rules (ἄρχειν) wherever it has κράτος (Thuc. 5.105.2). Just as the primordial sacrifice had asserted the priority of human claims over divine, so Peisetairos here reenacts and reinforces these claims. Peisetairos prepares dinner, then, as the audience faces the question of sacrifice which is the focus of the play's central device.

### III

Sacrifice does confirm hierarchy, and sacrifice is therefore political: Athens will not go away. *Birds* does not owe its entire conception, however, exclusively to Diagoras' bad luck or even to the religious scandals of 415, any more than it does exclusively to the Sicilian expedition (to which those scandals are connected also). The meditation on

sacrifice and the presence of Diagoras in *Birds* allow a greater level of generalization. The elusive political aspect of the play involves an entire network of social and political ideas and experiences, that is, *ta politika*.

The world Euelpides and Peisetairos invent is, in effect, a New Athens, not the Anti-Athens of their dreams, and it shows the same faults as the old.<sup>28</sup> There is criticism of Athens and of the very idea of empire, to be sure, but empire and Athens are coincidental (or secondary) to the plot, which focuses on sacrifice and on what, if anything, distinguishes divine from mortal. In *Birds* the political questions of empire and the right to rule are implicit in, and emerge from, the legitimating power of sacrifice.<sup>29</sup>

In 1906 Croiset (*Aristophane* 195–97) saw Peisetairos and Euelpides as exiles fleeing Athens to escape prosecution for *asebeia*. Impiety trials, however, did not become critically important again until 1991, when Hubbard wrote: “The *Birds* illustrates in comically exaggerated form the ultimate consequence we could expect from the actions of the impious—the overthrow of Zeus and the elevation to divinity of anything the individual thinker desires, including tiny birds and even the thinker himself” (*Mask* 161).

If a larger social context is needed to appreciate the play, it will include (and not be limited to) three decades of trials for *asebeia*, of which Socrates’ trial in 399 is merely one of the latest and the most famous.<sup>30</sup> The historical sociology of these *asebeia* trials cannot be separated from the profaned mysteries and the mutilated herms of 415, and the scandals of that year also made their contribution both to the

<sup>28</sup>It is an old crux whether Nephelokokkugia and Athens are to be identified, but see the brief remarks of Sommerstein, *Birds* 1 n. 3: general physical and sociopolitical similarities are unmistakable. (For the idea that Nephelokokkugia may be a colony of Athens, see note 29 below.)

<sup>29</sup>In the micropolitical sense, we should not forget that Peisetairos and Euelpides were off to found a colony (cf. οὐκίσειν, 965, 1515) and were equipped to conduct the colonial foundation sacrifice (43), and that Peisetairos actually oversees the beginning of that sacrifice more than once (848–903, 958–59, 1033–34) before the priest and he are driven indoors to complete it (1056–57). In this connection, too, we note that after the devastation of 416 the Athenians sent out five hundred *apoikoi* to colonize Melos (Thuc. 116.4).

<sup>30</sup>*Asebeia* remained a volatile issue for a long time. Plato’s Socrates, for example, implied that all the other charges against him paled beside the accusation of atheism (*Apol.* 18c). In the same year as Socrates’ trial Andocides also was brought to court, but exonerated, on a holdover charge (essentially) of impiety from the scandal of the profaned mysteries in 415.

composition of *Birds* and to its reception when it was produced the following spring (Hubbard, *Mask* 159–60).

In its central theme and its development *Birds* is similar to Plato's *Euthyphro*, an early dialogue written two decades or more after the play; both are dramatic fictions that explore the true nature of piety and impiety. Plato's dialogue is motivated by the impending trial of Socrates for a type of *asebeia*, and the very fiction depends on both the commonness and the paradox of already having had so many trials on this charge at Athens. When Plato's Socrates says that the argument has come full circle and must be begun again (*Euthyph.* 15c–e), he effectively terminates the present conversation. A similar closing of the circle occurs in *Birds* when Peisetairos goes off to marry Basileia and substitutes himself for Zeus in the cosmic/comic scheme. While neither work comes to a satisfying conclusion about piety, both expose a mundane view of it as a simple reflex of power, and both realize the temporal confusions that arise in a universe where claims of divine authority underpin the political order.

Criticism of *Birds* needs revision in light of Diagoras' connection to the central motif of the *limos Mēlios* and its coherence with the dramatic plot. The *limos Mēlios* drives the play's main action, provides its deepest reflection, and also structures the comic *Realpolitik* of a universe based on "official" recognition of sacrificial relations between gods and humans, whose respective spheres of action Diagoras considered separate and distinct, "walled off" from one another. Aristophanes' reflection also exploits the comic logic of the established paradigm whereby Promethean sacrifice is already a pro-human form of divine deprivation; and it deeply implicates audience and play in one of the most important, and least attractive, facets of Athenian life in the late fifth century.<sup>31</sup>

F. E. ROMER

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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


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## HIATUS IN THE ORATIONS OF AESCHINES

In his recent revision of Friedrich Blass's Teubner of the orations of Aeschines, Ulrich Schindel notes (*Orationes* xvii) that one of the shortcomings of Blass's edition is extensive emendation of the *textus receptus* to avoid hiatus. Victor Martin and Guy de Budé (*Eschine*) did restore most of the readings which had been standard prior to Blass, but their work has serious defects, including an inadequate critical apparatus and several words omitted from the text. Deficiencies of both editions will be addressed in my forthcoming Teubner of Aeschines. In this article I review Blass's assessment of hiatus in Aeschines and provide more thorough evidence to justify departing from his assessment than will be feasible in a critical apparatus.

In reviewing previous editions of Aeschines, Blass reveals his editorial bias when he says of his predecessors, "mirum plane est ad hiatus vitandi legem eos omnino non animam attendisse, quasi constaret ea norma hunc quidem oratorem usum non esse" (*Orationes* iv). In contrast to Blass, Benseler apparently did not find hiatus a significant factor in Aeschines, since he did not discuss Aeschines in his influential study, except for the following laconic statement: "In Lycurgo et Dinarcho hiatum non quidem evitatum, tamen rarius reperies. Frequentior est in Aeschine" (*De Hiatu* 194).<sup>1</sup>

Although Blass (*Orationes* v) acknowledged that Aeschines did not avoid hiatus as much as Isocrates or Demosthenes, he went too far in relying on hiatus as a criterion for editing Aeschines. Thus for the Second Oration, Blass cites examples of hiatus from the first, second, and third parts of this oration and concludes that all of them are corrupt "quamvis emendandi ratio fortasse plerumque incerta sit" (v). Similarly for hiatus in the first fifty sections of the Third Oration, he notes that although Aeschines can be considered to have been negligent, most instances of hiatus for 3.1–50 are also suspect (v sq.). In the First Ora-

<sup>1</sup> For a bibliography of hiatus prior to 1971 see Reeve, "Hiatus" 514 n. 2, where one finds a clear statement of the circumstances in which hiatus can be tolerated in the Greek novelists. Einarson (*Theophrastus* xxxi–xlvi) has an excellent treatment of avoidance of hiatus in Theophrastus through changes in word order, hiatus-blocking synonyms, etc. The extent to which Blass's "law" has been subject to revision can be surmised from McCabe, *Prose-Rhythm*, and Pearson, "Hiatus," which deals primarily with Demosthenes' use of hiatus for oratorical effect.

tion, Blass found hiatus to be frequent at the beginning of the oration and rare at the end, and for 1.180–90 he emends in every instance unless “medelam eorum certam non inveniebam” (vi).

In his attempts to purge hiatus from the text of Aeschines, Blass went so far as to include instances where a pause normally makes hiatus permissible. These include the following:

1. Before and after a vocative (see Reeve, “Hiatus” 516): 2.152 ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐκ] ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐκ Bl.
2. Before ὥς or ὥστε (see Reeve, “Hiatus” 517; Pearson, “Hiatus” 150 n. 30): 3.63 ἀφικόμενοι ὥς] ἀφικόμενοι πρὸς Bl.
3. Before ἥ (see Kühner and Blass, *Grammatik* § 49; Reeve, “Hiatus” 516): 3.91 αὐτῷ ἥ] αὐτῷ del. Bl.
4. Before a relative clause (see Reeve, “Hiatus” 517): 1.150 ἀνάγνωθι ἃ λέγει ἡ Θέτις.] [ἃ – Θέτις] Bl.; 3.94 ἀλλὰ πολὺ τούτου δεινότερον φανήσεται δὲ μέλλω λέγειν.] [φανήσεται] Bl.
5. After a parenthetical phrase (see Reeve, “Hiatus” 517): 3.33 οὐ γὰρ (οἶμαι) ᾤετο δεῖν] οἶμαι δεῖν ᾤετο Bl.
6. Before and after ἔφη (see Reeve, “Hiatus” 517): 1.181 “Ἰνα”, ἔφη, “οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι” [οἱ] Bl.; 3.146 πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεπονθέναι] [ἔφη] Bl.; 3.160 ἀγαπᾶν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔφη ἐν Πέλλῃ περιπατοῦντα] [ἔφη] Bl.; 3.160 ἔφη οὐκ εἰκάζων] [ἔφη] Bl.

In other cases Blass wrongly gave preference to inferior manuscript readings, which avoid hiatus.<sup>2</sup> In the first five instances cited below, avoidance of hiatus occurs in codex *i* (Paris. gr. 2996) of the fourteenth century, which has undergone extensive scribal revision. At some times readings in *i* are nonsense; at others they yield correct readings.<sup>3</sup> In the following instances I argue that the reading of *i* is in error, even though it avoids hiatus.

2.103 ἤδη ἔργον ἐστὶ πρόσβρων] ἔστιν ἤδη πρόσβρων ἔργον *i* Bl.

<sup>2</sup>This despite his caveat (*Orationes* v) “etenim casu quoque accidisse potest, ut lectio alioquin prava ab hiatu tamen libera sit.”

<sup>3</sup>On this manuscript see *Aeschinis Orationes* ed. Ferd. Schultz (Leipzig 1865) ix sq.; Blass, *Orationes* x–xi; and Diller, “The Manuscript Tradition.” Codex *i* also preserves ancient variants at 2.74, 75, which are also found in P.Oxy. 440. (See Martin and de Budé, *Eschine* I ix, and Leone, “Appunti.”)

For hiatus after η see section 4 below. Moreover, the word order ἔργον ἐστὶ is assured by 1.165 and 1.44 ἔγωγε μέγα ἔργον εἶναι νομίζω, 137 καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου ἀνδρὸς ἔργον εἶναι ἡγοῦμαι, 176 ὑμέτερον δ' ἔργον ἐστὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιτετάχθαι, 3.16 ὑμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπομνημονεύειν.

2.118 πότερον οὖν ὁ μηδὲν προθυμηθεὶς ἐργάσασθαι ἀγαθὸν δίκαιον ἐστὶν εὐδοξεῖν] ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσασθαι *i* Bl. Not only is hiatus common after –αι (see section 2 below, and note 4), but also ἀγαθὸν at the end of this phrase makes it more emphatic.

2.126 εἰ συγχωρήσει ὁ κατήγορος] εἰ συγχωρήσει ταῦθ' ὁ κατήγορος *V* Bl. For hiatus after –ει see section 3(a) below. An intransitive συγχωρήσει, “agree, assent,” suits the context better than a transitive συγχωρήσει ταῦθ', “concede.” Moreover, ταῦθ' is unnecessarily intrusive and without a clear antecedent.

2.179 συμβήσεται ἡμῖν παθεῖν] παθεῖν ἡμῖν *i* Bl. Compare Aeschines' practice to follow συμβαίνω with a dative: 1.137 and 2.28 συμβαίνει σοι, 147 συμβέβηκε αὐτῷ, 168 κινδύνου συμβάντος ἡμῖν, 1.136 μὴ οὐχὶ συμβεβηκέναι μοι, 3.114 συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, 165 συμβήσεται Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, 174 συμβαίνει τῇ πόλει, 207 ἃ δὲ συμβήσεται ὑμῖν. Moreover, the final position lends emphasis to παθεῖν.

Two more examples, from the third oration, show how Blass's “law” has led him to select inferior readings from manuscripts other than *i*.

3.47 τὸν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀναρρηθέντα στέφανον] στέφανον ἀναρρηθέντα *amg* Bl. For the hiatus after –α see section 1(a) below. For the word order rejected by Bl. compare 3.32 τὴν ἀνάρρησιν τοῦ στεφάνου, 36 ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνάρρησιν τοῦ στεφάνου. See further Kühner and Gerth *Grammatik* § 467, 8a.

3.107 οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ ὑμέτεροι] οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι *schol.* and Bl. Compare 3.88 οἱ στρατιῶται οἱ ὑμέτεροι, 2.37 οἱ ὑπηρέται οἱ τοῦ Φιλίππου.

To conclude this paper I list the emendations which Blass justified in his *apparatus criticus* as avoiding hiatus (*hiat.*)<sup>4</sup> and which I reject in my forthcoming Teubner edition. Since Aeschines allowed frequent hiatus, Blass's editorial bias seriously distorted Aeschines' style. To be as concise as possible, I present the examples according to the vowel or

<sup>4</sup>Curiously, some of these include cases of *scriptio plena*, which would be presumably delivered with elision: 1(b)(c), 2 and 6. See Kühner and Blass, *Grammatik* § 53.4.

diphthong which precedes hiatus. Moreover, I limit full citation of parallels, which can be most easily found in Martin and de Budé, *Eschine*.

1. After α:

- (a) 1.146 τελευτησάντων αὐτῶν τὰ ὁσῆ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ σορῶ] καὶ τὰ ὁσῆ τελευτησάντων Bl. sed vide 3.24 ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐχειροτονήθη, 27, 34, 67, 122, 186
- (b) 1.175 εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου οἴκαδε] [ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου] Bl. sed vide 1.9 πηνίκα ἀπιέναι, 19, 27, 29, 38, 72, 2.86; -ου οἱ cf. 8(b)
- (c) 1.179 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ ἐγκλήματα] [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide 1.2 ἐπήγγειλα αὐτῷ, 62, 2.183; -ῶ ἐ- cf. 9(b)
- (d) 3.118 ἃ ἐγὼ οὐτε] [ἐγὼ] Bl. sed vide 1.71 ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω, 144, 3.225; -ω οὐτε 9(h)

2. After αἰ:

- (a) 1.137 ἔργον εἶναι ἡγοῦμαι·] [ἡγοῦμαι] Bl. sed vide 1.122 ἀβίωτον εἶναι ἡγούμενος, 2.35, 117, 3.135, 197
- (b) 1.136 γεγονέναι ἐρωτικὸς] ἐρωτικὸς γεγονέναι Herm. γεγονέναι <τ'> ἐρωτικὸς Bl. sed vide 1.24 ἄρχεται ἐπιλείπειν, 27, 105, 3.1, 47, 54
- (c) 2.37 ὑπηρεῖται οἱ τοῦ Φιλίππου·] [οἱ τοῦ Φιλίππου] Bl. sed vide 1.28 πείσονται οἱ ἀλλότριοι, 3.10, D. 18.155 (δόγμα) αἰροῦνται οἱ Ἕλληνες
- (d) 2.44 θεάσασθαι ἐκ] θεάσεσθε Wolf et Bl., sed vide 2(b)
- (e) 3.51 ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι] [εἶναι] Bl. sed vide 3.182 ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι, D. 18.183, 186. Cf. *ZPE* 46 (1982) 24
- (f) 3.54 καταλογίζεται ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον] [ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον] Bl. sed vide 2(b)
- (g) 3.88 στρατιῶται οἱ ὑμέτεροι] [οἱ ὑμέτεροι] Bl. sed vide 2(c)
- (h) 3.91 ἢ τεθνάναι ἐγκαταληφθέντι·] [ἐγ]καταληφθέντι Bl. sed vide 2(b)
- (i) 3.103 σταθήσεσθαι ἐν Ὠρεῶ] σταθήσεσθαι ἐν Ὠρεῶ del. Bl. sed vide 2(b)
- (j) 3.121 γέγραπται ἐν τῇ ἀρεῇ] [ἐν τῇ ἀρεῇ] Bl. sed vide 2(b) et 3.48 προσγέγραπται ἐν τῷ νόμῳ
- (k) 3.170 πεφυκέναι αὐτὸν] [αὐτὸν] Bl. sed vide 1.18 διαλέγεται αὐτῷ, 47, 94, 135, 2.68, 3.118
- (l) 3.252 καὶ ἴσαι αὐτῷ αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο (xk)] (αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ *amgVLf*) καὶ - ἐγένοντο del. Bl., sed vide -αι αὐ: 2(k); -ῶ αι: vide 9(n); -οι ἐ vide 7(c)

## 3. After -ει:

- (a) 2.14 ἀποφεύγει ὁ Φιλοκράτης,] [ὁ] Bl. sed vide 1.13 λέγει ὁ νόμος, 26, 40, 2.73, 3.18, 19, 22, 191
- (b) 2.116 φέρει ἔθνος,] φέρειν Markland et Blass, sed vide 1.24 παρακαλεῖ ἐπὶ, 40, 146, 2.126, 3.131, 175
- (c) 3.63 ἐν ᾧ κελεύει ἐλῆσθαι] [ἐν ᾧ κελεύει] Bl. Cf. 3(b)

## 4. After η:

- (a) 1.165 ἤδη ἐρῶ. [ἤδη] Bl. sed vide 1.11 ἤδη ἐν. 18, 43, 92, 96, 2.130, 3.3, 94, 147
- (b) 3.6 εἰσὶν εἰς] [εἰσὶν] Cob. sed vide 1.15 ὑβρίζη εἰς, 18, 131, 3.6, 158
- (c) 3.94 ταῦτ' ἤδη ἄξιόν] [ταῦτ' ἤδη] Bl. sed vide 1.43 ἤδη ἀκολουθεῖν, 53 δαπάνη ἀπεῖπε, 57, 3.108, 202
- (d) 3.147 τοῦτ' ἤδη ἀγανακτεῖ] ἤδη del. Bl. sed vide 4(c)

## 5. After ι:

- (a) 1.111 τουτουὶ ἀδικεῖν] [ἀδικεῖν] Bl. sed vide 1.13 παιδὶ ἠβήσαντι, 41, 80, 89, 3.24, 27, 83
- (b) 1.145 ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πατρίδι ἀποθανεῖται,] [ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πατρίδι] Bl. sed vide 1.152 ἐν τῷ Φοίνικι ἀποφαίνεται, 3.223
- (c) 1.193 ὀνομαστὶ ἐμνήσθη] [ὀνομαστὶ] del. Bl. sed vide 5(a)

## 6. After ο:

- (a) 3.23 ἐκείνο αὐτῷ ὑποβάλλετε·] [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide -ο αὐ-: 1.25 εὐλαβοῦντο αὐτὸ, 2.28, 117, 133, 154, 3.76, 111, 121, 208; -ῶ ὑ- cf. 9(d)

## 7. After ου:

- (a) 1.147 μόνοι ἄπωθεν] [μόνοι] Bl. sed vide 1.154 νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσι, 2.142, 3.27, 68, 99, D. 19.330
- (b) 3.21 ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις,] τις ἄν Bl. sed vide 7(a)
- (c) 3.118 μοι ἐπὶ τὴν γνώμην μνησθῆναι] [ἐπὶ τὴν γνώμην] Bai. et Bl. (hiat.) sed vide 1.25 ἀρχαῖοι ἐκείνοι, 134, 2.74, 3.30, 41, 95, 122, 187
- (d) 3.243 ἅπαντες γὰρ σοι ἅμα ἀποκρινοῦνται] σοι del. Wei. sed vide 7(a)
- (e) 3.252 καὶ ἴσαι αὐτῷ αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο (xk)] (αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ *amgVLf*) καὶ - ἐγένοντο del. Bl. sed vide -αι αὐ-: 2(k); -ῶ αι-: 9(n); -οι ἐ-: 7(c)

## 8. After ου:

- (a) 1.146 αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ] [αὐτοῦ] Bl. sed vide 1.29 ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ', 43, 64, 75, 79, 113, 2.61, 3.201
- (b) 1.175 εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου οἴκαδε] [ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου] Bl. sed vide -α ἄ-: 1(b); -ου οἴ-: 1.153 ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν, cf. 1.50 ἐν τῇ Μιογόλα οἰκία, 2.28 πόλει οἰκείως
- (c) 2.7 μου ἀκοῦσαι] [μου] Bai. Sau. sed vide 1.12 (νόμος) ἡλίου ἀνιόντος, 14, 61, 75, 111, 2.96, 156, 3.132, 160, 209, 239
- (d) 2.16 ἀφεθείς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου ἄνευ] [ὑπὸ Φιλίππου] Bl. sed vide 8(c)
- (e) 2.34 αὐτοῦ ἐξήγγελο] [αὐτοῦ] Bl. sed vide -ου ἔ: 8(a)
- (f) 2.120 λόγου Ἑλληνικοῦ ἀνήκοον] (τῶν) Ἑλληνικῶν Bl. sed vide -ου ἔ: 8(a); -ου ἄ: 8(c)
- (g) 3.46 τούτου ἐξ] τούτων Bl. cf. 8(a)
- (h) 3.125 Τοῦ δόγματος τούτου ἀποδοθέντος] τούτου τοῦ δόγματος ἀποδοθέντος Bl. sed vide 8(c)

## 9. After ω:

- (a) 1.164 αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσεται [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide 83 μικρῷ ἀναλώματι, 97, 2.155, 3.24, 146, 168
- (b) 1.179 ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ ἐγκλήματα] [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide -α αὐ- ad 1(c); -ω ἔ-: 1.49 μειρακίῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐπιησάμενος, 109, 3.77, 130, 252
- (c) 2.155 αὐτῷ ἀπεκρίνατο] [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide 9(a)
- (d) 3.23 ἐκείνο αὐτῷ ὑποβάλλετε] [αὐτῷ] Bl. sed vide -ο αὐ- ad 6(a); -ω ὑ-: 3.208 αὐτῷ ὑποβάλλετε, 1.25 ἔργῳ ὑμῖν D. 19.250
- (e) 3.32 βουλευτηρίῳ ἀνακηρύττεσθαι] [ἀνα] Bl. sed vide 9(a)
- (f) 3.35 προεῖρῶ ὑμῖν,] [ὑμῖν] Bl. sed vide 1.111 συμβουλευῶ ὑμῖν, 122, 3.5, 69, 156, 177, 190, 202
- (g) 3.41 διδάξω ὑμᾶς] [ὑμᾶς] Bl. sed vide 9(f)
- (h) 3.118 ἃ ἐγὼ οὔτε] [ἐγὼ] Bl. sed vide ἃ ἔ- ad 1(d); -ω οὔτε: 1.41 λέγω οὐ, Andoc. myst. 4 ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄν, 29 περὶ τῷ θεῷ οὔτε
- (i) 3.128 ἧς ἐγὼ οὔτ'] ἐγὼ del. Bl. sed vide 9(h)
- (j) 3.130 αὐτῷ ἐξουσίας] αὐτῷ del. Bl. sed vide 9(b)
- (k) 3.154 ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐκείνῳ γε] [ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ] Bl. sed vide 9(b)
- (l) 3.156 θεῶν ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς] [ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς] Cob. sed vide 9(f)
- (m) 3.187 στεφάνῳ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον] [αὐτῶν ἕκαστον] Bl. sed vide 1.19 ἐξέστω αὐτῷ, 62 ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν



- (n) 3.252 καὶ ἴσαι αὐτῷ αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο (xk)] (αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ  
 amgVLf) καὶ – ἐγένοντο del. Bl. sed vide –αι αὐτῷ ad 2(k); –ῶ αι:  
 1.3 αὐτῷ αἰσχροῦς, 3.126 ἔργῳ αἰσχροῦς.; –οι ἐ cf. 7(c).<sup>5</sup>

MERVIN R. DILTS

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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<sup>5</sup>Andrew R. Dyck, Edward M. Harris, and a referee for *AJP* have made useful suggestions for improving this essay.

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## AN ILIADIC MODEL FOR THEOCRITUS 1.95–113

The nature of the love and death of Daphnis in the portion of Theocritus' First Idyll, which the herdsman Thyrsis sings, has long been controversial. The dramatic situation is particularly difficult to interpret in lines 95–112, as Daphnis finally confronts Aphrodite with fierce recriminations before going to his death:

ἦνθέ γε μὰν ἄδεῖα καὶ ἅ Κύπρις γελάοισα,  
λάθρη μὲν γελάοισα, βαρὺν δ' ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἔχοισα,  
κεῖπε “τὸ θην τὸν Ἐρωτα κατεύχεο, Δάφνι, λυγιξεῖν·  
ἦ ῥ' οὐκ αὐτὸς Ἐρωτος ὑπ' ἀργαλέω ἐλυγίχθης;”

ἄρχετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι, πάλιν ἄρχετ' ἀοιδᾶς.

τὰν δ' ἄρα χῶ Δάφνις ποταμείβετο· “Κύπρι βαρεῖα,  
Κύπρι νεμεσαστά, Κύπρι θνατοῖσιν ἀπεχθής,  
ἤδη γὰρ φράσδῃ πάνθ' ἕλιον ἄμμι δεδύκειν;  
Δάφνις κῆν Ἀίδα κακὸν ἔσσεται ἄλγος Ἐρωτι.

ἄρχετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι, πάλιν ἄρχετ' ἀοιδᾶς.

οὐ λέγεται τὰν Κύπριν ὁ βουκόλος; ἔρπε ποτ' Ἴδαν,  
ἔρπε ποτ' Ἀγχίσαν· τινεὶ δρῦες ἤδὲ κύπειρος,  
αἱ δὲ καλὸν βομβεῦντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι.

ἄρχετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι, πάλιν ἄρχετ' ἀοιδᾶς.

ὥραῖος χῶδωνις, ἐπεὶ καὶ μῆλα νομεύει  
καὶ πτῶκας βάλλει καὶ θηρία πάντα διώκει.

ἄρχετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι, πάλιν ἄρχετ' ἀοιδᾶς.

αὐτίς ὅπως στασῇ Διομήδεος ἄσσον ἰοῖσα,  
καὶ λέγε “τὸν βοῦταν νικῶ Δάφνιν, ἀλλὰ μάχευ μοι.” (95–113)

I would like to point out a new context for considering the actions of Daphnis in this passage which may help redirect some of our interpretations of this troubling poem.

By far the most common critical assumption about Daphnis is that he is “heroic” in a pastoral kind of way. This opinion can be found throughout the modern scholarship on the First Idyll. To cite a recent example, Gutzwiller states: “Yet the reader may recognize that Daphnis, like Diomedes, dares to resist the power of the goddess, so that the

cowherd's determination to die, his passive resistance, attains the aura of heroic action" (*Theocritus* 99). I do not share this assessment of Daphnis' heroism or his resistance.

The idea of resistance largely stems from the notion that Daphnis has made some vow that involves totally rejecting Aphrodite and her realm. This has its origin less in anything Theocritus says than in the ancient sources about the mythological character Daphnis, which relate that he was beloved by a nymph, promised to be faithful, and then, when he was not, suffered either blinding or death or both.<sup>1</sup> There is little evidence, however, that Theocritus had this character in mind when he composed his idyll, and the attempt to link the two has frustrated generations of scholars.

What Theocritus actually has Aphrodite say about Daphnis in the First Idyll is that he "prayed to throw desire, but was thrown instead." The verb used (*lugizein*, 97) is a term meaning "to bend or to twist," usually to describe weaving withes, but it is also applied to wrestling in reference to "throwing" an opponent. Even if the rendering "to throw" is a reasonable meaning for the Greek, does this imply anything like a fidelity vow? Many modern critics think not and, being unsatisfied with this interpretation, offer another youthful scorners of Aphrodite, Hippolytus, as the best analogue for Daphnis' actions. The prayer in this interpretation has mutated into a celibacy "boast," which is an unparalleled meaning for the verb *kateuchesthai* (97). Once Hippolytus is assumed as the model for the Theocritean Daphnis, the First Idyll takes on a very different tone, and Daphnis' revilement of Aphrodite becomes "heroic resistance" by association with the tragic hero.

In addition to what Aphrodite says, lines 100–103 seem to be key to this interpretation. As Gow translates them, the lines are stiff with pride and defiance. Line 102 is punctuated as a question: "thinkest thou, then, that all my suns are set already?" Line 103 follows as a pound vaunt: "Even in Hades shall Daphnis be a bitter grief to Love." It does not seem logical, though, for Daphnis to formulate a sarcastic rhetorical question in which he implies that he is *not* about to die, only to concede his death in the very next line. It makes more sense to regard both these lines simply as a resigned affirmation of his approaching death, since this is what Daphnis does in the rest of the poem. This death is related somehow to his erotic predicament. "You already per-

<sup>1</sup>Gow (*Theocritus*) has a full account of the various ancient sources in the preface to his commentary on the First Idyll.

ceive that my every sun has set. In *Hades* too Daphnis will be a grievous pain to desire.” This sounds like confirmation that he has lost, since Daphnis knows that Aphrodite is really irresistible, and one can only assume that being a “pain to desire” describes something about his current erotic situation, although it need not imply resistance to *erōs*.<sup>2</sup> It is this imminent death, not his heroic resolve, which provokes his anger at Aphrodite’s coy arrival.

Hippolytus, therefore, seems to me to be an inappropriate model. He remains antiseptically removed from desire, whereas Daphnis is positively wasting away with it. Given what Theocritus actually reveals about Daphnis’ situation in the First Idyll, we need to imagine a person who unwillingly feels deep desire, tries to resist, but succumbs angrily. I would like to propose, therefore, a different literary model for Daphnis’ actions in this passage, coming not from Euripides, but from Homer—namely Helen.

In our passage the most explicit suggestion of a Homeric subtext is in the final lines (112–13), where Daphnis tells Aphrodite to go face Diomedes again, referring to Diomedes’ wounding of Aphrodite in *Iliad* 5 (330–51). After Diomedes has wounded the goddess, he shouts at her, “is it not enough that you seduce strengthless women?” (5.349). Diomedes is, of course, referring to Helen here, and this Homeric context is key, since in our line 113 Daphnis places *himself* in Helen’s role as the person defeated by Aphrodite, tying this in directly with the Diomedes taunt. It is important to note there that Daphnis is *not* so much aligning himself with Diomedes’ bold action against the goddess, as hoping for some retribution for his own suffering. By evoking this scene and this context, Theocritus is signaling a specific set of Homeric circumstances that will inform his own character’s words and actions. In short, he is inviting comparison between Daphnis and Helen in the *Iliad*. So perhaps we should look more closely at Helen, specifically in her interaction with Aphrodite.

Aphrodite’s wounding is the culmination of her meddling in the

<sup>2</sup>Legrand (*Etude* 147–48) supports this interpretation of 102–3 as dejected resignation rather than proud resistance. He suggests emending the text to enhance this reading, by dropping the question mark at the end of 102 and reading in 103 the genitive *erōtos* (in QAG<sup>2</sup>S) instead of *erōti*, and by changing the nominative *Dafnis* to the dative *Dafnidi* on the suggestion of a scholiast’s note. He then translates the lines: “Cruelle Kypris,—cruelle, car, tu le vois, pour moi le soleil va s’éteindre,—Daphnis, jusque dans l’autre monde, souffrira les tortures de l’amour.”

opening battle scene of the *Iliad*. Paris had challenged Menelaos to single combat (3.67–75) to decide the final outcome of the war, but when Menelaos is about to finish off Paris, Aphrodite steps in to whisk him away to the bedroom (3.369–82). Menelaos is wounded by a bowshot and all-out war begins (4.124–222). It is Diomedes who shines then and is given permission by Athena to attack any mortal, but, of the gods, only Aphrodite (5.121–32). So Diomedes serves as an avenger, as it were, for Aphrodite's unwanted interference.

The scene we are interested in comes right after Aphrodite has saved Paris, when she approaches Helen to suggest a liaison (3.383–420). Helen is contentedly weaving when the goddess approaches in disguise, but the description of Paris as a "dancer" (3.393–94) so enflames Helen that she recognizes Aphrodite through her disguise. Despite her heightened desire, Helen tries to resist, harshly rejecting Aphrodite's suggestion, saying it would be "retribution provoking" (*nemesseton*, 3.410). I think this is a significant word, since it is exactly the same word Daphnis uses of Aphrodite herself, when she approaches him in the First Idyll (*kupri nemessata*, 101). I believe Theocritus uses this word to signal the Homeric context for his own scene. Indeed, we should note at this point Daphnis' resemblance to Helen: both unwillingly feel desire, but both angrily reject the idea of gratifying it. What both suggest in turn, though, is that *Aphrodite* be the one to satisfy her desires. Helen would send the goddess to consort with Paris in place of herself: "Hurry and go to him. Withdraw from the path of the gods. May you no longer wander Olympus, but always wail about that one and watch over him until either he makes you his wife or his slave!" (3.406–9). Daphnis' similar dismissal of Aphrodite is broken by a dramatic aposeopoeisis: "Is it not said of Cypris that the cowherd . . . ? Go on to Ida, go to Anchises" (105–6). He goes on to suggest Adonis as a possible love object for Aphrodite as well (109–10).

What happens next in the *Iliad* is revealing too. Helen's spirited words prove to be all show. When threatened by the angry goddess with unpopularity and a "bad end" (*kakon oiton*, 3.417), Helen goes immediately to Paris. She carries her anger at Aphrodite into the bedroom. She taunts Paris with his own boasts about being a better man than Menelaos, ending with the statement, "But come now, challenge Ares-favored Menelaos to fight again!" (3.432–33). Comparison here to the First Idyll is unavoidable, because there we have Daphnis casting a very similar taunt to Aphrodite: "Go approach Diomedes again, and say, 'I conquered Daphnis the cowherd, fight with me!'" (112–13).

Does this mean that Aphrodite plays the rejected lover to Daphnis

as Paris does to Helen?<sup>3</sup> I would rather say that Aphrodite is the *only* object available for Daphnis' futile rage, since his mysterious love object (unlike Helen's) is unavailable or unknown or both. While Helen goes to meet her lover Paris, Daphnis goes to die, as he says, "dragged by desire to Hades" (130). Nevertheless, I would argue that he too goes to meet the object of his desire. Unlike Helen, however, Daphnis' desire somehow implies death.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps because the object is so unattainable or completely unknown even to himself, Daphnis has just equated his desire with death. Or, more simply, Daphnis' love object is already dead, and he must therefore go to Hades to gratify this desire sent by Aphrodite.

By an artful telescoping, Theocritus has evoked three different scenes in the *Iliad*, all of which point toward Helen as the literary model for Daphnis' actions in this passage, but which also preserve the mystery of the object of Daphnis' desires—and I believe that Theocritus remains deliberately vague on this point. Whatever the ultimate solution to that mystery is, I hope to have shown that Theocritus has not presented a defiant tragic hero as much as a spiteful loser, one who throws out the most appropriate barbs he can muster, invoking the Homeric Diomedes as an avenger to the meddlesome Aphrodite. Daphnis seems more *resigned* to his desire than resistant, despite his bold words to Aphrodite. The paradigm of Helen in the *Iliad* helps to explain the hostility between Daphnis and Aphrodite, and why Daphnis says what he does to her, without turning him into a hero from the tragic stage, which would make him unlike any other character in the bucolic poems.

There *is* something sad and evocative in the love and death of Daphnis, but it is the pathos that Helen embodies in her tortured entanglement with Aphrodite, rather than Hippolytus' stalwart chastity, that Theocritus emphasizes in this poem. Obviously Homer's Helen is not an exact parallel for Daphnis, but it does put the whole nature of his final words and actions into a different and, I feel, more appropriate context.

CLAYTON ZIMMERMAN

CARLTON COLLEGE

<sup>3</sup>Crane ("Laughter" 181–84) suggests exactly this situation on the basis of his reinterpretation of lines 95–96.

<sup>4</sup>One should note, however, that Helen does wish for death (3.173–75) rather than to endure the shame of her relationship with Paris.

### THE THIRD DECEPTION IN *BACCHIDES*: *FIDES* AND PLAUTUS' ORIGINALITY

Chrysalus is one of Plautus' most clever slaves. In the course of *Bacchides* he deceives his master three times. But the model for *Bacchides* was Menander's *Dis Exapaton*, "The Man Deceiving Twice," whose title implies only two deceptions. This difference in arithmetic was the seed of a scholarly controversy which germinated in 1912 with the publication of Eduard Fraenkel's dissertation, *De Media et Nova Comoedia Quaestiones Selectae*. Fraenkel suggested that Plautus added the final deception in *Bacchides* through the process of *contaminatio*, using another, unidentified Attic comedy for his model. The response to this hypothesis was mixed; eventually Fraenkel himself abandoned it in response to the critique of Gordon Williams.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, the notion that the third deception is a Plautine addition, if not an example of *contaminatio*, has persisted, most recently in the work of Eckard Lefèvre and Adolf Primmer.<sup>2</sup>

Fraenkel's original hypothesis, its reception by Williams and other critics, and the recent work of Lefèvre and Primmer belong to the tradition of Plautine source criticism, or *Quellenforschung*, which seeks to analyze the text into those parts which are Roman, created by Plautus himself, and those parts which are Greek, adapted by Plautus from his models, which themselves are largely lost to posterity. In the effort to sort out the Roman from the Greek, the text of Plautus has been minutely analyzed in all of its poetic, dramatic, and cultural aspects. But since, apart from fragments, the texts of Plautus' models are lost to us, such *Quellenforschung* is a kind of philological shadowboxing in which the text of Plautus is matched against the text of a play which no longer exists. Small wonder that consensus is often difficult to achieve on the questions traditional Plautine source criticism addresses.

The present essay takes a different approach to the problem of the

<sup>1</sup>Fraenkel's hypothesis, originally presented in *Quaestiones* 100–104, was further developed in *Elementi* 57–58 and n. 2. Williams's response is included in the appendix to his article "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 446–55. Fraenkel's retraction is noted in the supplementary notes to *Elementi* 403. For a bibliography of the response to Fraenkel see Lefèvre, "Plautus–Studien II" 520–21. To the critics I would add Finette, "Fourberies." To Fraenkel's supporters add Thierfelder, "Generi in Plauto."

<sup>2</sup>Lefèvre, "Plautus–Studien II." Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung*.



third deception (a difference which may not at first be apparent, when I conduct a necessary review of Fraenkel's original hypothesis and Williams's critique),<sup>3</sup> through a close reading of *Bacchides* as a dramatic unity. I argue that the play is about trust and deception, a thematic antithesis which Plautus has characterized in ethnic terms: on the one hand, trust is romanized as *fides*; on the other, deception is characterized as Greek. This is relevant to the third deception because the ethical expectations of *fides* help shape the action and the behavior of the characters at several key points. Plautus' nominally Greek characters at times seem rather Roman in their attitude towards *fides*. I suggest that the third deception works only because the *senex* Nicobulus, like a good Roman, has regard for *fides*. This may not prove that the third deception is Plautine in origin; the theme of "trustworthiness" could have been present in Menander's play, now garbed by Plautus in Roman dress as *fides* to appeal to the sensibilities and ethical preoccupations of his audience. However, I show that where a direct comparison between *Dis Exapaton* and *Bacchides* is possible, it is clear that Plautus has introduced *fides* independently of his model. This suggests that *fides* is not merely the Romanization of a theme already present in *Dis Exapaton*. Ultimately I suggest that the characterization of *fides* as Roman and deception as Greek may be understood in the broader context of Plautus' society and its encounter with Greek culture. *Bacchides* enables us to see this Roman bias function in the context of an organic and unified work of literature. While we must be careful not to confuse Roman comedy with the Roman social reality, *Bacchides* both permits us to examine the tensions within the antithesis and helps reveal some of the complexity of the Roman response to Hellenism.

### FRAENKEL'S THEORY OF *CONTAMINATIO*

Before reviewing Fraenkel's *contaminatio* theory and Williams's critique, it is useful to review the three deceptions in *Bacchides*. The first deception is a straightforward lie. Before the action of the play begins, Nicobulus has sent his slave, Chrysalus, and his son, Mne-

<sup>3</sup>This first step is useful because however we may feel about his theory of *contaminatio*, Fraenkel has noted important clues that Plautus significantly altered his original; on the other hand, Williams's response, while the most cogent defense of the idea that all three deceptions were originally in Menander, is nonetheless flawed.

silochus, to Ephesus so they may collect money deposited with a guest-friend. However, the two have decided to keep the money for themselves, to help further the young man's romance with a courtesan, Bacchis of Samos. Chrysalus cobbles together a tall tale in which a treacherous guest-friend, pirates, and a narrow escape have forced him and Mnesilochus to leave the money behind in Ephesus. But this deception is as easily undone as it had been accomplished. Back in Athens, Mnesilochus wrongly suspects his friend Pistoclerus of having stolen Bacchis from him. In fact, Pistoclerus has fallen in love with Bacchis' twin, Bacchis of Athens. At any rate, in his distress Mnesilochus tells his father the truth and returns the money. But Mnesilochus soon learns that his friends are true and that his intemperate honesty has created the need for a second deception. Chrysalus has Mnesilochus compose a letter to his father, warning him that Chrysalus is planning to deceive him again and that Nicobulus ought to keep the slave under guard. As the old man has Chrysalus bound up, the slave adroitly seizes an opportunity to impose Bacchis of Samos on Nicobulus as the wife of Cleomachus, an outraged and bloodthirsty soldier, who is now on the verge of catching his "wife" and Mnesilochus *in flagrante*, but who may, nonetheless, be mollified by an appropriate cash payment. Mnesilochus appears to have his Bacchis, but Chrysalus deems that some extra money is necessary, so that the victorious troops may have proper drink to celebrate their triumph (972–72<sup>a</sup>). Thus we have a third deception in *Bacchides*: Chrysalus has Mnesilochus write a second letter in which he confesses to his father that he has promised to pay Bacchis of Samos, who Nicobulus still thinks is the soldier's wife, 200 gold philips; unless Nicobulus pays this amount, Mnesilochus will have perjured himself. So that his son may avoid that shame, Nicobulus pays up again.

Fraenkel's hypothesis that the third deception in *Bacchides* was not in Menander's *Dis Exapaton* was based on both the title of Menander's play and Chrysalus' reference in the great *canticum* to the legendary *tria fata* auguring the fall of Troy.<sup>4</sup> Chrysalus draws an explicit connection between these *tria fata* and the three deceptions he has contrived against his master (953–56). The passage is generally recognized to be Plautine in origin. Fraenkel also suggests that the third deception is a case of *contaminatio*; it was derived from another, unidentified Greek play. Like the second deception, this deception too was

<sup>4</sup>Fraenkel, *Quaestiones* 100–102 and *Elementi* 57–58 and n. 2.

based on a letter. For Fraenkel (*Quaestiones* 102–3) its polished style suggested Attic origins.

Even skillful surgeons leave a scar. Plautus' insertion of material from another play into his adaptation of *Dis Exapaton* created some confusion for the action of *Bacchides*. Fraenkel discerned the Plautine suture marks at 920–24, that is, immediately before the *canticum*. Nicobulus has already promised to pay 200 gold philips to the soldier; however, before he fulfills his promise Plautus has him indulge renewed suspicion about his slave. He resolves first to speak again with his son before paying the money (920–22), but suddenly changes his mind and decides to reread his son's letter: *uerum lubet etiam mi has perlegere denuo; / aequomst tabellis consignatis credere* (923–24). These last two lines give no indication of Nicobulus' subsequent movements.<sup>5</sup> This vagueness would have been unlikely in Plautus' model, for Greek New Comedy was generally careful in accounting for the exits and entrances and the movements of characters on and off stage. As is frequent in Plautine *Quellenforschung*, the Roman dramatist is faulted for his failure to meet the aesthetic standards of his Greek model. For Fraenkel the perceived ineptness of 923–24 was partial proof of their Plautinity. Fraenkel implies that in Menander's play the old man would have gone somewhere where he would learn the truth: perhaps to see his son at the courtesan's house, an intention suggested by 920–22; or perhaps to the forum to pay the soldier, from whom he would learn all, which of course is what eventually happened in *Bacchides*. At any rate, Plautus defers the moment when Nicobulus learns what is going on, and creates a space in which the third deception may unfold.<sup>6</sup>

Williams raised three objections which persuaded Fraenkel to abandon this hypothesis. First, the evident tampering at 923–24 may be attributed to the need to create dramatic space for the *canticum* at 925–78, not an additional deception. In *Dis Exapaton* there would have been no such *canticum*.<sup>7</sup> Second, to square his view that there were three

<sup>5</sup>The following summary of Fraenkel's views regarding the significance of 923–24 (with some of my own amplification) is drawn from his *Elementi* 57–58 n. 2.

<sup>6</sup>Skutsch, "Notes," has argued that Nicobulus' presence onstage at 923 may be explained simply: Plautus wanted him to be onstage but not to notice the arrival of Chrysalus, thus creating space for the *canticum*. Skutsch further observes that Nicobulus would have also provided an amusing visual counterpoint to Chrysalus.

<sup>7</sup>Williams, "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 452, argues that the Nicobulus character may have waited onstage for his slave to return, covering his absence with a monologue,

deceptions in the Greek play with Menander's title implying only two, Williams develops a suggestion of Ritschl's that the title simply ignores the first, frustrated deception;<sup>8</sup> thus there were three deceptions in *Dis Exapaton*, but the title refers only to the second and third, the two accomplished by letter.<sup>9</sup> Third, Williams argues that it was improbable that Plautus found an episode in another Greek play whose many details readily fit the action of *Bacchides*. This final objection was perhaps the most persuasive for Fraenkel, who resisted the idea that Plautus could create dramatic action without relying on a model.<sup>10</sup>

It is worth examining Williams's arguments in some detail.<sup>11</sup> The first point, that lines 923–24 may be adequately motivated by Plautus' insertion of the *canticum* which follows, cannot be resolved. The *canticum* and the third deception are so closely connected that it is difficult to know whether the obscurity raised by 923–24 creates dramatic space for the *canticum* alone or both the *canticum* and the deception it intro-

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and acknowledged the slave directly on his reentrance. Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung* 84–94, argues that Nicobulus exited at 920 to the forum, clearing the stage for the end of the fourth act.

<sup>8</sup>In Ritschl's *Opuscula Philologica* II 365, quoted by Williams, "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 453.

<sup>9</sup>I concur with Williams, "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 453 n. 1, in rejecting an alternative accounting which regards the two letter deceptions as a single one. The two letter deceptions share a method, but are two distinct acts of deception. For the bibliography on this question see Lefèvre, "Plautus-Studien II" 520–21.

<sup>10</sup>Fraenkel, *Elementi* 383–84: "Essi [sc. Plautus' models] debbono fornirgli la materia prima per le sue produzioni ciò che egli non sa creare di suo, la vera e propria invenzione drammatica e la condotta di un dialogo che promuova l'avanzare dell'azione."

<sup>11</sup>Apart from the arguments which follow, it should be noted that Williams's interest in the problem is connected with his thought-provoking but problematic attempt to determine the relative dating of *Bacchides* and *Pseudolus*. The general consensus since Ritschl has been that *Pseudolus* came first. Williams reaches the opposite conclusion in an analysis which compares motifs common to both plays. He argues that in *Bacchides* these common motifs are used consistently with the plot and thus derive from the Greek original; on the other hand, in *Pseudolus* the same motifs can be shown to be Plautine additions or reworkings of the model. Williams implies that this more independent use of the motifs in *Pseudolus* indicates Plautus' poetic development; therefore *Bacchides*, not *Pseudolus*, is the earlier play. The third deception involves one of the motifs in question, where the master himself insists the slave take some money (cf. 825 and 1059–66). According to Williams, *Bacchides*, the earlier play, was here following its Greek model. On the other hand, if the view is adopted that Plautus has added a third deception on his own initiative, Williams's earlier date for *Bacchides* would be undermined. See Questa, *Parerga* 15–22, for a review of the various approaches to the question of the date of *Bacchides*. Questa himself endorses the traditional view that *Pseudolus* came first.

duces. Williams's apparently simpler solution is not necessarily the correct one. Second, in his effort to discount the first deception Williams argues that only a moralist interested in the process of deception itself would have counted three deceptions in Menander's play. In his view only the actual extraction of the money would have mattered to Menander's audience—the proof of the perjury was in the payment. Thus when Mnesilochus returned the money to his father, the first deception was no longer a deception. Hence Williams argues ("Construction of *Pseudolus*" 453–54) that only a moralist would have been tempted to call Menander's play *Tris Exapaton*. This is surely special pleading. In the first deception Chrysalus successfully deceived his master because Nicobulus believed his lie. That deceit occurs when a lie is believed is not a view peculiar to moralists. But if we wish to accept Williams's argument to the contrary, we should remember that the money acquired through the third deception is also returned (cf. 1184). In that case we should have expected Menander to have called his play *Hapax Exapaton*.

Williams also objects that Fraenkel's theory of *contaminatio* asks us to accept the improbable idea that Plautus had at his disposal another Greek play containing an episode neatly fitting the details of *Bacchides* and ready to be grafted onto the main plot. This was a serious objection for Fraenkel, in whose view Plautus did not compose dramatic action which furthered the plot independently of a Greek model. But it is not a serious objection for us. Recent scholarship in the tradition of Plautine *Quellenforschung* has established a more generous appreciation of Plautine originality, one that acknowledges the Roman dramatist's ability to compose original dramatic action.<sup>12</sup> In particular, Primmer, in his reconstruction of *Dis Exapaton* from close analysis of *Bacchides*, argues that the third deception is Plautine, on the basis of the probable structure of Menander's play.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See the concise and helpful summary of this scholarship in Lowe, "Originality."

<sup>13</sup> Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung*. Earlier Büchner, *Literaturgeschichte* 92–96, had suggested without arguments that the third deception was a free creation by Plautus. Lefèvre, "Plautus—Studien II" 520–21, also argues that Plautus has added the third deception, in a complex reconstruction that distinguishes what is Plautine and what is Menandrian—but in greater detail than the sources allow. According to Lefèvre, Plautus created two letter deceptions from what was a single deception by letter in Menander. Plautus retained the circumstances of the Menandrian deception in his first letter deception, but composed a new letter for it, the one in which Chrysalus warns Nicobulus to be on his guard. The original Menandrian letter, with appropriate modification, was trans-

The argument advanced here for the Plautinity of the third deception differs from that of Primmer and others writing in the tradition of Plautine source criticism in that it emphasizes the dependence of the third deception on the main dramatic idea of the play, the antithesis between Roman *fides* and Greek deception, a theme which is Plautine in origin. The third deception works only because Nicobulus, like a good Roman, has regard for *fides*. The antithesis between the Roman ethic and its Greek opposite accommodated *Bacchides* to the biases of its original audience and provides us with some of the social logic behind Plautus' alteration of his Greek original.

### *FIDES IN BACCHIDES*

Before discussing the importance of *fides* in *Bacchides*, it is useful to review the importance of the ethic in the lives of the play's audience.<sup>14</sup> Plautus' audience would have recognized an important aspect of *fides* in the "reliability" or "trustworthiness" of the individual. This aspect of *fides* was concerned with the honoring of contracts and obligations of all sorts, personal, political, and commercial. Here *fides* worked as a social ethic, regulating the various ties which bound society together. This concern with social ethics is related closely to another aspect of *fides* concerned with personal morality. For the audience of *Bacchides*, as much as for its characters, *fides* was the guarantor of oaths and solemn promises such as *stipulatio*. To break one's word was an offense against *fides*. The ethic was associated with a particular pair of reciprocal promises: first, the promise of protection made by the strong to the weak; then, the promise of loyalty and subservience made by the weak in return for the protection the strong afford. In this regard

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posed to the second letter deception, Plautine in origin, in which Mnesilochus asks for a second 200 philips to give to Bacchis. Lefèvre's reconstruction has been endorsed by Barsby, *Bacchides* 170.

<sup>14</sup>It is neither possible nor necessary here to determine the "original" meaning of *fides*. Fraenkel, "*Fides*," sees the original sense in the protection offered the weak by the strong, which he argues is less a moral and more a practical or social commitment. On the other hand, Heinze, "*Fides*," stresses the moral compulsion implied by *fides*, a quality clearly present in Plautus. The related connection between *fides* and power is emphasized by Piganiol, "*Venire in fidem*," who sees *fides* as a quality akin to *imperium*, inspiring confidence in the authority of the leader. Hellegouarc'h *Vocabulaire* 23-40, emphasizes the social importance of *fides*. A useful summary of theoretical views on *fides* is found in Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung* 26-31.

Romans closely associated *fides* with the distribution of power and the social order.

This last aspect would have addressed the concerns of the aristocrats in the audience. The reciprocity of *fides* moderated the relationship between people of unequal rank, such as master and slave or patron and client. Thus while *fides* provided for some measure of protection for the weaker, it also recognized and legitimated the privileges of the stronger. For the aristocrats in the audience, in whom the personal and the political were inextricably bound, *fides* pertained to political as much as to personal conduct. The aristocrat's desire to maintain his *fides* was motivated not just by a concern for ethics and consideration for the weak. One's reputation for *fides* was also an index of one's power. The patron who failed to protect his client suffered injury not only to his ethical reputation but also to the public perception of his power—hence the practice in Roman politics of attacking a man through his clients. Correspondingly, the act of affirming one's *fides* could serve as a demonstration of one's power as much as it could serve as proof of ethical probity.

Finally, many in the audience, some more than others, were aware that the Romans had exported *fides*, the domestic ethic which regulated unequal relationships within Roman society, and used it as a principle in Rome's dealings with subordinate foreign powers. Foreign states which submitted themselves to the will of Rome and expected protection in return were said to be in the *fides* of the Roman people. The Romans themselves advertised their *fides* to other states as a guarantee of Roman reliability and fairness, but also as a reminder of Roman power.<sup>15</sup> This principle of conduct had been given concrete expression in the temple to the goddess Fides on the Capitoline, which was constructed in the 250s and served for the reception of foreign embassies.

Thus, in the ideal if not the reality, *fides* was an ethic that played a role in almost every aspect of a Roman's life, both public and private. Plautus' audience were both well prepared to recognize situations in *Bacchides* where *fides* was at issue and well conditioned to judge a character's moral worth in relation to his *fides*. Such a situation occurs at 526–62, a point when Mnesilochus has already undone Chrysalus' first deception, told his father the truth, and returned the money. He now confronts his friend Pistoclerus, who, Mnesilochus erroneously

<sup>15</sup> See Gruen, "*Pistis* and *Fides*."

thinks, has betrayed him by falling in love with his girlfriend. We are fortunate that discovery of a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus containing fragments of *Dis Exapaton* permits us to compare this episode from *Bacchides* directly with its model.<sup>16</sup> In the corresponding passage of *Dis Exapaton* the young lover, named Sostratos, soliloquizes on the relative guilt of his girlfriend, Bacchis, and his friend, whom Menander called Moschos. Direct comparison shows clearly how Plautus has reformulated the ethical aspect of the action, which in Menander turns on a notion of *dikē*, into terms of the Roman concept of obligation, *fides*.

In Menander the first part of 108–10, in which Sostratos tells Moschos of his grievance, is badly mutilated, but in light of Moschos' response in 111 the essence of Sostratos' charge appears distilled in the word *ēdikēkas* (110): Moschos has committed an injustice.<sup>17</sup> From this passage and Sostratos' soliloquy, where he notes the *adikēma* (101) committed against him, it is clear that Menander has dramatized the situation in terms of justice, *dikē*. Moreover, Sostratos charges Bacchis with the chief responsibility for the *adikēma*. Moschos, to whom he has given a sensitive trust involving the young woman, is not as harshly judged (100–102). In Plautus, Mnesilochus' judgment on Pistoclerus is not as forgiving.

In Menander, directness and economy characterize the exchange between Sostratos and Moschos. On the other hand, Plautus draws out this scene by having Mnesilochus baffle Pistoclerus, his imagined betrayer. Mnesilochus is wearing a long face and leaves it to Pistoclerus to discover what is wrong. Pistoclerus asks a series of questions and from the other's answers learns that a false friend, yet unnamed, has wronged Mnesilochus. In response to this partial revelation Pistoclerus inveighs against such false friends, ignorant that it is he himself who stands accused:

multi more isto atque exemplo uiuont, quos quom censeas  
esse amicos, reperiuntur falsi falsimoniis,  
lingua factiosi, inertes opera, sublesta fide. (540–42)

<sup>16</sup>Following the lead of Handley, *Comparison*, much has been written about these passages. In particular, I cite Gaiser, "*Bacchides* und *Dis Exapaton*"; Questa, *Parerga* 46–54; Bain, "*Plautus uortit barbare*"; Schönbeck, *Beiträge* 91–130; Arnott, *Menander, Plautus, Terence* 38–40. For bibliography up to 1975 see Fogazza, "Plauto 1935–1975"; up to 1976, Segal, "Scholarship."

<sup>17</sup>The line references to Menander are those of Sandbach, *Menandri Reliquiae Selectae*.



There are many men like that. You think they're your friends,  
they turn out to be perfidious perjurers,  
all talk, no show; *fides* means nothing to them.

Lines 540–42 are the Plautine rendering of what Menander distills in one word.<sup>18</sup> But the difference between Plautus and Menander lies not only in the more extravagant rhetoric of the Roman poet. Plautus has reinterpreted the Greek idea, based on *dikē*, into a Roman one, based on *fides*: the *fides* of such men is *sublesta*, “of no consequence.” The ethical terms in which Plautus has dramatized the conflict are reflected in the new name he has found for his unjustly accused protagonist: Pistoclerus. Built on Greek *pistis*, this name echoes in Greek the new Roman theme and underscores Pistoclerus’ true innocence.

This Romanization of the ethical terms that frame the action affects the characterization of the two young men, who seem Roman in their attitude towards *fides*. In Menander, Sostratos expresses pity for the foolishness of his friend (99) and reserves the harsher judgment for Bacchus; in Plautus, the emphasis is on Mnesilochus’ anger at his friend and Pistoclerus’ guilt. Pistoclerus himself unknowingly articulates the nature of the charge: he has betrayed the *fides* placed in him. Recast in these Roman ethical terms, Pistoclerus’ supposed betrayal of his friend represented, dramatically and ethically, a more serious matter for the audience of *Bacchides* than alleged betrayal in *Dis Exapaton* represented for its audience. Like the good Romans in the audience, both Mnesilochus and Pistoclerus have little sympathy for a betrayal of *fides*.

<sup>18</sup>Controversy surrounds 540–42, which are part of a passage (540–51) omitted by the Ambrosian manuscript. The passage was defended by Leo, *Forschungen* 131, who says that the description of the false friend is certainly derived from Menander. Tränkle, “Zwei Stellen,” led the attack on Plautinity of the lines. His arguments were endorsed by Schönbeck, *Beiträge* 115–18, and Bain, “*Plautus uortit barbare*.” Tränkle’s attack on the passage is comprehensive but unconvincing. Most surprising among advantages he sees with the removal of the lines is that the scene would have more *Zielstrebigkeit*. However, readers of Plautus would be surprised if the poet himself had held such “purposiveness” as an aesthetic desideratum. Indeed, the passage seems a fairly characteristic example of Plautine expansion, transforming the Greek material in accordance with a Roman theme. More significantly, a key phrase, *sublesta fide*, is echoed at *Persa* 348 (*fides sublestior*), a scene in which *fides* has similar thematic importance. Handley, *Comparison* 17, may well be right, that the passage was omitted initially to shorten the scene in production and that this abridgement was eventually adopted by editors who observed the passage was inorganic and had no parallel in Menander. See also Questa, *Parerga* 49–54.

Plautus takes the Romanization of the young men a step further, intimating an aspect of *fides* associated with Roman political life, when Pistoclerus condemns friends who are *lingua factiosi*. *Factiosi* is a word closely associated with Roman politics and means something like "busily active on behalf of one's political faction." It thus implies a political aspect of *fides*, which could guarantee political as well as personal *amicitiae*.<sup>19</sup> This reference to politics, while relevant to *fides*, seems unconnected with the action, which concerns an imagined betrayal of a personal friendship—the success the young men seek is sexual, not electoral. So it is tempting to fault Plautus for lack of artistry. However, there is a rationale for this apparent infelicity, which, as I argue later, affected how the audience perceived the "Romanness" of Mnesilochus and Pistoclerus.

In the second deception Chrysalus gulls Nicobulus into believing that Cleomachus is Bacchis' husband, about to catch his "wife" in bed with Mnesilochus, her adulterous lover: *iam manifesto hominem opprimet* (858).<sup>20</sup> The wily slave heads the soldier off, getting Nicobulus to promise payment to him as compensation for the outrage (842–924). The key event in this scene reflects circumstances in both Menander's Athens and Plautus' Rome, where a husband who caught his wife and her lover in the act had the right to kill the adulterer. At the same time, the arrangement in which the adulterer is able to make amends to the injured husband with a payment of money seems peculiarly Greek. Thus the second deception, while depicting a legal situation common to both Athens and Rome, is likely to be Greek in origin.<sup>21</sup>

Though basically Greek in its legal background, the second deception turns on the Roman contractual practice of *stipulatio*, an institution which depends on *fides*.<sup>22</sup> At 865–66 as Cleomachus blusters about, threatening to kill Bacchis and her lover, Chrysalus urges his master to "come to terms" with the soldier through a payment of money: *pacisci*

<sup>19</sup> Plautus frequently colors the language of personal relationships with the language of Roman politics. See Earl, "Terminology in Plautus" and the first chapter of his *Tradition* 11–43.

<sup>20</sup> For a detailed analysis of this scene see Schönbeck, *Beiträge* 131–59.

<sup>21</sup> See Barsby, *Bacchides* 164, who notes that *manifestus* is Roman legalese. On Roman legal usage see Corbett, *Marriage* 127–46. Roman law provided for compensation of the outraged husband, but from the offending woman's dowry. On the situation under Athenian law see Harrison, *Law* 32–38, and Harris, "Seduction."

<sup>22</sup> On the importance of the *stipulatio* in *Pseudolus* see Williams, "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 424–46.

*cum illo paullula pecunia / potes* (865). It is a suggestion Nicobulus desperately adopts (cf. 866), especially after Cleomachus' bloodthirsty threat at 868–69: *nunc nisi ducenti Philippi redduntur mihi, / iam illorum ego animam amborum exsorbebo oppido*. The ambiguity of *redduntur* reflects the misunderstanding: the soldier intends that something which belongs to him be returned; Nicobulus, who believes Bacchis is his wife, understands *redduntur* in reference to the meeting of an obligation, namely, the payment of the debt incurred for the violation of the man's marriage.<sup>23</sup> He urges Chrysalus again and again to "come to terms" with the soldier (*pacisce*, 870, 871). Chrysalus steps forward and orchestrates a formal promise between the two men:

CH. roga hunc tu, tu promitte huic. NI. promitto, roga.

CL. ducentos nummos aureos Philippos probos

dabin? CH. "dabuntur" inque. responde. NI. dabo. (881–83)

CH. You! Ask him for the money. You, promise him. NI. I promise—ask for it!

CL. Will you give me 200 good gold philips?

CH. Say, "They shall be given,"—answer! NI. I shall give them.

In *stipulatio*, "the substance of the answer had to correspond to the question and the verb used in reply had to be the same as that of the question." The prime guarantor of such a contract was the *fides* of the promiser (cf. 878, *uerbum sat est*); no writing or witnesses were required, although "no one possessing ordinary caution would fail to avail himself of one of these modes of proof."<sup>24</sup> This dramatization of the *stipulatio* indicates that Nicobulus' promise is a legal and formal one, one which he was obligated to fulfill according to the oldest and most deeply felt principles of Roman morality.

Here again Plautus' introduction of Roman practices and ethical standards has helped to Romanize his Greek characters. Chrysalus and Nicobulus, though nominal Greeks, were as familiar with the conventions of *stipulatio* as the audience of *Bacchides*. Nicobulus eagerly asks Chrysalus when he should make his formal pledge: *quam mox dico "dabo"*? (880). In other words, Plautus characterizes them in some way as Romans. On the other hand, the soldier, who would likely have been a foreign mercenary in Menander's play, is still depicted as a foreigner

<sup>23</sup> On *reddere* see Williams, "Construction of *Pseudolus*" 445–46.

<sup>24</sup> Watson, *Private Law* 117.

but, here, one who is unfamiliar with *Roman* practices. Thus Chrysalus and Nicobulus instruct him in what he must say in the *stipulatio* (881). We note that later, when misinforming Cleomachus about the whereabouts of Bacchis, Chrysalus supplies the kind of details that might interest a foreigner and tourist: *Illa autem in arcem abiit aedem uisere / Mineruae. nunc apertast* (900–901).<sup>25</sup>

In Nicobulus' *stipulatio* to Cleomachus, Plautus again has associated a public or political aspect of *fides* with a private arrangement. This is accomplished through the emphasis on Nicobulus' "Romanness" and the "non-Romanness" of the Greek soldier Cleomachus. As Gruen notes ("*Pistis* and *Fides*" 54–55), in their dealings with foreigners at this time Romans placed particular emphasis on the *fides* of the Roman people as a guarantee of Roman reliability, protection, and fairness. Characterized ethnically, as a promise made by a Roman to a Greek soldier, Nicobulus' *stipulatio* suggests an allusion to Rome's tendency to advertise its *fides* in its dealings with other nations.<sup>26</sup> Here again, Plautus appears to have suggested a political aspect of *fides* which seems inappropriate to the action. The high-minded allusion to Roman foreign conduct does not fit the circumstances of Nicobulus' *stipulatio*, which is a desperate promise to save his son from a disgraceful death in a tawdry affair. As with the reference to Roman politics implied by *factiosi*, I argue below that this apparent infelicity was intended to adjust the audience's perception of the characters' "Romanness."

Nicobulus' "Romanness" is confirmed by the unswerving determination he exhibits through the rest of the play to keep his promise. Both slave and master emphasize the connection between the promise and the certainty that Nicobulus will pay. This is the basis for Chrysalus' confidence at 968–70:

<sup>25</sup>It is interesting to note that the soldier uses some odd and extravagant expressions which perhaps may suggest his foreignness: *nam neque Bellona mi umquam neque Mars creduat, / ni illum exanimalem faxo, si conuenero, / niue exheredem fecero uitae suae* (847–49). Chrysalus, in fact, may even be mocking Cleomachus' manner of speech when he threatens to make the soldier (approximately) "more full of holes than a dirge for a dormouse"—*te faciam, si tu me inritaueris, / confossio rem* (888–89)—gibberish which Cleomachus, in his ignorance of the local patois, mistakes for some awful form of retaliation. For a survey of earlier views on these lines see Schönbeck, *Beiträge* 148–49.

<sup>26</sup>If MacMullen, "Hellenizing," is correct and Plautus' audience consisted of the Roman elite, they would have recognized this allusion without great difficulty. However, it seems likely that even the Roman *hoi polloi* were acquainted with the rhetoric which promoted Rome's image abroad by advertising its *fides*.

is nunc ducentos  
nummos Philippos militi, quos  
dare se promisit, dabit.

The 200 philips he promised—now he'll give them to the soldier.

Nicobulus himself refers to his promise at 920 and 1051. At 1096–98, after he has learned the true relationship between the woman and the soldier, Nicobulus pays nonetheless, because of his promise:

ita miles memorat meretricem esse eam quam ille uxorem esse aiebat,  
omniaque ut quidque actum est memorauit, eam sibi hunc annum  
conductam,  
relicuom id auri factum quod ego ei stultissimus homo *promissem* . . .

The soldier told me that the woman Chrysalus said was his “wife” is a  
“working girl.”

He told me all the details, that he'd hired her for the year,  
and finally the truth about the money, which I, like an idiot, *promised to*  
*pay*.

*Promised to pay . . . and therefore had to.* Of course, in real life Nicobulus would have been relieved of his obligation under such circumstances. But real life matters less here than the comic reality and the social assumptions behind it. The fulfillment of the second deception makes a kind of comic sense because it plays on the Roman ideal, if not practice, according to which one's *stipulatio* was strictly observed, as well as the Roman awareness of the moral obligation implied by *stipulatio*. Plautus' audience could have seen in Nicobulus a Roman fantasy of comic exaggeration, an extreme version of themselves. We do not know what was in Plautus' model at this point; however, there was no Greek equivalent to *stipulatio*. Nor does it seem likely that Menander would sacrifice social verisimilitude to the distorted demands of comic logic as Plautus has here.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup>The father may well have paid the money then and there, completing the second of the two deceptions in *Dis Exapaton*. Williams, “Construction of *Pseudolus*” 426–27, suggests that the *stipulatio* at *Pseudolus* 115–16 replaces a simple promise in the Greek play. According to Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung* 74–80, the Nicobulus character followed the soldier to the forum to pay the money at the conclusion of this scene.

THE THIRD DECEPTION AND THE CASE  
FOR PLAUTINE INVENTION

The *stipulatio* and the emphasis on Nicobulus' *fides* we have just seen in the second deception anticipate the theme of the third deception. However, in contrast to the second deception, which appears to reflect Greek practices and realities regarding adultery, the third deception is thoroughly Roman in its preoccupations and motivation. This Roman tenor is signaled by the words Nicobulus speaks at the controversial lines 923–24. While the soldier is gone, Nicobulus orders Chrysalus to go into the house of the Bacchis sisters to read young Mnesilochus the riot act. Nicobulus himself wavers. First he resolves to confer again with his son before paying, because Chrysalus cannot be trusted (920–22). But then he abruptly changes his mind:

uerum lubet etiam mi has pellegere denuo:  
aequomst tabellis consignatis credere.

But just the same, I'd like to read this letter again.  
You can depend on a document that's signed and sealed.

The vagueness of these lines about Nicobulus' subsequent movements led Fraenkel rightly to suspect that Plautus ceased to follow *Dis Exapaton* at this point. However, while these lines sacrifice Menandrian clarity, they add thematic relevance to the coming deception. Fraenkel notes ("*Fides*") that *fides* may also be the quality which makes a person or thing worthy of trust or belief. The issue here is the *fides* of the letter, which Nicobulus foolishly takes for granted.<sup>28</sup> This neatly anticipates the manner in which he is about to be deceived again.<sup>29</sup> Not only is Nicobulus comically foolish in maintaining his own *fides*, he is incapa-

<sup>28</sup>It is possible that this reference contains a topicality that is lost to us. Public records in Rome, *tabellae*, were not always carefully maintained, as Cicero indicates in *Pro Archia* (9), noting that in the case of a particular praetor *calamitas omnem tabularum fidem resignasset*. A similar scandal may have been behind Nicobulus' naive remark at 924.

<sup>29</sup>Questa, *Parerga* 63–64 n. 51, notes Gian Biagio Conte's view *per litteras*, that these lines are ironically relevant in that Nicobulus, warned not to trust Chrysalus, falls victim to deceit by not trusting him.

ble of estimating the *fides* of others. Thus the Roman motif of the third deception is introduced at the suspected point of Plautine insertion.

Chrysalus has been planning a third deception, a scheme to procure money for a wild party with the Bacchis sisters. He reenters bearing tablets which contain a second letter from Mnesilochus to his father, a second letter which, in fact, he has dictated to the boy. His entrance monologue is a triumphant Plautine *canticum* built around a grandiose, polyvalent metaphor comparing the mulcting of his master to the sack of Troy (925–78).

Nicobulus encounters Chrysalus after the Iliadic song. The slave falsely affirms that he has chastised Mnesilochus and presents his master with a letter from the boy. Fraenkel argues that the charm of this letter pointed to its Attic origins, that Plautus borrowed it from another Greek model.<sup>30</sup> The key moral issue, however, is Roman. After groveling apologies and expressions of shame (1007–9, 1013–16), Mnesilochus entreats his father for a second 200 gold philips:

NI. (reading) "ego ius iurandum uerbis conceptis dedi,  
daturum id me hodie mulieri ante uesperum,  
priu' quam a me abiret. nunc, pater, ne peierem  
cura atque abduce me hinc ab hac quantum potest,  
quam propter tantum damni feci et flagiti." (1028–32)

"I gave my most solemn word of honor  
that I would give the woman the money today before evening,  
before she left me. Now, father, arrange it so that I won't have broken  
my word  
and take me away from here, as far as possible from this woman,  
because of whom I have committed so much outrage and suffered so  
much loss."

Mnesilochus pretends to need the additional money because he has promised it to the soldier's wife; if he cannot pay, he will have perjured himself. The formulae *ius iurandum* and *uerbis conceptis* characterize Mnesilochus' supposed promise as solemn and binding. The Roman solemnity of this promise echoes that of the earlier *stipulatio*.

<sup>30</sup>Fraenkel, *Quaestiones* 102–3: "Quam actionem nulla Graeca fabula adhibita Plautum libere finxisse ut parum uerisimile est, plane refutatur eximia epistulae uenustate. Talia Attici poetae stilum redolent." Lefèvre, "Plautus—Studien II" 522–25, and Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung* 65–70, 84–88, have argued that the second letter derives mainly from *Dis Exapaton*.

However, whereas that promise to pay reflects an actual Athenian law providing that an adulterer compensate the outraged husband, Mnesilochus' promise here has no such legal point of reference. We may be dealing with Plautine burlesque of Athenian law—in this case, it is the woman who is offered money. It seems less likely that such a travesty of Athenian law would be in Menander.

Nicobulus asks Chrysalus for his advice. The slave knows his master's attitude toward promises and slyly replies that he himself would rather pay the money than permit a situation to come about in which the boy would have committed perjury:

dem potius aurum quam illum corrumpi sinam.  
duae condiciones sunt: utram tu accipias uide:  
uel ut aurum perdas uel ut amator peiieret.

I would rather pay the money than allow him to be compromised  
morally.

You have two choices; you be the judge:  
either you lose the money or lover—boy is a liar.

Nicobulus realizes he must pay again; Chrysalus helps him rationalize the expense with the observation that the loss of more money is preferable to a public airing of *that* disgrace—that his son is a perjurer:

si plus perdundum sit, perisse suauius  
quam illud flagitium uolgo dispalescere.

If more money must be lost, it is better to lose it  
than to have that shameful deed aired in public.

Thus Chrysalus pries even more money away from the old man. Nicobulus fears the disgrace Mnesilochus would incur by reneging on a solemn promise. In *flagitium uolgo dispalescere* there may be an allusion to the Roman practice of *flagitatio*, a right which allowed an offended party to expose and shame publicly a person who had failed to maintain his *fides*. Thus, the aspect of *fides* at issue here concerned the question of one's public reputation for trustworthiness.

The third deception succeeds only because Plautus has endowed Nicobulus, nominally a Greek, with a Roman sense of scrupulosity for *fides* which the old man carries to the point of farcical obsession. It matters not that he thinks the woman to whom Mnesilochus made his promise was herself an adulterous wife. Nor does it occur to Nicobulus



that the *flagitium* his son may incur for breaking his word to such a woman may pale in comparison to the *flagitium* he has already admitted as an adulterer. I sense that Plautus' Roman audience had little difficulty recognizing a caricature of themselves in Nicobulus' obsession. Both this social caricature and the deception itself make "sense," albeit comic sense, in terms of Roman society only, which held *fides* as a core value. This, I suggest, points to the Plautine and Roman origins of the third deception.

### THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

It is now time to go beyond the parameters of this old problem in Plautine source criticism and to consider the antithesis between trust and deception in *Bacchides* in its social context. We have seen that the audience would have recognized many aspects of the wide nexus of conducts and behaviors implied by *fides*, both social and moral, public and personal, in the behavior and attitudes of Pistoclerus, Mnesilochus, and Nicobulus. But there is more to this play than a dramatic anatomy of *fides* in all its parts. The Plautine treatment of *fides* in *Bacchides* depicts a state of moral disorder, for Nicobulus is deceived repeatedly, not only despite his *fides* but in fact because of it. It is tempting to see Plautus here as a social critic—one who, for example, might mock the Roman value through Nicobulus' foolish gullibility. But Plautus was a comic playwright, not a social commentator; the implications of his treatment of *fides* are not so straightforward.

*Bacchides* is a play about deception as well as trust. Nicobulus' credulity and his comic concern to preserve his *fides* are the foils which show off the brilliant deceptions of his slave Chrysalus, who is as ready to deceive as his master is to be honest. Moreover, while Nicobulus' honesty is dramatized in the context of Roman *fides*, Chrysalus' talent for deceit is characterized as Greek. The social "message" of *Bacchides* needs to be considered in the context of the ethnic antithesis Plautus draws between these values.

Plautus emphasizes the "Greekness" of Chrysalus' deceptions through the use of Greek words. At 240 Chrysalus puns in Greek just before embarking on the first deception: *opus est chryso Chrysalo*. In the letter prepared for the second deception Chrysalus uses a Greek word (*sycophantias*, 740) to characterize the intrigue he plans. The same letter states that Chrysalus hopes his intriguing will enable Mnesilochus to "party like a Greek" (*congraecem*, 743).

Moreover, the contrast between Greek deceit and Roman honesty is implied in the *canticum* at 925–78. The *canticum* contains a fantastically elaborated metaphor in which Chrysalus compares his deceit of Nicobulus to the exploits of the Greeks at Troy: the *tabellae* on which the second letter has been written are the Trojan Horse; the letters in the *tabellae* are the Argive soldiers; Pistoclerus is Epius; Mnesilochus is Sino at one point, Paris at another; Cleomachus is Menelaus. Chrysalus' three deceptions are the *tria fata* which presaged the fall of Troy: the theft of the Palladion, the death of Troilus, and the razing of the Phrygian Gate. Chrysalus himself is Agamemnon; but above all, he is Ulysses, who, like the slave, was "bold and bad" (*audacem et malum*, 949).<sup>31</sup> Thus, Chrysalus' exploits are set in the context of one of the most famous events in Greek literature; the slave himself is compared to Ulysses, the cleverest and most deceitful of Greek heroes. Chrysalus' target is Nicobulus, who is compared to Troy and Priam, an allusion to Rome through Rome's Trojan ancestors. This contrast between Greek and Roman is further emphasized in the episode which immediately follows, the third deception, in which Chrysalus exploits his master's zeal to honor the Roman obligations of *fides*.

This ethnic antithesis between Roman *fides* and Greek deception appears to reflect a similar distinction made by the comic poet's society: Romans had *fides*; Greeks were dishonest.<sup>32</sup> This stereotype is reflected in the reason Polybius adduces for the difference between the Greek and Roman procedures of auditing public officials. The Greeks assumed corruption and ruthlessly audited their officials. For the Romans, the *fides* of the official was sufficient to guarantee proper conduct (6.56.14). Even when, *mirabile dictu*, a Roman was deceiving a Greek, as was the case when Q. Marcius Philippus deceived Perseus regarding Roman intentions prior to the Third Macedonian War, the stereotype prevailed. Certain senators, adding insult to injury, implied that Philippus' sharp practice had more in common with Greek *calliditas* than

<sup>31</sup>Jocelyn, "Chrysalus," argues that this *canticum* has been subjected to extensive post-Plautine interpolation. However, I accept its essential Plautinity and the view expressed by Slater, *Performance* 111 n. 26, that "Jocelyn has done a real service in minutely describing the shifts within the monologue, but all or nearly all are in the imaginative range of one poet and the performance powers of one actor." See Lefèvre, "Plautus—Studien V," for a more detailed defense of the Plautinity of the metaphorical twists and turns in the *canticum*.

<sup>32</sup>On the Roman contrast between Greek deceit and Roman honesty see Petrochilos, *Attitudes* 43–45.

Roman *virtus* or *religio* (Livy 42.47.7). While this attack on Philippus was politically motivated, it nonetheless presupposes the existence of a Roman bias to which Philippus' opponents could appeal. The stereotype is reflected in anecdotes such as Cato's assertion that the Greeks speak with their lips, the Romans with their hearts (Plut. *Cato* 12.5), and in the proverbial oxymoron *fides Graeca*.<sup>33</sup> Plautus generously catered to the prejudices of his audience. His words for deception and trickery, such as *sycophantia*, *machinae*, and *techina*, are generally of Greek origin.<sup>34</sup> The point here is not the fairness or historical reliability of the antithesis; we are dealing with a self-serving myth. We should note that although the Greeks had no form of oral contract such as the *stipulatio*, they valued honesty, the maintenance of oaths, and the fulfillment of obligations nonetheless. No single nation, not even the Romans, has ever had a monopoly on these virtues.<sup>35</sup> In other contexts Romans themselves were ready to acknowledge their own corruptibility, which they were disposed to blame on the pernicious influence of Greek mores.<sup>36</sup> The Romans trumpeted their *fides* the loudest when they wished to distinguish themselves from other peoples, and from the Greeks in particular.

The construction of this stereotypical antithesis may be connected with two events: Rome's acquisition of an overseas empire and its first extensive confrontation with the achievements of Greek culture. Both events contributed to a crisis in traditional Roman values: on the one hand, empire furnished immense wealth and temptation; on the other, the Greek achievement in literature, philosophy, science, and art presented an intimidating standard. The Romans reexamined their traditions, but now in relation to Greek culture. There evolved a tendency for the Romans to think of themselves and the Greeks stereotypically and antithetically. The antitheses they constructed allowed the Romans

<sup>33</sup>Plautus refers to *fides Graeca* at *Asinaria* 199.

<sup>34</sup>For other examples of Greek terms for deception in Plautus see Brotherton, *Intrigue*.

<sup>35</sup>Certain aspects of *fides* and *pistis* may be closer than the common view has allowed. Gruen, "*Pistis* and *Fides*" 64–66, has argued that *pistis* played a role similar to *fides* in the conduct of relations between Greek states, including the regulation of arrangements between stronger and weaker powers. However, he does not address the question whether *pistis*, like *fides*, regulated the relationship between stronger and weaker individuals.

<sup>36</sup>For a discussion of Roman perceptions of Roman moral corruption see Lintott, "Moral Decline."

to rationalize the achievements of Greek culture and reassure themselves regarding the superiority of their own. The concern here is Greek dishonesty and Roman *fides*; other antitheses from this period include those between Greek extravagance and Roman parsimony, Greek lasciviousness and Roman sexual restraint, Greek *levitas* and Roman *gravitas*, the Greek love of theoretical discussion and Roman pragmatism.<sup>37</sup>

This antithesis between Roman *fides* and Greek deceit is not historically fair or accurate. Nonetheless, it helps suggest the complexity of the Roman reaction towards Hellenism. In particular, *Bacchides* offers us the opportunity to consider the complex and contradictory aspects of the reaction in the context of an organic literary work.<sup>38</sup> We must make allowances for the genre: the aim of Roman comedy was laughter, not the accurate reflection of Roman social attitudes. Still, it is possible to infer from the exaggerations and distortions required by the comic genre how Plautus' audience may have actually felt about the Greeks.

At the center of *Bacchides* is the audacious and brilliant Chrysalus. Not only does he deceive Nicobulus three times, but after the first deception he warns his master to be on guard against more trickery (742–44). The slave even predicts the conditions under which Nicobulus will be deceived; he will not need to filch the money, for the old man will surrender it of his own accord (824–25). This audacity is based on Chrysalus' confidence that he knows how to manipulate his master; the

<sup>37</sup>Most of the evidence for these stereotypes is from the late Republic. However, as Gruen suggests, *Hellenistic World* 260–66, it appears that the late Republican stereotypes had their roots in Plautus' period. For other discussions of the Roman stereotype of the Greek see Petrochilos, *Attitudes* 35–53, and Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens* 30–40.

<sup>38</sup>Petrochilos, *Attitudes*, examines the complexity and contradictions in the Roman response to Hellenism. His work is useful as a collection of evidence for Roman attitudes; however, much of the evidence he has assembled is post-Plautine and taken out of the context in which it originally appears. Gruen, *Studies*, sees a tension between Rome's private embrace of Greek culture and a public effort to distance the state from Hellenism and assert what is distinctly Roman; such tensions were at play in Rome's reception of the cult of Cybele in 201, the suppression of the Bacchus cult in 186, the burning of the Pythagorean books in 181, and periodic expulsions of Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. He perceives a similar ambivalence to Greek culture in Plautus, for all that the poet worked in a Greek genre. MacMullen, "Hellenizing," discusses the motivation behind Roman Hellenism, which was self-promotional as well as aesthetic. He distinguishes between aspects of Greek culture which received acceptance, such as literature and architecture, and aspects rejected, such as homosexuality and luxury.

melodramatic events that Chrysalus narrates in the first deception blind Nicobulus to the improbability of the story; in the second and third deceptions Chrysalus appeals to his master's reflexive and unthinking concern to protect his son and preserve his *fides*. Thus Chrysalus' Greek deceitfulness is served by his facility for persuasive talk, a talent which the Romans particularly associated with the Greeks.<sup>39</sup>

Of course the Romans were keen practitioners of rhetoric themselves, perhaps no less than the Greeks. But this reality did not stop them from constructing a stereotype of "Greek" rhetorical cleverness. On hearing a Greek speaker, many a Roman would have tempered his enjoyment with caution. In 155, for example, Romans thrilled to the public philosophical lectures of Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, who were present in Rome as ambassadors representing Athens. Carneades in particular enthralled his audience on one day arguing in favor of the notion that justice exists in nature; on the next day he argued brilliantly against it. Cato was scandalized. The censor urged the Senate to decide the issue on which the philosophers had come as ambassadors and send them on their way, because, according to Pliny, *illo viro argumentante quid veri esset haut facile discerni posset* (NH 7.112).<sup>40</sup> Similarly, in *Bacchides* Chrysalus' brilliance also excites and enthralls a Roman audience; at the same time it encodes a Roman caution regarding the slave's Greek rhetorical cleverness. For Plautus has characterized the stock New Comic situation in which a clever slave deceives his foolish master in ethnic terms: the clever *Greek* slave deceives the trustworthy and overly trusting *Roman* master; Greek Ulixes dupes Roman Priam. Thus Chrysalus symbolizes an aspect of Greek accomplishment which fascinated the Romans but potentially caused them uneasiness. Perhaps we may speak more generally: Chrysalus' facile manipulation of Nicobulus might reflect an underlying Roman uneasiness regarding the superiority of Greek culture in general, in literature, philosophy, science, art, and architecture.

Plautus would not have amused his audience by suggesting they were inferior and leaving it at that. His humor worked by raising a matter of the Roman concern and then rendering it harmless. The ac-

<sup>39</sup>On the Roman stereotype of the Greek as a clever talker see Petrochilos, *Attitudes* 35–45, and Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens* 32–33.

<sup>40</sup>On Cato and the embassy see Astin, *Cato* 174–77. Plutarch's account of the incident (*Cato Maior* 22–23.1) stresses that Cato was hostile to Greek philosophy in general.

knowledge of Greek superiority implicit in Chrysalus' triumph is mitigated by several strategies. First, Nicobulus' regard for his *fides* represents both the clearest suggestion of his Romanness and at the same time the reason why he is deceived. Thus, for all his foolishness, there is something admirable about the old man in defeat: he is the only character in the play who upholds a principle, even when it causes him material loss. Second, Nicobulus' adherence to the higher morality of *fides* also helps to rationalize his defeat. It is not an even contest when one antagonist cleaves to a demanding code of behavior and the other can do whatever it takes to win.

Next, the ethnic symbolism of Chrysalus' triumph is blunted because Nicobulus, for all that he kept his *fides*, is not really a Roman but a Greek character in a *fabula palliata*. His eagerness to guarantee his son's reputation for good faith ignores Mnesilochus' confessed (falsely, no less!) disgrace as an adulterer. Nicobulus observes the punctilio of *fides* rather than its true spirit. Thus, Plautus simultaneously suggests Nicobulus' Romanness, through his concern for *fides*, and denies it, through Nicobulus' inability to get it right. Nicobulus' moral deficiency is also apparent at the end of *Bacchides*. After an initial show of resistance, Nicobulus finally succumbs to the seductions of Bacchis of Athens when she offers to return half the money cheated from him. With Philoxenus, the other *senex* and Pistoclerus' father, he joins the Bacchis sisters and the two young men in their revels. Thus, the old man's delinquency results from a combination of prurience and greed. Plautus provides an ethnic rationale for this fall from grace which goes beyond the previous depiction of Nicobulus as a Roman manqué. For Nicobulus surrenders to temptation because he is a Greek. He will participate in the same revelry condemned earlier as *congraecari* (743). Plautus further suggests the Greekness of this sort of celebration early in the final scene itself. While he is still in an attitude of resistance, Nicobulus asks Philoxenus if he is "in love," that is, if he intends to join the party. "*Nai gar!*" exclaims Philoxenus in Greek (1162). Like his deficient Romanness, Nicobulus' Greekness provided Plautus' audience with an assuaging ethnic rationale for the old man's delinquency.

Two other episodes suggesting the Romanness of characters in *Bacchides* are undercut. When Mnesilochus wrongly suspects his friend Pistoclerus of betrayal, the imagined wrong is dramatized as a breach of *fides*, and both young men seem rather Roman in their regard for the ethic. However, when Pistoclerus condemns those false friends who are *lingua factiosi* . . . *sublesta fide*, he describes his relationship to Mne-

silochus in the language of Roman politics, with no apparent relevance to the action. The inappropriate reference to an aspect of *fides* associated with Roman politics helped remind Plautus' audience that despite their concern for the Roman ethic, these young men were not really Romans after all. In the second episode Plautus depicts Nicobulus' *stipulatio* to Cleomachus in ethnic terms, as an arrangement between a Roman and a foreigner; this ethnic contrast alludes to the conduct of Roman foreign policy, in which *fides* served as a guarantee of Roman fairness to subject states. But Nicobulus is promising to save his son from a disgraceful death, and this high-minded allusion does not fit the circumstances of his *stipulatio* and undercuts the suggestion of Nicobulus' Romanness. Thus these references to Roman society, far from being incidental Plautine infelicities, were essential to the Roman poet's subtle presentation of the "ethnicity" of his characters.

Finally, the apparent superiority of Greek Chrysalus over the "Roman" characters he manipulates is further undercut by the fact that the clever slave, for all his cleverness, is still a slave, and wishes to remain one. After the reversal of the first deception, when he warns his master to expect more trickery, Chrysalus predicts that Nicobulus will offer him his freedom and he will refuse it (828–29). Thus, Chrysalus' *calliditas* reassuringly presents no threat to the existing order of things and may be dismissed as a trivial and servile sort of cleverness.

#### FINAL REMARKS

In the contrast between Roman *fides* and Greek deceit in *Bacchides* we may discern some aspects of the Roman response to the Greeks and Hellenism. Chrysalus' manipulation of the "Roman" characters suggests anxiety at Greek intellectual superiority. However, Plautus renders this superiority harmless and allows his audience to dismiss it. He accomplishes this through a subtle modulation of the ethnic characterization of his "Roman" characters that simultaneously suggests and undercuts their Romanness; Nicobulus, Mnesilochus, and Pistoclerus are not really Romans, but Greeks. Chrysalus, for all his cleverness, is a slave and knows his place. Whatever the trivial advantages of Greek *calliditas*, the Romans possess *fides*.

*Bacchides* itself may represent an assertion of Roman superiority. With the addition of a third deception, Plautus in a sense surpassed his model—a likely ambition in any artist, perhaps more so when the artist

was Roman and the master Greek. Plautus himself may allude to this achievement in the course of *Bacchides* itself, when Chrysalus boasts:

non mihi isti placent Parmenones, Syri,  
qui duas aut tris minas auferunt eris. (649–50)

I don't like those Parmenos and Syruses  
who steal two or three measly minae from their masters.

Syrus was the slave in Menander's play. In Chrysalus' declaration of superiority over Syrus may be Plautus' claim for the superiority of his *Bacchides*, with three deceptions, over Menander's *Dis Exapaton*, with two.<sup>41</sup>

WILLIAM M. OWENS

OHIO UNIVERSITY

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## HORACE'S POETICS OF POLITICAL INTEGRITY: EPISTLE 1.18

Horace's Eighteenth Epistle, addressed to Lollius, takes as its subject the complex position of what might be called the lesser *amicus*. While the epistle has received critical attention for its overt personal advice and general statements about *amicitia*,<sup>1</sup> a sophisticated subtext that reveals a larger historical dimension has never been fully explored. This discussion analyzes how the diction, structure, and exempla of the epistle create a subtext suggestive of Horace's own experience of patronage at a time when the Roman government oversaw a cultural production of interested versions of history.<sup>2</sup> Before giving a close reading, I review the salient features of this poem, the longest epistle in the first book.

<sup>1</sup>Kilpatrick, *Friendship* 49–55, in keeping with the orientation of his study, discusses the overt advice given by the speaker and gives an explication of the appropriate behavior of a subordinate *amicus*. For comments on the philosophical emphasis of the speaker's advice see the more abbreviated analyses of Macleod, "Poetry of Ethics" 282–84, and McGann, *Studies* 77–82. Reckford, *Horace* 116–18, and Fraenkel, *Horace* 318–21, also give explications of the epistle. All quotations from Horace follow the OCT text of E. C. Wickham.

<sup>2</sup>Such a vision of the Augustan principate as orchestrating its own image is, of course, a vast topic that has received much scholarly attention. For a recent view of this issue that sees even the much-discussed disappearance of Maecenas as powerful patron after 23 B.C. as a staged act, see Williams, "Fall from Favor?" The related issue of patronal pressure is quite complicated, and it is not my intention here to lay out the various positions held by critics who have written on the matter. As will become evident, my own view obviously inclines to the presence of some pressure, tacit or otherwise. Part of this pressure arises naturally from the reciprocity ethic implicit in patronage. In his discussion of the language of patronage, Saller observes that he describes "the Roman ideology of exchange, one similar to that which Marcel Mauss explored in relation to other societies" (*Personal Patronage* 22). The "gifts" of estates by the Augustan regime to Vergil and Horace, in particular, demanded some kind of return. And a qualified compliance with the ideological vision of the regime would have functioned as such. For a good introduction to the subject see Gold, *Literary and Artistic Patronage*. In his introduction to his study of *Odes* book 4, Putnam (*Artifices* 20–23) gives a balanced and generous interpretation of the passage in Suetonius' *Vita Horatii* where the poet is said to have yielded to Augustus' demands. See also Griffin, "Augustus and the Poets" 191, who quotes Macrobius' observation that "power does compel, not only if it invites but even if it beseeches."

While Lollius' actual identity remains unclear,<sup>3</sup> he appears in the epistle to be a man of privilege and wealth. His father owns a country estate, and he has the leisure to hunt and write poetry. His attachment to a patron, then, would derive more from political motives of status than economic necessity.<sup>4</sup> Assuming the voice of experience, the Horatian persona plays the part of the *praeceptor* and applies a general lesson to the specific case of his young friend's wishing to maintain a balance between servile compliance and willful independence. The epistle has drawn attention for both its length and its abundant use of biographical and autobiographical material:<sup>5</sup> in contrast to the caricature sketch of Scaeva in the Seventeenth Epistle, a poem concerned with similar issues, the figure of Lollius here appears rooted in history, a young man who has fought in the Cantabrian wars and who now wishes to attach himself to a patron; at the end of this verse letter of friendly advice, the *praeceptor* turns to his own life, as an exemplum of near self-sufficiency, a person contentedly at the mercy of the whims of Jove, rather than those of a patron: *sed satis est orare Iovem qui ponit et aufert, / det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo* (Ep. 1.18.111–12).

This vignette of the joys of private life, however, an autobiographical glimpse of the poet in retreat, only points up by contrast the public

<sup>3</sup>So Fraenkel, *Horace* 315, and Kilpatrick, *Friendship* 126 n. 1. Horace distinguishes Lollius by addressing two epistles to him, 1.2 in addition to 1.18, so that he must have been someone of importance to the poet. He appears to be too young to be the Lollius of *O.* 4.9, who is usually taken to be *cos.* in 21.

<sup>4</sup>In his chapter on *clientela* Brunt writes: "Men of wealth and standing . . . thought it 'like death' to be called clients; they might even be reluctant to accept favours that bound them too closely to the benefactor and looked for a return" (*Republic* 395). Given Lollius' social position and the existing convention of euphemism, the terms *patronus* and *cliens* would be avoided by Horace in preference to the more delicate *amici*. However, the relationship which Lollius receives advice about is clearly not one between equals, and the commentaries—Kiessling and Heinze, *Briefe*; Morris, *Satires and Epistles* 112; Wilkins, *Epistulae* 210—as well as the critic Kilpatrick (*Friendship*) refer to the *potens amicus* whom Lollius courts either as a patron or as someone of distinctly higher rank. What distinguishes *clientela* most readily from *amicitia* is the former's economic relations of support and dependency. Although this concrete expression of hierarchical difference does not seem to characterize Lollius' relations with his *potens amicus*, such benefactions *did* mark the speaker's relationship with his friend and patron, Maecenas. Since these latter relations obviously inform the speaker's advice to Lollius, and, as I will argue, create a subtext about the experience of Horace as a *cliens*, I sometimes translate the term *amicus* as "patron" when the context makes it applicable.

<sup>5</sup>See note 1 above for recent critical interpretations.

history which appears at the very center of the poem. The Cantabrian wars, Augustus' current public policy, and a reference to a mock reenactment of the Battle of Actium make the epistle more than a didactic poem tailored to Lollius' personal situation. Admittedly these allusions to recent historical events come up in reference to Lollius' participation in communal activity, and thus are mediated through his private experience. Lollius' activities in the public, historical domain are said to qualify him for the demands of social patronage. These topical references, however, contribute to a more complicated subtext: in the case of Actium, for example, it is literary patronage which demands a specific representation of history, an image whose unanimous endorsement was as artficed as the literary retellings themselves. Simply put, public history does not prepare for the compromises involved in patronage; rather, those compromises help to create versions of history. And while such representations may have subsumed private dissension on Horace's part in other poems, I argue that a suppressed vision of history, one distinct from the state, reemerges in this subtext that runs throughout the poem.

The first two lines of the epistle—*Si bene te novi, metues, liberrime Lolli, / scurrantis speciem praeberere, professus amicum*—present the conflict whose repercussions for free expression lie at the heart of Horace's advice. As the *praeceptor* analyzes his friend's dilemma, Lollius fears the appearance of slavish imitation that might arise from the necessary compliance and conciliations of playing the part of an *amicus*. His character, we are told, is noted for being *liberrime*, a word whose implications for Augustan Rome are many.<sup>6</sup> In the context of Lollius' implied biographical background, this quality of *liber* seems to refer primarily to a bold freedom of action, a lack of restraint that would apply to speech as well.<sup>7</sup> As the later reference to Lollius' reenactment of the battle of Actium on his father's estate suggests, the connotation

<sup>6</sup>See Wirszubski, *Libertas*, for a full discussion; add the chapter on *libertas* in Nicolet, *Citizen* 317–41; and the chapter "*Libertas* in the Republic" in Brunt, *Republic* 283–84, where he claims that *libertas* first and foremost denoted the status of one who was not a slave. Since *libertas* thus was the "precondition of citizenship," it also signified the political rights of a citizen. And these rights, according to Brunt, were "of two types: immunity from arbitrary coercion and punishment by magistrates, and some degree of participation in political power" (297).

<sup>7</sup>The *liber amicus* as the frank friend is a type that Horace has praised in Satire 1.4. However, Lollius is *very* free, and the superlative draws attention to the word whose connotations serve as a major theme of the epistle.

of "free-born" in *liber* superimposes the issue of a psychological frankness on that of political liberties.

This conflation of emotional traits and social or historical contexts at once describes the overt meanings of the epistle as well as the latent suggestions of its subtext. On the one hand, it is Lollius' penchant for bold behavior that makes his insertion into the system of patronage problematic—he fears the loss of identity, of a distinct self. From this evidently proud young man's point of view, the role of an *amicus* requires a distasteful subordination that borders on mimicry, a sympathy of interests that flattens all the contours of his character. In a sense, the concept of role here is twofold: in the system of patronage, the role of the subordinate *amicus* entails an entire "grammar of behavior";<sup>8</sup> the codified demeanor towards a patron had achieved degrees of stylization such that Horace can give general advice about rules of deportment. On a second level, the theatrics involved in patronage were innate to the system: a subordinate had to take his cue from the patron, fashioning his responses to conform with the wishes of his benefactor. The system itself operates according to discursive roles,<sup>9</sup> and within that system the role of the less powerful man suffers the direction of the *patronus*. This metaphor from the stage appears at the very beginning of the epistle, where the speaker establishes a polarity between extreme compliance and excessive license:

alter in obsequium plus aequo pronus et imi  
derisor lecti sic nutum divitis horret,  
sic iterat voces et verba cadentia tollit,  
ut puerum saevo credas dictata magistro  
reddere vel partis mimum tractare secundas. (10–14)

The role of a lesser *amicus*<sup>10</sup> here allows for little more than fearful imitation, a skillful parroting of the lead of a *patronus*. The first image, of a *scurra* or parasite at a dinner party, leads into the speaker's comparison of the client's role to a schoolboy's tutelage under a master or the second actor in a mime. If we view the speaker here as representative, to one degree or another, of Horace himself, the extreme analogy to the

<sup>8</sup>This term is from Whigham, *Ambition* xi.

<sup>9</sup>Patronage in ancient Rome is an excellent example of Foucault's idea of historically specific discourse.

<sup>10</sup>Brunt, *Republic* 395, quotes the first line of this section when he discusses the resistance which Romans of well-established status felt towards the appellation *cliens*.

art of mime points up the *praeceptor*'s own understanding of the pitfalls of patronage.<sup>11</sup> For like the young Lollius' penchant for unbridled freedom, it is the speaker's liberal sentiments, his easily inflamed sympathies for the dead of the civil wars, which in the past may have conflicted with his own role as a poet supported by the state.<sup>12</sup> In Horace's case, the metaphor of representation assumes a special resonance: for as an encomiast of the Augustan regime, one supported by its benefactions, he became an instrument of an intentionally cultivated vision.<sup>13</sup> As such, he served to buttress the visions for the future and versions of the past which the regime endorsed. His part in the official representation of events may very well have invoked the analogy of playing second to the primary actor on the stage of history. Similarly, the schoolboy's repetitions of his *dictata* to a *magister* suggest not only the performance of an assigned task, but an element of coerced return as well.<sup>14</sup> The exercises or language—*dictata*—which is given back shares the same root as dictatorship.<sup>15</sup>

This inscription of the *praeceptor*'s own experience in his advice to Lollius is most apparent in the cameo of the staged Battle of Actium and the lines leading up to it. In lines that bring to mind Maecenas' advice in Dio Cassius' famous and fictitious debate between him and

<sup>11</sup>To assume that Horace's own experience informs the statements of a poem about patronage is surely not farfetched. The second assumption, that he intended the speaker of his poem to be read as drawing to some degree from the poet's "actual life," is encouraged by what I will argue is the epistle's treatment of Actium. Moreover, Horace's frequent allusions to the value which he—as speaker elsewhere in his poetry—placed on his independence make his identification with the younger Lollius not unlikely.

<sup>12</sup>One of the best examples of this is Ode 2.1, addressed to Pollio, where the speaker's warning about the dangers of writing history—*periculosae plenum opus aleae, / tractas, et incedis per ignis / suppositos cineri doloso* (6–8)—modulates into a dirge for the dead of the civil wars. The last stanza, where Horace rebukes his *procax Musa* for her digression, suggests at least the appearance of conflict with his role as patronized poet. Of course such conflict becomes part of the artistry of the poem. Another famous example of such ambivalence is the Cleopatra ode. Here, Horace has fashioned a victory poem gone awry when the speaker differentiates himself from the communal vision of his *sodales* by a sympathetic paean to the foreign queen.

<sup>13</sup>This idea of the encomium of a political vision or public policy is most forcefully argued in Williams, "Fall from Favor?"

<sup>14</sup>See note 2 above for a discussion of "coercion."

<sup>15</sup>While there may be a hint of Horace's experience here, the exemplum clearly displays satiric exaggeration. Also, cf. *Epist.* 1.1.14 and 54–56 for statements of philosophical independence that complement the following argument about Horatian *libertas* in Epistle 1.18. I am indebted to the anonymous referee of this paper for these references.



Agrippa, the speaker first warns Lollius about the necessity for circumspection and respect for the privacy of information: *arcanum neque tu scrutaberis illius umquam, commissumque tegetes et vino tortus et ira* (37–38). Seemingly innocuous injunctions in the context of social advice, these lines suggest on a more general level the issue of free speech. One characteristic obviously associated with more republican forms of society is the “free exchange of information,” or the right of the public to be informed of all affairs which affect the well-being of the state. In the Roman Republic, this took the form of *contiones*, reports to the public of the proceedings of the Senate.<sup>16</sup> Taking the etymological roots of “republic,” we have, of course, the *res publica*, and the consequent suggestion of knowledge or information as public property. These two lines present information as a form of property—the status of object apparent in the substantive endings of *arcanum* and *commissum*—secrets belonging to the patron, or guarded jealously if entrusted to the client.

Since the system of patronage became not only the primary means of entry to government service but also the way in which government was conducted,<sup>17</sup> Horace’s advice here suggests the increasing secrecy in which decisions about policy were made. The notorious story of Maecenas’ fall from favor as a result of his indiscreet confidences in his wife, Terentia,<sup>18</sup> provides only the most crude of examples of the tight-lipped conduct of state affairs. The corollary, of course, to this closed-door diplomacy was the gradual erosion of *libertas* in the context of free expression. While the Roman Republic did not have a fully developed constitutional notion of free speech, the concept of *libertas* implied the right to open debate in the Senate: “and *libertas*, with regard to Roman

<sup>16</sup>See Wirszubski, *Libertas* 20.

<sup>17</sup>See the chapters “The Working of Patronage” and “The Government” in Syme, *Revolution* 369–405; and “The Emperor and His Court” in Saller, *Personal Patronage* 41–78, where he agrees with Syme but modifies his views somewhat. Brunt, *Republic* 438–70, also supports this vision of the early Principate, but disagrees with Syme about Augustus’ gaining and maintaining his power through patronage. Brunt claims that the oath of fealty sworn to Octavian in 32 was not modeled on an oath in a relationship of patronage. He does, however, aver that “Octavian must have inherited and acquired, in virtue of his adoption, power, and wealth, a *clientela* that exceeded all others,” and that “the more that decisions were taken in the emperor’s closet, or by officials whom he appointed and who enjoyed his favour, the stronger was the impulse to seek the aid of those who had the best access to authority.”

<sup>18</sup>Suet. *Aug.* 3.

domestic politics under the Empire, often means, explicitly or implicitly, *libertas senatus*. *Libertas senatus* means that important matters of State shall be brought before the Senate, and that senators may freely express their opinions and vote without constraint."<sup>19</sup> The concept for the Romans was inextricably tied up with the *res publica*: the *libertas* enjoyed by a Roman rested on his status as a citizen of the Republic.<sup>20</sup> This emphasis on the rights of the individual, and in particular the right to participate in his own political process,<sup>21</sup> constitutes a form of personal liberty which safeguards ideological difference in the public domain. In the context of literary expression, the public dimension of political debate in the Senate might be said to complement the poet's right to a private point of view on history.

While Epistle 1.18 makes no explicit reference to the principle of senatorial debate, as a characteristic innate to the Republic such ideological contention is the implied victim of both an increasingly monarchical regime and the system of patronage it promotes. The civil war between Octavian and Antony might be viewed as civic antagonism on a martial level that parallels the spirit of contentious pursuit for *dignitas* in the political arena of the Senate: "Free political activity among his equals was as a rule considered to be the senator's vocation and his aim in life. The display of one's abilities and free competition for honour and glory were felt to be the life-blood of republicanism."<sup>22</sup> The Principate that emerged out of a half-century of civil wars, a system of government, as it were, that was the eventual outcome of one man's yielding to another, put an end to free debate in the Senate even as it cultivated a propagandistic vision of unanimity to which a *cliens* qua poet had at least partially to capitulate,<sup>23</sup> should he wish to benefit from the system. The *arcanum* which a *cliens* is not to pry out of his patron, then, or the *commisum* with which he is entrusted, is, in the context of the literature of the period, the visions and versions of history that were

<sup>19</sup> Wirszubski, *Libertas* 137.

<sup>20</sup> Nicolet, *Citizen* 321.

<sup>21</sup> I use this phrase loosely, since despite the various offices which represented the Roman people, as Wirszubski points out, "the government of Rome, although elected by all the full citizens, was essentially non-democratic because, once in power, it was largely independent of the popular will" (*Libertas* 48).

<sup>22</sup> Wirszubski, *Libertas* 88.

<sup>23</sup> This modified capitulation is evident in Ode 1.37, where despite the poem's final tribute to the Egyptian queen, Horace represents the victory at Actium as the conquest of a foreign enemy.

not officially endorsed. In the context of the civil wars it was just that—the fact that they were civil—and, more specifically, the figure of Antony. That the advice to maintain silence about affairs of state precedes in this epistle the allusions to civil war suggests that this is what is suppressed.

The exemplum about the twin brothers Amphion and Zethus further underscores this parallelism between the domination of one man in government and the patron's control of perspective. The *praeceptor's* injunction to respect and withhold private knowledge ironically modulates into a clear if indirect allusion to the stifling of private voice for the sake of a uniformity of interests:

nec tua laudabis studia aut aliena reprendes,  
 nec cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.  
 gratia sic fratrum geminorum Amphionis atque  
 Zethi dissiluit, donec suspecta severo  
 conticuit lyra. fraternis cessisse putatur  
 moribus Amphion: tu cede potentis amici  
 lenibus imperiis . . .

(39–45)

A story about the founding brothers of Thebes has been cleverly adjoined here to apply to the context of patronage. In Horace's attenuated version, however, no mention is made of Amphion's skill, a lyrical power so moving that the stones of Thebes fell spontaneously into place. The speaker refers here to a quarrel depicted in Euripides' *Antiope*, where Zethus' fraternal taunts became a harsh and rigid disapproval of Amphion's musical pursuit. Like the poems which the *praeceptor* recommends that Lollius forgo writing when his patron wishes to go hunting—*nec cum venari volet ille, poemata panges*—Amphion's lyre falls silent so that ruptured fraternal harmony might become whole again. What is striking about Horace's sparing use of myth here is his emphasis on brothers, division, and poetry as the cause of that fracture. Poems, in both the exemplum and the lines which lead into it, suggest a solitary individualism and a consequent antagonism of interests.

While the speaker invokes this exemplum to support his recommendation that Lollius comply with the whims of his patron, an autobiographical subtext is not far beneath the surface: patronage threatens not only an autonomy of action but also the independence of private voice. The fraternal division of this image anticipates the later allusion to Actium even as it refers to the propagandistic pressure exerted to

downplay the civil aspect of that battle. Indeed, the lyric solitude in the figure of Amphion suggests a fragile and threatened independence, one which recalls, for example, the delicate shift of poetic sympathy in the Cleopatra ode. And despite that poem's decided liberty in its magisterial celebration of the foreign queen, the elision of the figure of Antony implies the same concessions to a false image of unanimity as Amphion's renunciation of his lyre.

Indeed, it is this lyric autonomy which Horace tries to reclaim in the epistolary genre. And while my argument here is that he recovers a suppressed perspective or voice through a subtextual resonance in his advice to Lollius, such gestures of independence appear in numerous other guises in the *Epistles*. His overt refusal of Maecenas' request for more odes in the First Epistle, for example, displays an autonomy that is reflected in his cameo appearance at the end of the poem to Lollius. But his claim to *auctoritas* over his own voice comes only after a period of service such as he recommends to Lollius. And it is one of the many complexities of this poem that the issue over which the patron's cooptation of the private voice of the poet encountered most resistance—the Battle of Actium—returns as an emphatic subtext that complements the overt text. Such a subtext gives the speaker back the voice that he “lost” in such communal visions as the beginning of the Cleopatra ode, and lends him thus the self-possession that the vision of his plenitude at the end of the epistle to Lollius suggests.<sup>24</sup>

But the overt text advises a literal renunciation of the lyre. Instead, Lollius should accompany his patron on a hunt, that virile Roman pastime which is the customary cultivation of young men. Moreover, he is suited for such masculine pursuits, with their promise of fame and stature, by his previous military exploits. Indeed, the *lenibus imperiis* of the patron modulate in very few lines into the widening *imperium* of the emperor:

denique saevam  
militiam puer et Cantabrica bella tulisti  
sub duce qui templis Parthorum signa refigit  
nunc, et si quid abest Italis adiudicat armis. (54–57)

<sup>24</sup>The passive periphrastics with which the Cleopatra ode begins (*Nunc est bibendum, nunc pede libero / pulsanda tellus . . .*) suggest the loss of an individual “I” distinguished from the “we” of state ego. There is no choosing subject here, only the imperative to an action in which identity dissolves.

If we look more closely at what this biographical sketch of Lollius implies, the scenario of Lollius' involvement in the making of empire becomes not the reason for his ability to capitulate to the designs of his patron, but rather that which demands such capitulation. What was adduced merely as an illustrative example turns out to be the underlying source of the system. The ultimate patron is the emperor,<sup>25</sup> and lands fall into line beneath the protection of Rome, that is, as *clientelae* to its patronage, in much the same way as the speaker advises Lollius to fall in with his friend. Horace reinforces this reflection of the historical dimension in the private sphere with a verbal echo that initiates another exemplum of Lollius' capacity to comply. The vignette of a reenactment of the Battle of Actium, moreover, again functions on the level of overt advice even as it provides the reference for the *arcanum* of patronage, the suppressed text of the experience of Horace as a *cliens*, the lyre that must fall silent for the sake of peace:

ac ne te retrahas et inexcusabilis absis,  
 quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque  
 curas, interdum nugaris rure paterno;  
 partitur lintris exercitus, Actia pugna  
 te duce per pueros hostili more refertur,  
 adversarius est frater, lacus Hadria, donec  
 alterutrum velox Victoria fronde coronet.  
 consentire suis studiis qui crediderit te,  
 fautor utroque tuum laudabit pollice ludum.  
 protinus ut moneam, si quid monitoris eges tu,  
 quid, de quoque viro, et cui dicas saepe videto. (58–68)

Just as the speaker warns Lollius not to stand aloof from the sport of his patron—*ac ne te retrahas et inexcusabilis absis*—so too unconquered land succumbs to Italian arms—*si quid abest Italis adiudicat armis*. The private dynamic of domination in patronage has its counterpart in the public sphere. But these lines imply more than just a parallelism—for the system of patronage is in the service of the Principate, and the compliance that the speaker advises is partially a compliance in the fictions of the government itself.

Here is where the subtext of Horace's experience as a *cliens* comes in: to stand aloof from the demands of the patron would be a

<sup>25</sup>See again Syme, *Revolution* 369–405. For the view that Augustus' status qua ultimate patron was largely metaphorical see Brunt, *Republic* 438–42.

disloyalty to the empire. And in Horace's case, such a lack of compliance does indeed constitute a threat to *imperium* because the Augustan regime depended on the visions of propaganda to promote its image of an unproblematic *pax*.<sup>26</sup> The *imperium sine fine* was just as much a rhetorical vision demanding consent as a geographical entity imposed on client nations. Hence the references to poetic decorum in the phrase introducing the vignette about Actium: *quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque / curas, interdum nugaris rure paterno*. While the reenactment of this touchy subject is ostensibly cited as evidence of Lollius' capacity to "join in the fun," and thus to comply with the whims of his *amicus*, the disclaiming prelude points to the irony of the historical allusion coming from Horace's pen.

The subject of Actium as a civil war was taboo, and for Horace to refer to it as such transgresses the decorous silence he should keep.<sup>27</sup> The cameo of Lollius' reenactment of the battle may reveal his readiness to acquiesce in another's plans—though this, too, is problematic—but it demonstrates the very opposite tendency in Horace: the verbal representation of Lollius' dramatic one reveals a lack of compliance with the official vision of a unified Italy, a *tota Italia*,<sup>28</sup> and thus constitutes the very violation of poetic delicacy which the speaker claims that Lollius respects. Lollius may not transgress the boundary of decorum with his *nugae* on his father's estate, but the speaker's allusion flirts with the unspeakable, the *nefas* of the Augustan regime, skirting and crossing the edges of taboo territory. The half-line *adversarius est frater*, seemingly a simple mention of the *dramatis personae*, is an unmistakable expression of the fratricidal nature of civil war. Moreover, the poetic diction of *nil extra numerum fecisse modumque* recalls the lyre of Amphion, silenced for the sake of fraternal harmony. From the perspective of Horace as a *cliens*, such silence is metaphoric—the *tota*

<sup>26</sup>See the chapter "The Organization of Opinion" in Syme, *Revolution* 459–75. For the cultural program in the visual arts see Zanker, *Power of Images*, especially the chapters "The Mythical Foundations of the New Rome" and "Form and Meaning of the New Mythology." See also bibliography in note 2 above.

<sup>27</sup>Ancient literary sources for the suppression of references to Actium as a civil war, and its distorted representation as a battle against the barbarous forces of the East, include Prop. 3.11.51–56, 4.6; Ver. *Aen.* 8.675ff.; and of course the first half of Hor. *Od.* 1.37. While Antony is mentioned by Vergil, the "enemy" is clearly the demonized East. Zanker, *Power of Images* 82ff., discusses the manipulation of visual imagery in reference to Actium.

<sup>28</sup>See the chapter "Tota Italia" in Syme, *Revolution* 276–93.

*Italia* envisioned by the Principate did not brook division. The image of the brothers Amphion and Zethus symbolizes the denial of civil conflict as an issue of fraternal discord; or, the civil discord whose elision Augustus effected in propaganda ironically becomes the dominant image in terms of which Horace alludes to the emperor's campaign to efface it. So that when swift Victory crowns either Lollius or his brother as winner of the battle—*donec alterutrum velox Victoria fronde coronet*—the moment recalls the acquiescence signaled by the *donec* in Amphion's deferral to his brother Zethus. Just as patronage will brook no dissent, so the outcome of the civil wars was a submission to the rule of one man. And, similarly, as the rule of one man began to exert more influence over the representations of his government, the official visions of empire assumed a unified front.

The image of the *amicus* lending his approval to Lollius' *ludus* raises this issue of a consensus informing the endorsed versions of history. The overt text presents the *amicus* as praising Lollius' play in response to the young man's acquiescence in his patron's pursuits: *consentire suis studiis qui crediderit te, fautor utroque tuum laudabit pollice ludum*.<sup>29</sup> Referring to Lollius' deferral to his *amicus*, the verb *con-*

<sup>29</sup> On the one hand, these lines appear to refer back to line 39, where the speaker advises Lollius to forgo the solitary activity of writing verse when his patron requests his company. Following Kiessling and Heinze, the *ludus* here would mean poetry, as it does in the First Epistle (1.1.3, 1.1.10), where Horace renounces his role as lyric poet. In that introductory epistle, the speaker metaphorically conceives of writing the odes as a gladiatorial *ludus* from which he now begs to be free. But given this precedent, albeit metaphorical, Lollius' *ludus* could refer not only to his verse but also to the actual "game" of Actium which he stages on his father's estate. Surely its placement after the spectacle of Actium suggests that it refers to this playful display as well. Since the statement of lines 65–66 is a general one that looks to the future, its tone is inclusively rather than narrowly referential. And insofar as it immediately follows the vignette about a mock Actium, the statement's future tense refers to the continuous endorsement of such *ludus* when it might occur. The present tense and the adverb—*interdum nugaris rure paterno*—imply a repeated activity that would extend into the future. Moreover, in Cicero's *De Officiis*, he cautions, *Ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis omnia profundamus elatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. Suppeditant autem et campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi* (1.29.104). The Horatian speaker also recommends hunting and cites Lollius' prowess on the *campus* (45–54) as examples of socially approved pastimes. Horace might very well be alluding to this passage of Cicero's in an epistle concerned with similar issues. And when the mock battle of Actium is introduced as an event just within the limit—*quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque*—of acceptable behavior, Cicero's warning of a *ludendi . . . modus* certainly seems relevant. Finally, in terms of a subtext of Horace's experience as a patronized poet, the

*sentire* suggests the unanimous endorsement with which Augustus tried to justify his usurpation of power. This unanimity—the *consensus Italiae*—was at once a rhetorical weapon, or, to use Ronald Syme's phrase, a political catchword, as well as a concrete, legitimizing measure. In 32 B.C., as a means of securing the loyal following of the Italian population at large, Augustus, then Octavian, enjoined *tota Italia* to swear an oath of allegiance to him.<sup>30</sup> As Syme points out, there is no historical evidence of how the oath was administered. No doubt a seamless, undivided endorsement of Octavian was the ideal which he succeeded in cultivating only as a rhetorical fiction. But the concept of relations behind the oath was that of patronage, so that many of the veterans whom Octavian had settled on confiscated lands "regarded Caesar's heir as their patron and defender and were firmly attached to his *clientela*."<sup>31</sup>

If, as suggested above in discussion of the public dimension of patronage and the building of empire, Augustus served as the ultimate patron, he no doubt hovers again behind the figure of the specific *amicus* here. The patron's endorsement of this *ludus* of Actium can only serve as an ironic comment on the subtext of Horace's experience of patronage, where participation in the official visions meant a denial, not an admission, of the civil character of the war. The *consensus Italiae*, first a political tool of legitimization, becomes a rhetorical vision whose plural yet unified voice Horace adopts for many of the odes.<sup>32</sup> That Lollius stages Actium mocks with a kind of distorting, or retorting,

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mention of Lollius' theatrical game is of a piece with Horace's poetic game. The epistle's inclusion of Lollius' mock battle is Horace's *ludus*.

<sup>30</sup>Syme, *Revolution* 161, 284–89.

<sup>31</sup>Syme, *Revolution* 289; and see note 17 above for Brunt's modification of Syme's view. Saller, *Personal Patronage* 73, also discusses the oath of loyalty annually sworn to the emperor but does not comment on the specific oath of 32 B.C. Galsterer, "After Fifty Years" 17, refers to the *patrocinium* and *clientela* which Augustus created for himself by the *consensus universorum*. Indeed, even if the oath itself had no model in patronal relations, the swearing of allegiance would have established Augustus, then Octavian, as "having the whole state and all the citizens in his care and protection" (Brunt, *Republic* 439).

<sup>32</sup>Again, the voice of the *sodales* at the beginning of the Cleopatra ode provides a clear example. In addition, the so-called Roman Odes present the speaker in a sacerdotal mode whose voice, though often singular, nonetheless speaks in the interests of the nation at large. The frequently quoted and disturbing dictum from these odes, *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* (3.2.13), displays this authoritative voice that speaks for the whole even as the meaning of the line similarly enjoins sacrifice for an entity larger than the self.



grimace the original portrayal of that particular battle: the war must be retold—*refertur*—in order to correct Octavian's first misrepresentation. While sham naval battles of this kind were commonly put on for purposes of celebration and diversion, the emphasis on representation here slyly accentuates Octavian's efforts to construct a history for himself. As Ahl points out, Lollius reconverts the war back into a civil one.<sup>33</sup>

Indeed, the ironies multiply when one considers how the speaker claims that this mock battle exemplifies Lollius' capacity to comply with his patron, and thus to restrain his impulsively strong-willed nature. For although this is how the episode is introduced, the skit becomes not an activity of the patron's to which Lollius defers, but rather an act of risky independence of a type which would win the patron's approval in exchange for participation in his affairs. This concluding comment by the speaker recasts the lines *ac ne te retrahas et inexcusabilis absis, / quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque* in an ironic light, making Lollius' staged Actium not, perhaps, an inexcusable absence from any participation, but at least a divergence from the conventional compliance. In fact, the "marginal" behavior implied in the verb *retrahas*, where Lollius would pull back from involvement and thus stand on the periphery, or the sidelines; in a sense characterizes his action. He pushes the limits of official representation, going beyond the number and measure of Augustan propaganda.

Finally, as mentioned above, this liberty which Lollius takes with the party line, or measure, functions simultaneously as a liberty of representation on Horace's part.<sup>34</sup> The independent nature which Lollius fears losing, his *liberrimus* character, stands metaphorically for the political liberties that suffered erosion under the Principate. Not only does the lyric diction which phrases the issue of transgression suggest Horace's experience, but the reference to a gladiatorial show in the patron's gesture of approval recalls the speaker's metaphor in the First Epistle for his capacity as official encomiast in the *Odes*.<sup>35</sup> Lollius'

<sup>33</sup> Ahl, "Rider and the Horse" 52.

<sup>34</sup> From the broadest point of view, that is, in terms of an overt text *and* the full resonance of a subtext, the *ludus* suggests Lollius' poetry, Lollius' sham Actium, Horace's poetry in general (the speaker's advice draws from experience), and this particular game of poetic subversion.

<sup>35</sup> Horace there envisions himself as a retired gladiator: *non eadem est aetas, non mens. Veianius armis / Herculis ad postem fixis latet abditus agro, / ne populum extrema totiens exoret harena* (Epist. 1.1.4–6).

battle, then, suggests the following subtext about the Horatian experience of liberty—that the independence of the act of representation itself depends on compliance with the patron. In other words, the compliance with the overall fiction or scheme of the Principate permits or allows a critical gesture that diverges from the party line.<sup>36</sup>

However, such liberty of representation for Horace depends on the figure of Lollius, insofar as his mock naval battle as a textual image provides the vehicle for the poet's license. That such license over the Battle of Actium occurs via the dramatic figure of Lollius points up again the repression of liberty and of individual voice, as the effect of the system of patronage. For this situates the liberty that Horace *does* take on a subtextual level. The remarks that follow the vignette about Actium further support how the subtextual level of this license constitutes a kind of "return of the repressed." As if the biographical touch about Lollius were a digression from the didactic development of the speaker's thought, he resumes his comments about the necessity for circumspection:

protinus ut moneam, si quid monitoris eges tu,  
quid, de quoque viro, et cui dicas saepe videto.  
percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,  
nec retinent patulae commissa fideliter aures,  
et semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum. (67–71)

Like the references to the *arcanum* and the knowledge—*commissum*—which have been entrusted to a *cliens*, these words of advice underscore a furtive secrecy about information that characterizes the system of patronage. Indeed, that the digression about Actium is embraced by advice about the need to withhold information, and respect such privacy, points up on a structural level the taboo status of the war as a civil one.

A different form of this subtextual reference to civil discord, one that, perhaps, more truly merits the appellation "subtextual," appears at the very beginning of the epistle in the binary oppositions with which

<sup>36</sup>This *quid pro quo* dynamic resembles the ambiguous role of the Sabine Farm in the Seventh Epistle: as the gift which the Augustan regime made to Horace, it demands a certain compliance with the official vision, one which Horace expresses in the *Odes*; however, as the repeated configurations of the Sabine Farm in the *Epistles* make clear, it also functions as a *topos* of independence, the *locus* apart from Rome and any participation in its imperial visions.

the speaker attempts to define the role of a more subordinate *amicus*. After asserting that Lollius fears the dangerous proximity between an *amicus* and the appearance of a *scurra*—a servile buffoon—the speaker illustrates the distinction by claiming that the two roles are as far different from each other as a *meretrix* from a *matrona*:

Si bene te novi, metues, liberrime Lolli,  
scurrantis speciem praebere, professus amicum.  
ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque  
discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus. (1-4)

The emphasis on division in the diction of definition here—*dispar*, *discolor*, and *distabit*—anticipates both the loss of harmony between the brothers Amphion and Zethus—*gratia dissiluit*—as well as the obvious civil discord which they represent. The explicatory distinctions continue when the speaker opposes a “country roughness” to the vice of the imitative buffoon. Here, rather than distinguish vice from virtue, the speaker opposes two vices: *est huic diversum vitio vitium prope maius*. In a sense, this illustrative device of opposition creates a bifurcating structure. For after distinguishing vice from virtue, the speaker splits vice, and develops each example of an extreme in sentences beginning with the word *alter*: *alter in obsequium plus aequo pronus et imi* (10); *alter rixatur de lana saepe caprina* (15). Then the example of excessive independence yet again fissures—this time into the division of opinion created by a boorish hair-splitter wishing to assert his difference from his more powerful *amicus*: *ambigitur quid enim? Castor sciat an Dolichos plus; Brundisium Minuci melius via ducat an Appi* (19-20). Moreover, this example of trivial wrangling follows on the first overt reference to free speech in the poem: in contrast to the *scurra* who merely mimics and repeats the sayings of his *amicus*, the boor cries out “*scilicet ut non / sit mihi prima fides, et vere quod placet ut non / acriter elatrem! pretium aetas altera sordet.*”

Although the tone here is satiric, these lines underscore the issue at the heart of this epistle—a client’s freedom of expression, or the right to “part company with” his patron. And this issue of the overt text parallels the covert text of Horace’s specific experience of a form of censorship when writing of the Battle of Actium. However, the speaker’s direct and indirect allusions to this historic event in the course of his advice to Lollius assert a basic independence and integrity whose

aesthetic expression testifies to Horace's complex and sophisticated craft.<sup>37</sup>

LOWELL BOWDITCH

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

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"THERE BENEATH THE ROMAN RUIN  
WHERE THE PURPLE FLOWERS GROW":  
OVID'S MINYEIDES AND THE FEMININE IMAGINATION

As the first human artists of *Metamorphoses*, who relate an elaborate set of tales, the Minyeides and their stories (*Met.* 4.32–415) have received considerable attention in Ovid studies.<sup>1</sup> Because they resist the rites of Bacchus, avatar of erotic desire and disorder, most readings depict them as broadly opposed to both. But this does not explain—except as perverse fascination—such anomalous details as the sisters' concentration on erotic tales, their articulation of their storytelling as a site of pleasure,<sup>2</sup> and their focus on the East as a geography of passion. This essay argues that they do not *resist* desire so much as pose the question of a *gendered* desire—a curious interlude of transvestism, in which Ovid seems to hand over his narrative to other voices and other interests.<sup>3</sup> The Minyeides stage Woman's desire, not as an affair of

<sup>1</sup>To name only the more substantive of recent discussions: Nugent, "This Sex Which Is Not One"; Holzberg, "Ovids 'Babyloniaka'"; Newlands, "The Simile of the Fractured Pipe"; Segal, "Pyramus and Thisbe"; Perraud, "*Amatores Exclusi*"; Castellani, "Two Divine Scandals"; Rohrer, "Red and White in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*"; Leach, "*Ekphrasis* and the Theme of Artistic Failure"; Duke, "Ovid's Pyramus and Thisbe."

<sup>2</sup>*Utile opus manuum vario sermone levemus*, 4.39; *hoc placet*, 4.53; *dulcique animos novitate tenebo*, 4.284.

<sup>3</sup>Ovid himself works diligently to maintain this illusion of distinct voices arising in the text by, for example, explicitly distancing his anonymous narrator's sympathies from those of the Minyeides. The narrator aligns himself strongly with Bacchus (so much so that he joins in the hymn to Bacchus that opens book 4, 11–30, seemingly caught up in the general religious enthusiasm); but when the sisters' voices take up the poem where the narrator leaves off, they are quick to express their contempt for Bacchus and his *commenta sacra* (4.37). The dramatic illusion of the Minyeides' independence strongly engages Ovid, and logically so: the gender-subversive connotations he has written into the tale would largely be lost were they overrapidly assigned to his (male) subject position as author. I have therefore bowed to maintaining this dramatic illusion in my discussion of the Minyeides' episode, and refer generally to "Leuconoë's" artistry, rather than Ovid's, as a way of temporarily bracketing the obvious fact of his sole authorship.

Further discussions of Ovid's internal narrators (a device he often uses in the *Metamorphoses*) may most recently be found in Janan, "'The Book of Good Love?'; Nagle, "Byblis and Myrrha"; Nagle, "Ovid's 'Reticent' Heroes" and "A Trio of Love-Triangles"; Newlands, "The Simile of the Fractured Pipe"; Hofmann, "Ovid's *Meta-*

anatomy or biology, but of knowledge and institutions.<sup>4</sup> Woman's desire disrupts public, social institutions: Law (broadly conceived as *all* social constraints), language, and the way both conspire to produce "truth" as "what you are *supposed* to think." Moreover, the East figures in these tales less as geographic reality than as a "feminine" re-imagination of the sisters' familiar Greek hometown. The Eastern sites featured in their tales reflect the sisters' own Orchomenos as a conceptual abstraction, The City: a set of boundaries culturally imposed on bodies, speech, and thought, as well as on territory.<sup>5</sup> The sisters' tales magnify the inevitable logical gaps and half-truths in such ideological constructions—gaps through which a "feminine" desire fleetingly reveals itself.

The daughters of Minyas abstain from the rites of Bacchus when his worship comes to Orchomenos; they remain indoors, spinning wool and narrating an elaborate interlocking set of tales. The first sister to speak tells of Babylonian Thisbe illicitly meeting her lover Pyramus, both lovers doomed by a series of mutual misapprehensions to double suicide (4.55–166); the last Minyeid explains how Carian Salmacis became an emasculating spring—vengeance for the nymph's attempted rape of the attractive Hermaphroditus (4.285–388). The middle sister tells two tales, one of the adulterers Mars and Venus caught by cuckolded Vulcan (4.169–89), the other of the lethal jealousy the Sun God's love for the Persian princess Leucothoë inspires in his former mistress, Clytië (4.190–270). When Clytië exposes Leucothoë's lost maidenhood, the princess's father buries her alive.

Groundbreaking studies have recently been done on the topic of

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*morphoses*"; Gamel, "Baucis and Philemon"; Leach, "*Ekphrasis* and the Theme of Artistic Failure."

<sup>4</sup>By "Woman," I designate a social construction, "a fictional construct, a distillate from diverse but congruent discourses dominant in Western cultures" (De Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't* 5), as opposed to a woman, or women.

<sup>5</sup>Patricia Joplin, drawing upon the work of René Girard, Mary Douglas, and others, carefully documents ancient Greek and Roman conceptualizations of the polity as the product of complex sets of rules governing cultural and political exchange. In addition to physical boundaries, signifying oppositions such as speech versus silence, rape versus legitimate marriage, and male versus female all play a role in establishing the nature of the city and who properly belongs to it. See Joplin, "Ritual Work" and "The Voice of the Shuttle." See also Stehle, "Venus," which pursues a similar line of thought about the polity's ideological construction in the specific context of Roman religion.

desire in the Minyeides' tales.<sup>6</sup> Yet their enquiry has curiously stopped short of examining the central tales in detail. This is all the more surprising in that Leuconoë's two stories, more starkly than the flanking narratives, pose the question of Woman's desire in an institutional setting. Her tales focus on the *public* conceptualization of two sexual crimes, adultery and rape. Her first contrasts an outraged husband with the *laissez-faire* gods, summoned as witnesses; her second frames the essence of a rape case by posing the question of whether Leucothoë consented to, or refused, the Sun God's sexual advances, and thus of the exact nature of the crime for which she dies.

This aspect of Leuconoë's narratives reflects an important feature of the Minyeides' own situation, since in refusing to join Bacchus' rites they oppose a private definition of how Woman's desire may properly be channeled to a public one. Leuconoë's tales work together as an intricate diptych, less to provide an answer to "*Was will das Weib?*" than to interrogate the ways in which social institutions—of which Law is the paradigmatic example—conspire to deform, deny, or suppress any possible answer. So while it is important to contextualize Leuconoë's tales with reference to her sisters' narratives, I concentrate my attention on the way in which her particular stories not only problematize a construction of their author as virtue's zealot, but trouble the very conceptualization of feminine virtue.

The common reading of all three sisters as "prudes" is, to be sure, a reading faithful to certain elements of the text. Rejecting by their words and actions the vices regularly attributed to Woman since Hesiod (a misogynist tradition Ovid laid under contribution in *Ars Amatoria* and elsewhere), the sisters appear to align themselves with a particular masculine construction of the feminine ideal. If Woman is stereotypically indolent, irrational, and at the mercy of her desires,<sup>7</sup> the sisters by

<sup>6</sup>See Nugent, "This Sex Which Is Not One"; Segal, "Pyramus and Thisbe"; Rohrer, "Red and White in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*." Barkan (*The Gods Made Flesh* 57–58) also has some thoughtful, if brief, remarks on the subject.

<sup>7</sup>Laziness, unreason, and lust—among other vices—are laid to Woman's account in a range of ancient literature too broad to be surveyed here. However, I cite as exemplary Hes. *Th.* 590–612 (where men are hardworking bees, while women are lazy drones); Semonides of Amorgos, "The Satire on Women" (Pellizer and Tedeschi fr. 7), who compares women to natural phenomena and, while tarring all with the brush of laziness, singles out "donkey—" and "horse-women" for especial indolence, "sea—" and "mud-women" for irrationality and idiocy respectively; Vergil's *Aeneid*, which dwells on wom-



contrast work almost compulsively, skeptically sift each others' tales for veracity, and tell stories in which the expression of female desire is regularly and ruthlessly punished.<sup>8</sup> Their goddess is Minerva, chaste avatar of reason and feminine domestic industry, "supporter of the male in all things."<sup>9</sup>

Yet such a reading passes too rapidly over the places where the sisters' alignment with this particular construction of feminine virtue breaks down. Consider, briefly, the disturbingly lurid features of the tales told by the first and last sisters, of Pyramus' and Thisbe's *Liebestod*, and Salmacis' weird power to emasculate. When Pyramus stabs himself with his own sword, mistakenly believing that he has been responsible for his beloved Thisbe's death, the Minyeid telling the tale

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en's general irrationality as exemplified in Dido's distraction and suicide (book 4 *passim*), the Trojan women's burning of their own ships (5.654–79), Amata's curious obsession with her prospective son-in-law Turnus, and her suicide (12.54–80, 593–607), and the like; Sallust's *Catiline*, in which the infamous portrait of Sempronia summarizes all Catiline's female adherents, as swayed by pure profligacy and greed to his cause (24–25); Livy, who contrasts Lucretia's industriousness with the otherwise general indolence and debauchery of the commanders' wives (1.57); Tacitus (*Annals*), whose anecdotes of upper-class women regularly portray them as corrupt, especially sexually corrupt (the histories of Messalina, 11.1–38, and Agrippina, 12.1–14.9, being only the most flamboyant instances of the type); Juvenal 6, where women's lust is exemplified throughout the poem, but also wives' irrational cruelty (219–23), and the Golden Age is presented as a time when hard work kept women chaste, just as luxury and peace now corrupt them (287–345).

In Ovid's own work, *Ars Amatoria* specifically refers to women as by nature more lustful than men, and "proves" the point by citing examples of mythical women's unnatural lusts—Myrrha, Pasiphaë, and so on (1.275–342). And though Ovid in general shows more tact than the other texts I have cited, Myerowitz (*Ovid's Games of Love*) demonstrates that his georgic imagery in *Ars Amatoria* aligns Woman with impassioned, irrational, and "passive" Nature, which needs to be shaped and controlled by Man.

For a more general overview of misogynistic literature see Richlin, *Garden of Priapus* esp. 173–77, 194–95, 202–7.

<sup>8</sup>Noted by Nugent, "This Sex Which Is Not One" 161.

<sup>9</sup>Τὸ δ' ἄρ' ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα, as Aeschylus has Athene describe herself in *Eu.* 737. Though the phrase belongs to Aeschylus, Minerva's scattered appearances in the *Metamorphoses* generally support the characterization. To women, she offers (a) no help (the Minyides themselves being an example of this, despite being her worshippers, 4.38); (b) metamorphosis marred by her subsequent ingratitude (Coronis' transformation, 2.547–95); and (c) outright punishment (e.g., Aglauros, 2.752–832; Arachne, 6.129–33). To men, on the other hand, she is considerably kinder, offering (a) instructions to Cadmus as to how to sow the dragon's teeth (3.101–5); (b) companionship to Perseus (5.46–47, 250–51); and (c) metamorphosis marred by no ingratitude (Perdix' transformation, 8.251–59).

compares his jetting blood to the effusions of a burst water pipe (*Met.* 4.122–24). Not to be outdone, the last sister has Salmacis (then nymph, now enervating spring) try to lure a youth to her bed with a speech modeled on Odysseus' delicate flattery of Nausikaa (*Od.* 6.149–59). In Salmacis' mouth, Odysseus' respectful praise of a maiden becomes a brutally frank sexual proposition. Both passages have raised critical eyebrows: readers have commonly seen the plumbing simile as unforgivable bathos at the dying Pyramus' expense,<sup>10</sup> and are only slightly more tolerant of Salmacis' playing *épater les bourgeois* with Homer.<sup>11</sup> What curious purpose do these breaches of decorum serve within the Minyettes' narratives, for women who appear to prize *comme il faut* above all things?

Such ruptures are not easily aligned with a program of disparaging erotic desire as *itself* a dangerous break in decorum—even if we take them as making *erôs* appear bathetic, shocking, and generally distasteful. Glossing these images simply as “anti-*erôs* propaganda” still leaves unexplained their excess of disturbing fascination.<sup>12</sup> That something is left out of the equation becomes all the clearer when we try to align Leuconoë's tales with an anti-*erôs* program. She too uses Homer, and she too modifies her source. In telling the story of Mars' and Venus' adultery Leuconoë jettisons from her source in *Odyssey* 8 the bard Demodokos' clearly articulated moral strictures on the lovers. Crime pays, and pays handsomely, in her tale: she lets the lovers off without so much as an apology. Now, why would a “prude” do that? I submit that her surprising gesture of indifference, set beside her sisters' outrageous appropriations of Homeric speech and plumbing accidents, forces a realignment of all the tales along a new axis—the axis of a “feminine” desire that evinces little concern for the public meaning their stories

<sup>10</sup>See Galinsky, *Ovid's Metamorphoses*; Newlands, “The Simile of the Fractured Pipe”; Bömer, *Kommentar* ad 4.122–23.

<sup>11</sup>See Bömer, *Kommentar* ad 4.321 for commentary with references.

<sup>12</sup>Note, for example, that readers turn repeatedly to just these passages, and passionately defend (or decry) Ovid's flamboyancy. See, e.g., Kirby, “Humor” 247; Albrecht, “Zur Funktion der Gleichnisse” 286–88; Segal, *Landscape* 50; Bömer, *Kommentar* ad 4.320–21. *AJP*'s anonymous reader for this essay kindly drew my attention to the fact that Horace stages a similar fascination with luxurious excess in some of his odes, despite his rejection of such baroque on an intellectual level. (See *Carm.* 1.5; Commauer, *The Odes of Horace* esp. 117; Gold, “*Mitte Sectari*” esp. 21.) Horace's rejection is, however, quite explicit, while the Minyettes' attitude is not so easily determined at any level.

"should" have and instead reappropriates storytelling for private pleasure.

By "feminine" I mean an affair principally of signification, not of anatomy. Dividing the world according to the supposedly meaningful opposition Man/Woman may be tied to anatomy as the sign of its concerns; yet anatomy only represents, and neither explains nor causes, a larger cultural agenda: the attempt to construct the second term (Woman) as a special, inferior instance of the first term, as supplement and threat to Man. What is at stake in the Minyeides' tales is not so much gender per se as the cultural meaning of gender.<sup>13</sup> The struggle is therefore over knowledge, over "what is true," to the degree that truth (as the Minyeides receive it) revolves around a certain set of anxieties about Woman's desire, and of institutional attempts to control it.<sup>14</sup> I label these anxieties "masculine" insofar as the tales themselves chiefly show men occupying (albeit often uneasily and ungracefully) positions of power and authority shored up by the "truths" the anxieties generate. The Minyeides in general, and Leuconoë in particular, evince a "feminine" imagination wherever they call this bluff—wherever their stories show up the apparent coherence of received truth, its "naturalness," as a fiction institutionally contrived to serve particular interests. For that reason, seeking private pleasure over public utility amounts to a revolutionary act.

Let us consider certain features of Leuconoë's tale that clarify what I mean by "feminine desire." Fortunately, two extant antecedents for the Mars/Venus tale (*Od.* 8.266–366; *Ars Am.* 2.561–92) make it easier to see how Ovid rethinks material when fitted to a "feminine" imagination. Leuconoë conforms to the Homeric tale's general outline as told by the Phaeacian bard Demodokos: the Sun spies upon the adulterous couple's lovemaking and tells the cuckolded husband, whom he shocks into immediate action. Vulcan plans to trap them with a wondrous, invisible net.

<sup>13</sup> A meaning that may, or may not, align predictably with anatomy—one of the reasons that I place cautionary quotation marks around the word "feminine." Consider, for example, the Roman horror of adult males who preferred to be penetrated, rather than the penetrator, in sex. They drew upon themselves much of the same opprobrium directed at women and were also scorned as "feminine." See Richlin, "Not before Homosexuality" esp. 541–54.

<sup>14</sup> On knowledge as tied to gender position in the ancient world see Winkler, "Gardens of Nymphs" esp. 68–69.

. . . at illi  
et mens et quod opus fabrilis dextra tenebat  
excidit: extemplo graciles ex aere catenas  
retiaque et laqueos, quae lumina fallere possent,  
elimat (non illud opus tenuissima vincant  
stamina, non summo quae pendet aranea tigno),  
utque leves tactus momentaque parva sequantur  
efficit et lecto circumdata collocat arte.<sup>15</sup> (4.174–81)

. . . both his composure and the work he was holding in his blacksmith's hand dropped from him: straightway he files down and polishes slender chains and nets and nooses made of bronze, such as can deceive the eyes (the finest threads could not surpass that work, nor the spider/spider-web<sup>16</sup> that hangs from the highest beam), and he fashions them so that they yield to a light touch and gentle motion, and he places them skillfully around the bed.

This far exceeds the two-line description of the trap in *Ars Amatoria* (*Mulciber obscuros lectum circaque superque / disponit laqueos; lumina fallit opus*, "Vulcan places the hard-to-see snares both around and above the bed; the work deceives the eyes," 2.577–78). But comparing Leuconoë's description with that in the *Odyssey* shows that she has done more than embrace epic scope. Demodokos describes the blacksmith-god's engines of revenge in a much more businesslike fashion:

ἐν δ' ἔθετ' ἀκμοθέτω μέγαν ἀκμονα, κόπτε δὲ δεσμούς  
ἀρρήκτους ἀλύτους, ὄφρ' ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένοιεν.  
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεύξε δόλον κεχολωμένος Ἄρει,  
βῆ δ' ἔμην ἐς θάλαμον, ὅθι οἱ φίλα δέμνι' ἔκειτο,  
ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἐρμῖσιν χεῖε δέσματα κύκλῳ ἀπάντη·  
πολλὰ δὲ καὶ καθύπερθε μελαθρόφιν ἐξεκέχυντο,  
ἧψ' ἀράχνια λεπτά, τά γ' οὐ κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο,  
οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων· πέρι γὰρ δολόεντα τέτυκτο. (Od. 8.274–81)

He set the great anvil upon its stand, and hammered out fastenings that could not be slipped or broken, to hold them fixed in position. Now when, being enraged at Ares, he had contrived this cunning device, he went into his chamber where his own dear bed lay, and spread it circlewise all

<sup>15</sup> All references to the *Metamorphoses* are taken from the text established by William Anderson. Translations are my own.

<sup>16</sup> *Aranea* means both "spider" and "spider web." I believe, and argue, that the text draws on both meanings.

around the bedposts from every direction. Some hung down from the roof beams, like slender spider webs, which no one could see, not even one of the blessed gods.

The Homeric description anchors each detail of the god's contrivance firmly to the logic of the plot. Homer elaborately specifies how the god works the bonds for maximum strength; where he fastens them around the bed; why his manufacture makes them undetectable—and thus makes the incredible act of securely trapping two gods *in flagrante delicto* seem quite natural. No detail is wasted, save perhaps the fine touch of comparing the delicately interwoven bonds to a spider's web.

Characteristically, Leuconoë preserves and expands only this otiose image, while jettisoning the precise details of mechanics and deployment that propel the Homeric scene. Gone are anvil and hammer: Leuconoë's fastenings spring forth as if by an act of will. Demodokos laboriously specified that *some* fastenings attached to the bedposts, *others* to the ceiling beams; but Leuconoë's Vulcan just "places them skillfully around the bed"—as if this bed floated in space, unanchored to domestic architecture. She expends her imagination instead on elaborating sensual details beyond the point of strict logic or narrative economy, as when she stipulates that Vulcan makes his chains from bronze. She thus immediately conjures up their bright, auburn-gold, reflective appearance (a curious embroidery, since it would seem to make these "invisible" bonds unmistakably apparent). She also multiplies Demodokos' simple synonymous *desmous* (274) and *desmata* (278)—"fastenings"—into the redundant triplet "chains and nets and nooses" (*catenas / retiaque et laqueos*, 4.176–77), which obscures the logical relationship of the three. But Leuconoë cheerfully trades logical simplicity for the words' lovely rhythm and unfolding surprise. Taken *sensu stricto*, all these cannot logically coexist. (Chains might be woven together to make up a net, but how would "nooses" fit in?) The reader must revise any initial impression, and retrospectively either take *laqueos* as proleptic (thus working against the pure parataxis of the line) or read these words as tropes, rough synonyms for "snare."<sup>17</sup> Iron-

<sup>17</sup>Bömer too seems troubled by the phrase's logical inconcinnity. He quotes several passages using *rete* and *laqueus*, singly or together, from Ovid and from other authors, yet cannot find an exact parallel that would smoothly gloss the logical conflict in the phrase, and concludes rather weakly that "after Seneca's *Phaedra*" *retia* and *laquei* were "even synonymous" (ad 4.177).

ically, the more terms for bondage that crowd into these lines, the more their meaning floats giddily away from technical precision, unable, like the location of Vulcan's contextless bed, to be precisely determined. Leuconoë thus exploits every opportunity the story's tradition offers her for sensual pleasure in color and sound, at the expense of logically and efficiently unfolding a narrative focused on controlling a wife's desire.

Consider, too, the fastenings' texture. Leuconoë uses unusual terminology for the only feature of their production of which she affords us a glimpse: *elimat*, "file down and polish." This is a rare word (occurring only here in Ovid's extant work), and almost all the instances we have of it are figurative in sense, referring to putting the finishing touches on poetry or artistic prose.<sup>18</sup> The presence of this term activates other descriptive details of Vulcan's work—its fineness and subtlety—as metaphors for Callimachean artistry, to which, here as elsewhere, the *Metamorphoses* signals its allegiance.<sup>19</sup>

But Leuconoë's description signals more than poetic loyalties. Consider how she reshapes these trite images, by making her long, parenthetical elaboration of the bonds' fineness depend upon two metaphors: weaving, and the spider's web. Each draws upon a symbolization system used to construct the feminine in ancient culture: the sphere of domestic work, and the myth of Arachne, who claimed distinction on the basis of that work.<sup>20</sup> In *Metamorphoses* 6, Arachne's

<sup>18</sup>See Deferrari et al., *A Concordance of Ovid* s.v. *elimo*; and, e.g., Cic. Att. 16.7.3, *velim οχόλιον aliquod elimes*.

<sup>19</sup>Fineness: *graciles*, 4.176; *non illud opus tenuissima vincant / stamina*, 4.178–79. Subtlety: *quae lumina failere possent*, 4.177. The literature on Callimachean (and, more broadly, Hellenistic) aesthetics in the *Metamorphoses* is too extensive to cite here in full. The following works are both themselves exemplary, and offer further helpful references: Hofmann, "Ovid's *Metamorphoses*"; Knox, *Ovid's Metamorphoses*; Hinds, *The Metamorphoses of Persephone*; Lync, "Ovid's *Metamorphoses*."

<sup>20</sup>The Minyides ostensibly reside in northern Greece, yet the details of their portrait and their stories are ostentatiously calibrated to speak to a Roman audience (Leuconoë, for example, arranges an inhumation—traditional punishment for a Roman Vestal who has broken her vow of chastity—to chastise a Persian princess's loss of maidenhood). Their concentration on weaving lays under contribution its cultural implications both for Greeks and Romans as metonymic symbol of domestic virtue. Ovid's image unavoidably draws upon other cultural moments, textual or historical, focused upon weaving, such as Livy's choice of weaving to epitomize Roman womanly virtue in Lucretia (1.57); the women of Augustus' household—who could well afford to buy fine cloth—weaving clothing for domestic use (Suet. Aug. 73); Vergil's comparison of Vulcan,

unparalleled artistry in weaving attracts Minerva's jealous attention and results in a contest between mortal and goddess to see who is the superior weaver. Ovid's version of the tale supports Arachne's boast to rival Minerva in weaving skill: her tapestry—containing unedifying tableaux of the gods' more vicious sexual intrigues—is faultless, but the goddess first beats her into suicidal despair, then transforms her into a spider. When Leuconoë employs the weaving and spider images, she puts pressure upon their use by a (chiefly male) artistic tradition to epitomize the aesthetic allegiances of its poets.<sup>21</sup> Her status as woman and weaver, as well as defier of (certain) gods, reactivates the images' ties to a *feminine* artistic tradition: the heritage of the preeminently skilled Arachne (*Met.* 6.1–145), who, like Leuconoë, weaves both cloth and irreverent tales about the gods. Leuconoë's clear fascination with the spider image, over and above any other detail offered by Demodokos or *Ars Amatoria*, subtly invokes the mythical progenitor behind the arachnid spinner: the benchmark of artistic excellence becomes another defiant woman, as *aranea* recalls *A/arachnē*.

Arachne's transformation is commonly interpreted as a punishment (even though Minerva herself considers her action in part an act of grace):<sup>22</sup> she is condemned to weave fragile, meaningless spiderwebs. But as we have seen, Leuconoë uses the image of the spider's web to transform bondage into a proliferation of sensual details that exceed any calculation of the bonds' usefulness in repressing sexual misbehav-

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hard at work upon Aeneas' arms, to the *univira* rising early to weave, so that she may earn the independent living that keeps her loyal to her first husband (*Aen.* 8.407–15). Ogilvie collects the relevant texts (*Commentary* ad 1.57).

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Joplin, "The Voice of the Shuttle" esp. 50–54; Brink, *Horace on Poetry* III 242, on *Ep.* 2.1.225. Also, for more specific analyses of Ovid's use of the metaphor see Harries, "The Spinner and the Poet"; Hofmann, "Ausgesprochene und unausgesprochene motivische Verwebung" and "Ovid's *Metamorphoses*" esp. 230–34.

<sup>22</sup>*Met.* 6.134–38:

Non tulit infelix laqueoque animosa ligavit  
guttura; pendentem Pallas miserata levavit  
atque ita "vive quidem, pende tamen, inproba" dixit,  
"lexque eadem poenae, ne sis secura futuri,  
dicta tuo generi serisque nepotibus esto!"

To be sure, Minerva also describes Arachne's transformation, and that of her epigones, as a *lex poenae* (137)—but my point is that Minerva and the anonymous Ovidian narrator (who describes the goddess as "taking pity" on Arachne, 135) see the change as more complex in its implications than simple condemnation.

ior and maintaining public decorum. Vulcan's web of bonds transcends the specific conditions under which it comes into being: his lovingly woven trap becomes, in its fineness and polish, its glittering refinement, a quintessential metaphor for artistic excellence—but correspondingly loses credibility as an unbreakable trap. Ultimately, it registers as pure imaginative luxuriance, rather than as an instrument to restore social order. Woman's pleasure escapes the web's restraining pressure, and reappears as sensuous delight in color, texture, and surprise.

Juxtaposed to Leuconoë's revaluation of the spider's web, Arachne's punishment may also be seen to transform and transcend its own terms: as a spider, she now weaves the subtlest of webs, pure texture and ephemeral form, released from the limitations imposed by representation.<sup>23</sup> Her web is the logical extrapolation of a minor but persistent trend evident in Roman pictorial art. Arachne's web epitomizes Roman painters' interest in images as pure form or pure color, rather than as realistic mirrors of the world (evident in the geometric patterns and impressionistic, dreamlike images seen in Roman murals).<sup>24</sup> Her story and Leuconoë's, linked by formal and thematic parallels, exert a gravitational pull on one another and transvalue each other's interpretations. Arachne's post-metamorphosis weaving parallels the Minyeides' productions—subtle, ungraspable tales, too delicately shaded to be sorted out by a binarism like “prudish/prurient.” The sisters transcend the conditions of their bondage—such as Woman's imposed duty to weave—for private pleasure.

Yet in executing this transvaluation, Leuconoë opposes a formidable weight of tradition: the versions of the adultery tale in both the *Odyssey* and *Ars Amatoria* construct an object lesson in what happens

<sup>23</sup>Donald Lateiner, almost alone among Arachne's interpreters, also sees her transformation as at least a partial triumph, though not for the reasons I have mentioned: “Although [Minerva] can deform the artist, she cannot gainsay her human art's power. So Arachne, although diminished to a spider, continues forever to exercise her nimble skill as a spider” (“Mythic and Non-Mythic Artists” 16).

<sup>24</sup>Consider, for example, the perspectival cubes that decorate part of the House of the Griffins in Rome (Room IV, side and back walls); the sketchy brushwork evident in the House of Livia, designed to create color impressions rather than strictly modeled portrayals; the indifference to defining topography (distinguishing sea from land from sky, for example) that characterizes the paintings of the villa at Boscotrecase. Ling, *Roman Painting*, reproduces and discusses these works. (My thanks to Christopher Spelman for suggesting that Arachne's post-transformation weaving may be read as a redefinition of her art.)



when Woman becomes the subject, rather than exclusively the object, of desire. The "truths" they extract from this lesson revolve around her institutional threat (to marriage, or to other forms of exclusive possession) and the types of control available to a man in such a situation. If he is clever (as in Demodokos' tale), he can expose the liaison and demand economic recompense from her lover. If he ignores the liaison (as Ovid recommends), he can at least expect the lovers to be discreet and thus protect the social fiction of his exclusive possession. But Leuconoë's abstention from aligning herself with either piece of worldly wisdom—or any other—shifts the tale's center of gravity away from conceiving Woman's desire as problem, as institutional threat, and as public concern. She jettisons any "moral" interpretation of the adultery tale. No husband demands recompense, as in Demodokos' version, or regrets his futile intervention, as in *Ars Amatoria*. Leuconoë's tale ends with the subversive power of laughter, which pays no debts nor acknowledges any allegiance to the social concerns that are its foil.<sup>25</sup> To be sure, she inherits her jest from Homer and Ovid: both poets have a divine observer of the hapless pair remark that he wouldn't mind switching places with the goddess's lover, even in his present undignified position. Yet Leuconoë significantly changes the joke's placement. In the *Odyssey* and *Ars Amatoria* the locker-room witticism makes light of alarm over female desire, but occupies each tale's middle. In both versions the denouement partially negates the joke's irreverent effect by advising the cuckold how to deal with his errant woman. The *Odyssey* and *Ars Amatoria* recuperate the problem of Woman's desire as a problem, about which something (albeit, in *Ars Amatoria*, something cynically conceived) must be done. Leuconoë, by contrast, refuses to answer the implied questions—what should happen to Mars and Venus? What should Vulcan do about his unfaithful wife?—thereby refusing to consolidate the level of understanding on which they are asked, which makes regulating Woman's pleasure a matter of civic concern.

No conflict exists between this reading of Leuconoë's revision as making pleasure a political issue and her resistance to Bacchus, a god apparently dedicated to sensual pleasures. Bacchus' rites change the forms that regulate Woman's desire but preserve the principle: his "orgies" are command performances, demanded by his *sacerdos* to honor

<sup>25</sup> *Met.* 4.188–89: . . . *superi risere, dluque / haec fuit in toto notissima fabula caelo.*

the god.<sup>26</sup> Leuconoë's elision of moral logic in her first tale is, by contrast, much more profoundly revolutionary. It escapes the crude oppositions that seem, at first, to govern the Minyides segment: Minerva versus Bacchus; control versus chaos; chaste self-discipline versus sensuality; Law versus lawlessness. Her refusal to draw a difference treats each pair as a specious opposition: any choice between opposed terms would mean accepting the logic that (falsely) sees them as distinct, with the second term a deviation from or negation of the first. Bacchus' artful authoritarianism summarizes contradictions in both the human and the divine sphere that (as we shall see) show each term to be hopelessly contaminated by its supposed opposite.<sup>27</sup> The only true resistance, then, is indifference.

Leuconoë's indifference in part reflects the way she sees Law operate upon women—as Crime systematized, legitimated by power and authority. Sol, the moralist outraged at adultery, in Leuconoë's very next tale bends the princess Leucothoë to his sexual will; his fastidiousness proves quite flexible when confronting his self-interest. Of course, we could simply dismiss Sol as a hypocrite, and not undermine the system of sexual control whose champion he designs himself. But Leucothoë's father, who knows no such moral flexibility, proves as repellent as the Sun God when informed by Sol's ex-lover Clytië that his daughter is no longer a maiden. Perfectly consistent and perfectly monstrous, Orchamus buries his daughter alive, interested only in her body's lost virginity. He does not debate the question of rape, substituting her body's seemingly unambiguous physical state for the slipperier task of

<sup>26</sup> *Met.* 4.4.9:

festum celebrare sacerdos  
 immunesque operum famulas dominasque suorum  
 pectora pelle tegi, crinales solvere vittas,  
 sarta coma, manibus frondentes sumere thyrsos  
iusserat et saevam laesi fore numinis iram  
vaticinatus erat.

<sup>27</sup> Clearly the reading of the Minyides episode for which I argue—one that reverses the terms of a polarity in order to displace the general system in which they participate—is a deconstructionist reading of the kind most often associated with the philosopher Jacques Derrida, though others have contributed profoundly to deconstruction's conceptualization and practice. Derrida himself acknowledges that he has but made explicit what other thinkers who preceded him (notably Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx) employed implicitly. The best introduction to the subject, with helpful bibliography and references, remains Culler, *On Deconstruction*.

evaluating testimony as to her mental state—her consent or nonconsent to the Sun's advances.<sup>28</sup> Leuconoë's women appear in Law as bodies and as objects, but not as consciousnesses; they thus reflect a persistent deficiency in Rome's cultural conceptualizations of women (both in formal legal codes and elsewhere).<sup>29</sup>

But again, Leuconoë's framing of her tale resists any interpretation that would make Orchamus the simple villain of the piece. Repellent as his reaction is, Orchamus' stolid indifference to his daughter's defense draws attention to a problem in the interpretation of her desire. Consider Leucothoë's reaction to Sol's sexual overtures.

. . . pavet illa metuque  
et colus et fusi digitis cecidere remissis.  
ipse timor decuit, nec longius ille moratus  
in veram rediit speciem solitumque nitorem;  
at virgo quamvis inopino territa visu  
victa nitore dei posita vim passa querella est. (4.228–33)

. . . she pales and because of her fear, both her spindle and her distaff fell from her slack fingers. Her very fear made her more beautiful! Nor did he hesitate any longer to resume his true appearance and his accustomed splendor; but the maiden, although terrified by the unexpected sight, was conquered by the god's splendor and, having laid aside her complaint, suffered rape.

<sup>28</sup>The discussion of rape that follows is heavily indebted to Ferguson's masterly essay on the theorization of rape, "Rape and the Rise of the Novel."

<sup>29</sup>On legal representations and limitations see Gardner, *Women in Roman Law* esp. ch. 2, "The Guardianship of Women"; Crook, "Feminine Inadequacy"; Richlin, "Roman Oratory." Though Gardner notes that in practice the *tutela mulleris* may have been no more than "a routine inconvenience" (5), it looms large as a symbol of women's "deficiency"—a putative deficiency also reflected in the *senatusconsultum Velleianum*'s framing, as Crook cogently argues. Crook shows that though slightly later than Ovid's time, the *senatusconsultum* drew upon a train of thinking legally amplified, but hardly invented, by Augustus. The practice of women's guardianship assumes that women lack what is required for self-determination—and Richlin rightly emphasizes the degree to which Cicero's *Pro Caelio* relies upon this cultural prejudice to fashion a picture of Clodia as not only self-willed to the point of insanity, but in desperate need of reproof and restraint by her male relatives. He himself assumes the persona of her distinguished ancestor, Appius Claudius the Blind, in order to lecture her.

On (principally) literary representations of women and female deficiency see Joplin, "Ritual Work on Human Flesh" and "The Voice of the Shuttle"; Joshel, "The Body Female"; Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus*. More generally, on the representation of women as objects rather than consciousnesses see Richlin, *Feminist Theory*.

What exactly happened to Leucothoë? Does Sol's "resuming his true appearance and accustomed splendor" mean that he dropped all anthropomorphic form? The question is important, because she is described as both "terrified by the unexpected sight" and "conquered by his splendor." Does that mean he appeared in human, but radiantly beautiful, form (taking *nitor* as "human beauty," a common figure), so that she might plausibly have been seduced by his comeliness? Or is this a weaker version of Jove's lethal appearance to Semele in all his splendor? That is, was Leucothoë literally overpowered (*victa*) by the Sun's intense radiance (*nitore*)—thus unable, not unwilling, to resist?

The *language* of 4.232–33 also reflects the uncertainty as to the princess's state of mind, because the reasoning it records is so inconsistent. "Although [*quamvis*] she was terrified . . . she suffered rape" makes no sense, given that it sees the princess's capitulation as happening *despite* terror rather than (more logically) because of it. The last sentence's logical dissonance calls forth a lengthy, agonized paragraph from Bömer's customarily taciturn commentary. He wrestles the passage into sensible coordination by suggesting ways a reader could rearrange its elements retrospectively. Yet his approach smooths over too rapidly an irreducible divergence at the heart of this sentence. Part of Leucothoë's description seems to support the assumption that Leucothoë was a willing object of Sol's attention (*posita* . . . *querella*; *victa nitore dei* could be read so, even though the phrase is fundamentally ambiguous). Yet the assumption that Leucothoë was seduced runs aground logically upon the phrase "she suffered rape." The sentence implies *both* seduction *and* rape, but neither connotation can be made to square with the other: we can never know for certain whether Leucothoë said yes, or no, to Sol's advances.

Not by accident does this contorted sentence lie at the logical crux of a rape case. What is at stake here is Leucothoë's coherence (in all senses of that word): the apparent smooth alignment of her actions, her will, her desire, and the various other facets of her being into a unified whole that can be represented as a subject in language, an "I" who consented, or did not consent. Leucothoë's description dramatizes the conceptual insufficiency of that fiction of the unified subject. The text's irreducible duplicity, pointing simultaneously at rape and seduction, conjures up a "subject" in the modern theoretical sense of that term, conceived, not as a substance (like a stone), but as a site through which social, cultural, institutional, and unconscious forces pass. The text, in all its logical discord, better registers the degree to which Leucothoë is

*subject to* forces she neither originates nor controls, including unconscious desire, her power relative to Sol's, and her terror. From this point of view, Leucothoë as coherent subject—autonomous, self-reflective, and fundamentally unified—is an illusion, a fiction sustained (if fitfully) by language.<sup>30</sup>

Leucothoë herself retrospectively constructs the act as rape<sup>31</sup>—yet her reading cannot, anymore than Bömer's, smooth over the logical fractures that trouble its description and frustrate any attempt to retrieve from that moment a unified consciousness, a yes or no not haunted by reservations. Some of these inconsistencies are available to Orchamus, too. Why did she not scream for help? Why did she not tell someone what had happened? But rather than grapple with the notion of a subject whose will, actions, and desire might be at variance, his verdict appeals to the incontrovertible—her lost virginity—and shapes a representation of her as criminal subject around that apparent given, as against the possible ambiguities of her own testimony in word and actions. Orchamus settles the business of ascertaining his daughter's desire by saying, in effect, "I don't want to know anything about it." But Leuconoë, by insistently focusing on the conceptual intractability of the moment he thus papers over, dramatizes the impossibility of representing Woman's desire as an institutional failure, a failure both of Law and of language. Language cannot express the complexity of Leucothoë's desire, nor Justice grapple with it—and each incapacity, resting upon an impossible demand for a unified subject, intertwines with the other to represent her as a simple criminal before the Law.

Leuconoë's account frets the problem of making a woman a subject, visible before the Law and thus able to ask for justice. That project concerns certain branches of contemporary feminism—the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin comes to mind, among others—but also engaged women in ancient Rome, as Amy Richlin has shown.<sup>32</sup> Yet Richlin emphasizes that the project's success was severely limited: for every woman orator who earned the backhanded compliment that she had "a man's spirit," many more were labeled "barking

<sup>30</sup>In formulating these issues I have made use of Leicester's clear and trenchant discussion of subjectivity's conceptualization (*Disenchanted Self* 14).

<sup>31</sup>*Met.* 4.237–39: . . . *precantem / tendentem manus ad lumina Solis et "ille / vim tulit invitae" dicentem*. . . .

<sup>32</sup>See, e.g., Dworkin, *Pornography and Intercourse*; MacKinnon, *Feminism Unmodified* and "Feminism, Marxism, and the State"; Richlin, "Roman Oratory."

dogs." Trying to define Woman as a subject before the Law must appeal ipso facto to the categories of thought upon which the institution rests—categories immanent in language itself, insofar as, for every subject, the grammatical "I" discursively organizes the semiotic histories of the political and social "I." An impeccable trap: it founds a challenge to popular conceptions upon the very idiom it is intended to confront, and an assault on ideology upon a linguistic appeal to that same ideology.<sup>33</sup> Richlin has pointed out that simply speaking in public—becoming an "I" who makes political claims—problematizes a woman's position. Cicero refuted Clodia Metelli's charges of assault against Caelius Rufus by saying, in effect, "If you were a virtuous woman, you wouldn't be in this courtroom, bringing these charges; and if you are not a virtuous woman, we need not believe them."

Not surprisingly, then, at the end of her second story Leuconoe ostentatiously sets aside the possibility of a woman's pleading in her own defense as doomed from the start. Princess Leucothoe's defense earns her nothing but inhumation, and her lover's tardy grace of transforming her remains into the frankincense plant. And while Clytie could plead jealousy and anger at being jilted as extenuating factors, Leuconoe notes that Sol rejects her plea a priori. Clytie grieves silently, obsessively following his daily round with her eyes, until she changes into a sunflower. Though one woman is the victim of violence, the other its (indirect) instigator; one, cherished by the Sun, the other, rejected by him—both end up occupying the same conceptual niche. Both become plants whose focus is ex-centric, away from themselves and on their ex-lover, either turning towards him in his daily round, or rising towards him as incense. The metamorphosed Clytie and Leucothoe thus dramatize a logic that consistently and indiscriminately relegates Woman to the status of the supplemental and marginal.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup>The central paradox of humanism, as Mitchell succinctly formulates it (*Feminine Sexuality* 4).

<sup>34</sup>Both psychoanalysis and deconstructionism have focused attention upon this aspect of Woman's social construction. See, for example, Derrida and McDonald's commentary on the feminist implications of Derrida's work in "Choreographies"; that essay provides a useful guide to further reading on the subject in Derrida. In psychoanalysis, on the other hand, Jacques Lacan's "return to Freud" has inspired the most heated (and arguably the most fruitful) debate over the conceptualization of Woman and how it might be rethought. See Mitchell and Rose, *Feminine Sexuality* esp. 1–57, which rightly focuses attention on the Lacanian text of principal interest to feminists, his twentieth Seminar (*Encore*) and also provides further bibliography.

Yet Woman, conceived as supplemental, opens up the possibility of thinking the whole conceptual structure that underpins Law and other social institutions hopelessly flawed: the account cannot really be adequate if it cannot account for *her*. The very indistinction of Leucothoë's and Clytië's fates indicts the pretense of "masculine" institutional structures to evaluate Woman adequately—and thus lessens her stake in their smooth operation. Leuconoë does not frontally attack the problem of how to make female subjectivity understandable within social institutions; rather, she refuses entirely the attempt to define Woman as coherent subject. Like some contemporary feminists (of whom Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva are probably the best known) she frames it as a limiting project, not an empowering project.<sup>35</sup> She focuses instead upon the gaps in logic, the ruptures of sense, will, and desire that haunt *all* subjects (even the gods, alternately puritans and *debauchés*)—and a fortiori, all human institutions. Social fictions contrive to suppress these discontinuities, or to relegate them to Woman's side of the account, for the sake of civic cohesion and Man's narcissistic pride. Leuconoë's narrative appeals, therefore, to what challenges culture's pretense to represent the world logically, self-sufficiently, and transparently. She appeals to the ambiguous, the sensual, the non-utilitarian—everything that the order of culture reads as non-sensical. These counterlogical details disrupt and revolutionize insofar as they interrupt the apparently smooth coherence of ideology, and thus its persuasive force. Predictably, an angered Bacchus eventually transforms Leuconoë and her sisters into bats; though they lose their speaking voices and are read as exempla of the god's wrath (4.516–17), he can neither erase their stories from the *Metamorphoses* nor wholly bend

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" and "Questions" in *This Sex Which Is Not One* 68–85, 119–69. The best guide to the complexity of Irigaray's thought on this, as on other, subjects is Whitford, *Luce Irigaray*; see especially in this regard chapter 8, "Women and/in the Social Contract" 169–91. Kristeva's most concise expression of her views on this topic may be found in her essay "La femme, ce n'est jamais ça," now translated and collected as "Woman Can Never Be Defined." Toril Moi offers an admirably clear guide to this aspect of Kristeva's work (*Sexual/Textual Politics* 150–73).

On a more empirical plane, anthropology has recorded the power of women to create change, not by assuming the dominant position so much as by interrupting and disrupting the dominant discourse. See Dubisch, *Gender and Power* esp. 3–41; Friedl, "The Position of Women." (My thanks to *AJP*'s anonymous reader for drawing my attention to these writings.)

their interpretation to his own purposes. They stand as monuments to an order of signification that escapes his narrow vengeance. For the Minyeides, gorgeous mischief is the beginning of freedom.<sup>36</sup>

MICAELA JANAN

DUKE UNIVERSITY

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<sup>36</sup>Charles Segal also notes that the Minyeides' achievement could be rated a victory for resistance ("Pyramus and Thisbe" 399).



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## BOOK REVIEWS

OLIVER TAPLIN. *Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. xii + 314 pp. Cloth, \$69.

Ten years ago, Taplin writes, he began planning a general introduction to Homer's poetic artistry; since then others have accomplished this task, and he can now pursue more detailed and specialist observations on two Homeric subjects in particular: ethics and poetic form (including narrative techniques). His volume thus "purports to be advanced rather than elementary," its audience including those "experienced in literatures and cultures other than Greek" (viii).

He further explains: his book "aspires to be a pilot and to enhance the epic journeying of others," and—continuing the metaphor—the "soundings" of the title "add up, I hope, to a kind of chart for those who embark upon the *Iliad*" (2). However, a footnote immediately adds that "these *Soundings* are, then, for those who have already set off, rather than for those about to embark." This is rather confusing; in fact, Taplin takes the middle ground between a number of general introductions to the *Iliad* and the recently completed six-volume Cambridge University Press *Commentary* edited by G. S. Kirk. His timing is rather unfortunate, in that he was apparently able to make use of only the first two volumes of that major work. In particular, his study of the natural and book divisions of the poem would have benefited by reference to Nicholas Richardson's introductory sections in volume VI.

The publishers have been indulgent in allowing Taplin to print long passages in Greek, accompanied by Martin Hammond's translation (in some chapters as much as half the space is thus taken up). This is pleasant for the reader, but perhaps hardly necessary (since anyone who can make use of the Greek has easy access to a text), and must have contributed to the volume's rather high cost.

Taplin sets out four "ethical or evaluative" theses of the volume, three of which are "aesthetic or technical" (5–11). In the first group are: that poet and audience together decide the content of the poem, and hence the *kleos* assigned to the characters; that Homer does not moralize, but nevertheless the *Iliad* "is full of *implicit* evaluation or 'focalization'"; that the *Iliad* is more inclined to *question* the ethics and values appearing in social and political relationships than to establish certain values; and that similar questions are raised by the personal human issues of the poem, including the attitudes of the gods. In the second group, Taplin asserts that Homeric prosopography and characterization are consistent; that the interconnections, back-references, foreshadowings, and cross-references in the poem are coherent; and that the *Iliad* was shaped as a whole and was intended to be received by its audience in sequence.

All this is acceptable and unsurprising. What attracts attention, however, is that Taplin's emphasis on the unified design (except for book 10) leads him to a view contrary to the "widely held" one "that [the poem] was created to be performed in extracts of (say) one or two hours' length." He holds that it "was shaped to be conveyed as a whole to its audience" (12), and since some breaks in the performance of so long a work are obviously necessary, he suggests narrative time as a guide. Listing the fourteen days of actual narrated events in the *Iliad*, he admits that there is "no major division across this narrative sequence" (18) but declares, "From the appreciation of the massive structural unity of the central day [i.e., most of *Il.* 11–18] follows the observation that the poem as a whole is constructed in three parts, or three movements, the first two about equal in length, the third appreciably shorter" (19). Part I (*Il.* 1–9) leads up to the central day (part II), and part III (18.354–24) tells of its aftermath.

This is a combination of the ideas suggested by Sheppard in 1922 (divisions after books 9 and 18) and Wade-Gery in 1952 (dividing book 18 between lines 353–54). (Richardson, *op. cit.* 2–4, gives an account of the history of the idea.) Taplin supports this view by showing how roles and motifs are articulated within the three parts, Achilles appearing mainly in parts I and III, Hector in part II, and the quarrel and reconciliation of Achilles and Agamemnon beginning parts I and III; important scenes (the interventions of Thetis, and supplications of the old men Chryses, Phoenix, and Priam) appear at the beginning or end of the three parts. He notes (22) the end-of-day scenes and responses of both sides to the day's events, and stresses in particular the clustering of forward-markers ("tomorrow," "when the sun rises," etc.) at the ends of his part I and part II.

He then makes a rather startling claim: "My theory is, simply, that the three-part structure matches and arises from Homer's own performance; and that the two clusters of forward-markers to 'tomorrow' in *narrative-time* also serve as forward-markers in *performance-time*. Hence the combination of closure and anticipation: 'that's all for now, but come back to hear what happens tomorrow'" (26). He then considers the practical implications of this theory, finding no other intervals built into the artistic construction of the poem than those between the three parts but allowing that "it is likely that the brief breaks were variables at the discretion of the poet, using his sensitivity to audience response" (27–28). He goes on to consider the genesis and transmission of our text (31–44), concluding that it was developed orally, a little later than 700, by a peripatetic master poet who performed it on three successive all-night sessions in the banquet hall of a lord or at a big festival. Possibly it was dictated, but more likely it was memorized by disciples until writing techniques made transcription possible, perhaps under Peisistratus.

This is possible, but undecidable (for a contrasting view see now R. Janko in volume IV of the Cambridge commentary, 29–38). It is, however, a weak point in Taplin's argument that neither in fixing these two division-points nor in his comments on the Hellenistic book divisions (285–93) does he pay attention to

the phraseology before and after the postulated break. The traditional book divisions most frequently have a new book start with a phrase summarizing the preceding action, introduced by ὡς οἱ μὲν (ὡς δ' μὲν, ἄλλοι μὲν) followed by words introducing a new scene (books 2, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23). In other cases there is a different summarizing phrase (book 3), or the preceding book ends with a summary (before the start of books 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15). Only four books begin without such a summary (books 4, 11, 17, 24). In the three other cases the break is harsh: between 6 and 7, where it falls between a speech and the following ὡς εἰπὼν . . . (Taplin oddly calls this "a fair dividing-point," 288); between 18 and 19, where a visit type-scene is interrupted and a dawn-couplet may have been later inserted; and between 20 and 21, which interrupts a passage recurring unbroken at 11.169–70. Taplin takes no account of this apparent habit of summarizing the preceding action after a break.

In most ways Taplin's division between books 9 and 11 (omitting 10) is reasonable enough; the first part concludes with a view of the sleeping Greeks, the second begins with the dawn and Zeus' despatch of Eris to their ships. But the division between his parts II and III at 18.353–54 presents a problem. He is amazed that here "there is not even a paragraph division in the Oxford Classical Text!" (201). But in fact, though Leaf, Willcock, and Lattimore show a paragraph here (Monro, van Leeuwen, and Fagles do not), a break here is undesirable. This division makes Taplin's part II end abruptly after the preparation of Patroclus' corpse, ". . . and they covered it with a white robe," while part III begins with the succeeding lamentations, "πᾶννύχιοι μὲν ἔπειτα around swift-footed Achilles the Myrmidons mourned, lamenting Patroclus. But Zeus said to Hera. . . ." This seems unnatural, not only because of the rapidity of the scene-change to Olympus, but because ἔπειτα here does not *summarize* the preceding actions but merely leads on to the next in the series of events in the Greek camp (as it does in the similarly phrased passage at 7.476–77, where no one seems to put a paragraph division; μὲν ἔπειτα rarely seems to be used at the introduction of a new scene, perhaps only at *Il.* 1.312 and *Od.* 24.220).

In the following eight chapters Taplin accompanies his reader through the *Iliad*, basing his discussion on certain highly significant passages. He is a perceptive critic and knows Homer and the bibliography well, and his discussions are fruitful and often provocative. There is much I agree with, and (Homerists being what they are) also much I would question. From my many pages of jotted notes, I would select as particularly valuable: the section on *timē* (50–51); the account of how events prior to the plot of the poem are filled in by various narrative techniques (83–88); the suggestion that Chryseis was captured at Thebes because she had a husband living there (85) (Kirk does *not* assume she was visiting the city); the well-written treatment of Zeus' position vis-à-vis the other gods, and towards humankind (129–43); a useful note on the well-known technique by which the characters may be assumed to know what the audience knows (150 n. 4); the remarks on the *Doloneia* (152–53); the characterization of Achilles' frame of mind at the funeral games as "a kind of burnt-out exhaustion

which renders him more sociable" (253); the idea that Achilles, in his scene with Priam, is presented as just having finished a meal because in the Homeric type-scene of hospitality eating should come before business (268); the observation that the gifts are described by the narrator, not by Priam, whereas in book 9 Agamemnon reels off the long list of gifts but does *not* deliver them himself.

As arguable, I would consider: the idea that βασιλῆϊ in 1.9 is ambiguous until Ἀργεῖδης in 12—technically correct but hardly significant except for a rather hypothetical first-time hearer; the long discussion of Helen's responsibility for the war, focusing on the usage of αἴτιος ("surprisingly neglected by scholars," 99) but oddly ignoring Priam's οὐ τί μοι αἰτία ἔσσι (3.164); Taplin does not accept (105 n. 34) "the standard view" that Apollo's gift of a bow to Pandarus should be taken figuratively, but gives no explanation (though several are possible) of how he reconciles this with the manufacture of the bow from the horns of a goat shot by Pandarus himself (4.105–11); his comment "There is no suggestion at all that the Trojans speak a language different from the Achaeans" (113) is hard to square with the quotation with which he begins this chapter (4.427–38); γλαυκῶπι by Iris to Athena (8.420) is not unique (142)—it is used with apparent intentional familiarity by Odysseus to Athena on Ithaca (*Od.* 13.389); the removal of 19.310–14 and 338–39, which he recommends (212 n. 15), would remove the parallel between this and the previous scene in which Briseis leads the other captive women in lamentation; the very complexity of Achilles' speech after his killing of Hector makes interpolation unlikely (247 n. 75), and I do not see that Achilles' dragging off the corpse behind his chariot is "totally inconsistent" with the Greeks' triumphant march back to the ships; Taplin stresses the "particularly good joke [that] seems to have been missed" (257), the splitting of the winner's and loser's prizes for wrestling, a tripod and a slave woman, but the careful mention of the value of each in oxen would make an adjustment easy (Taplin himself misses one "joke," or rather, a heavy irony: Achilles' award of a prize for spear-throwing to Agamemnon without calling upon him to do anything to win it; cf. his complaint at 1.165ff., 9.332ff.); a reference to Pandora's jar would be more useful than the rather odd idea that the jars on Zeus' threshold are used to store the wool spun by the Moirai (271 n. 30; the reference to Macleod should be to his note on 527–33); there is no comment on the difficult ἐπιχειρομέων in the Priam–Achilles scene (24.649); Homer might not have regarded Ἡῶ μῦνον as "a fine spondaic cadence" (289) (see Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* I 54).

Taplin has a habit of making rather tendentious remarks. M. I. Finley is heavily censured (50) for saying that "the heroic code was complete and unambiguous, so much so that neither the poet nor his characters ever had occasion to debate it," but Taplin himself says, "It is true that the poet does not explicitly state, let alone debate, ethical issues in his own voice, but he is the poet not the commentator" (51). And Finley's "the soothsayer gave the answer, and the heroes either obeyed or did not, as their hearts bade them" is not far from Taplin's "while it is never disputed that *timē* should be given where it is due (and

denied where it is not), there is much debate between the characters over the application of this in practice" (51). Griffin says Euphorbos is "gorgeously dressed" but does not associate him with effeminacy (184 n. 6). I am not convinced that critics "ever since [the book-division]" have failed to do proper justice to the importance of Priam and Ilios in the *Iliad* (293).

There is a well-chosen Select Bibliography, a glossary for nonclassicists, an *index locorum*, and a general index (which, sensibly, does not include the names of modern scholars).

MARK W. EDWARDS

LOS ALTOS, CALIFORNIA

MALCOLM DAVIES, ed. *Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Vol. I, Alcman, Stesichorus, Ibycus. Post D. L. Page edidit. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xiv + 336 pp. Cloth, \$92.

Why re-edit the Greek lyric poets after Sir Denys Page's now standard edition, familiar in its abbreviated form as *PMG* (*Poetae Melici Graeci*, Oxford 1962) and his *SLG* (*Supplementum Lyricis Graecis*, Oxford 1974)? The editor of the long announced and recently published *PMGF* I asks the same question and, for an answer, refers his reader to his article announcing and justifying a new edition of the early Greek lyric poets ("Towards a New Edition of the Greek Lyric Poets," *Prometheus* 14 [1989] 193–98). His reasons are cogent, and Oxford University Press has persuaded him to undertake this edition of the Greek lyric poets in four volumes that will replace not only Page's *PMG* and *SLG*, but Lobel and Page's older *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford 1955). One answer a reviewer of *PMGF* I can give is that we will eventually have *PMG* and *SLG* and Lobel and Page's Sappho and Alcaeus integrated in four volumes, and Oxford University Press has allowed these three editions to go out of print.

Volume I of *PMGF* contains the poetry of Alcman, Stesichorus, and Ibycus, in the same order as Page's *PMG* and with his supplements noted by Page's siglum S. The most important of these are the fragments of Stesichorus' *Geryoneis*, preserved in P.Oxy. 2617 (S7–87). In a magnanimous gesture of compassion to the reader, Davies has preserved the numeration of Page's *PMG* and *SLG*, although the supplement numbers are often, as in the case of Ibycus, intercalated in the numbers of *PMG*. In two cases a fragment in Page's *PMG* and *SLG* appears as a testimonium in *PMGF* I (*PMG* 345 = Ibycus TB8; *SLG* S5 = Alcman TA11b). There is very little new material in this volume and, as the author admits, he can offer little to improve the texts of the papyri. The remarkable improvements to Alcman 11 (P.Oxy. 2389) are due to in part the meticulous reconstruction of W. S. Barrett in his review of Lobel's *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, part 24 (1957) in *Gnomon* 33 (1961) 685–88. The first accession to the poetry of Alcman comes in 4(a) (p. 47), where some nine lines from P.Oxy. 3209 are added



to P.Oxy. 2388, which gave some twenty-two bits of papyrus. Most remarkably there is the Lille Stesichorus (222(b)) published in separate fragments and separately by Claude Meillier and G. Ancher in 1977. There is also Ibycus 267(a) (P.Oxy. 3538), which West ascribes to Ibycus (*ZPE* 57 [1984] 23). Davies also gives us an appendix of fragments edited by Michael Haslam that can reasonably be attributed to Stesichorus. Unfortunately, there is not much to be gleaned from these. There is some new evidence that does not come from new papyri but from a fuller exploitation of ancient testimonia: S5(c) from Herodian; 55(ii) from Menander Rhetor; 289(b) from the scholia to Aristophanes *Birds* 192.

The new material presented in volume I of *PMGF* is mainly ancient. It did not appear in either *PMG* or *SLG*, but it is most welcome. The first volume of this series contains a valuable collection of the varied and varying testimonia for the "canon" of the nine lyric poets of archaic Greece (*Testimonia ad Novem Lyricos Pertinentia* 1–3), including the three elegiac versions of the canon in the Palatine Anthology (all anonymous, TA1–TA3). These allow us to better understand the canon Horace had in mind when he addressed Maecenas with the words *quodsi me lyricis vatibus inseres / sublimi feriam sidera vertice* (*Odes* 1.1.35–36). Davies also provides us with testimonia for the life, poetry, and meters of Alcman, Stesichorus, and Ibycus in the manner of the more recent volumes of Bruno Gentili's *Collana di testi critici: lyricorum quae extant* (and most pertinently Claude Calame's *Alcman* [Rome 1983]).

Another category of accessions to the editions of Page is old but not ancient. The discriminating reader would expect to find in this successor to Page's editions of the lyric poets (and *carmina popularia*) a less austere and more fastidious treatment of the history of scholarship invested in the editions of the works in which the fragments of the lyric poets are preserved. This is exactly what Davies provides. The discovery of the Lydian Alcman (Λυδός) in the word Ἀλμωδός of the manuscripts of Aelian's *Varia Historia* (Vx) is given with perfect etiquette to Adamantios Koraës's edition of 1805; even the edition of Peruscius (1545) is acknowledged (VH 12.50, TA5). This feature of this volume occupies little space, but it is the product of great labor and learning and helpful not only to the cleric who is an expert in Greek lyric poetry but to the cleric who is a historian of classical scholarship.

But there are surprises. A sensitivity to the world of nature is often admired in Greek lyric poetry, but in no edition of the lyric poets are animals and insects so prominent as in this. Darcy W. Thompson's *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (Oxford 1936) serves as our Audubon to the fragments of Alcman and Ibycus and is one of the very few books listed in Davies's bibliography under the heading *Commentationes*. We find it in the company of L. Bodson's *IEPA ZQIA: Contributions à l'étude de la place de l'animal dans la religion grecque* (Paris 1978). Davies and Kathirithamby's *Greek Insects* (Oxford 1986) is noted for its help in understanding Alcman's fatal *phtheiriasis* (TA17). Frequent are the responses to the naming of the nightingale in the lyric poets: for the fragmentary nightingale in Alcman 1.10 we are turned to Thompson.

One feature of this new presentation of the Greek lyric poets is novel and to my mind disconcerting. Davies follows, where possible, the lucid and modern editorial practice of dividing the apparatus to a text into two bands: one for the indirect transmission, the second for the readings of our manuscripts or papyri, modern editions, and emendations. E. R. Dodds's edition of Plato's *Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) offered a model for the practice, as did M. L. West's edition of Hesiod's *Theogony* (Oxford 1966). Both address a significant indirect transmission (Dodds, *Gorgias* 58–66; West, *Theogony* 67–72). Rarely is this the case for the three poets included in *PMGF* I. The innovation in this new edition is a third editorial band, reserved for what the recent Oxford University Press classical studies catalogue describes as “a brief exegetical commentary.” Since the majority of the fragments published in *PMGF* I have no indirect transmission or a very spotty one, we seldom find three bands of editorial matter for the text and interpretation of a single fragment.

The text of the Louvre papyrus of Alcman's partheneion (Alcman 1) gives us our best example of Davies's three-band editorial commentary; the text of the Oxyrhynchian papyrus of another *partheneion* (P.Oxy. 2387) gives us an example of the treatment of a poem for which we have no indirect evidence, but for which we now have Davies's brief exegesis. The problem with this mode of exegesis is that it refers the puzzled reader either to the exegesis of others or to Davies's articles on his three authors. The dazzling birds that perch on the top branches of Ibycus 317 receive the following treatment: “de abundantia epithetorum in animalibus describendis, cf. Bühler ad Mosch. *Eur.* 29 (pp. 214sq.); in primis conferendus Alcaeus fr. 345” (296). The additional reference to Alcaeus is welcome and a rare example of exegesis by reference to the words of an ancient poet. The usual manner of Davies's exegetical band is to point learnedly to the exegetical works of modern scholars, including Davies himself. We have then a *subsidiium subsidiis* as well as a *supplementum supplementis*.

To illuminate the comparison in Alcman 3 describing the gaze of a young girl as “more melting than sleep and death” (61–62) Davies provides us with this brief exegetical commentary: “62 de somno morteque saepe coniunctis vid. ex. gr. Nisbet et Hubbard in Horat. *Carm.* I. 24.5 (l. 284)” (40). If the reader turns first to Horace, he finds not sleep joined to death, as in Alcman, but *perpetuus sopor*; if to Nisbet and Hubbard, nothing that illuminates the combination of *erôs* and *thanatos* present in Alcman. And if the editor is interested merely in the pairing of sleep and death, why not refer to *Iliad* 16.672, where Hypnos and Thanatos are spoken of as twins; or to *Euphronium Somnum Mortemque depingentem*; or to Emily Vermeule's *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (1979) 145; or to Calame's *Alcman* ad 26.61? As for the textual band of the apparatus, Davies is at times more learned than helpful. In his textual note on Alcman TA14, we are referred to a universally rejected conjecture of Astor in his *Commentariolum in Antiquum Alcmanis Poetae Laconis Monumentum* (1683), p. 13 (Davies 15). Happy are the readers who use this edition in the Bodleian or the British Museum!

In sum, Davies has done us a considerable and lasting service by integrating *PMG* and *SLG* in *PMGF* I. And by integrating the new papyri finds, especially the Lille Stesichorus, along with the new critical editions of the authors who preserve our fragments. (Strabo is one of these authors. Davies seems worried about the Budé *Strabon* and assures us that a new edition is "in the safe hands of S. L. Radt," *Prometheus* 14 [1988] 194 n. 11.) Better than in the clumsy hands of unnamed editors. He has provided us with valuable testimonia for the three poets now edited as well as for the canon of the *lyrici*. For all this he deserves the coveted *laus philologorum*. But he has done more: he has invented an editorial band of brief exegetical commentary that points the reader in need of illumination to the work of other exegetes, including himself. The result is a welter of notes, learned and laborious, devoted to the clarification of details in the stoichedon manner of formal commentaries. One cannot speak of a unified interpretation of the poems presented here, for all are fragments. In the exegetical band, Davies tends to fragment the fragments he is editing with such care. The reader could ask for less attention to discrete detail and more to the context and poetics of the poetry presented, but the Latin exegetical commentary is not the place for this. Davies has promised what might be a fuller form of this third band of commentary: "My commentary on Stesichorus will appear separately and (almost) simultaneously" (*Prometheus* 14 [1988] 198). It has yet to appear, but if it is no more than an enlargement of what Davies provides in *PMGF* I, perhaps his reader must accept the counsel of patience. If there is a bright spot in this serious and elegant presentation of Alcman, Stesichorus, and Ibycus it comes in Davies's attention to the animals that populate the world of the archaic lyric poets, birds especially.

With admirable learning and indefatigable industry, Davies has run the risk of illustrating the stern, impersonal workings of a Scotsman's law of diminishing returns. But Oxford University Press has acted to counter the workings of that law. With Lobel and Page's *Fragmenta Poetarum Lesbiorum* out of print for some time, and with *PMG* and *SLG* now out of print, Oxford has left us with only Page's *Lyrice Graeca Selecta* (1968) as an alternative to *PMGF*. We can now look forward to volumes II (Anacreon, Simonides, Corinna), III (Poetae Minores et Adespota), and IV (Sappho and Alcaeus). I wonder where Davies will place Page's *adespotum* 976 (Δέδυκε μὲν ἃ σέλανα)—in volume IV or in volume III? And what he might say of it in a brief exegetical commentary?

DISKIN CLAY

DUKE UNIVERSITY

J. H. LESHER, ed. *Xenophanes of Colophon, Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. xvi + 264 pp. Cloth, \$45. (Phoenix Supplementary Volume 30 = Phoenix Presocratics 4)

With the publication of this volume, the Phoenix Presocratics lacks only those on Anaxagoras and Democritus to meet its goal. Designed for students of philosophy who, although they may welcome some help, can handle Greek, this successful series derives its format largely from Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. After an introduction, D-K's B fragments are presented in order, with a facing English translation. These receive a commentary in the next chapter. Next follow English translations of D-K's A (testimony) and C (imitations) fragments, accompanied not by full commentary but only by occasional footnotes. This section will be particularly welcome to students in need of guidance through the thickets of Aristotelian commentators' Greek. A section on "Sources and Authorities" is also useful. (Here we learn something about the Cyril of Jerusalem, who is mentioned only once. But there is nothing on Irenaeus, who appears together with Cyril in the same clause.) Bibliography and indices complete the volume.

Xenophanes was originally assigned to Leonard Woodbury, who, I am told, was found to have left only scattered notes behind at the time of his greatly lamented death. Leshner, the author of several articles on early poetic philosophical texts (including one on Xenophanes himself), was an obvious choice to succeed Woodbury. On the whole, he has produced an admirable volume, from which all may learn. It will be especially welcome as the only book-length study of Xenophanes in English. Indeed there is very little competition in any language: essentially only E. Heitsch, *Xenophanes: Die Fragmente* (Munich 1983), which Leshner makes much good use of, and M. Untersteiner, *Senofane: Testimonianze e frammenti* (Florence 1955), to which, surprisingly, he scarcely refers. Totally ignored, although its brief notes are occasionally useful, is A. Farina, *Senofane di Colofone, Ione di Chio: Introduzione, testo critico, testimonianze, traduzione, commento* (Naples 1961).

Chief among Leshner's virtues is a sensitivity to Xenophanes' poetic language, which allows him constantly to explain Xenophanes' language in literary as well as philosophical terms, all in a lucid prose style which can deal with philosophical issues with a minimum of technical terms and a complete absence of academic jargon. The result is a book that offers a clear and well-argued thesis about the nature of Xenophanes' philosophical intentions. He also makes some good observations about Xenophanes' reception by other philosophers; note especially his remarks *passim* about Plato's adaptation of Xenophanean ideas. If he has not always convinced me of individual interpretations of the fragments, he has only his exemplary statement of the issues to thank for permitting his readers to disagree with him. As I proceed to discharge my critical duty by pointing out faults and disagreements, I want to make it also clear that

Leshner's book is always worth consulting by students of early Greek poetry and/or philosophy.

The forty-four B fragments themselves are arranged in D–K order, as dictated by the format of the series, and a good idea in any case; their respective commentaries, however, are arranged into four groups, according to subject matter, as Leshner perceives it: (1) men and morals (B 1–6, 8, 22); (2) the divine (7, 10–12, 14–17, 23–26); (3) nature (19, 27–33, 37); and (4) human understanding (18, 34–36, 38). Is, however, B 10, *ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες*, to be grouped with fragments on the nature of divinity? Men have learned all sorts of things from Homer, not all of them paralleled by divine hanky-panky. It is true that B 10 seems to fit well with B 11, but without any context to guide us we cannot be sure that its point was in any way theological. Missing are comments on B 9, 42, and 45 (one-line fragments not admitting of philosophical interpretation), 39–40 (one-word fragments), and 13, 20–21a (which Diels should have filed in the A testimony). (B 43–44 have been dropped from recent editions of D–K; cf. Wilamowitz, *Aischylos Interpretationen* 217–18.) This arrangement works quite well. Below every fragment the pages of its commentary are cross-referenced. And the grouping by subject matter allows Leshner to build up a thesis for each section, which is summarized at its end. I recommend that readers do as I did and read the fragments in the order of Leshner's commentary.

Regrettably, Leshner dismisses Lebedev's claim to have discovered a new Xenophanes fragment in the three-line anonymous verse passage quoted by Philoponos *In de An.* 188.26 Vitelli:

πάντα θεοῦ πλήρη, πάντῃ δέ οἱ εἰσιν ἄκουαί·  
καὶ διὰ πετρῶων καὶ ἀνὰ χθόνα καὶ τε δι' αὐτοῦ  
ἀνέρος ὅτι κέκευθεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα.

("All things are full of god [θεοῦ Lobeck, θεῶν mss.], and his hearing is everywhere. Through rocks and through earth and through a man himself in whatever thought he conceals in his breast.") Note that Philoponos alone quotes B 29. Cf. A. Lebedev, "A New Fragment of Xenophanes," in *Studi di filosofia preplatonica*, edd. M. Capasso et al. (Naples 1985) 13–15. Cf. further G. Giangrande, "On Hexameters Ascribed to Xenophanes," *Orpheus* 2 (1981) 371–73.

I am tempted to agree with Lebedev, and would welcome a more thorough discussion, pro or con, than is found in Leshner (101), who, since he argues from the B fragments that Xenophanes' god is not coextensive with the universe, finds that Lebedev's fragment is inconsistent. To come to this conclusion, however, Leshner must dismiss the testimony of Aristotle (*Meta.* A 5.986b18ff., A 30) and that attributed to Theophrastos (by Simplicios, A 31) that says exactly this about Xenophanes' god; cf. pp. 191–92. Aristotle and Theophrastos often misrepresent Presocratic thought, of course, as Cherniss has taught us in general and as he has argued in regard to *Meta.* A 5 in particular (ACPP 201 n. 228). Here the

Peripatetics may be assimilating Xenophanes (called by later tradition the head of the Eleatic school) to Parmenides. On the other hand, Xenophanes, whom Leshner shows to be original in many matters, may have developed a complex theory of the divine that allows for god to pervade, if not actually be coextensive with, the world. Thus, not only could Lebedev's fragment be by Xenophanes, it could also suggest how his god both perceives with all his substance (cf. B 24, οὔλος ὁρᾷ κτλ., with Leshner's excellent commentary) and perceives all, so that Leshner's picture of Xenophanes' god can be made to consist with Aristotle's testimony.

Another example where Leshner's attempt to derive a unified picture of Xenophanes from the B fragments needs to be balanced against other evidence may be found in his comments on B 18,

οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξεν,  
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἔμεινον.

Leshner, summarizing his earlier article (*Anc. Philos.* 11 [1991] 229–48), argues, against almost everybody else, that Xenophanes is not here expressing his faith in human progress, but rather that only the wise individual has the ability to show mankind how to improve. This is in line with Leshner's analysis of Xenophanes' elegies, whose moral message he convincingly demonstrates. B 2 in particular, in which Xenophanes compares the value to the city of athletes and that of himself in his role of wise man, seems to demonstrate that Xenophanes, like Herakleitos and others, sees a wide gap between himself and the unenlightened masses, who could not be expected to advance civilization on their own. For an analysis of the structure of B 2 (which supports Leshner's view of 10, εἶτε καὶ ἴπποισιν) cf. W. M. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius* (Leiden 1982) 59–62.

To Leshner's reading of B 18, congruent with that of the elegies, several objections can be made: First a general one, namely that implicit in his grouping of Xenophanes' fragments by subject matter is the belief (never addressed) that all of Xenophanes' many poems, no matter what the genre, constitute a philosophically unified corpus. It may be, however, that the hortatory message of the elegies (like that of Solon and Tyrtaios' poems) is distinct from the point (whatever it may be) of B 18. Second and more particularly, in his emphasis on the wise man, Leshner interprets the plurals of B 18 as if they were singular. Thus, he takes ζητοῦντες to apply only to "individual seekers" (p. 150), and throughout argues as though this were the case. To Leshner's contention that "there is no obvious reason why Xenophanes should have embraced so optimistic an outlook" as belief in progress (150), one can answer that there is no obvious reason why not. Simple disagreement with the elegiacs is not enough; and in any case, the disagreement is not so clear as Leshner makes out. A wise man can have faith in his own ability to benefit the state and yet believe that in all sorts of ways (not all political) mankind has progressed on its own. For a far more detailed defense

of the progressivist interpretation of B 18, see now A. Tulin, "Xenophanes Fr. 18 DK and the Origins of the Idea of Progress," *Hermes* 121 (1993) 129–38.

Other points of disagreement are minor and do not mar the general run of the argument; they need not be spelled out here. One general objection is that Lesher is willing to elevate every contrary-to-fact conditional sentence to the status of "thought experiment." And perhaps I could note with arched eyebrow that at the end of an exemplary analysis of B 1 Lesher concludes that since its message is ethical Xenophanes' audience would not have been philosophers, on the grounds that such learned folk are not in need of moral instruction.

In printing the Greek text of the fragments Lesher was guided by the general format of the series, which keeps textual annotation to a minimum (Gallop's *Parmenides* is a necessary exception). On the whole, this can be justified, but even a reader interested more in ideas than the constitution of the text will want to know whether what the printed page shows is in fact what the manuscripts present. In this and in a few other details, Lesher's textual annotations are less than accurate. I also wonder why he based his text on that of Edmonds (of all people), when Diels, Diehl, West, and Gentili-Prato are far more secure guides. The result is that he occasionally misattributes a reading to the wrong scholar and does not always indicate where the text has been emended.

In the following passages, Lesher does not indicate that the following readings are scholarly conjectures: B 1.20, οἱ Coraes; B 1.21, οὔτε Edmonds; B 1.22, πλάσματα Schweighäuser; B 3.5, ἀγαλμένοι Wilamowitz; B 22.3, ἐπι-τρῶγοντ' Coraes; B 23.2, οὔτε Sylburg. Among some other errors in describing the text: B 1.17, "West reads ὕβρεις for ὕβρις and takes τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι πρῆσσειν as antithesis to οὐχ ὕβρεις." But ὕβρεις in fact is the reading of the manuscripts, and Lesher does not explain that the antithesis he describes can be read only if πίνειν δ' (again the reading of the mss.) is read, not merely πίνειν, as Lesher prints. (Gentili-Prato agree with West.) At B 12.1 Lesher attributes a reading of Fabricius to Diels and a reading of Stephanus to Edmonds. At B 15.5 (notes, p. 90), for "Hiller" read "Herwerden."

The translation is quite serviceable, but note the following cavils: B 1.6, μέλιχος, is not translated. B 2.3, παλαίων, is not translated. At B 17 Xenophanes uses βάκχοι (which Lesher capitalizes) in the sense "branches" (carried in honor of Dionysos), but since English "bacchant" can mean only "worshiper of Dionysos," Lesher's "bacchants of pine" is incomprehensible without the commentary. At B 32, for φοινίκιον translate "scarlet" rather than "red." At B 34 Lesher translates εἰδὼς ἀμφοὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων as "knows about the gods and what I say about all things." I follow Diels, Untersteiner, and others in construing as "knows what I say about gods and about all things." The translation of the A testimony is similarly serviceable and accurate. Note, though, that at A 5 συνδιατρίψαι means only that Parmenides spent much time with Xenophanes, not that "he lived with him for a time." At A 31 Lesher translates ὄντως ὄν as "the real nature of being"; better is "that which truly

exists." At A 33 (last sentence) Leshner translates a present general condition (which interestingly implies a cyclical view of the development of the world) as though it applied only to the future, and further confuses things by translating ἀρχεσθαι τῆς γενέσεως as "generation begins again" (so too Untersteiner, "incomincia di nuovo la generazione"), when syntax and context make it clear that what is meant is that "*men* will begin to be born again."

The very few misprints I have noticed in the Greek are trivial and will delay nobody. On p. 86, top line, for "14" read "16."

DAVID SIDER

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

C. FRED ALFORD. *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Greek Tragedy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992. x + 218 pp. Cloth, \$27.50.

Alford looks to Greek tragedy to support his plea for a therapy and mode of living based on pity, reparation, and shared suffering. Himself a follower of Melanie Klein, he believes that the Attic poets were her precursors and that their dramas embodied a single "theory" not unlike hers since they sought "to confront the power of the uncivilizing emotions with the strength of the civilizing ones" (164). The book is addressed ostensibly to the psychoanalytic community in the hope that it will be enriched, and a reader of classical interests must remember that he is, in a sense, eavesdropping on a conversation not meant for him. He will hear blanket statements about "the Greeks" that may surprise him (e.g., "The Greeks raged against death," 91), but he will also partake in a centrifugal discussion that moves out from tragedy and into contemporary psychology and philosophy. The promise seems high, but unfortunately it is not fulfilled because the tragedy that provides the point of departure is handbook drama read in haste and distorted to suit the author's (quite sympathetic) bias.

Like Philip Slater (whose book he admires), Alford thinks it possible to describe the psychic state of a culture. He finds the Greeks at the end of the fifth century caught in what he calls "the Dionysian crisis" because they perceived their gods much as the subject of a Kleinian analysis might the mother, as "Bad" when they ought to be "Good." (He doesn't admit that each god and daimon had always had both a favorable and an unfavorable mode.) The result, he says, was a general Greek anxiety of the sort termed "paranoid-schizoid," characterized by confusion about what was good and bad in themselves (49, 52, 59), and this the tragic poets, like therapists (169), tried to alleviate. Their dramas depicted conflicts both individual and cultural (62), and they outlined and criticized various solutions, some less, some more satisfactory. Thus the *Oresteia* ostensibly did away with confusion by making its chthonian powers very Bad, its Olympians very Good, then arranging a triumph for the latter. This, in



the language of Klein, is the "manic denial" typical of a subject still in need of treatment, and Aeschylus, understanding its insufficiency, undermined the Olympian victory with destructive parody. (This last assertion comes with a misreported and misleading quotation from Anne Lebeck culled from Simon Goldhill, 60.)

Another paranoid-schizoid move is to separate Bad from Good with ritual, and (calling on Girard, Burkert, and Vernant indiscriminately) Alford describes Greek sacrifice in this way, as a device for turning violence against objects designated as proper to it (86). In his view the poets were bent on leading their subject, Greek society, away from this self-deception; sacrifice as a defense against rage and violence was repudiated by them all (49). As evidence he notes that the final killing of the bull in Euripides' *Helen* did not lead to comfort and companionship (it led to Sparta, at any rate) but rather to the slaughter of fifty innocent Egyptians (60) (forty-nine, to be fussy, and they are barely noted and never lamented).

With such pieces the poets, in Alford's view, urged audiences away from unsatisfactory modes of dealing with the "crisis," while with others they proposed more positive solutions. When the Kleinian subject reaches the depressive, as distinct from the paranoid-schizoid, stage he supposes that the hostility of the parent-other is provoked by his own anger and sees himself as wholly bad and permanently alienated. If, however, he goes on to perceive some admixture of good in the parental figure and, by reflection, in himself he may, through the agency of conscience or super-ego, begin the kind of self-repression that leads to "depressive integration." This, according to Alford, is what Sophocles would demonstrate in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, though with a flawed example. Oedipus tries to "harness his anger and desire to his reason," but his reason is the wrong agent of repression, being merely a rationalization of primitive desires, and so he comes to grief (85). The ultimate reconciliation occurs only when the subject reexperiences his own pain and suffering in a burst of civilizing emotion based on pity (86); in preparation for this, tragedy taught its audiences what all men owe to death and the dead, warning them against denial (103) and emphasizing the importance of funeral customs (105). It also showed, through figures like Agamemnon, Ajax, and Oedipus, that a man is responsible for his actions though his character be determined and his situation unfree (117-18). This, in Alford's view, becomes a kind of Lacanian lesson in the illusory nature of the controlling ego: "we must recognize that they" (moira and daimon) "are ourselves" (135). Thus when Oedipus blinds himself he accepts that "lack of being that is the self" (137). Nevertheless, the poets teach the reality of relationships and so of a meaningful social order (138) in which fragmented selves know "Responsibility without Freedom" (ch. 5). And above all they give an education in pity, the "civilizing passion" or "what Klein calls reparation" (163). "This is the task of tragedy" (152); its "confrontation with blood ritual, and more generally with the fear of death, rage, and confusion behind it, is an attempt to limit

the violence that these experiences threaten to evoke by providing an opportunity to share one's pain vicariously with others and so be shriven" (159).

Minor errors are inevitable when an author leaves his field of specialization to adventure into another, but here their abundance is distressing, especially since many are of the sort that copy editors should have caught (e.g., Tauris, 45; *physus*, 34; the disastrous transliteration of *OT* 1229–30, 121). It is also to be expected that such an author will be guided by the most readily available secondary treatments, but an argument about tragedy that hops from Bowra to Kitto and on to Winnington-Ingram is not invigorating. Worse, the secondary source is sometimes embarrassingly evident behind what purports to be Alford's own discussion; thus in the extended development at 115–21 one recognizes the parallel pages, complete with the same quotations from Barbu, Rivier, and de Romilly, in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy* (51–57) (cf. Alford's remarks on *OT* on p. 121, which come directly from *Myth and Tragedy* 78–79, where, however, the citation from Sophocles is correct).

More disturbing are the many categorical statements that are simply wrong. We are told that *ōmophagia* is the term for a sacrifice in which the meats are eaten (68), and that *ōmophrōn*, at *Ajax* 931, means "single-minded" (118). According to Alford, most of the labors are not described in Euripides' *Heracles* (78), though the chorus at 348 covers ten of them; Alford sees these deeds as bad because they are violent, and so he reports that the purification (actually of the house, after Lycus' killing) is Heracles' attempt to cleanse himself from them (78) (cf. 79, where the victory dedication in *S. Th.* is likewise described as "intended to cleanse him of the blood he has spilled in his labors"). The reader learns that "in *Ion* two kinds of blood are mixed," though Creusa insists on their separation at *Ion* 1017, and that the result is "disastrous," though in fact the poison misses its mark (79). Misrepresentation turns up everywhere: Sophocles' *Trachiniae* ends with "Hyllus' curses upon Zeus" (43), Antigone "regrets" her burial of Polyneices (123), and Phaedra "falls ill because of her bad intentions" (125). I will give just one more example. In support of his claim that tragedy would lead its audience beyond all paranoid-schizoid solutions and into a resolution dictated by "civilizing passions," Alford makes the following statement, as if it were incontrovertible: "most admired by all three poets are people who are in a position to take revenge, have legitimate reasons for it, but refrain or persuade others to refrain" (163). He has the Odysseus of Sophocles' *Ajax* in mind, but where are the others? Perhaps Iphigeneia will qualify, since she abandons her sacerdotal revenge upon all Greeks, and perhaps the very minor servant who would dissuade Theoclymenus at the end of *Helen*, but who else? Surely no one will claim that Chrysothemis wins her poet's admiration.

Alford believes that "the Greeks" expected gods to behave like good parents, and also that the tragic poets worked among them like therapists, urging love, relatedness, and reparation. These ideas blind him to the essential uncanniness of tragedy (he hardly touches on fear), but nevertheless there are

some valuable responses here. There is, for example, a good description of how masks and stylized language and "protagonists whose inner lives are suppressed for the sake of the story"—the very elements that discourage vulgar personal identification—create "a space of distant-nearness . . . in which the audience may find its own feelings and experience" (159). And he is strong when he insists that the question one asks at the end of a tragedy is neither "Is it fair or just that the protagonist be held responsible for his acts?" nor "Could or should he have done otherwise?" Rather, he says, one must ask, "How should we feel about the suffering of the protagonist . . . ?" and "With how much courage, grace and nobility does he accept his responsibility?" (127, 136).

ANNE PIPPIN BURNETT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RUTH PADEL. *In and Out of Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. xx + 210 pp. Cloth, \$29.95, £18.

Padel describes her book as dealing with "the manifestations of consciousness in Greek thought" (ix). The first four chapters list expressions referring to the body's interior as a site of human reaction, mental, physical, emotional; the sources are archaic and classical Greek poetry, as well as philosophical and medical texts of the period. The fifth chapter deals with the tendency of certain bodily imagery to be gendered female. Chapters 6 through 8 collect the language used, especially in tragedy, to describe violent emotions and madness. Padel argues that animal imagery has a significant role in this kind of description and that animal figures have a close link to Greek religious belief about malignant divinities (*daimones*). The arrangement throughout is loose and catalogue-like, and central themes tend to recur several times in different contexts.

This book contains much that is perceptive and even acute, and its zestful marshaling of physical metaphors is likely to cling to and enrich the mind of any reader. Insights abound, and frequently a particular passage (e.g., Aeschylus on the winds of Aulis and the winds in Agamemnon's soul, *Ag.* 192–221) is illuminated by the ongoing citation of many parallel texts. The juxtaposition of early texts on physiology and psychology with tragic poetry is enlightening; for example, Padel shows that in both prose and poetry, liquid and gas, air and blood, are thought to traverse the body through the same pathways (26, 89). The suggestion that for Greeks emotion is "gendered," that is, that vulnerability to violent currents of emotion is particularly associated with female gender, is persuasive and is confirmed by other work on Greek views of women's psychological nature.

Problems of method, however, continually recur; and because they remain unresolved, the book becomes less than the sum of its parts. Padel places

a gulf between the Greek world and our own, emphasizing the "strange" elements in this alien culture. This is a valid and potentially productive scholarly stance; but in Padel's hands it verges on the patronizing and traditionally "anthropological" habit of focusing on the naive limitations of "primitives" (cf. Padel's tendency to support her arguments with rather shallowly based generalizations about tribes such as the Ilongot). The reason for this is, I believe, that her view of Greek culture rests on an overly facile acceptance of unstated and unanalyzed truisms about our own.

Padel believes that Greek statements about inner sensations and emotive reactions must be understood as concrete descriptions in a way quite different from the way "we" understand our own, that is, as mere metaphors. Although she briefly acknowledges the importance of metaphor as "key to all ideas of mind and self" (9), she argues that, in part because the word *metaphora* was not yet in use, metaphor had an "alien status in the fifth-century linguistic world" (132), and tragic language about thought, emotion, and sensation was therefore more concrete and less "dissociated" (see 34) for the Greeks than it appears to us moderns. (In justice to Padel, she does state that a forthcoming volume, *Connexions: Mapping and Divinity in the Greek Tragic Self*, will deal with these issues more fully.)

It is certainly true that we should look to Greek ideas about physiology and religion for clues to key differences between Greek usage on emotional matters and our own. But Padel appears to confuse analytic terminology with what it describes: obviously poets composed in dactylic hexameter before metrists named the meter. Then too, it seems unlikely that the invention of a term such as *metaphora* could have effected a radical change in the linguistic function of metaphor. As the work of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff has shown, metaphor is "a pervasive, indispensable structure of human understanding" (Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, xx). (An obvious example would be the extension of meaning for prepositions or preverbs—e.g., *περί*—from a description of motion to metaphoric uses that involve no motion at all.) Something this basic to human thought processes is not transformed simply because certain extreme examples are recognized under a special term.

Padel believes that in modern usage metaphors for emotive sensations such as "heartache" are "unmeaning fossils," although she remarks that the persistence of something so empty and so contradictory to "what we now believe is inside us" is odd (34). Her mistake seems to lie in the assumption that current belief about human modes of thought and perception is clear and unproblematic. An abundant literature has recently begun to focus on these topics. From the phenomenologist Drew Leder's work on proprioception (*The Absent Body*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) to the book by Mark Johnson cited above, and the work of Daniel C. Dennett, who takes a philosopher's approach to research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence (*Consciousness Explained*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), it is everywhere appar-

ent how inadequate have been the traditional modern accounts of the mental and physical processes that attend what we call "thought and emotion."

Certain Cartesian preconceptions about sensation, emotion, and "conscious rationality," now recognizable as profoundly misleading, have proven remarkably difficult to shake off and may have led Padel to her belief that this very old language about the body is now devoid of any real meaning. At times Padel seems to grasp the complexity masked by modern cognitive models, as when, countering Bruno Snell's famous work, she refers to the "unity in multiplicity" (44) of Homeric views of sensation and mental/physical activity. But a lack of curiosity about our own views of the body seems also to underlie the book's central thesis, which is frequently reasserted, often in the teeth of Padel's own data: that the Greeks see "things from outside" as disturbing the normal tranquility of the self. (I have written "self" because the tendency to split mind/body, thought/emotions is not to be cured by simply writing both the opposite terms together.)

In fact, what we find continually in Padel's own exploration is a picture of the self as porous, filled with conduits that link "inner" with "outer" to such an extent that these terms themselves become as inherently fallacious as the "mind/body" terminology. *Erôs*, for example, beams from the eye as much as it pierces into the bones; and emotional energy floods outward from the self, even as it also surges inward from the exterior (see Padel 84, 89). In early Greek conceptions of human physical and mental functions, the interpenetration of self and environment is striking, simply because it emphasizes a truth about human existence that has often been ignored by modern philosophical and psychological theory.

The problems in using tragic texts as evidence for Greek "beliefs" about these matters are rather lightly dismissed by Padel (40–41). That the language of tragic lyric spoke effectively to its audience is undoubtedly true; but it was a very special language, conventional, yet elaborated at times to the point of grotesquerie. Other meta-languages have their own biases: the role of persuasive rhetoric, for instance, in medical texts (pointed out by Padel herself, 50) might well explain the tendency of these texts to treat disease as an external and alien evil of which the self must be "cleansed." Padel is aware that tragic and medical texts share a common bias towards pathology, and she uses the example of Freudian psychology (4) to defend her choice. But criticism of psychoanalysis has often focused on its tendency to identify abnormal without defining normal function.

Finally, there is the question of Greek rationalism and of the varying and contradictory belief systems that operated in that culture, as in our own. Padel notes (187–88), but passes over, the moment when the chorus in *Choephoroi* (1051–56) argue with Orestes that his Furies are only *doxai* of the *phrenes*, confused by blood. Paul Veyne's thesis (*Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*, trans. P. Wissing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) that Greeks were—like ourselves—capable of many forms

of belief in many, contradictory gradations of "truth," applies fully to the half-realized metaphors for interior sensation that we have inherited from their culture. We should be wary of pushing (as Padel does, 114) the analogy between our own "belief" in electricity and Greek "belief" in various daemonic forces.

A book like this one raises interesting issues in many areas: adequate completion of Padel's interesting project would require some study in thought and research outside classics, a more careful weighing of the biases of the texts taken in evidence, and a more sophisticated approach to archaic Greek culture.


ANN N. MICHELINI

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

PETER F. DORCEY. *The Cult of Silvanus: A Study in Roman Folk Religion*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992. xiii + 193 pp. 6 maps, 10 pls. Cloth, price not stated. (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 20)

As Dorcey points out in his introduction, the classic interpretations of such students of Roman religion as Mommsen, Wissowa, and Latte, which suggest that little in the way of religion existed outside Roman public cult, are misguided, as most scholars now concede. That the evidence of private cult is largely lost or inaccessible does not mean that it did not exist or was unimportant, painful as that realization may be for modern scholars. Dorcey is also quite right in pointing out that there is a relatively large corpus of archaeological and especially epigraphical evidence in this realm which has yet to be carefully assimilated and interpreted. Thus there is a real need for systematic scholarly treatments of each of the Roman gods prominent in the private sphere. Recently, for example, we have H. H. J. Brouwer's excellent study of the Bona Dea (*The Bona Dea: The Sources and a Description of the Cult*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989). We can hardly doubt that Silvanus is also an apt subject for such a study; more than 1,100 inscriptions make this (to us) obscure god one of the most frequently venerated deities in the realm of votive religion, second only to Jupiter Optimus Maximus in some parts of the empire, as Dorcey demonstrates. All this is by way of saying that Dorcey's study is well conceived.

Well conceived, but considerably less well executed. Dorcey's work suffers in comparison with Brouwer's. As the title of the latter's work implies, it is a compilation and careful review of all the sources—literary, archaeological, epigraphical—which in turn leads to a close description of the cult. Brouwer provides not just lists of literary and inscriptional texts, but the texts themselves, together with careful translations. His interpretation of the evidence is at times questionable and occasionally faulty, but the sheer magnitude of scholarly footwork manifest in the compilations ensures the utility of his work for years to come. By comparison, Dorcey's work, based on his Columbia dissertation, is essentially an attempt at a reinterpretation of the cult. Here the primary



evidence is largely relegated to appendices and footnotes, where texts are usually cited but often not translated (one especially misses a translation of the *Lex Familiae Silvani*). The evidence is marshaled to support the author's thesis that "Silvanus and his place in Roman religion have been profoundly misunderstood, as well as underestimated" (6). Specifically, Silvanus "occupies a special place in the general polytheistic system in that he stood completely outside public cult. He had no state temple, festival, or holy day" (1-2).

Dorcey's main thesis is at least dubious, nor does he ultimately convince us. But more disturbing is his ham-fisted use of the evidence, especially the literary evidence. He implies that this profound misinterpretation of the god derives from philologists' reliance on literary material, which "provides remarkably little information and sometimes contradicts the more extensive epigraphic and archaeological sources" (1). I fear that Dorcey has succumbed to the same sort of methodological transgression for which he chides traditional scholars. The primary evidence for the archaic and Republican god is remarkably rich and varied but at the same time woefully difficult to interpret, and was demonstrably so for the Romans themselves. No surprise, then, that secondary studies of the evidence are diffuse and discordant. But the obscurity of the evidence does not vitiate its importance or accuracy, nor does the relative preponderance of epigraphical evidence necessarily weigh in its favor in this case, since the bulk derives from the second century A.D. and after, a fact of which Dorcey takes too little account in his argumentation.

A few examples must suffice. As early as Plautus (*Aul.* 674-75, 766), Silvanus is conflated with Greek Pan. But Dorcey's contention (8) that "the purely Latin Silvanus of an earlier period is lost to us" is inaccurate and overstated. Recent studies of cultural borrowings in earliest Rome make questions of "purely Latin" divinities dubious; further, that Silvanus could so readily be syncretized with the Hellenistic god and that the poet could expect his audience to make the identification is itself powerful evidence of the god's archaic nature. Troubling, too, is Dorcey's treatment of Cato's formula for an annual sacrifice *Marti Silvano* (*Agr.* 83). Keil and others have pointed out that other names of distinct deities appear asyndetically juxtaposed in Cato, and we may well have such a case here. Dorcey offers the insufficient and tautological argument that "it is unlikely that Silvanus is subordinated as mere epithet, since Cato seems to have Silvanus in mind as much as Mars" (9). This we are to infer from cultic elements of the rite which point to Silvanus' characteristics "at least as they are known during the imperial period." Indeed. Those characteristics are precisely the point at issue, are they not?

Dorcey's discussion (15-16) of Servius' mythical aetiology of the connection of the god with the cypress is marred by his translation of *cervam* as "stag," a minor slip, perhaps, but one which radically alters the sexual dynamic of Servius' wonderful tale. His review (12) of etymological theories which derive Silvanus from Etruscan *Selvans* finds "compelling reasons for rejecting an etymological association." No such compelling reasons exist; whencesoever the

religious character of the Latin and Etruscan gods, their names, it is now conceded, derive from Latin. Nor does etymological borrowing imply cultural dominance, as Dorcey implies.

Finally reduced to straits, Dorcey concludes that "the difficulty of pinning down the god's [archaic] character . . . might stem from his long being thought of as a numinous spirit, not yet conceptualized in human form" (13). The socio-evolutionary theory from which this statement derives has for a good thirty years been thoroughly debunked in the anthropological circles where it started, but among some students of classical religion it appears absolutely impervious either to reason or to ridicule.

Dorcey strives mightily in chapters 2 and 3, "Religious Character and Function" and "Faunus, Pan and the Silvanae," to prove that our god is fundamentally different from such archaic gods as Mars, Faunus, and Pan. Thus the reason ancient authors so consistently mention together in the same breath, as it were, Pans, Fauns, and Silvani, not to speak of Faunae, Silvanae, and Nymphs, is that they wish to distinguish and contrast them: "The very mention of Pan and Silvanus together implies two separate deities" (41). Wissowa's conjecture that Silvanus is the private counterpart to public Faunus is an "elaborate and imaginative theory" (39). His conjecture may well be wrong, of course, but can one imagine a scholar less given to "elaborate and imaginative" theories than the plodding, prosaic, but eminently serviceable Wissowa?

No. Silvanus has not been, on the whole, profoundly misunderstood. He has simply been dimly understood, due to the limits imposed by the hoary antiquity of his origin. In that exigency, his associations with other gods who derive from the same stratum and religious impulses still tell us far more about his essential nature than do perceived differences.

Dorcey's use of the archaeological and epigraphical evidence is far more evenhanded. His discussion of the god's characteristics and functions, for example, is at its best when he examines iconography and epithets. Chapter 4, "Interpretatio Romana," is especially well done, since Dorcey uses a discussion of this phenomenon as vehicle for a systematic review of the inscriptions and artifacts of geographical areas in which Silvanus is represented. Very useful, at least for the period which the material encompasses, are the chapters "Cultic Structure and Organization" and "The Worshipers," and for the same reason: Dorcey here uses primarily epigraphical evidence, and generally in a responsible way. The exception is his attempt to prove that women were not excluded from worship of the god, as "traditional scholars" have claimed (124ff.). No major scholar, to my knowledge, has ever made such a claim, though several point out, correctly, that women were systematically excluded from the god's rites. And again Dorcey's use of primary texts is faltering. He interprets a fourth-century scholion (*ad Juv.* 6.447), which states that *Silvano mulieres non licet sacrificare*, to imply "the total exclusion of women from the worship of Silvanus" (126), despite the technical sense in which *sacrificare* is here used. He cites (127) a statement recorded in Pseudo-Ambrosius (*Ep.* 2.12),



supposedly uttered by the Christian Valeria when accosted by a *collegium* of the god and invited *secum epistulari: Christianus sum, non licet mihi de Silvani vestri sacrificiis manducare*. Dorcey translates the key phrase *sacrificiis manducare* as "make sacrifices," an egregious misinterpretation of the author's contention that Valeria was so pious she would not even partake of the banquet's food and drink, some or all of which may have been part of the formal sacrifice. Valeria's participation in the actual *sacrificium* can hardly have been at issue.

But fellow epigraphers will forgive an author almost any sin if he provides us a good list. Dorcey's sins are probably venial in any case, but he goes far towards atonement by providing useful lists, specifically appendices detailing the primary literary sources, the corpus of inscriptions and Silvanus gems, and some excellent maps showing distribution of the evidence. All are conveniently arranged and largely accurate. Ultimately, I suspect, it is these lists which will prove most helpful to other scholars; one wishes they might have been showcased more prominently in the book.

One is left with the impression that Dorcey's original effort was an earnest scholar's epigraphical study, a study forced or allowed to outgrow its natural bounds, often with unfortunate results. Dorcey would have been well served by more exacting editors. Still, an indication of the degree of need for studies of this type is the fact that Dorcey's book, with all its flaws, will be a serviceable tool for students of Roman religion.

DAVID L. THURMOND

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, GREENSBORO

OLAF PERLWITZ. Titus Pomponius Atticus: Untersuchungen zur Person eines einflussreichen Ritters in der ausgehenden römischen Republik. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992. 151 pp. Paper, DM 60. (Hermes Einzelschriften, 58)

A propos of a treatise on Greek accents Cicero wrote to Atticus in 45 B.C.: "The book itself will not please me more than your admiration of it. I like a man who takes all learning for his province (*amo πάντα φιλειδήμονα*) and am delighted to find you so enthusiastic about so rarefied a study. But that is you all over; knowledge is your desire, the only food of the mind." Does this not tell us as much about Atticus as any comparable passage in the correspondence? It tells Perlwitz that his subject was expert at spying out "manche lukrative Gewinnmöglichkeit" ahead of business competitors (80).

The lapse highlights the book's two main defects. It is not the comprehensive study implied by its title. Atticus is seen primarily as a "banker," a money-getter and money-manager; and that is to see him out of focus. For was there not Atticus the Philhellene, the connoisseur, the annalist and genealogist, not to mention the family man? Nepos' picture is fairer than Perlwitz's. True, a long

section purports to deal with Atticus' relationship to politics, but it does not amount to much, and the conclusion that the data produced confute "the widespread conception that Atticus stood apart from the political life of his time" is nonsequential.

Perlwitz takes two of his predecessors to task for careless use of the sources (principally, of course, Cicero's letters), but his own does not pass muster. Mistranslations, misinterpretations, and outright blunders are rife. One example will suffice. We are told (120 n. 188) that the sources show Atticus as an intimate of Appius Claudius Pulcher, cos. 54. Evidence: Atticus travelled to Asia on business in July 54 "because he hoped for advantages to himself from Appius' governorship." But the governor mentioned in *Att.* 4.15.2 was not Appius but his brother Gaius, and Cicero was joking anyway—by no means the only place where Perlwitz shows himself impervious to Ciceronian irony; another follows later in the note, when Cicero's facetious comment on the Bona Dea scandal ("I'm sure it distresses you," *Att.* 1.12.3) is taken literally.

Incidental errors unimportant in themselves but significant of philological insecurity include mixups of two Metelli (60), of Cicero's cousin with his father (114), of Tyrrell and Purser's "baggards of Velia" with Caesar's friend C. Oppius (108 n. 94), of Atticus' Italian properties (65), of his protégé M. Laenius with Cicero's Brundisian host M. Laenius Flaccus (98 n. 67). The cognomen "Patrensis" is bestowed on M'. (*sic*) Curius, who lived in Patrae, and on L. Papirius (Paetus), who did not (*ibid.*). We hear more than once of a family of "Appii Claudi," and C. Fannius, tribune in 59 and a fairly well-known *nobilis*, is reduced to "ein gewisser Fannius." "Gaius" is regularly "Caius," and both "Sextus" and "Servius" are abbreviated "S." The spurious letter *Br.* 1.17 (M. Brutus to Atticus) is cited (and gratuitously misunderstood) without reservation as to authorship (84 n. 308).

Ἄλλοις ἐν ἐσθλοῖς τόνδ' ἀπωθοῦνται ψόγον, says Cicero of Caesar's assassins. Without going that far, some good points deserve mention. The item on Atticus' estate in Epirus (66–78) looks like a meritorious piece of research (I cannot speak with knowledge of the topography), including the interesting suggestion that Atticus' quartan fever and the ill health of his wife and daughter derived from this malarial source. His migration to Athens may have had an economic motive as well as the political and intellectual ones adduced by Nepos; and he certainly made money there. Epicurean leanings and "publishing" activities are discretely handled. Much of the section "on the economic foundations of Atticus' position" can be read with profit.

There is a rather idiosyncratic bibliography, but no index.

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## PLURAL WORLDS IN ANAXIMANDER

The ancients ascribed to Anaximander a belief in plural worlds, but the state of the evidence does not make it immediately clear whether these worlds are coexistent or successive. Zeller argued that they could not be coexistent, but his view was challenged by Burnet; yet Cornford, as Kirk puts it, "demonstrated that Burnet's argument . . . rested on a false assessment of the doxographic evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics."<sup>1</sup> So far so good, but Kirk goes further and contends not only that coexistent worlds have been wrongly assigned to Anaximander, as Zeller and Cornford have shown, but that successive worlds are also a doxographic error; a similar view is argued by Kahn.<sup>2</sup> In this essay I propose to scrutinize our evidence on Anaximander's plural worlds and to examine, systematically and exhaustively, Kirk's and Kahn's criticism of this evidence—both as against the doxographic testimony and on its own merits.

### I

In view of the complicated character of the doxographic evidence on the subject and the ensuing scholarly controversy it is advisable to begin by determining what Theophrastus reports on the point in question. I have therefore compiled a synoptic comparison (see table 1) of the parallel versions in which Theophrastus' account has come down to us, namely, the versions found in Simplicius (*Phys.* 24.13 = DK 12 A9

<sup>1</sup>Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* 305–12; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* 58–61; Cornford, "Innumerable Worlds"; Kirk, "Some Problems," 335 (citations are to Furley and Allen pagination).

<sup>2</sup>Kirk, "Some Problems" 335–40, and Kirk et al., *Presocratic Philosophers* 122–26; Kahn, *Anaximander* 46–53.

Table 1. Synoptic Comparison of Parallel Versions of Theophrastus' Account

	Hippol. Ref. 1.6.1-2	Simpl. Phys. 24.13
1	Θαλοῦ τοίνυν Ἀ. γίνεται ἀκροατής. Ἀ. Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος . . .	. . . Ἀ. μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητής
2	οὗτος μὲν ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον εἰρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἀπειρον,	ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἰρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἀπειρον,
3	πρῶτος τοῦνομα καλέσας τῆς ἀρχῆς.	πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς.
4	. . . οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἔφη τῶν ὄντων φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἀπειρου . . .	λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἀπειρον,
5	πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ κίνησιν αἰδίων εἶναι, ἐν ᾗ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς.	
6	. . . ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμον. ταύτην δ' αἰδίων εἶναι καὶ ἀγήρω, ἣν καὶ <u>πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους</u>	ἐξ ἧς <u>ἀπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους.</u>
7		ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι
8		κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν,
9		ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.
10	λέγει δὲ χρόνον ὥς ὠρισμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς.	

Simpl. Phys. 41.17	Ps.-Plut. Strom. 2	Aët. 1.3.3
	μεθ' ὃν Ἄ. Θάλητος ἐταῖρον γενόμενον	Ἄ. δὲ Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος
		φησι τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἀπειρον·
. . . ἀπειρόν τινα φύσιν ἄλλην οὖσαν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἀρχὴν ἔθετο,	ἥς τὴν αἰδίον κίνησιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς τῶν οὐρανῶν γενέσεως ἔλεγεν.  τὸ ἀπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς.  ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι <u>τούς</u> τε <u>οὐρανοὺς</u> ἀποκεκρίσ- θαι καὶ καθόλου τοὺς <u>ἅπαντας</u> ἀπείρους <u>ὄντας κόσμους</u> .	ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθίρεσθαι.

Continued.



Table 1. Synoptic Comparison of Parallel Versions of Theophrastus' Account (*cont*)

	Hippol. <i>Ref.</i> 1.6.1–2	Simpl. <i>Phys.</i> 24.13
11		
12	τὴν δὲ γῆν εἶναι μετέωρον ὑπὸ μηδενὸς κρατουμένην, μένουσαν δὲ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν πάντων ἀπόστασιν.	
13	τὸ δὲ σχῆμα αὐτῆς γυρὸν, στρογγύλον, κίονι λίθῳ παραπλήσιον.	
14		
15	τῶν δὲ ἐπιπέδων ὅς μὲν ἐπιβεβήκαμεν, ὃ δὲ ἀντίθετον ὑπάρχει. τὰ δὲ ἄστρα γίνεσθαι κύκλον πυρός, ἀποκριθέντα τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πυρός, περιληφθέντα δ' ὑπὸ ἁέρος.	
16		

Simpl. <i>Phys.</i> 41.17	Ps.-Plut. <i>Strom.</i> 2	Aët. 1.3.3
	<p>ἀπεφάνετο δὲ τὴν φθορὰν γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ ἀπείρου αἰῶνος ἀνακυκλου- μένων πάντων αὐτῶν.</p>	<p>διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεσθαι.</p>
	<p>ὑπάρχειν δέ φησι τῷ μὲν σχήματι τὴν γῆν κυλινδροειδῆ,  ἔχειν δὲ τοσοῦτον βάθος ὅσον ἂν εἴη τρίτον πρὸς τὸ πλάτος.</p>	
	<p>φησὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυτῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὥς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν· ἥστινος ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἰς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας.</p>	

*Continued.*

Table 1. Synoptic Comparison of Parallel Versions of Theophrastus' Account (*con*

	Hippol. <i>Ref.</i> 1.6.1–2	Simpl. <i>Phys.</i> 24.13
17	ἐκπνοὰς δ' ὑπάρξαι πόρους τινὰς αὐλώδεις, καθ' οὗς φαίνεται τὰ ἄστρα κτλ.	
18	τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἐτέρῳ ζῳῷ γεγονέναι, τουτέστι ἰχθύι, παραπλήσιον κατ' ἀρχάς.	
19		
20	ἀνέμους δὲ γίνεσθαι κτλ.	

and *Phys.* 41.17 [absent from DK]), Hippolytus (*Ref.* 1.6.1–2 = DK 12 A11), Pseudo–Plutarch (*Strom.* 2 = DK 12 A10), and Aëtius (*Plac.* 1.3.3 = DK 12 A14). To assess the reliability of Ps.–Plutarch's information on the issue we need to evaluate the general accuracy of his report on Anaximander, which makes it necessary to continue the synopsis to the end of his whole section on Anaximander.

The order of statements numbered 1 to 5 on the synopsis is at variance in Simplicius and Hippolytus. Hippolytus' text here shows clear signs of a rearrangement of the original report: the phrase οὗτος μὲν ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε . . . καλέσας τῆς ἀρχῆς is misplaced, its natural location being at the beginning of the report; the "eternal motion" mentioned in the next phrase is added mechanically—"in addition to this there is eternal motion"—and is followed by the awkward expression "in which it results that the heavens come into being," which certainly does not preserve Theophrastus' wording; on the whole, section 2 gives the impression of consisting of phrases which the excerptor had first neglected but then had added to the already com-

Simpl. *Phys.* 41.17Ps.–Plut. *Strom.* 2

Aët. 1.3.3

ἔτι φησὶν, ὅτι κατ'  
 ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἁλλοειδῶν  
 ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος  
 ἐγεννήθη,  
 ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι'  
 ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι,  
 μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον  
 πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι  
 τιθηνήσεως· διὸ καὶ  
 κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἂν ποτε  
 τοιοῦτον ὄντα  
 διασωθῆναι.

pleted excerpt on the *Apeiron*.<sup>3</sup> This being the case, Simplicius' order of exposition is preferable; hence in the synopsis I rearrange the two first sections of Hippolytus' account to make them run parallel with Simplicius.

Diels located Hippolytus' statement 10 at 8 while Kirk places it at 7;<sup>4</sup> neither is justified by the wording and content of the phrase, which is a comment on Anaximander's notion of time. This notion appears in the last clause of the fragment, namely 8, and therefore the most natural place of the comment is after the fragment.<sup>5</sup> Diels believed that Ps.–Plutarch's 11 is a parallel version of 5,<sup>6</sup> but this is a mistake: Ps.–Plutarch's parallel to 5 is τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι . . . καὶ φθορᾶς, a clause

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kahn, *Anaximander* 29–30.

<sup>4</sup> Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* 133; Kirk, "Some Problems" 325, and Kirk et al., *Presocratic Philosophers* 106–8.

<sup>5</sup> Kirk, "Some Problems" 325, regards this location as second best.

<sup>6</sup> *Doxographi Graeci* 133.

which resembles Simplicius' wording. Kirk, for his part, takes Ps.—Plutarch's 11 as a parallel to 7,<sup>7</sup> which is also incorrect, as Aëtius' parallels demonstrate. Indeed, the sentence which in Aëtius corresponds to Simplicius' 7 is ἐκ γὰρ τούτου . . . πάντα φθείρεσθαι, and it is unlikely that Aëtius' next clause (11 in the synopsis) would be yet another version of the same phrase in Simplicius, the more so in that Aëtius' report condenses the whole of Theophrastus' account of the *Apeiron* into three phrases. For the latter reason it is also improbable that Aëtius' 11 parallels 8, as Cornford suggested,<sup>8</sup> for quotations are the first thing to be dropped in such a radical abridgment. But if Aëtius' third clause, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι . . . ἐξ οὗ γίγνεσθαι, is not another version of 7, neither is Ps.—Plutarch's 11, which resembles this clause.

The synopsis makes it clear that though partly diverging in content, Hippolytus' and Ps.—Plutarch's accounts entirely agree in the order of exposition, which is the typical sequence of subjects in the sources stemming from Theophrastus. The two excerptors often select different pieces of the Theophrastean information for their respective accounts while retaining its original arrangement; the two excerpts run parallel and complement each other. This being the case, the possibility that Ps.—Plutarch conflates Theophrastus with another, non-Theophrastean source is decidedly unlikely. Further, where Ps.—Plutarch's wording can be compared with Hippolytus and Simplicius, namely in 1, 5, 6, 13, and 18, his report shows an apparent tendency towards abridgment and rewording but never to the extent of entirely twisting Theophrastus' meaning or totally losing resemblance to Theophrastus' locution. We therefore have good reason to accept the statements in Ps.—Plutarch which have no parallel in Hippolytus and Simplicius as genuine pieces of the Theophrastean information, as they are actually taken by Anaximandrian scholars in the case of 14, 16, and 19. But this must also apply to 5 and 11, which are directly pertinent to our subject, and as a matter of fact 5 is found to parallel, in wording and content, Simplicius' phrase (and through it, also Hippolytus'). This being the case, it would be arbitrary and prejudicial to discard Ps.—Plutarch's 11 as the sole phrase in his whole account not deriving from Theophrastus or distorting Theophrastus' words and intention to an extent unequaled in the rest of the report. Therefore we should accept Ps.—Plutarch's 11 as

<sup>7</sup>"Some Problems" 325, and Kirk et al., *Presocratic Philosophers* 106–8.

<sup>8</sup>"Innumerable Worlds" 11.

faithful, in basic content, to some Theophrastean statement which has not survived in Hippolytus and Simplicius, and Aëtius' parallel warrants this conclusion.

Of the sections directly pertinent to Anaximander's supposed belief in plural worlds (5–11), three (5, 6, 7) contain parallel versions, and we must decide which should be preferred in each case.

At 5 the agreement between Simplicius and Hippolytus testifies that Theophrastus spoke here of the eternal motion of the *Apeiron* as the cause of the coming into being of the *ouranoi*. Ps.–Plutarch's version of 5 is thus distorted in that it speaks of the *Apeiron* rather than its eternal motion as the cause of generation (and perhaps also in that it adds "the destruction," not confirmed in other sources). The context leaves no doubt that *ouranoi* here means "the worlds," and Ps.–Plutarch is therefore correct in glossing the word as *to pan*, but he deviates from Theophrastus in that he renders the original plural in the singular. Generally in *Physics* 41.17 Simplicius seems to have relied on Theophrastus less directly than in *Physics* 24;<sup>9</sup> but the agreement with Hippolytus' versions of 4 and 5, supported by Ps.–Plutarch's parallel in 5, makes it practically certain that Simplicius is fairly close here to Theophrastus; if so, his wording is to be preferred to Hippolytus' awkward and unintelligent formulation.

At 6 the version which should be followed is that of Hippolytus. Indeed, the comparison shows that Ps.–Plutarch's phrase is the result of excising or dropping the second part of Hippolytus' first clause (after the words *tous ouranous*) and the greater part of the second clause, whose Theophrastean provenance is confirmed by the almost identical locution of Arist. *De Caelo* Γ 5.303b12 (δ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἅπειρον ὄν)<sup>10</sup> as well as by the archaic ἀγῆρω which Diels reasonably believed to be Anaximandean. In Ps.–Plutarch *pantas* becomes *hapantas*, but the words *ouranous* and *kosmous* are not combined into one phrase, *hapantas* qualifying only the *ouranous*; the abridged sentence was expanded by Ps.–Plutarch's favorite *katholou*<sup>11</sup> and by *apeirous ontas*. Simplicius' text has the same omission, but the *hapantas* is removed into the beginning of the phrase and qualifies both the *ouranous* and the *kosmous*, thus producing the phrase which, on the

<sup>9</sup>See Kahn, *Anaximander* 14–15.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. *Phys.* Γ 4.203b9, περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* 156 n. 1.

face of it, parallels Hippolytus' first clause, but in fact combines the beginning of Hippolytus' first clause with the end of his second clause.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, at 7 Simplicius' version is to be preferred to Aëtius', both because of the general superiority of the former source and because the latter's wording is, so to speak, a *lectio facillior*.

Having selected versions which seem to represent Theophrastus' wording more accurately, we can reach our conclusions as to his notion of plural worlds in Anaximander. We may observe that, as far as our evidence goes, Theophrastus referred to Anaximander's worlds only in the plural—as *hoi ouranoi* at 5, as *hoi ouranoi kai ho en autois kosmos* at 6a, and as *pantes hoi kosmoi* at 6b, viewing them as not only generated (5 and 6a) but also as perishable. The latter notion is conspicuously implied at Hippolytus 6b in the contrast between the eternal and unaging *Apeiron* and all the generated worlds it "encompasses";<sup>13</sup> it is explicit at 7, where Simplicius makes us understand that Theophrastus quoted Anaximander's words (8) as a description of the way in which the world proceeds to its eventual destruction;<sup>14</sup> at 10, where Anaximander's concept of time is expounded as "limited [spans] of the generation, the existence, and the destruction"; and finally, at 11, which most probably reflects Theophrastus' direct statement to this effect. It remains to determine whether Theophrastus was thinking of Anaximander's plural worlds as coexistent like those of the Atomists or rather as single successive ones.

It may be noted from the outset that, on our evidence, Theophras-

<sup>12</sup>Thus the discrepancy between Hippolytus' and Simplicius' phrases is due not to a copyist's error in one of the cases, but to a deeper textual corruption in the ultimate common source of Ps.-Plutarch and Simplicius; therefore the credit that scholars give to Simplicius' version (e.g., Reinhardt, *Parmenides* 175; Hölscher, "Anaximander" 290 n. 17; Kahn, *Anaximander* 34) is unwarranted.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Hölscher, "Anaximander" 300; Seligman, *Apelron* 54–55; Guthrie, *History* I 112.

<sup>14</sup>The traditional view that Theophrastus understood Anaximander's words as referring to the eventual destruction of the world has been challenged by Kahn, who contends that neither Simplicius nor Theophrastus, who "are in this instance indistinguishable from one another," ever took Anaximander's phrase to mean this (*Anaximander* 166–69). I cannot improve on Schwabl's comment ("Anaximander" 60) on Kahn's exegesis of Simplicius' text: "Indem bei ihm besonderer Wert auf die Kohärenz der Gedankenfolge bei Simplikios gelegt ist, kommt es dazu, dass die etwa existierende Kohärenz der Parallelberichte praktisch ignoriert wird." For detailed criticism of Kahn's interpretation see Engmann, "Cosmic Justice" and my "Anaximander's Conception of the *Apeiron*."

tus never referred to Anaximander's worlds as *apeiroi*, "innumerable" (in Ps.-Plutarch's 6 *apeirous ontas kosmous* has been found to be a doxographic gloss). Further, both the fragment and the comment on it (8, 10) stress the regularity of the generation and destruction of the worlds, the idea which, as Kirk points out,<sup>15</sup> is alien to the Atomistic conception to which irregularity is essential. The same idea of regularity is implied in the expression *hoi ouranoi kai ho en autois kosmos*, "the heavens and the arrangement in them,"<sup>16</sup> which suggests that all the worlds have the same internal structure. It is noteworthy that though admitting "innumerable worlds" elsewhere in his account, namely at 6, at 11 Ps.-Plutarch resists the Hellenistic doxography's tendency to construe Anaximander's worlds in the Atomistic fashion, and even Aëtius while describing Anaximander's worlds as "innumerable" seems to have been thinking of them as successive.<sup>17</sup> Not less noteworthy is that at 5 Ps.-Plutarch glosses the Theophrastean plural *hoi ouranoi* as the singular *to pan*, which indicates that he understands Theophrastus as meaning single successive worlds: as distinct from the coexistent worlds of the Atomists, the theory of single successive ones can be rendered in terms of one world which periodically comes into existence and perishes.<sup>18</sup> The conclusion is that Theophrastus conceived of Anaximander's plural worlds as successive rather than coexistent. The synopsis in table 1 demonstrates that in accounting for Anaximander's doctrines Theophrastus (a) referred to his worlds both as *kosmoi* and *ouranoi*, and (b) never described *kosmoi* and (what is of importance here) *ouranoi* as innumerable. This fact undermines Cornford's suggestion that *ouranoi* must have referred to the rings of the celestial bodies,<sup>19</sup> while the deterioration of the later tradition on Anaximander's plural worlds resulted precisely from the confusion of "innumerable heavens," meaning the plural celestial rings, with the innumerable worlds of the Atomists. The confusion seems to be due to a much more simple reason: it must have been caused by the association be-

<sup>15</sup>Kirk et al., *Presocratic Philosophers* 125.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. Diels, DK ad loc. (though in *Doxographi Graeci* 133 he emends Hippolytus' text in accordance with Simplicius); Guthrie, *History* I 110.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Guthrie, *History* I 108.

<sup>18</sup>It appears that Ps.-Plutarch's mention of the destruction at 5 is not necessarily a doxographic gloss, but even if it is, it seems to represent Theophrastus' general meaning correctly.

<sup>19</sup>"Innumerable Worlds" 10-12.



tween Anaximander's notion of the *Apeiron* and the corresponding notions of the Atomists.

## II

The synoptic examination of the sources shows that Theophrastus credited Anaximander with the theory of single successive worlds. Yet some critics, notably Kirk and Kahn, claim that the doxographic tradition must have been mistaken on the point. I now proceed to consider their arguments; but first I call attention to the fact that assuming the possibility of error on Theophrastus' part is methodologically a highly problematic procedure. One can hardly improve on Engmann's lapidary formulation: "In view of the extent to which we have to make use of information deriving from Theophrastus himself in identifying and correcting any supposed mistake by him, it would obviously be preferable to avoid an interpretation which hinges on the occurrence of such a mistake."<sup>20</sup> To assume an error in Theophrastus would thus be an emergency move, demanding very good reasons indeed to adopt. Consequently we should require those who wish us to believe that in assigning the theory of successive worlds to Anaximander Theophrastus went astray, that they show that he must, not merely might, have been wrong.

Let us turn now to the reasons which Kirk, the most decided opponent of attributing the theory of periodical world destruction to Anaximander, adduces to discredit this doxographic attribution.

The concept of successive separate worlds is a very difficult one, and it is unlikely to have occurred before Parmenides forced scientific dogmatism to become more extreme, and to exceed by far the range of common sense, in the effort to overcome his criticism. Empedocles, with his theory of successive states of the cosmic Σφαῖρος, may have mediated the idea of entirely separate worlds.<sup>21</sup>

First, it is necessary to clarify our notions. Empedocles' successive states of the cosmic Sphere is the theory of entirely separate worlds: the state of the thoroughly homogeneous mixture of the four elements is superseded by a world which then completely vanishes, being resolved into the homogenous mixture of the elements which is again superseded by a new world, and so on. On Theophrastus' account, Anaximander's

<sup>20</sup> Engmann, "Cosmic Justice" 9.

<sup>21</sup> "Some Problems" 340.

conception displays the same basic pattern: the homogeneous *archē* is superseded by the state of the manifold world, which then completely vanishes, the original homogeneity of the *archē* being restored, and so on. But why does the theory of successive separate worlds seem to Kirk "very difficult"? As far as I can see, he seeks to show this by means of two separate arguments.<sup>22</sup>

First, he applies Cornford's objection against coexistent worlds—namely, that "nothing in the appearance of nature" suggests such—to successive worlds and claims that the object of the Ionians "was to explain *our* [Kirk's italics] world and account for its coherence." Does he indeed believe that "our world" is a bare physical appearance experienced always and everywhere in the same way? It seems he does not, for he admits that the account of the world "necessitated, as it seemed to the Milesians, the description of a cosmic evolution from a single kind of matter" and that "this world is assumed to have birth because only so, it seemed, could its intuited unity be rationally explained." This is to say, Kirk recognizes that the Milesians intuited the world in their own, peculiar manner which determined the ways in which they accounted for it and which led them to postulate things which "nothing in the appearance of nature" suggested, for example, a cosmic evolution from a single kind of matter. But if so, it is perfectly possible that their intuition of the world also "necessitated, as it seemed to the Milesians" the description of a cosmic evolution from the developed world to that single kind of matter from which it was assumed to have originated—because, for instance, "only so, it seemed, could its intuited unity be rationally explained." We form our idea of how the Milesians intuited the world by way of inference from their accounts of it as these accounts are reported in our sources; therefore if we censure these reports on the plea that the Milesians' intuitions did not necessitate one or other kind of account we may be accused of either a *petitio principii* or an arbitrary idea of the Milesians' vision of reality.<sup>23</sup>

Kirk's second argument runs as follows: "The material of the world was divine; it possessed its own life and movement, perhaps, but

<sup>22</sup> "Some Problems" 335–36.

<sup>23</sup> From a more general point of view Kirk's argument exemplifies the fundamental fallibility of the aprioristic "commonsense" approach. It is well known that what in some places and epochs are cornerstones of common sense, in other places and epochs often strike people as "irrelevant and bizarre," as Kirk qualifies the theory of successive worlds ("Some Problems" 335). As Seligman comments, *Apeiron* 127, on Kirk's interpretation Anaximander's teaching may perhaps conform to our own conception of rational cosmogony, yet at the expense of the historical specificity of his thought.

the life was the unending life of the immortal gods and not the terminal life of R. G. Collingwood's cosmic cow." Yet the argument is misleading: just as the transition of the divine material from its initial condition of the homogeneous *archē* to the state of the manifold world is the birth of the world, not of the divine material itself, so also the reverse transition of the divine material from the state of the manifold world to that of the homogeneous *archē* is the death of the world, not of the divine material.

Content with these two arguments against the possibility of Anaximander's belief in successive worlds, Kirk goes on to suggest how Theophrastus could have judged the point wrongly:

Theophrastus may have been persuaded (a) by an illegitimate extension of the application of natural cycles in Anaximander, (b) by a misinterpretation of the extant fragment, and (c) by an application of Atomistic arguments to *all* [Kirk's italics] who explicitly postulated (as it seemed) infinite matter, to credit Anaximander with innumerable worlds of the Atomistic type. This would account for peculiarities in the later tradition.<sup>24</sup>

Subsequently Kirk suggested an additional reason, namely, that Theophrastus may also have been misled by

(d) . . . the theory that the earth was surrounded by a number—perhaps an infinite number—of rings of the celestial bodies.<sup>25</sup>

In (a) Kirk means that "it is possible . . . that Anaximander did, like Xenophanes, postulate long-term changes of the earth's surface. . . . It is easy to see how this theory of successive states of the earth's surface . . . could have been later expanded into one of successive separate worlds."<sup>26</sup> Now apart from the question whether Xenophanes postulated long-term changes of the earth's surface rather than

<sup>24</sup> "Some Problems" 340.

<sup>25</sup> In Kirk et al., *Presocratic Philosophers* 126 (already in the first edition, 126). In "Some Problems" 338, Kirk had regarded this as a possible consequence of Cornford's suggestion that *pantas tous ouranous* at Arist. *De Caelo* Γ 5.303b10 may refer to Anaximander's celestial rings of fire, a suggestion that Kirk was reluctant to accept here: "I do not think that Cornford adequately demonstrated that οὐρανός might be used in precisely such a sense [viz. in reference to the celestial rings]," 338 (and in that he was quite right). But it appears that he considers it more favorably in *Presocratic Philosophers*.

<sup>26</sup> "Some Problems" 337.

successive worlds,<sup>27</sup> nothing in the reports by Aristotle and Alexander (*Meteor.* B 1.353b6; *Ad Meteor.* 67.3 = DK 12 A27) that Kirk refers to suggests the construal of the progressive drying up of the world as part of the reversible changes of the earth's surface.<sup>28</sup> On the contrary, the process is reported to have been going on from the very beginning of the world, eventually to be completed with the entire elimination of moisture, which is hardly compatible with the construal of the testimony as a description of cyclical alternations between wetter and drier cosmic periods. As a matter of fact Aristotle's "at first (*to prōton*) the whole region about the earth was moist" and the Theophrastean "primal moisture" (*hē prōtē hugrotēs*) in Alexander (cf. *hē prōtē hugrasia* in Aët. 3.16.1 = DK 12 A27) cannot possibly describe moisture as periodically covering a part or even the whole of the earth's surface. It appears then that what Kirk believes to cast doubts on Theophrastus' attribution of plural worlds to Anaximander rather confirms it. Of course, one can claim that Aristotle was also mistaken in reporting the Anaximandrian doctrine of the progressive drying up of the moisture in a way that suggests its irreversible character; this is possible, just as it is possible that he was mistaken about Thales' principle or Anaximenes' account of earthquakes. However, since this can be never proved, no interpretation which builds upon such possibilities can be more than speculation.

In (b) Kirk refers the reader to Burnet's interpretation of Anaximander's fragment:

The important word ἀλλήλοις is in all MSS. of Simplicius, though omitted in the Aldine. This omission made the sentence appear to mean that the existence of individual things (ὄντα) was somehow wrong (ἀδίκια) for which they must be punished. With ἀλλήλοις restored, this fanciful interpretation disappears. It is *to one another* [Burnet's italics] that whatever the subject of the verb may be make reparation and give satisfaction, and therefore the injustice must be a wrong which they commit *against one another* [Burnet's italics]. Now as δίκη is regularly used of the observance of an equal balance between the opposites hot and cold, dry and wet, the ἀδίκια here referred to must be the undue encroachment of one opposite on another, such as we see, for example, in the alternation of day

<sup>27</sup> As Kirk argues elsewhere; see *Presocratic Philosophers* 176–78; cf. Guthrie, *History* I 387–90.

<sup>28</sup> The interpretation was proposed by Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae* 183–85, who suggested Anaximander's belief in a Great Year. Yet Cornford's interpretation finds no support in our evidence; cf. Freudenthal, "Theory of the Opposites" 218–19.

and night, winter and summer, which have to be made good by an equal encroachment of the other.<sup>29</sup>

Kirk rebukes Burnet (and Heidel) for their failure "to establish any satisfactory relation between this continuing cosmological balance and the odd hypothesis of innumerable worlds. If the worlds are successive, however, the difficulties become intolerable. How does the world pass away, if it forms a self-perpetuating system? . . . The fragment has nothing to do with worlds perishing into the Boundless, but . . . it describes cosmological changes in the one continuing world."<sup>30</sup> Now if this is the plain meaning of the Greek, one is left to wonder how Theophrastus could not have understood it. Fortunately, we can save our wonderings: the Greek *allēlois* means the reciprocal as well as the non-reciprocal, that is, a chain-like relation.<sup>31</sup> The latter sense dispenses with the impossible consequence that the *Apeiron* commits injustices on other things and pays them penalties, as well as with the interpretation of the relationship between the opposites as a self-perpetuating balance of alternating mutual encroachments.<sup>32</sup> Anaximander's words can be understood as a legalistic rendering of, to use Heraclitus' terms, one thing's life by the death, that is, at the expense, of the other, and such a series of elemental transformations is quite compatible with, and can well lead to, the eventual destruction of the world.<sup>33</sup> But if this is a possible meaning of the fragment, why should we take it in the alternative sense and dispute Theophrastus' judgment, backed up as it is by his natural feeling for Greek and knowledge of the immediate and broader context of the words he was citing?

As to Kirk's (c), the synopsis (table 1 above) shows that Theophrastus assigned to Anaximander the theory of single successive worlds, that is, a doctrine quite different from the Atomistic one, and therefore the possibility that in crediting Anaximander with plural worlds Theophrastus in one or another way confused his ideas with those of the Atomists, is simply out of the question. Our sources show the deterioration of the doxographic tradition: the familiar Atomistic

<sup>29</sup>*Early Greek Philosophy* 54 n. 1.

<sup>30</sup>"Some Problems" 342.

<sup>31</sup>See LSJ s.v. ἀλλήλων.

<sup>32</sup>Strictly speaking, this interpretation is not necessary also on the understanding of *allēlois* as reciprocal; see Freudenthal, "Theory of the Opposites," esp. 212, 216 n. 65.

<sup>33</sup>I discuss the issue in more detail in my "Anaximander's Conception."

"innumerable" worlds penetrated into reports of the Theophrastean descent and gave rise to ambiguous and mistaken formulations. This and not Theophrastus' alleged misapplication of the Atomistic arguments accounts for what Kirk calls "the peculiarities in the later tradition." Such confusions are found in Aët. 2.1.2–3 (in Stobaeus' version included in DK as 12 A17, but not in Plutarch's; see Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* 327) and 2.1.8; and in Simpl. *De Caelo*, 202.14 (absent from DK) and 615.13 (DK 12 A17) (in both cases, however, Simplicius seems to be in doubt, as his *dokei* is usually taken to mean by commentators) and in *Physics* 1121.5. The same confusion also seems to occur in Augustine's *Civitas Dei* 7.2, where *eosque mundos . . . quante quisque aetate sua manere potuerit* indicates that in all probability he saw Anaximander's worlds through the prism of the Atomistic theory.<sup>34</sup>

The case of Aëtius 1.7.12 and Cicero *De Natura Deorum* 1.10.25 (both under DK 12 A17) seems to be more complicated. Cornford believes that in Aëtius' Ἀναξίμανδρος ἀπεφίητο τοὺς ἀπείρους οὐρανοὺς θεοὺς the word *ouranous* must have referred to Anaximander's celestial rings of fire and suggests that in Cicero's *Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos* the word *mundos* (= *kosmous*) is substituted for the original *caelos* (= *ouranous*).<sup>35</sup> Now apart from the erroneous character of the assumption that *ouranoi* must have referred to the rings of the heavenly bodies, it is difficult to believe that these "rings of fire enclosed in opaque mist, from which the fire escapes at the points we see in the sky [the stars, sun, and moon]," could have been counted by Anaximander as gods. Cornford's appeal to "a deeply rooted belief, both popular and philosophic" in the divinity of the heavenly bodies misses the point: Anaximander's fiery rings are formations which do not resemble the heavenly bodies traditionally believed to be divine, and therefore the belief in the divinity of the latter cannot prove that he believed in the divinity of the former. It may be added that belief in the divinity of the celestial bodies is not characteristic of Presocratic cosmology, which (on the contrary) shows a palpable tendency towards the naturalization of the heavenly phenomena. On the other hand, the divinity of the world is a quite conceivable idea, since the developed world is but a state of multiformity which informs the divine *archē* as the result of a cosmogonical evolution. Therefore we need not take

<sup>34</sup>Pace Kahn, *Anaximander* 48.

<sup>35</sup>"Innumerable Worlds" 10–11.

*ouranoi* in Aëtius' report to mean "celestial rings" and substitute *caelos* for *mundos* in Cicero to bring the two reports into agreement: they already agree and ascribe to Anaximander a view which seems to be fairly plausible, namely, the divinity of the worlds which come out of the divine *archē*. As to Cicero's *longis intervallis*, the phrase seems to me to have the temporal sense, but the expression *innumerabilis mundos* involves Atomistic connotations just as Aëtius' *apeirous ouranous* does. The question whether Aëtius and Cicero thought of Anaximander's worlds as coexistent or successive cannot be settled, but fortunately the issue is of no importance, for Theophrastus' judgment, from which the two reports ultimately derive, is pretty clear.

In (d) Kirk suggests that in presumably speaking of the *Apeiron* as "embracing all the heavens" at *De Caelo* Γ 5.303b10, Aristotle might mean under *ouranoi* Anaximander's plural celestial rings, while "Theophrastus seems to have decided to clarify Aristotle's phrase by adding the words 'and the worlds in them,'" and therefore the whole passage has nothing to do with plural worlds.<sup>36</sup> But the true parallel to Aristotle's  $\delta \text{ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀπειρον ὄν}$  is not Simplicius' corrupted  $\xi\kappa \eta\varsigma \text{ ἀπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς}$  (the correct phrase in Hippolytus reads  $\xi\kappa \eta\varsigma \text{ γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς}$ , and it bears no resemblance to Aristotle's locution) but Hippolytus' 6b,  $\eta\gamma \kappa \alpha \iota \text{ πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους}$ , where the presumably Theophrastean counterpart of Aristotle's *ouranoi* is *kosmoi*. This fact invalidates Kirk's (d), the more so in that section 6 is not, as the synopsis shows, the only Theophrastean reference to plural worlds in Anaximander.

Kahn advances another argument which draws on the possibility of a confusion between Anaximander's plural celestial rings and plural worlds.<sup>37</sup> Following Reinhardt, he argues the authenticity of Simplicius' *hoi ouranoi* and *hoi kosmoi* in them:

Although κόσμος in the singular can be used by Aristotle for a portion of the universe, and for the sublunary "world" in particular . . . , there seems to be no Aristotelian example of κόσμος in the plural except for the

<sup>36</sup>"Some Problems" 338. Kirk also considers the possibility that under *ouranoi* Aristotle might here mean celestial spheres: *ibid.*, and *Presocratic Philosophers* 125.

<sup>37</sup>*Anaximander* 46–53. In the second printing of his book (Philadelphia, 1985, new preface, xiv) Kahn added as a correction to p. 50: "Zeller's suggestion that πάντες οἱ οὐρανοί for Anaximander meant the celestial rings no longer seems so plausible, and the interpreters who take this as a reference to a cyclical repetition of world systems are probably right."

doctrine of other worlds. . . . The phrase is a very unusual one for a Peripatetic, and it has been suggested that ἀπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους must have been taken by Theophrastus almost verbatim from the book of Anaximander.<sup>38</sup>

Kahn then suggests that by *ouranoi* Anaximander was referring to the celestial rings which constituted the visible heavens, while *kosmoi* should mean diverse regions or departments of the world, "some lower 'arrangements' of atmosphere or earth." But what about the doxographic attribution of the theory of plural worlds to Anaximander? "It may well be that Anaximander's statement was so brief, and his terminology so unfamiliar, that Aristotle and Theophrastus simply paraphrased his words without venturing to decide whether or not this conception was identical with the *κόσμοι* of the atomists. The later doxographers, of course, exercised no such restraint."<sup>39</sup>

Now the assumption that the peculiarity of Simplicius' wording attests that the locution is a paraphrase of Anaximander's idiom is mistaken, for this peculiarity is due to quite another reason, namely the distortion of Theophrastus' text; the correct phrase in Hippolytus has, for its part, *kosmos* in the singular and is perfectly usual for a Peripatetic, the word being used in the regular Aristotelian sense of the sub-lunary world.<sup>40</sup> Further, Cornford's contention, followed here by Kahn, that in Anaximander the word *ouranoi* refers to the rings of the heavenly bodies, has been found to be contrary to our evidence.<sup>41</sup> Yet even on his own assumptions Kahn's argument is self-contradictory. Indeed, if Theophrastus accounted, as he certainly did, for Anaximander's theory of the heavens as constituted by the fiery rings, he thereby proved himself capable of understanding the peculiar sense in which Anaximander supposedly used the word *ouranoi*; and therefore one cannot suggest, as Kahn does, that because of the unfamiliarity of the terminology Theophrastus could not have formed a clear idea of the meaning of the allegedly Anaximandrian "*hoi ouranoi* and *hoi kosmoi* in them." On

<sup>38</sup> *Anaximander* 49; see Reinhardt, *Parmenides* 175; cf. Kerschensteiner, *Kosmos* 30–32.

<sup>39</sup> *Anaximander* 50.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. DK ad loc.; Guthrie, *History* I 110.

<sup>41</sup> Seligman's criticism of Kahn (*Apeiron* 128–29) is weakened by his acceptance of the assumption of the peculiar meaning of *ouranoi* in Anaximander and by his evasiveness in recognizing Hippolytus (6) as alternative and superior to the parallel version in Simplicius.



the contrary, being familiar with the supposed Anaximandrian use of *ouranoi* Theophrastus could not understand the phrase otherwise than as "the sky and the arrangements in it," that is, as referring to one sole world. If we suppose now that the phrase was the only source of Theophrastus' information on the point (as Kahn's argument implies), we have to conclude that Theophrastus could not have credited Anaximander with the theory of plural worlds—which, however, is contrary to what the synopsis demonstrates.<sup>42</sup>

Our examination of the arguments against Anaximander's belief in plural worlds has found them to be fallacious—partly because of their methodological or logical invalidity, partly because of their drawing on speculative probabilities, and partly because of mistaken assessments of the sources. The whole controversy is largely artificial, for the attempts to discard the doxographic evidence on Anaximander's theory of periodic world destruction are mostly prompted by a personal feeling that such a theory is "difficult" and "unlikely" rather than by the actual state of our evidence, whose complicated character is quite satisfactorily accounted for by the later association and confusion of Anaximander's successive worlds with the coexistent ones of the Atomists.<sup>43</sup> The suggested reasons for Theophrastus' alleged error in ascribing the theory to Anaximander fail to show why Theophrastus would have had to commit it; what they show (partly unsuccessfully) is that Theophrastus might have been mistaken for several and various reasons, that is, they demonstrate nothing.<sup>44</sup> However, the fact is that Theophrastus' account contained reports on two Anaximandrian conceptions which actually testify, independently of the fragment and of each other, to the accuracy of his judgment.

The first of these reports is the doctrine, mentioned by Aristotle and ascribed in Theophrastus' name to Anaximander by Alexander, according to which the world, from its very beginning, undergoes the continuous process of drying up. As we have seen, the way in which

<sup>42</sup> Kahn's claim, *Anaximander* 50–51, that his interpretation has the advantage of avoiding the very serious difficulties of attributing the theory of innumerable (Atomistic) worlds to Anaximander is misleading, for it is simply not true that the only alternative lies between denying Anaximander the belief in plural worlds and ascribing to him the view of the Atomists.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Guthrie, *History* I 108.

<sup>44</sup> As Seligman, *Apeiron* 127, observes, Kirk, *Presocratic Philosophers* 125–26, shows himself aware of the inconclusive character of his arguments.

both Aristotle and Theophrastus describe this process most naturally suggests its irreversible character and therefore the eventual destruction of the world. The second testimony is Theophrastus' comment on Anaximander's notion of time: "he speaks of time as of limited [spans] of the generation, the existence, and the destruction" (synopsis, 10). The remark is related to the concluding phrase of the fragment, *kata tēn tou chronou taxin*. As it stands in the fragment, the phrase is perfectly understandable and needs no exegesis. That Theophrastus nevertheless comments on it indicates that he intends here to provide the reader with some additional information, and in fact the comment goes beyond the information retrievable from the fragment. This being the case, we should accept Theophrastus' statement at face value, that is, as an observation on Anaximander's phraseology or a reference to his definite statement about time. Its empirical nature having been recognized, Theophrastus' remark has the force of almost authentic testimony. Kirk's contention that the fragment (allegedly misconstrued) was the sole source of Theophrastus' information on the cosmic cycles in Anaximander<sup>45</sup> thus proves unwarranted; on the contrary, as our evidence shows, in reporting Anaximander's theory of periodic world destruction Theophrastus relied on a range of the authentic expressions of this belief in Anaximander's teaching.

ARYEH FINKELBERG

TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY

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<sup>45</sup> "Some Problems" 339.

## COLD MEATS: TIMOKREON ON THEMISTOKLES

In his *Life of Themistokles* (21.3–4) Plutarch preserves a poem by Timokreon of Ialysos in Rhodes (quoted below), one that inveighs against Themistokles for not restoring him to Ialysos (after the second Persian invasion). Were it not for scholarly interest in Themistokles, this poem would receive next to no attention at all. No one has found it worthy of remark that Plutarch's source, presumably some earlier work on Themistokles or the Persian wars, recorded the poem.<sup>1</sup> I argue here that the poem's survival implies that it was a successful song in its own setting, the symposium, then propose a way of reading the poem that makes its popularity more credible than now appears. Finally I point out a consequence for our understanding of the dynamics of oral tradition.

My first question is how the poem entered the body of historical writing from which Plutarch got it. Timokreon depicts himself in the poem as a victim of Themistokles' perfidy; whether the incident is truth or fiction, he was thus presumably composing his poetry in the first half of the fifth century.<sup>2</sup> Where Timokreon was living is indeterminable; he might have been on Rhodes (for the poem does not say that he did not get home), or in Asia Minor, or even at Athens.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the precise place and date of its composition, the significant thing is that this is a symposium poem.<sup>4</sup> It was sung to a small group of men, friends of Timokreon, who gathered in a private house to eat and drink together.<sup>5</sup> Such a poem would only become known outside the group if it was

<sup>1</sup> See Flacelière, *Vie* 20–25, and Podlecki, *Life* Part II, for discussions of Plutarch's sources.

<sup>2</sup> Robertson, "Timocreon" 63–64, is the first to suggest that the whole episode alluded to may be a fiction. He compares Hipponax, whose low-life vignettes are presumably not reports of actual adventures.

<sup>3</sup> Timokreon was alleged to have been exiled on a charge of Medizing, according to Plutarch (*Them.* 21.7); Thrasymachos of Chalkedon (see below) reveals that he portrays himself as a guest of the Persian king.

<sup>4</sup> Smyth, *Melic Poets* ad loc., identifies it as such from the personal tone of the opening and the short stanzas. It has analogies in the lyric invective of Alkaios and Anakreon. Cf. Gentili, *Poetry* 107–14, on poetic praise and blame; Koster, *Die Invektive*, for a survey of uses and occasions for invective in antiquity.

<sup>5</sup> For a description of the physical setting of the symposium see Bergquist, "Symptotic Space." Sanctuaries also had dining rooms for small groups, as she points out.

resung by members of the group to other gatherings, and by the audiences at those sessions to yet others. The poem had to spread in genuinely popular fashion and be taken up in circles of relatively educated and sophisticated men in order to come to the notice of a writer of history. Perhaps it had to migrate from one city to another. Without such propagation it is difficult to explain how the writer who recorded it in a historical tract heard it, let alone why he thought it worth transcribing among what must have been hundreds of ephemeral symposium songs.<sup>6</sup>

The poem may have circulated in written form as well, and possibly the transcriber found it in a collection of Timokreon's poetry. There was such a collection, judging from access to Timokreon's poems by later writers.<sup>7</sup> But that possibility does not invalidate the point about the poem's popularity, for a written text would only be valued and copied initially if the poetry was current, that is, if people wanted to learn and sing it. No archival impulse is detectable in the first half of the fifth century; there was no place like a library that collected manuscripts for consultation by those seeking to recover past opinions.<sup>8</sup> Textual survival was not an alternative to continued public interest in a poet but a support for that interest until the late fifth century at least.<sup>9</sup> Once Timokreon was an established name, in the penumbra at least of the

<sup>6</sup>Possible transcribers, both writing in the second half of the fifth century, are Ion of Chios (*FGH* 392) and Stesimbrotos of Thasos (*FGH* 107). See Jacoby's notes for characterization of their writing. Ion moved in the same circles as Themistokles' rival Kimon. In his autobiographical writing he described symposia that he attended (T5); at one such symposium he heard talk about Themistokles (F13). Stesimbrotos wrote a tract conventionally called "On Themistokles, Thoukydides, and Perikles" in which he included attacks on Themistokles (e.g., F2); Carawan, "Stesimbrotus," studies the evidence for its contents. Plutarch cites Stesimbrotos in his *Life of Themistokles*. Podlecki, *Life* 55–58, mentions these writers among others as early sources for material on Themistokles.

<sup>7</sup>The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Wasps* or his source must have had a copy of Timokreon's poems available in order to identify the line. Another of Timokreon's castigations of Themistokles, one that shared the theme of "three talents" with the poem discussed here, was quoted by an author of *Peri ainou* (= *PMG* 730). Frost, *Commentary* 183–84, adds a reference to the same poem by Aelius Aristides and takes these citations as a sign of wider currency for this poem than for ours, but the quotations are too late to tell us anything about earlier popularity. These references must be derived from a text.

<sup>8</sup>On the lack of an archival habit at Athens before the fourth century see Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, esp. 60–83; cf. also Georgoudi, "Manières d'archivage."

<sup>9</sup>This view is essentially that of Rösler, *Dichter* 91–106.

canon inherited from the fifth century, his work would be preserved in textual form.

Other evidence suggests that Timokreon's poetry was well known in the fifth century. Aristophanes parodied one of his poems at *Wasps* 1060–62 and another, probably less contentious, poem at *Acharnians* 533–34.<sup>10</sup> Thrasy machos of Chalkedon, a sophist of the later fifth century (and an interlocutor in Plato's *Republic*), recounts an episode from Timokreon's alleged sojourn with the Persian king.<sup>11</sup> This tale must be drawn from Timokreon's poetry; in it—as in our poem—Timokreon appears as a scrapper who hobnobs with the great. Plato may be paraphrasing a ditty of Timokreon's at *Gorgias* 493a–b.<sup>12</sup> Plutarch quotes from two other poems directed against Themistokles (21.5–7, *PMG* 2–3). Some of these various poems are generic *skolia* (drinking songs), but Timokreon's anti-Themistoclean stance seems to have been a distinctive feature of his oeuvre, so we may imagine that a set of poems with a definable political attitude was part of the shared liturgy among banqueters of certain persuasions. Although it may have been available in writing, our poem must have owed its continued life in the fifth century to an essentially oral tradition.

Oral tradition, however, is a chancy medium; a song must be effective if it is to hold its own in collective memory against newer efforts. We can therefore ask what the continuing appeal of this invective against Themistokles was. Here is the text and a translation of the poem:

ἀλλ' εἰ τό γε Πανυσανίαν ἦ καὶ τό γε Ξάνθιππον αἰνεῖς,  
 ἦ τό γε Λευτυχίδαν, ἐγὼ δ' Ἀριστείδαν ἐπαινέω  
 ἄνδρ' ἱερῶν ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν  
 ἐλθεῖν ἓνα λῶιστον, ἐπεὶ Θεμιστοκλῆν ἤχθαρε Λατώ,  
 ψεύσταν ἄδικον προδόταν, δς Τιμοκρέοντα ξεῖνον ἐόντα  
 ἀργυροῖσι κοβαλικοῖσι πεισθεῖς οὐ κατὰ γεν  
 πατρίδ' Ἰαλυσὸν εἰς(ω),  
 λαβῶν δὲ τρεῖς ἀργυροῦ τάλαντ' ἔβα πλέων εἰς ὄλεθρον,

<sup>10</sup> *Wasps*: *PMG* 733 (a scholiast quoting Didymos); *Acharnians*: *PMG* 731 (a scholiast who quotes Timokreon's *skolion*).

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Athenaios 416A, not included in *PMG*. For Thrasy machos see DK II no. 85 (319–26).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *PMG* 732; Hephaistion quotes two lines of Timokreon's that could be Plato's source for the figure of a *Sikelos kompsos anēr*.

τοὺς μὲν κατάγων ἀδίκως, τοὺς δ' ἐκδιώκων, τοὺς δὲ καίνων·  
 ἀργυρίων δ' ὑπόπλεως Ἴσθμοι γελόιως πανδόκευε  
 ψυχρὰ (τὰ) κρεῖα παρίσχων·  
 οἱ δ' ἥσθιον κηῦχοντο μὴ ὦραν Θεμιστοκλέος γενέσθαι.<sup>13</sup> (727 PMG)

Now if *you* praise Pausanias or again you praise Xanthippos or you Leotychides, I on the other hand praise Aristides, the one best man to come from holy Athens, for Leto developed an antipathy to Themistokles, that liar, perverter of justice, traitor, who let himself be persuaded by underhanded money and did not restore Timokreon to Ialysos, though he was a guest-friend. Instead, taking three talents of silver, he went sailing to perdition, restoring some unjustly, driving others out, and murdering others. And full of silver he laughably kept an inn at the Isthmos, supplying meats that were cold. The others ate and hoped that no care/portion (of sacrificial meat)<sup>14</sup> of Themistokles would come into being.

It is not immediately obvious why this poem should remain popular. There appear to be rhetorical problems with it, especially in the priamel and the last stanza. How should one take the praise of the priamel, as sincere or as heavy irony? What is the relationship of the priamel to the clause introduced by *epei* that follows it? As for the last stanza, it seems not only obscure but feeble as a conclusion to invective.

Modern attempts to clarify the poem have centered almost completely on identifying its historical context and date. Most commentators, assuming that the praise in the first two lines is sincere, have dated the poem to 478 or 477 before either Pausanias or Leotychides had been tainted with the charge of treating with the enemy.<sup>15</sup> C. M. Bowra discusses the poem in *Greek Lyric Poetry* with his customary learning and

<sup>13</sup>The meter is dactylo-epitrite, a form that is usually thought of as choral, and the poem appears to be a triad, although Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 351–52, suggests emendations to make it monostrophic. But Pindar's encomia (118–28 SM) are almost all dactylo-epitrite, including one (123) that is triadic, and they are probably solo songs for the symposium, as Van Groningen, *Pindare* 15–18, argues. Smyth, *Melic Poets* ad loc., comments on Timokreon's innovations. Choral song from tragedy was sung solo at symposia; cf. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm* 30–35, for discussion.

<sup>14</sup>On this word see below.

<sup>15</sup>Fornara, "Aspects" 257–58, discusses earlier views. Scodel, "Encomium" 102 n. 1, gives a good summary with more recent bibliography. The date 478/7 is also tentatively accepted by Lenardon, *Saga* 104. Fornara argues that Pausanias was not a pariah by 477, so that the poem could be later. Schieber, "Leotychides," discusses Leotychides' disgrace at length with a view to establishing a secure *terminus ante quem* for the poem and proposes the spring of 477.

liveliness; he proposes that "Leto" is a reference to the Delian League organized by Themistokles' rival Aristekides.<sup>16</sup> Themistokles' "innkeeping" at the Isthmos has been referred since Kirchhoff to the episode described by Herodotos (8.123–24): after the battle of Salamis the generals gathered at the Isthmos to vote on the most worthy in battle; each general voted for himself first, but the majority voted for Themistokles second. The matter was left unresolved, and Themistokles, disappointed, went to Sparta, where he got a grand welcome.<sup>17</sup> Both of these ideas have been accepted by most scholars, and they are consistent with a date of 478 or 477 for the poem. The serious obstacle to locating the poem historically is that no occasion can be identified on which Themistokles was in a position to restore Timokreon.<sup>18</sup> Given that fact, it is legitimate to observe that if the poem is a straightforward account of a minor historical event, its survival is a puzzle anyway, so perhaps another mode of interpretation is needed. The historical approach also does nothing to elucidate the rhetorical problems.

More recently Noel Robertson has argued that since the point of the poem is invective against Themistokles, the priamel must be ironic and the poem must therefore have been composed *after* the downfall of all four generals mentioned in it.<sup>19</sup> "Themistokles is doubly damned by the praise of Aristekides; in plain prose, even Aristekides gains by comparison with Themistokles." These four are "mentioned as the most outrageous names Timokreon could think of. Yet they are paragons beside Themistokles!"<sup>20</sup> The episode of Themistokles' betraying Timokreon, he suggests, may well be a fiction. In Robertson's version the poem escapes from the historical straitjacket that would quickly make it yesterday's news, and he adds to appreciation of its invective. But like

<sup>16</sup>*Lyric Poetry* 349–58. Kirkwood, *Monody* 182–85, also deals briefly with Timokreon and emphasizes his satirical tone.

<sup>17</sup>Kirchhoff's view is summarized by Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles* 138 n. 27. Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 352–53, misreports Wilamowitz's dating of the poem; the latter suggests 478/7. According to Herodotos the prize went unawarded because of jealousy, but Themistokles' reputation was on everyone's lips.

<sup>18</sup>The impossibility is acknowledged by Fornara, "Aspects" 258–59, and Lenardon, *Saga* 104.

<sup>19</sup>Robertson, "Timokreon" 65–66. Robertson argues that all four fell from favor in the 470s. Podlecki, *Life* 53, emphasizes that *prodota* in our poem (5) could point to the charge of treachery laid against Themistokles, suggesting that the poem postdates his exile (although it could refer simply to betrayal of Timokreon).

<sup>20</sup>Robertson, "Timokreon" 65, 66.

the other interpretations, his view assumes that the singer must have the same attitude toward all four generals. It is, however, by no means clear that either Xanthippos or Aristides was ever disgraced or that Aristides was hated by members of the Delian League.<sup>21</sup> True, "damnation on them all" may have been a colonial view of Athenian and Spartan generals, but Robertson's explanation does not quite work rhetorically, as I will show in a moment.

Ruth Scodel offers the only literary consideration the poem has received since Bowra. She is interested in the genre affiliations of the poem and proposes that it defines itself as encomium by its opening but in a witty surprise becomes anti-encomium, invective, at the end of the first strophe; the rest of the poem is then a foil for the opening.<sup>22</sup> The praise of the opening is not necessarily ironic, although it is a pretext for invective. Leto is mentioned because she is the kindest of gods and would be the last to hate; the gods' hatred is an inversion of a theme from encomiastic poetry.

However, the rhetorical problems remain. In all these versions of the priamel there is a logical jolt that makes the poem seem arbitrary. The problem is this. The structure of the priamel makes it at least formally disjunctive, that is, the last entry should eclipse the ones before.<sup>23</sup> There must therefore be a rising series of which Aristides is the peak. What then is the relationship of this climax to the following denunciation of Themistokles? If the praise of Aristides is genuine, as Bowra and others think, then the abrupt change of tone is dismissive of the *laudandus* in effect.<sup>24</sup> If the priamel is sarcastic, then it comes to a climax with Aristides as the biggest current rogue—and drops him to turn to Themistokles. Why pass up an active scoundrel for a deposed one? Sarcasm in which "best" *at the climax of a series* means "mildly bad by comparison" (as Robertson takes it), rather than "worst," loses its force. On the other hand, if "best" means "worst," then it detracts from denunciation of Aristides to switch attention to Themistokles

<sup>21</sup> See Meiggs, *Empire* 59–60, on Aristides' later career; 61, on later reactions to Aristides' assessment. He cites (64–65) the case of several Chalcidian cities that were to return to the assessment of Aristides as a result of the Peace of Nikias, presumably because it was acceptable.

<sup>22</sup> Scodel, "Encomium."

<sup>23</sup> See Race, *Priamel* 1–17, for definitions and attempts to categorize priamels.

<sup>24</sup> Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 353, speculates that Timokreon is grateful to Aristides. But on 352 he says, "Timokreon announces that his own hero is Aristides, but uses this really as a cover to attack Themistokles." This shift in emphasis is a sign of the problem.



and detracts from vituperation of Themistokles to make Aristeides the climax of a list of disreputable characters. Scodel's view, in which the priamel, although it may be positive, is just a foil for the attack on Themistokles that follows, is better from the point of view of rhetorical force. But it too accepts a lack of connection between the priamel and the rest of the poem; in fact, she sees the sudden violation of the audience's expectations as the point. Yet if the audience felt powerful admiration of Aristeides, it would be irritated by the abuse of the encomiastic form. If it did not admire him, the praise would have to be taken as sarcastic. In that case either the sarcasm is mild and insignificant, or it is emphatic, with the problems mentioned above. In sum, either the priamel is meant seriously, in which case the switch enfeebles it, or it is essentially pointless.<sup>25</sup>

There is also the problem of how to take *epei* in line 4. Robertson translates *epei* in line 4 as "now that."<sup>26</sup> Yet his interpretation does not require that anything have changed as a result of Themistokles' loss of prestige (unless one supposes Themistokles' fall from favor to have exposed the extent of his villainy or made him worse). There is a logical discontinuity in the statement, "now that Themistokles has fallen from favor, even Aristeides is a paragon of virtue compared to him." Others translate "when" or "since."<sup>27</sup> "When" is not helpful, for it makes what is rhetorically the main part of the poem into an inessential temporal marker. "Since" implies a causal relationship that goes unexplained.

These interpretations do nothing to illuminate the last stanza, either. As mentioned, the old suggestion of a reference to the vote at the Isthmos is usually accepted. But this episode was not a particular embarrassment to Themistokles since he received a majority of the second-place votes. Robertson comments that the imperfect *pandokeue* implies a continuing activity rather than a particular occasion; he thinks that it refers to Themistokles' lobbying for democratic governments at various Isthmian festivals.<sup>28</sup> That makes an even less satisfactory ending to a poem whose goal is insult. Even if the singer was antidemo-

<sup>25</sup>The comment of Race, *Priamel* 15, is relevant: "Once the subject of ultimate interest has been arrived at, highlighted as it were, then the author is free to elaborate on it if he wishes, or, having made his point, he may pass on. But there must be some *point* to the priamel. Not just any list constitutes a priamel; it must lead up to something."

<sup>26</sup>Robertson, "Timocreon" 66.

<sup>27</sup>Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 351, translates "when," as does Podlecki, *Life* 51. Meiggs, *Empire* 414, translates "for," and Lenardon, *Saga* 51, gives "since."

<sup>28</sup>Robertson, "Timocreon" 68.

cratic, mention of Themistokles' prodemocratic activities was not shaming to Themistokles, and an insult that would not be perceived as such by the recipient is not very gratifying to the insulter. Themistokles may have gone out with a whimper, but the poem does too. Scodel on the other hand thinks that the stanza parodies encomiastic motifs such as the victor's banquet.<sup>29</sup>

I propose to look at the poem afresh from the perspective of its audience, asking how it establishes rapport with the listeners. The first step must be to consider the requirements of the performance context, the symposium. The function of poetry and song in that setting was to promote camaraderie among the participants and present the singer as a loyal friend and strongminded fellow.<sup>30</sup> A poem should affirm the group of friends and probably political allies that are gathered together.<sup>31</sup> Let us look at the poem with this audience in mind.

The priamel engages the singer with his audience as the singer points to one, then another: "if *you* praise Pausanias. . . ."<sup>32</sup> On the other hand the audience is left to guess the rationale of these choices. They might well have different reactions to different members of the list. The appropriate model against which to see this opening is not the encomiastic priamel but a typical symposium form, the capping game.<sup>33</sup> The singer suggests that he and his audience are engaged in a series of caps—and that he wins.<sup>34</sup> But what makes his contribution tops is not evident until he mentions the name Themistokles.<sup>35</sup> That name organizes all the previous names as a list of rival politicians and mili-

<sup>29</sup>Scodel, "Encomium" 106–7.

<sup>30</sup>The requirements of symposia can be learned from Aristophanes. In *Wasps* (1196–1264) Bdelykleon tries to teach his father proper behavior at the symposium; Philokleon persists in insulting the other guests rather than praising them. Cf. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm* 24–30, on this passage. In *Ach.* 979–87 Polemos is imagined as a destructive symposium guest who refuses to accept the cup of friendship.

<sup>31</sup>For the kind of relationships that performance in the symposium should promote see Murray, "Affair" 7, and Slater, "Ethics."

<sup>32</sup>Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 352, and Smyth, *Melic Poets* ad loc., comment on the air of conviviality created by the opening.

<sup>33</sup>On riddles, responses, and taking up a song from another at symposia see West, *Studies* 17–18.

<sup>34</sup>Notice the *de* (2) setting off his contribution from the previous ones.

<sup>35</sup>Compare the priamel in Tyrtaios 12 W, in which the principle that explains the singer's refusal to praise various achievements is withheld until line 9. The priamel in Sappho 16 V also lists all the choices except the speaker's own before giving the criterion for choice, namely, what is most beautiful.

tary leaders who outstayed Themistokles on the inter-state political scene.<sup>36</sup> What these figures have in common is not necessarily goodness or badness but only their roles in upstaging Themistokles. Aristeides is the cap because his activity on behalf of the Delian League most clearly revealed Themistokles' disappearance from the Aegean scene, or because his reputation was an indictment of Themistokles' character.<sup>37</sup> Any who were poised to protest the idea that they might praise one or another of these generals would let out their breath and laugh when they saw the point. The praise is ironic not because everyone in the list was disgraced but because they are praised for a reason having nothing to do with their own merits (or demerits). The wit, then, is in withholding the terms of the game until too late for anyone else to predict the cap. Although the form is disjunctive and competitive, the implied game actually unites the participants in opposition to Themistokles. All are pictured as joining in the fun of shaming Themistokles by praising those who outstripped him.

The priamel then is a logical lead-in to the rest of the poem, which explains why the singer rejoices at Themistokles' eclipse. The *epei* should be translated "for" and gives the reason for Aristeides' being best: he was the agent of Leto's opposition to Themistokles, and this agency recommends him to the singer.<sup>38</sup> The point is only Aristeides' showing up Themistokles and not any assessment of Aristeides independent of that fact.

<sup>36</sup>All had commands against the Persians in the aftermath of Salamis, while Themistokles is not recorded to have been a general after 480. Xanthippos and Aristeides were political opponents of Themistokles. Leotychides sailed together with Xanthippos in the naval campaign of 479 (Hdt. 8.131), Pausanias and Aristeides in the fleet of 478 (Thuc. 1.94.1 plus Diodoros 11.44.2 and Plut. *Aristeides* 23.1). Aristeides, of course, was involved with the founding of the Delian League. See Meiggs, *Empire* 33–43. On Themistokles' strongly anti-Spartan attitude, which would add to the insulting effect of praising the two Spartans, see Fornara and Samons, *Athens* 114–27.

<sup>37</sup>On the conventional opposition between Aristeides and Themistokles see below.

<sup>38</sup>My view requires that mention of Leto bring Delos (and therefore the Delian League) immediately to mind. Leto and Delos are so closely connected in poetry that there would be no obscurity. The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* narrates Leto's travels and choice of Delos as site for her birth-giving. Lines 147–55 indicate that it was performed at the pan-Ionian festival on Delos, so Leto is linked to the island's political significance. There were also the hymns of Olen about Leto and her children, sung on Delos (Hdt. 4.35), and Pindar's *paianes* 7b and 12, for performance on Delos, tell of Leto's birth-giving. Pindar fr. 33c.1–2 SM addresses Delos as "god-established sprout, most delightful to the children of sleek-locked Leto."

In the following stanza the denunciation of Themistokles is organized around the contrast between money and friendship.<sup>39</sup> Themistokles took a bribe to betray a guest-friend. For the members of the symposium, a group that relied on the power of friendship and was always vulnerable to betrayal, the theme was of immediate interest.<sup>40</sup> The singer, by denouncing Themistokles, signals his own hierarchy of values, with friendship at the top.

The theme of Themistokles' greed continues into the last stanza. Rather than entertain guest-friends, he played the innkeeper and charged for food and drink. Yet after the opprobriousness of abandoning Timokreon this generalization of the charge is weak. Furthermore, as mentioned above, if this is a reference to the episode at the Isthmos recounted by Herodotos, it is scarcely the most embarrassing scene the speaker could have evoked. And if the poem was still sung years after the event, one can hardly imagine that such an oblique reference to an indecisive event was a satisfying climax for the attack. Something more vigorous must be going on in the final stanza, something that appeals to the particular kind of audience found in the symposium.

The "something more vigorous" is, I think, a sustained sexual insult. All of the words of the stanza appear in iambic poetry and/or old comedy as double entendres referring to sexual activity or parts.<sup>41</sup> The adverb *geloîōs* in line 10 points to a more mocking meaning for the sentence than the surface one. Insult by impugning the "manhood" of the victim is a technique well-established for symposium poetry, used by Anakreon (388 *PMG*) as well as Hipponax and Archilochos. Timokreon's poem, translated into straightforward insult (with the help of Jeffrey Henderson's study of sexual language), says: Themistokles, acting as prostitute, admitted everyone who paid him to the area between his legs, but what he offered was a frigid body; still, his clients used him for intercourse and hoped that he would not get an erection.

To show how I arrive at this decoding, I now discuss each word in

<sup>39</sup>As Scodel, "Encomium" 105, points out.

<sup>40</sup>Cf. Alkaios' denunciation of the traitor Pittakos (e.g., 129 V; note the imagery of "eating" in lines 23–24) and Theognis' inveighing against the evil effects of money (e.g., 145–48, 183–92, 319–22).

<sup>41</sup>Old comedy and iambic share a vocabulary that was probably more widespread. See Rosen, *Old Comedy*, on the links between iambic and comedy. Bowra, *Lyric Poetry* 355, comments on the parallels in comedy for *kobalikoisi* in Timokreon and the near-slang that recalls Archilochos or Hipponax.

turn. The verb *pandokeuein* is usually translated as “to be an inn-keeper,” but in this context it must be metaphorical. Since the word literally means “to receive all” it is a natural metaphor for a prostitute.<sup>42</sup> The image here can be compared with *dektria* in the lines sometimes attributed to Archilochos (spuria 331 W):

συκῇ πετραίῃ πολλὰς βόσκουσα κορώνας,  
εὐήθης ξείνων δέκτρια Πασιφύλῃ.

Fig tree among the rocks that feeds many crows, kindly, receptive of strangers Friendly-to-all (Pasiphile).

Athenaios (594 cd) identifies the name as a courtesan name. Pasiphile both receives and feeds strangers.<sup>43</sup> Timokreon’s image is cleverer and nastier, since *pandokeuein* combines the ideas of receiving/feeding and of taking money.

Themistokles received all comers “at the Isthmos.” Henderson says of the word, “*isthmos*, a ridge or any narrow strip of land connecting larger land masses, is used in obscene jokes about men to refer to the perineum (located between the genitals and the anus). . . . In Old Comedy the specific reference is to the Isthmus of Corinth.”<sup>44</sup> The image can be used of women also, and the following line implicitly shifts the image to one of female anatomy.

Themistokles supplies “meats that are cold” to his guests. “Meat” is a metaphor used in comedy to refer to a woman’s genitals.<sup>45</sup> Its application in this context makes Themistokles the passive partner, the one in the “female” position (as a male prostitute would generally

<sup>42</sup>LSJ derive it via *pandokos* from *dechomai*.

<sup>43</sup>For *dechomai* in a sexual context see Semonides 7.49 West and (probably) Archilochos 189 West, both cited by Henderson, *Muse* 243. In the Semonides passage the donkey-wife’s indiscriminate sexual activity is coupled with constant eating.

<sup>44</sup>Henderson, *Muse* 137–38. That the pun was a popular one is indicated, Henderson suggests, by the hetaira name Isthmias found in the comic poet Philetairos (9.5 K).

<sup>45</sup>Henderson, *Muse* 144, cites as prominent examples Aristophanes’ *Ach.* 795, *Lys.* 1062, and *Peace* 717 (this last quoted below). Other food metaphors, e.g., fish or cakes, are also found. Food/sex jokes are especially prominent in *Acharnians* and *Peace*, in which the return of various kinds of abundance and self-indulgence is celebrated; see Henderson 47 for food imagery, 60–66 for discussion of the two plays. As Taillardat, *Images* 59–60, points out, *kreas* also means “body” in general in Aristophanes, probably a reflection of “vulgar” usage.

be). The metaphor "meat" of course entails "eating" as its corollary.<sup>46</sup> Two lines from Aristophanes' *Peace* bracket, in a heterosexual context, the image found here. In 717 Trygaios says, envying the *boulē* its enjoyment of Theoria:

δσας δὲ κατέδδει χόλικας ἐφθὰς καὶ κρέα.

How many boiled sausages and meats you will eat!

The line provides a parallel in imagery and double meaning to Timokreon's stanza.<sup>47</sup> A little later (879–80) a slave explains what he is doing when he is caught "marking out" Theoria:

τὸ δεῖν', εἰς Ἴσθμια  
σκηγὴν ἔμαντοῦ τῷ πέει καταλαμβάνω.

Nothing special, I am staking out (a place for) my tent at the Isthmian games with my penis.

Thus the reference to the Isthmian games that some have seen in Timokreon is compatible with the sexual meaning.<sup>48</sup>

"To supply," *parechein*, is found as a euphemism in sexual con-

<sup>46</sup> Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary* 138–41, discusses Latin sexual imagery of eating, which refers to fellatio and cunnilingus. Greek imagery of eating is broader; it includes those acts but also describes male satisfaction in sex. The most indicative passage is in the Megarian's attempt to sell his daughters as "pigs," *Ach.* 795–96: καὶ γίγνεται γὰρ τάνδε τῶν χοίρων τὸ κρεῖς / ἄδιστον ἂν τὸν ὀδελὸν ἀμπεπαρμένον, "And the flesh of these young pigs is sweetest when pierced on a spit." Here the idea of eating is unexpressed but clearly present; it does not provide an image of the particular sexual act ("spit" does that) but rather a nonvisual analogy of the pleasure of intercourse with a desirable partner. Cf. also *Ach.* 1106, a perfect double entendre in a list of delicious-sounding food preparations.

<sup>47</sup> Henderson, *Muse* 144, identifies the image as cunnilingus, which in the previous line it is; but as the previous note shows, imagery of eating has a more general application. Consequently I think that this line shifts to a summarizing statement of pleasurable sexual acts. In Timokreon I think that anal intercourse is the act implied.

<sup>48</sup> Taillardat, *Images* 77, quotes the scholion ad loc. for the explanation that it refers both to the Isthmian Games and to the "narrowness of the prostitute's genitals." Kantharos (10 KA), also a fifth-century comic playwright, has the lines (A) οὐκοῦν ἀκρατι-  
σώμεθ' αὐτοῦ. (B) μηδαμῶς / Ἴσθμοι γὰρ ἀριστήσομεν, "(A) So then we shall break our fast here. (B) Certainly not; for we shall have breakfast at the Isthmos." This is probably a reference to sexual activity, according to Henderson, *Muse* 138 and 186 (who refers it to cunnilingus); if so it is parallel to Timokreon in its combination of eating and Isthmos.

texts; the verb adds nothing to the vividness of the image but is not inappropriate to it.<sup>49</sup> *Lysistrata* 227 uses the verb in a context of sexual unresponsiveness:

κακῶς παρέξω κοῦχλ' προσκινήσομαι.

I will supply (my part) with ill grace and not move responsively.<sup>50</sup>

It is used in *Lysistrata* by the female partner of complying with the man's desire, a perfect parallel to its use by Timokreon.

But Themistokles is so devoid of the capacity for sexual excitement that his flesh is clammy.<sup>51</sup> Like the women of *Lysistrata*, he offers only an inert body. For the contrast between warmth and cold as sexual responses it is possible to cite, in addition to parallels from comedy, another poem of the early fifth century, Pindar's encomium for Theoxenos (123.3–6, 10–11 SM): "he who looks at the sparkling rays of Theoxenos' eyes and does not swell with desire has a dark heart with cold fire forged of adamant or iron," whereas "I melt like the wax of holy bees in the warmth."<sup>52</sup>

But those who were eating prayed that "no care/joint (*ōra*) of Themistokles arise." William Slater has pointed out that *ōra* could be a pun on a word meaning (apparently) "joint" of meat in a sacrificial context.<sup>53</sup> This second meaning fits into the food imagery of the stanza and can be supposed, by analogy with *kōlē*, "joint," to admit a secondary sexual sense.<sup>54</sup> However unpleasant cold flesh might be, they hoped that he would not acquire a "joint," for if he did he might reverse the

<sup>49</sup>Henderson, *Muse* 161, citing *Lys.* 162–63, 227, 362.

<sup>50</sup>On *proskinoumai* see Bain, "Six Verbs" 66.

<sup>51</sup>"Heat" characterizes both the woman and the man in a heterosexual encounter. See Henderson, *Muse* 47–48, 145 no. 183, 177–78.

<sup>52</sup>Hdt. 5.92, the story of Periander and his dead wife Melissa, whose ghost says that he "put his loaves in a cold oven," should also be recalled. This is a different image, according to which the female body is an oven in which the man bakes his penis.

<sup>53</sup>Slater's suggestion is cited by Robertson, "Timocreon" 62 n. 9, who translates it as "portion." In *SIG* 1037, a list of parts of a sacrifice that a priest should get in various cases, *ōra* is distinguished from *kōlē* (thighbone), but they may be similar since an *ōra* is explicitly substituted for a *kōlē* in one case. The two words are said by a scholion ad *Od.* 12.89 (quoted in *SIG*) to mean the same thing, *ōra* being Ionic.

<sup>54</sup>On the image *kōlē* (thighbone with meat on it) for erect penis see Henderson, *Muse* 129.

situation and screw them.<sup>55</sup> Even if only the meaning "care" is admitted, the implication is clear that should Themistokles pay attention to the sexual arrangement, it would be hard on the others.

In light of the rest of the stanza, it is easy to see the first two words, "full of silver," as having a second meaning as well. The verb *pimplēmi* is used of a man's sexual activity.<sup>56</sup> The silver that Themistokles collects is the material that his customers fill him with, another indication that he is "female" to their "male" (*hypopleōs* = "full from below"?).

The stanza now follows coherently on the previous one, completing the account of how Themistokles treated his *xenos* Timokreon by giving a fuller picture of the bribery that overrode the ties of *xenia*. The one who bribed Themistokles went to his "inn" and for a price made use of his body, that is, got him to do the briber's bidding. The obscene image maligns Themistokles' authority, depicting his political activity as unfree subservience to other men.<sup>57</sup>

In the context of the symposium Themistokles becomes the "other" that the symposium group defines itself against. Violation of ties of friendship is imaged as "female" passivity, in contrast to which the symposiasts are "men." The imagery of eating in the poem brings Themistokles into immediate juxtaposition to the audience, who ate as well as drank together. By contrast, the group's eating becomes a symbolic gesture of trust, and the always fragile links among the men are thereby emotionally strengthened. If women or boys were present at the symposium, they must have added to the contrast by making the men feel "warm." In addition, because the audience must decipher the last stanza it acts as an in-joke; to detect it is to be a member of a select

<sup>55</sup>*Kreas* of a man's penis is found only in homosexual contexts in comedy, according to Henderson, *Muse* 129. Imagery of "eating" a man appears only in the case of fellatio (Henderson 47; cf. 167–68). An alternative construction of the imagery in this stanza, therefore, could see Themistokles as providing his clients with the opportunity to practice fellatio on him. However, he is so cold/impotent that he cannot produce an erection. This version is much more demeaning to the customers, for it puts them in the abhorrent position of paying to act like "women," whereas in the version given above Themistokles is in the female position. The point would then be that the customers were willing to degrade themselves in order to buy his political backing. For imagery of fellatio performed by men see Henderson 245–46; on the disgust expressed in conventional writing, Jocelyn, "Indecency."

<sup>56</sup>Henderson, *Muse* 161 n. 49.

<sup>57</sup>Cf. the discussion of male prostitution and its political implications in Dover, *Homosexuality*, and Halperin, "Prostitution."



and witty coterie.<sup>58</sup> The popularity of the poem becomes understandable when the final stanza is seen to provide a climax to the insult and a joke for the audience that also makes it feel validated as a group.

The poem could be resung at any time because it did not require knowledge of or emotional response to any specific historical situation (beyond Aristeides' connection with the Delian League) to make it effective.<sup>59</sup> The poem's survival is also abetted by its structure. Although Timokreon is referred to by name, the singer of the poem is not identified with him. Timokreon's name appears in the third person in the anecdote of the second stanza. By this means the poem is made available to whoever wishes to sing it. The poem improves, in fact, if someone other than Timokreon is the singer. Now the audience need not wonder suspiciously what the real story is, for Timokreon's misadventure becomes an example for the singer, a way of illustrating Themistokles' typical conduct.<sup>60</sup>

The separation of the singer from Timokreon is no doubt deliberate. Another poem of Timokreon's (729 *PMG*), quoted only in part by Plutarch, shows the same structure and confirms that the poet favored giving his poems a life apart from himself. The lines are worth looking at:

οὐκ ἄρα Τιμοκρέων μόνος  
Μήδοισιν ὀρκιατομεῖ·  
ἀλλ' ἐντὶ καὶ ἄλλοι δὴ πονη-  
ροὶ κοῦκ ἐγὼ μόνα κόλου-  
ρις· ἐντὶ καὶ ἄλλαι ἰώπεκες.

Well, and so Timokreon is not alone in exchanging oaths with the Persians, but there are other evildoers too, and I am not the only fox to lose a tail; there are other vixens also.

Timokreon is branded as a Medizer, but the singer switches to a more general description of his own knavery. Any situation in which the singer wished to make the point that another had been caught doing what the singer was accused of could call forth this song. The singer is distinguished not only from Timokreon but from Timokreon's particu-

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Nagy, "Iambos," on the *ainos* in the context of the symposium.

<sup>59</sup> It follows that the poem cannot be dated by identifying the situation it describes.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Fabbro, "Sul riuoso," on the minor ahistoricizing alterations undergone by a stanza of Alkaios when it became a skolion, detached from its historical setting.

lar (fictional or real) experience. Timokreon must have been a more self-conscious poet than he has been given credit for, a poet who expected that the poem would circulate beyond his circle. That expectation in itself is evidence that poems were resung.

This thought brings us back to the matter of the oral tradition, on which the poem provokes one further observation. If this poem continued to be popular, then Themistokles must represent more than the particular politician. The poem itself helps make Themistokles into an emblematic figure, on the one hand similar to a stock tyrant and on the other associated with the Athenian navy. His "innkeeping" links him with those who work for a living, that is, with the *dēmos* and democracy. Since his dealings are with someone from Rhodes he can stand as a symbol of Athenian imperialism. The poem allows different significance to be attached to Themistokles depending on the political needs of the singer and his group.

Symposium song must have been one of the mechanisms by which historical figures were turned into quasi-legendary ones.<sup>61</sup> Legends of lawgivers, the stories of the Seven Wise Men, and tales of tyrants probably formed and evolved in symposium poetry as old poems were handed down and new ones composed in response to them.<sup>62</sup> Prominent politicians were drawn into the same ambit and re-created as paradigmatic figures.<sup>63</sup> The symposium, among other institutions, accounts for both continuing awareness and evolution in the perception of these figures.

EVA M. STEHLE

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK

<sup>61</sup>Work on oral transmission at Athens often ignores the symposium; Thomas, *Literacy* 108–27, discusses oral tradition in Greece and on 121 gives the symposium two sentences. Rösler, "*Mnemosyne*," does emphasize symposium song as one of the roots of historiography. For the earlier period see Gentili, *Poetry* 197–215, on Alkaios; he emphasizes communication within the group.

<sup>62</sup>On the legends of lawgivers cf. Szegedy-Maszak, "Legends." For the Seven Wise Men see Snell, *Sieben Weisen*, esp. 62–67, "Das Gastmahl der Sieben Weisen."

<sup>63</sup>See Vox, "Bacchilide," on the use of Solon and Theseus by Themistokles and Kimon; he detects an echo of Solon 35 W in our poem and thinks that Timokreon is debunking Themistokles' adoption of Solon as a predecessor. Aristophanes' *Wasps* 811–12 shows Kleon comparing himself with Themistokles, on which cf. Podlecki, *Life* 59. Frost, *Commentary* 3–39, studies the development of the Themistokles legend, including the later tendency to contrast Themistokles and Aristides as types of men.

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## A KEY TOPOS IN THUCYDIDES: THE COMPARISON OF CITIES AND INDIVIDUALS

One of Thucydides' goals in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* is to explore the nature of the polis.<sup>1</sup> As an early political scientist he not only considers the leaders of communities but also examines the community as a unified whole. He returns time and again to certain key questions, such as how a polis or city behaves, in what sense a city is unified, and whether it is legitimate to speak of the character of a city. Concerning relations between cities, the most important problem is one city's behavior toward another. Thucydides has offered a model to facilitate the exploration of these issues: a model comparing cities and individuals.

The first part of this essay surveys eight passages where this comparison is explicitly made. Cities are likened to individuals in both speech and narrative within Thucydides' work. Although at times the comparison is merely asserted, Thucydides continues to probe this idea. The second part of this essay considers the implications of comparing cities with individuals. In part, this model helps the historian and his readers to analyze the past. The actions and motivations of cities may best be understood by analogy with the actions and motivations of individuals. A possible means for resolving conflict between cities is also suggested. If cities, like individuals, may be thought of as moral agents, this comparison implies that when the interests of cities collide, considerations of justice are relevant to resolving such conflict.<sup>2</sup>

The idea that cities are like individuals is first articulated by Archidamus. In passage 1, the Spartan king asserts the possibility of resolving accusations made both by cities and by individuals.

<sup>1</sup>Jaeger (*Paideia* I 384) says that for Thucydides "the central problem is the nature of the state." An extremely valuable account of the beginnings of political analysis is found in Strasburger, "Die Entdeckung."

<sup>2</sup>Hornblower (*Commentary*) considers this comparison at certain key passages noted below; in his *Thucydides* (178) he emphasizes 3.82.2, because Thucydides introduces the comparison in his own voice (see discussion below). I have also greatly benefited from Farrar, *Origins*, esp. 153–58.

- (1) “ἐγγλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν ὁλόν τε καταλύσαι· πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαντας ἀραμένους ἔνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, ὃν οὐχ ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ’ ὅτι χωρήσει, οὐ ῥάδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι.” (1.82.6)

“For accusations—both by cities and by individuals—are capable of resolution. But once—for the sake of private concerns—our confederacy initiates war, the course of which it is impossible to foresee, it is not easy to settle matters honorably.”<sup>3</sup>

Archidamus is responding to the Corinthians and Athenians who have just spoken. At issue is whether—given recent Athenian actions—Sparta and her allies should go to war. The Corinthians charge that the Athenians have been enslaving Greece (1.68.3–4); the Athenians respond that this gathering has no legitimate authority to judge its actions (1.73.1). In passage 1 Archidamus begins by asserting that it is possible to resolve such accusations (*enklēmata*) made by cities. He goes on to say that if the confederacy (*ksympantas*) initiates war due to the separate interests of individual states (*heneka tōn idiōn*), it will be difficult to decide matters between Corinth, Athens, and other cities.

Yet this is only half the equation. Archidamus states that the accusations of both cities and individuals are capable of resolution, *kai poleōn kai idiōtōn*.<sup>4</sup> That is, he generalizes beyond the immediate circumstances to express a principle which works at two levels: the small-scale perspective of individuals within a city (what we might call the intrapolitical realm), and the larger scope of relations between cities (the interpolitical sphere). Archidamus initiates the idea that cities and individuals may profitably be compared. Here the point of similarity is the issue of answering accusations, yet Thucydides returns to this comparison in different contexts in order to explore the analogy. Rather than focusing on the debate in book 1, I prefer to link this passage to other

<sup>3</sup>Unless otherwise noted, translations are based on Warner's.

<sup>4</sup>Hornblower (*Commentary* 127, cf. 131) says, “It is passages like this [1.82.2] which convince me that it came naturally to Th. to speak of states as moral agents and that he thought that moral judgements could be made about them: he uses the same vocabulary about both, and brackets them as here.”

While more commonly *idiōtēs* contrasts with *politēs* (a person in his private station as opposed to a citizen in his public capacity), here *idiōtēs* contrasts with *polis*. This is complicated by the immediately following expression *heneka tōn idiōn*, which refers to the separate interests of individual states as contrasted with the common interests of the Peloponnesian League. On the range of meaning for *idiōtēs* see *HCT* II 192.

sections of Thucydides' history where the comparison of city and individual is further developed.

In passage 2, the Corinthians address the cities of the Peloponnesian League, some of whom are reluctant to go to war.

- (2) “Ὅτε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῇ τάδε παραινούτων, εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταῦτα ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι.” (1.124.1)

“From every point of view, then, you have good reason to go to war, and this is what we recommend as being in everyone's interest, if it is true that identity of interest is the surest guarantee for both states and individuals.”

Archidamus had suggested that war would advance the interests of only certain cities (cf. passage 1 above). The Corinthians answer that view here by pointing out that Athenian expansion threatens all cities. There is no safety when a tyrant (i.e., Athens) is on the loose.<sup>5</sup> War is in everyone's interest (*koinēi*) provided that identity of interest (*to tauta ksympheronta*) is the surest guarantee for cities and individuals.<sup>6</sup> The shared interest of security is the goal not only of Corinth but of all the Peloponnesian cities. The Corinthians are concerned in this context with the advantages of each city, but again a more general principle is put forth. The second half of the equation (the coincidence of advantage for individuals) is not explored.

Pericles links cities and individuals at the conclusion of two of his speeches. In passage 3, Athens considers the prospect of war. Pericles recognizes the risks, but argues that from such risk comes great honor.

- (3) “εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν, ἣν δὲ ἐκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχόμεθα, ἥσσον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔξομεν, ἐκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ μέγισται τιμαὶ περιγίγνονται.” (1.144.3)

“We must realize that we are forced to go to war, but if we take it on willingly, our opponents will press us eagerly; we must also realize that from the greatest risks come the greatest honors—both for the city and for the individual.”

<sup>5</sup>Cf. 1.122.2–3, 1.124.2–3. Hornblower (*Commentary* 200–201) remarks that the term *tyrannos* is applied to a city, yet “a tyrant is essentially an individual.”

<sup>6</sup>HCT I 417–18 translates with expansion: “if it is true [as of course it is] that identity of interests is the safest ground for action for states as for private individuals.” Various readings and possible interpretations of this passage are then explored.

This war is not, Pericles insists, of the Athenians' choosing. Yet if the Athenians bravely engage in it, they accomplish two things: dampened enthusiasm on the other side, and—from such danger—the greatest honors, just as individuals win the greatest honors from the greatest dangers.

Passage 4 comes from book 2, after war has begun. In spite of the plague and the devastation of the Attic countryside, Pericles argues that the Athenians must maintain their original policy. It is important for Athens to respond to these afflictions with intelligence and proper action.

- (4) “ὡς οἵτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμη μὲν ἥκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν.”  
(2.64.6)

“When adversity occurs, those cities and individuals who are hurt least in judgment and who resist most in action are the strongest.”

The strongest individuals and the strongest cities derive that strength from comparable behavior. These are the final words of Pericles in the *History*.

In his first two books Thucydides asks to what extent a city is like an individual, and in what ways a city behaves as an individual behaves. While we find the idea proposed in these speeches, Thucydides himself makes no definitive judgment. The behavior of the community and of the individual is said to be similar with respect to the arbitration of disputes, the path to security, the winning of honor, and the appropriate response to adversity. We find almost formulaic language. The phrase signaling the comparison (with variation of case ending) is *kai poleōn kai idiōtōn*.

In book 3 the same comparison is introduced in somewhat different language. As they rebel against the Athenians, the Mytilenians approach the Spartans at Olympia. Realizing that their actions are suspect, they seek common ground with the Spartans. In passage 5, they compare friendship among private citizens—*philian idiōtais*—with an alliance between cities—*koinōnian polesin*.

- (5) “εἰδότες οὐτε φίλιαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὐτε κοινωνίαν πόλε-  
σιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ μετ’ ἄρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιτο καὶ  
τᾶλλα δμοιότροποι εἶεν.”  
(3.10.1)



Thucydides goes on to discuss individuals in Corcyra who in the midst of civil war choose revenge over self-preservation (3.82.7).

From these eight passages we can make several observations. Various speakers endorse specific action by arguing that honor, power, or security, for example, are attained in the same ways for both cities and individuals. The principles expressed have two applications: to individuals within a community, and between cities themselves. The movement of the comparison could work either way; most frequently, however, the impulse appears to be to seek understanding of the inter-political arena (the nature and behavior of cities) by reference to knowledge of the intrapolitical terrain (that of individuals). The half of the equation focusing on the polis is often further developed by indicating the consequences for Corinth, Athens, or Mytilene.<sup>9</sup> Although Thucydides himself expresses the analogy only once in his own voice, such repetition indicates the historian's fascination with the comparison.

Comparing cities with individuals is surely not original with Thucydides. Not only is it fully developed a generation later in Plato's *Republic*, where the search for justice in the individual is sought by constructing justice in the city,<sup>10</sup> but it underlies the thought found in a number of Thucydides' contemporaries. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis proves himself equal to his name: this lone individual (with his household) becomes a "just polis," as he makes a personal peace with Sparta and her allies. Here the smaller acts like the larger, as a man takes on the status of a political community. Knox remarks that when Sophocles' *Antigone* is called *autonomos* (821), this word is generally applied to cities, that is, to independent communities living under their own laws. The tragedian likens his heroine to a sovereign state, by describing her in terms more commonly used to characterize a polis.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>While the second half of the equation concerning individuals must be supplied by the reader, the motivations and behavior of individuals are of great interest to Thucydides. In passage 1 Archidamus has neglected the aspect of individuals' accusations, because he is attempting to deal with the issue at hand, namely, whether the Peloponnesian allies should go to war against Athens. It is possible to deduce the other side: the analogy with war between cities would presumably be civil war (*stasis*) between citizens within a city, and the subsequent difficulty of judging accusations after citizens are divided into warring factions. In passage 8, where Thucydides himself articulates the analogy (3.82.2), he goes on to describe civil war at Corcyra. See Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics."

<sup>10</sup>Esp. *Rep.* 368–69, 434–35, 544; cf. *Arist. Pol.* 1253, 1261, 1323–24.

<sup>11</sup>See Knox, *Heroic Temper* 66. Both Protagoras and Democritus may have pursued the city-individual analogy. It is said that the whole of Plato's *Republic* was sketched

In fifth-century Athens, the comparison of cities and individuals undoubtedly became a conventional topos for writers and thinkers, as specific terms and metaphors appropriate to one arena were applied to the other.<sup>12</sup> It is worth emphasizing that it was from a democratic society that this model arose. In fact, there should be no surprise that in the literature and ideas of Classical Athens the private citizen—*idiōtēs*—should be elevated to the status of the city itself.<sup>13</sup> By juxtaposing city and individual for his own purposes, Thucydides has given us a model which evolves and expands over the course of the history.

We may now briefly speculate upon the significance of the city-individual comparison. The consequences are both analytical and practical, but first, let us recognize the sort of dynamic set up for the reader. Elsewhere Thucydides discusses the ability of historians and statesmen to see likenesses and, in fact, praises their capacity to foresee the probable course of events. In each case, he uses the verb *eikazein* and related words, which mean “to compare,” and also “to make conjectures on the basis of comparisons.”<sup>14</sup> Themistocles successfully anticipates the importance of walls for Athenian independence (1.90–91), the potential for the Piraeus as a port (1.93.3), and the link between Athenian dominance and sea power (1.93.3–4). Summing up his ability, Thucydides calls him “the finest at forecasting” (*aristos eikastēs*, 1.138.3).<sup>15</sup> In

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out in Protagoras’ *Antilogikoi* (see DK 80 B5). Democritus was fascinated by the interplay between small and large: regarding political language and the individual, see DK 68 B245, B250, B259.

<sup>12</sup>On the recycling of rhetorical topoi see Hudson-Williams, “Rhetorical Method.” Regarding similar modes of expression in Thucydides and Isocrates, he says that they both “are following a well-established rhetorical tradition of taking old or conventional *dianoiai* and expressing them in their own words” (77).

<sup>13</sup>The comparison is not limited to democratic Athens: cf. Hdt. 1.5.4, which may well refer to both individuals and cities (or empires). It is interesting that Thucydides does not use the term for citizen (*polītēs*). While *idiōtēs* may connote a looser interaction with other citizens, it is also possible that Thucydides may be thinking of apolitical or prepolitical individuals such as the Homeric and tragic heroes and heroines, who seek their own preeminence and autonomy (note especially passage 3, on honor) and fail to subject their desires and ambitions to the good of the community. On this reading, cities will pursue communal action only after giving up their heroic pretensions.

<sup>14</sup>Hunter (*Artful Reporter* 27) defines *eikazein*: “to relate past and present experience, find their essential similarities, and then conjecture or predict what is most likely to occur under given circumstances. It is reasoning based on probability.” See her chapter on this topic (23–41).

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Pericles’ ability to anticipate: *prognous* 2.65.5, *proegnō* 2.65.13; cf. 2.60.1,

"We know that for individuals there is no reliable friendship, for cities there is no true alliance, without the conviction of honorable behavior on both sides, and in other respects there ought to be like-mindedness."

In attempting to link themselves to the Peloponnese, the Mytilenians explain that they previously helped the Athenians out of fear, not friendship. They now wish to free, rather than enslave Greece (3.12–13).

After the Athenians put down the Mytilenian revolt, Diodotus argues that appropriate penalties be brought against such rebellious cities. Yet Athens must recognize the inevitability of mistaken judgments, since individuals and states share the same propensity to error.

- (6a) "πεφύκασι τε ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου." (3.45.3)

"Everyone both privately and publicly is liable to make mistakes—this is a part of nature—and there is no law to prevent it."

The phrase *kai idiai kai dēmosiai* has various applications: here, the latter term, *dēmosiai*, evidently refers to the actions of cities such as Mytilene. Diodotus endeavors to offer an explanation not only of why Mytilene behaved as it did, but also of what other subject cities are likely to do.

It is worth noting that the fullest argument for linking cities and individuals occurs here, yet it derives from an examination of individual behavior. In the past, Diodotus maintains, individuals broke laws. Yet when harsher penalties were enacted, crimes were still committed. Even with the strongest possible punishments, individuals would behave without regard for the likely consequences; indeed, no one risked a crime he did not think he could succeed with (3.45.1–4). Diodotus begins at the small-scale perspective with how individuals behave. He then applies the same logic to communities. As we see in passage 6b, cities no less than individuals are affected by unexpected luck (*tychē*).

- (6b) "ἀδοκῆτως γὰρ (sc. τύχη) ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἥσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἔκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν." (3.45.6)

"For sometimes luck does come unexpectedly to one's aid, and so she tempts men to run risks for which they are inadequately prepared; and

this is particularly true in the case of cities, because they are playing for the highest stakes—either for their own freedom or for power over others—and each individual, when acting as part of a community, has the irrational opinion that his own powers are greater than in fact they are.”

Cities no less than individuals are subject to the enticements of chance, desire, and hope.<sup>7</sup>

When the focus shifts to Sicily in the next decade, Euphemus of Athens attempts to persuade Camarina not to join Syracuse. It is not inconsistent, he argues, for the Athenians to enslave the Chalcidians in Euboea, yet to allow the people of Leontini independence (6.84). With great candor, he describes Athenian motivation in terms of advantage and reliability.

- (7) “ἄνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι συμφέρον οὐδ’ οἰκείον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν.” (6.85.1)

“For a man who’s a tyrant, or for a city possessing an empire, there is nothing illogical if it is advantageous; ties of blood mean nothing if they cannot be trusted.”

These principles operate at the level both of the individual (*andri de tyrannōi*) and of a city (*polei archēn echousēi*).

These seven passages comparing cities and individuals appear in speeches. An eighth, in book 3, is expressed in Thucydides’ own voice. In describing the civil war at Corcyra, he examines the judgment of cities and individuals in peacetime.

- (8) ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν. (3.82.2)

In peace and prosperity, both cities and individuals have better judgment, because they do not meet with pressures over which they have no control.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Hunter (“Sociology” 26) comments: “In Diodotus’ view the city is very like a person, experiencing all the errors and feelings of the individual, including insolence, pride, hope, and greed.” Cf. *ἡ τε ἐλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί . . .* (3.45.5). Is *epi panti* temporal (“at all times”), or does it extend to all situations (i.e., “for the city as well as for the individual”)?

<sup>8</sup>This translation is based on Connor, *Thucydides* 248–49.

passages 1–8, Thucydides has challenged his reader to engage in this very activity, to compare cities and individuals and to see the points of similarity and difference. Because he has withheld any authoritative answer—that is, because seven of these eight passages occur in speeches and receive no direct comment by the historian—the reader is set in the position of interpreter.<sup>16</sup>

This comparative model is valuable in part for providing an analytic tool for understanding the past. The reader may return to this model as a basis for exploring a multitude of issues. Are cities, like individuals, unified in some sense?<sup>17</sup> Do cities, like individuals, have a particular character?<sup>18</sup> When a city is likened to a tyranny, in what ways is this analogy valid?<sup>19</sup> As a political scientist, Thucydides has offered a potentially productive avenue of approach to these questions. The statements linking city and individual are not, as we have seen, limited to specific contexts. Rather general principles are articulated which seek to link the behavior of individuals within a community to that of

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2.64.6. The historian, too, is left with no choice other than to conjecture based on the evidence (*eikazein de chrē* 1.9.4), but success may prove elusive (cf. 1.10.2). The title phrase of the talk which led to this essay (*hōs mlkron megalōi eikasaī*) comes from Thucydides' comparison of the small and large battles of Sphacteria and Thermopylae (4.36.3).

<sup>16</sup>Farrar (*Origins* 136) says that the "many echoes and recurrent patterns . . . [are meant to] . . . challenge [the reader] to assess the genuine differences and similarities between two contexts, to think historically." She describes one of Protagoras' goals as "securing the audience's imaginative participation" (127), which could apply to Thucydides as well.

<sup>17</sup>Farrar (*Origins* 155–57) says that Thucydides assumes "that the behavior of the political community is appropriately characterized both as the behavior of persons, of a collectivity, and as the behavior of a unit, an entity." Thucydides' interest in the city as a unity is indicated by his choice to have cities speak as a whole: "the Corinthians say . . .," "the Thebans say . . .," "the Plataeans say . . ." This is discussed in Strasburger, "Die Entdeckung" 402–3. Loraux, *Invention of Athens* 270–74, analyzes the shift between depicting the city as a unity and as a plurality of individuals. While it is valuable to speak of communities as units, the key events leading up to the war, at both Epidamnus and Plataea, belie the notion of unanimity within a polis (see 1.24.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.2; cf. also 1.2.5–6, 1.12.2, 1.18.1, 1.23.2, e.g., and the generation gap at 6.18.6).

<sup>18</sup>See esp. 1.70–71, 2.36–46, 6.16–18, 8.96.5. The possibility is also expressed that certain communities are hostile to one another by nature: see Hermocrates' remark that Sicilians are the natural enemies of Athens: *to physei polemion* (4.60.1). For a recent treatment of "political" characteristics see Crane, "Fear and Pursuit of Risk."

<sup>19</sup>Cf. 1.122.3, 1.124.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, 6.85.1. See Hunter, "Athens *Tyrannis*" and Connor, "Tyrannis Polis."

cities toward each other. The task of the reader is critically to examine the wide range of proposed similarities, both in the specific context in which they are introduced and as general principles.

One is tempted to make a stronger claim for the importance of this analogy. It could be said that the validity of portraying a city such as Athens as a tyrant (which designates an individual ruler) can only be determined *after* evaluating the city-individual analogy. That is, the analogy of city and individual is of a higher order, which allows subordinate ideas such as a city's unity, character, and behavior to be explored at all. This central analogy then possesses critical significance, because of the many key inquiries which depend upon it.

The reader's assessment of the strength of the city-individual comparison will determine whether the link between justice and interpolitical relations should be considered in a new light. This recurring issue might also be seen as deriving from the city-individual comparison. It goes beyond the scope of this essay to develop that argument fully, but I would like to sketch out the potential implications of the comparison, both for judging events which occurred during the Peloponnesian War, and for its value toward interpolitical relations after 404 B.C. The ethical value of the comparison arises in the following way. Individuals within communities may settle their disputes by going to court before impartial judges. To the extent that cities are like individuals, the resolution of disputes between cities might follow a path analogous to the resolution of individual disputes. Hornblower has recently suggested that the city-individual comparison implies that cities may be thought of as moral agents. It would follow that the principles prevailing in a domestic court system could apply to the arbitration of conflict between Greek cities.<sup>20</sup> It would then be possible to judge the decisions and actions of cities by using the standards of right and wrong as they exist within communities of individuals. If the reader thinks that in interpolitical affairs justice is only relevant between equal powers, but that the weaker must follow the dictates of the stronger, then the Athenians' actions against Melos, for example, might not only be understood but also approved of. If on the other hand the reader believes that,

<sup>20</sup>See note 4 above. White (*When Words Lose Their Meaning* 64) supports this notion: "it is apparent that the principal figures in this world are the individual cities, regarded as units, which can speak to each other through representatives in certain established places and modes. They are capable of making agreements and breaking them, hence of moral action."

in fact, cities are like individuals to the extent that they have an obligation to behave fairly and justly toward all other cities, then those same actions would be condemned on moral grounds.<sup>21</sup>

Of course, the idea that cities act justly toward one another is strongly opposed in the *History*, most consistently by the Athenians. Diodotus argues that while in domestic affairs citizens must look to justice, in foreign policy expediency is the only criterion.<sup>22</sup> This viewpoint, however, is only a part of the dialogue. Thucydides allows two views to be expressed. Each speech presents a particular perspective, yet the situation is dynamic. Because the issue is not resolved wholly one way or the other, the reader is forced to consider several arguments, to inspect the consequences of following one course of action rather than the other, and ultimately is left with a deeper understanding of the complexities of the political situation and the rhetoric which attempts to describe it.<sup>23</sup> The argument that cities might be constrained by moral values is developed throughout the history and is worth pursuing. By building upon the model of city and individual, we may investigate the two sides of the argument about cities' appropriate behavior toward each other and the implied consequences.

Beyond its use for assessing the past, the comparison may suggest a practical application for future conflict. Yet what are the paths toward negotiating interpolitical conflict? The war itself led to a variety of models for interaction between cities. There is the "overseer" model, when the Athenians debate the fate of another city, Mytilene (3.36–49). Athens not only has the final say, but the people who are judged are not allowed to speak. Second, there is third-party arbitration. The Pla-

<sup>21</sup>The issue of cities unequal in power may be illuminated by examining individuals of unequal status in society, whether the disparity is brought on by slavery or by poverty. While a comparable inequality among cities surely exists, White's suggestion is worth pondering (see note 32 below).

<sup>22</sup>At 3.44, 3.46–47; cf. 1.73–77, 2.62–64, 5.89, 5.107. De Ste. Croix (*Origins* 16–17) endorses Diodotus' view as revealing Thucydides' own beliefs. He maintains that in "relations between states . . . moral judgements are virtually inapplicable . . . force [is] the sole ultimate arbiter in international affairs." Yet he admits that Thucydides never made this fundamental distinction explicit. When the Athenians say that the gathering of Peloponnesian allies has no authority to judge its actions (1.73.1), this raises the question: does any body have the power or the legitimate authority to do so? If so, what would such a body be like?

<sup>23</sup>Newman ("Dialogic Principle" 45) remarks that pairs of speeches call for the judgment of the audience. According to the "dialogic principle . . . all dogmatic and would-be final formulations are betrayals."

taeans and the Thebans accuse one another and make their own defenses before the Spartan "judges" (*dicastais*, 3.52.3), who ultimately fail to render an impartial verdict. As Thucydides says, the decision was determined by Thebes' strategic importance to Sparta (3.62–68). A third possibility is the "street fight" model offered in the Melian Dialogue. Both Athenians and Melians manage to voice their viewpoints; the stronger side attempts to set the rules of discourse, but ultimately neither side changes the other's mind (5.84–116). Not only is each model profoundly disturbing, but none functions as a satisfactory prototype for resolving future disputes between cities.

In accordance with the city–individual analogy, however, conflict between cities might best be resolved by looking at an intrapolitical model, a model of arbitration between individuals within a community. The fullest one offered is that of the Athenian *politeia* articulated by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, where it is said that Athenians help victims of injustice and resolve private quarrels in accordance with the law and, most importantly, that all citizens are equal before the law. The Athenian constitution is even called a "model" for others (*paradeigma*, 2.37). If we view Athens as a microcosm—a model for all Greece—and if we consider its constitution as an exemplar for some sort of interpolitical forum, we come to see the practical value for future readers in examining the city–individual comparison.<sup>24</sup> If no effective method of resolving disputes is found, the alternative is war. Thucydides offers no blueprint for how cities would peacefully resolve their disputes, nor the means of enforcing such a scheme. But to say that the Peloponnesian War and others like it are inevitable and that no arbitration between cities is possible is nihilistic and diminishes the enormous potential which underlies Thucydides' exposition.<sup>25</sup> Again, I think the reader is challenged. What Thucydides has done is to construct a situation that

<sup>24</sup>It is also said that Athens is a teacher for the rest of Greece (2.41.2). On *paradeigmata* see Hunter, *Artful Reporter* 85–94; at 180, she says: "For the reader earlier events exist as *paradeigmata*, model situations, the outcome and possibilities of which he knows. By bringing this knowledge of the past with him into the present, he is equipped to compare and judge, even to predict." Regarding the feasibility of a Panhellenic forum, cf. the fourth-century development of Panhellenism in Isocrates, e.g., as discussed by Jaeger, *Paideia*, III 74–82.

<sup>25</sup>Farrar (*Origins* 145) maintains that while Thucydides shows how things happened and why, he suggests that it was not inevitable. On the question of contingency see Flory, "Thucydides' Hypotheses."



invites assessment of the practical possibilities for the reader's own time and situation. The city-individual comparison offers a point of reference for considering such a possibility. As Thucydides has structured his narrative, the final act of the Athenians—before war begins—is to call for arbitration where the parties involved are on an equal footing (*epi isēi kai homoiai*, 1.145). While it is possible to read Pericles' words as cynical and manipulative, the sequence offered by Thucydides indicates that lack of success in the field of arbitration led to the war itself. It is possible that Thucydides is suggesting interpolitical negotiation in the early fourth century as a peaceful and less disruptive *modus vivendi*.<sup>26</sup>

I began with the question of politics and the nature of the polis. There are two aspects of a city: internal politics concerns the affairs of individuals within a community; external politics requires dealing with other states. Thucydides' comparison of city and individual suggests that these two spheres are not utterly distinct. What we know about human beings (and human nature) at the level of the individual may potentially be transferred to the larger-scale interaction between communities. Certain principles apply both to the individual within a city and to the polis vis-à-vis other cities. The validity and the application of comparing cities and individuals must be determined by the reader. I have suggested that one value of this comparison is purely scientific: the reader uses the model as a point of departure in seeking to understand why events occurred as they did in the late fifth century.

The possibility of a practical application of the comparison should not be dismissed. Of course, Thucydides tells a story of failed negotiation with war ensuing. Yet his history seeks to do more than help the reader understand the past; the author claims utility for his work as well

<sup>26</sup> Arbitration is referred to a number of times in the *History* (1.82, 3.53, 3.56, e.g.; cf. the offer made by Sparta at 4.19–20 and the Peace of Nicias itself at 5.14–24). While in retrospect the Spartans rue their refusal of the Athenians' original offer in 432 B.C., they come to view the Athenians' refusal in 413 B.C. as auspicious (7.18). See discussion in *HCT* IV 394–95, and de Ste. Croix, *Origins* 290–92.

The recent evidence which might suggest that Thucydides lived perhaps a full decade after the end of the Peloponnesian War reinforces the likelihood of his interest in the future of relations between Greek cities. If Lichas son of Arcesilaos is the proxenos of Argos and Thucydides knew of his death (in 397 B.C.), then Thucydides himself of course lived past 397. See Pouilloux and Salviat, "Lichas, Lacédémonien, Archonte," and "Thucydides après l'exil"; for a cautious reading of this evidence see Cartledge, "A New Lease of Life?"

(1.22.4).<sup>27</sup> He emphasizes the upheaval and human suffering involved in the Peloponnesian War; but given the constancy of human nature, the same sort of conflicts between cities would likely recur. It was in the interests of the Greek cities of the early fourth century to seek a less violent means of resolving potential disputes. No satisfactory model was found to resolve the interpolitical conflict of the Peloponnesian War, yet, as Thucydides says, in peacetime cooler heads prevail (3.82.2).<sup>28</sup>

To those who remain convinced that such hopes constitute pure fantasy, a review of the evidence is worth pondering. First of all, the recurrent analogy itself asks the reader to consider the similarities between cities and individuals in a variety of situations.<sup>29</sup> Second, the ubiquitous use of legal and judicial language throughout the history is applied in most cases to cities' interactions with one another.<sup>30</sup> Finally, the conflict between cities has an analogue in the political tension played out within the polis between the competing claims of public and private goals. Pericles argues that citizens must sacrifice private interest for the good of the whole city (2.60–61). It is possible to extend this idea by thinking of Greece as a whole sharing common interests—at the very least, to avoid the suffering occasioned by war—which overshadow the particular interests of individual cities.<sup>31</sup> Indeed Thucydides begins the history itself with a look at more distant history, when

<sup>27</sup> At 1.22.4. On utility and history see de Romilly, "L'utilité de l'histoire." A more restrictive view is found in Flory, "The Meaning of τὸ μὴ μνησθῆς," esp. 206–8.

<sup>28</sup> White (*When Words Lose Their Meaning* 63) endorses this idea (citing 1.34.2): the proper occasion for invoking the practice of arbitration is before resorting to arms. Pearson ("Popular Ethics") describes the degeneration of moral values as the war proceeded. Connor (*Thucydides* 250) says that while the *History* demonstrates the sufferings of mankind and that they are rooted in human nature, still he sees the "simultaneous insistence that they are mistakes to be avoided." It is up to later generations to find ways to avoid such mistakes, because "the work provides no resolution to this tension."

<sup>29</sup> The fit is not always precise, for the differences have to be examined and re-examined, as Plato admits in his work exploring this same analogy (*Rep.* 434e–435a).

<sup>30</sup> The language of the judicial system (*dicastēs*, *dicas dounai*, *enklēmata*, *apologēō*, etc.) is throughout the *History* applied to interpolitical conflict and attempted negotiation. See the valuable discussion in Darbo-Peschanski, "Thucydide: historien, juge."

<sup>31</sup> Farrar (*Origins* 161) discusses the importance of the collectivity. By extension, we find all Greece suffering during war, when cities insist upon their own separate needs in opposition to other cities. Cf. also the case of Sicily, where cities contemplate uniting for a common cause: see 6.80, and the discussion in Connor, *Thucydides* 121: "At the center of [Hermocrates'] speech is the idea of Sicily as a unit" (see also 120–22). At a different level, Attic villagers viewed leaving their villages as though they were leaving their own cities (*kai ouden allo ē polin tēn hautou apoleipōn hekastos*, 2.16).

Greeks united for mutual benefit against Troy and later against Persia.<sup>32</sup> This leads us back to the comparison's practical value. It is worth pursuing the city-individual comparison for its many possible applications: to understanding how cities act, toward judging decisions which took place during the war, and also to approaching the most difficult problem of how cities should behave toward one another in the future.<sup>33</sup>

JAMES V. MORRISON

CENTRE COLLEGE

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<sup>32</sup> At 1.2–19; cf. esp. 1.3.1, 1.10.5, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.18.2. The Plataeans argue that the Greeks are joined in significant ways, including a shared set of laws (3.58–59; cf. 1.41.1, 3.67.6) and common religious beliefs (3.59). They emphasize the importance of Greek unity (3.54, 3.59). Creed ("Moral Values" 219–20) analyzes the various obligations a Greek might have to a friend, to his city, or to Greece itself (on loyalty, see 224). White (*When Words Lose Their Meaning* 91) poses the following question: "But could equality be seen not as the factual precondition of the discourse of justice, but as its product, as something that it creates and makes real in the world? Could Athens, that is, have recognized that even cities unequal in power may have an equal interest in maintaining the discourse that gives them identity and community, that indeed makes their life and competition possible?"

<sup>33</sup> A version of this essay was presented at the New Orleans meeting of the American Philological Association on 30 December 1992. I thank John Dillery, Michael Flower, Ludwig Koenen, and Peter Krentz for reading drafts at various stages and for their helpful comments and skeptical questioning. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for several suggestions.

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## COUNTING ON NUMBER: PLATO ON THE GOODNESS OF *ARITHMOS*

It is a commonplace that as Plato matured mathematics played an increasingly prominent role in his thought. In a hypothetical version of what might be called "the standard story," the first text cited to document the influence of mathematics on the maturing Plato would be the "slave boy" passage in *Meno*, which would be taken to show the beginning of Plato's infatuation with geometry. This might then be followed by passages from *Euthydemus* (290b–d) and book 7 of the *Republic*, which would be called upon to evince the increasingly intimate relationship between mathematics, dialectic, and the theory of Forms. The next move would be to late dialogues such as *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and the highly formalized method of *diaeresis*. *Philebus* (especially 16c–18d) might then be cited as an explicit example of the conjunction of *diaeresis* and mathematics. A fitting conclusion to this story might well be *Ti-maeus*, where the five regular solids play such an important role.

If one adds to the survey of even these few passages the fact that mathematics, particularly geometry, was an important element in the curriculum of the Academy, and the extended discussion of Plato's (apparently) unwritten mathematical–ontological doctrine of "intermediate numbers" in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, it is not surprising that for many scholars the salient feature of Plato's mature work is precisely its strongly mathematical bent.<sup>1</sup>

On the standard reading of Plato's development, the earlier dialogues are thought to stand in marked contrast to the mature works. The young Plato, we are told, was far more influenced by the historical Socrates and was yet to be touched by the enthusiasm for mathematics that would later enflame him. As a result, the contrast between these two sets of dialogues is a sharp one indeed. As Vlastos puts it, "In different segments of Plato's corpus two philosophers bear that name. The individual remains the same. But in different sets of dialogues he

<sup>1</sup>This version of the standard story is pieced together from some well-known commentaries, including Annas, *Aristotle's Metaphysics M and N* (esp. "Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics," 3–26, and 41–72); Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, especially 3–116; Stenzel, *Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles*; Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, esp. "Elenchus and Mathematics," 107–32; and Wedberg, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*.

pursues philosophies so different that they could not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout unless it had been the brain of a schizophrenic" (*Socrates* 46).

To avoid the diagnosis of schizophrenia, Vlastos offers the distinction between Socrates E, the character expressing the views of the early Plato, and Socrates M, the one who represents the decisively changed philosophical positions of the Plato working in the middle of his career. The two are distinguished by both the content and the form of their thought. Socrates E is "exclusively a moral philosopher" (48), whose sole method is the elenchus and who regularly denies the possession of knowledge. His concerns are so thoroughly moral that his thinking "maintains epistemological innocence, methodological naivety" ("The Socratic Elenchus" 63). By contrast, Socrates M is "a moral philosopher *and* metaphysician *and* epistemologist *and* philosopher of science" (etc.), who "seeks demonstrative knowledge and is confident that he finds it" (*Socrates* 48). Such a drastic change demands an explanation, and Vlastos locates this precisely in the mature Plato's study of advanced mathematics. Socrates M "has mastered the mathematical sciences of his time" (48) and by the time of the *Meno* is willing to "hold up geometry as paradigmatic science" (122). Socrates E, on the other hand, "professes no interest in these sciences and gives no evidence of expertise in any of them throughout the Elenctic dialogues" (48). Indeed, Vlastos is confident that it was *because* of his study of advanced mathematics that "Plato reached the metaphysical outlook that characterized his middle period" (108).

I would dispute one of Vlastos's most basic theses, namely that Plato fundamentally changed his views concerning mathematics as he developed. I do not argue against the biographical claim that the mature Plato studied advanced mathematics. Perhaps he did, and if so it is surely reasonable to assume that this had an impact on his philosophical work. As mentioned above, the role of mathematical ideas in *Timaeus*, of *diaeresis* in the late dialogues, and of geometry in the curriculum of the Academy, as well as Aristotle's testimony, make this assumption *prima facie* plausible. Nevertheless I do argue that in one very important respect Plato was extremely consistent in his thinking about, and evaluation of, mathematical science from the beginning to the end of his career.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>In what follows I employ Vlastos's method of both interpretation and presentation of evidence. The former might well be called "accretive"; Vlastos gradually con-



In *Euthyphro* (an early dialogue), Socrates examines Euthyphro's statement that "what the gods love is holy, and what they do not love is unholy" (7a).<sup>3</sup> A problem with this definition is that often the gods disagree about what they love, and then become angry with one another as a result. Socrates urges Euthyphro to specify about what the gods disagree and get angry:

- (T1) My good man, disagreement about what creates hostility and anger? Look at it this way: if you and I disagree about number (*arithmos*), which [of two numbers] is larger, would the disagreement about this make us hostile, and angry with one another, or would we settle it quickly by turning to calculation (*logismon*)? (*Euthphr.* 7b6–c1)

Socrates elaborates this point with additional examples. If we disagree about what is greater and what lesser, we can quickly put our dispute to rest by turning to "measurement" (*metrein*, 7c4); if our disagreement is about what is heavier and what lighter, we can easily decide by turning to "weighing" (*histanai*, 7c7). Since each of these areas of potential dispute can be studied, and thoroughly mastered, by a specific mathematical discipline that will clearly and authoritatively adjudicate any disagreements within that area, disputants need not get angry with one another.

By contrast, when disagreement occurs about what is "right and wrong, fine and shameful, and good and bad," that is, about moral issues, there is real trouble, since for these no straightforward and satisfactory solution (*hikanēn krisin*) seems forthcoming. Hostility between disputants is thus likely (7d1–5). As possible objects of inquiry, then, *arithmos* and morality are fundamentally different.<sup>4</sup>

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structs a philosophical story by analyzing a series of discrete passages. His method of presentation is simply to label each passage T1, T2, etc.

<sup>3</sup>My Greek text is Burnet's Oxford edition. Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own. In describing *Euthyphro*, *Ion*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Gorgias* as "early," I am following convention.

<sup>4</sup>A related difference is noted in *Hippias Major*. If two men are each beautiful, then they are so both individually and collectively: that which makes them beautiful, namely *to kalon*, belongs to them both "in common and to each privately" (300a8–b2). By contrast, if two individuals are each one in number, which of course they are, they are each odd-numbered. Together, however, they are two, and hence even-numbered (392a). Thus "it is not altogether necessary . . . that what both are, each also is, and that what each is, also both are" (392b). The point seems to be that there is a fundamental difference between number and other qualities, such as *to kalon* or the just. As Klein puts it, "While in

The first question concerning this passage is, what exactly does *arithmos* mean? In ordinary Greek, it means both “number” and “counting,” and the former is never severed from the latter. As Nussbaum explains, “The most general sense of *arithmos* in ordinary Greek of the fifth century would be that of an ordered plurality or its members, a countable system or its countable parts” (“Eleatic Conventionalism” 90). In Klein’s words, a number is “a definite number of definite things” (*Greek Mathematical Thought* 46). For this reason, 0 and 1 are not *arithmoi*.<sup>5</sup>

T1 shows Plato to be following ordinary usage.<sup>6</sup> When Socrates offers the case of two people disagreeing *peri arithmou*, he must imagine them disagreeing about, for example, how many olive trees there are in a field. If you say fifty and I say forty, we need not get angry, for we can turn to “calculation”: we can count the trees and then compare our respective results.<sup>7</sup>

There is another sense in which T1 shows Plato to be traditional in his understanding of *arithmos*: he appreciates that number is uniquely knowable. As Nussbaum puts it, “from the earliest texts (and fifth-century texts are fully consistent with these) we see the use of *arithmos* to mean that which is counted, and a close association between . . . numerability and knowability” (“Conventionalism” 91). What is noteworthy about T1 is the contrast drawn between the epistemic reliability of number and, presumably, the precariousness of morality.<sup>8</sup>

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general a property which belongs to several things in common must be attributed also to each single one of them . . . there is also a *kolnon* of such a kind that it does indeed belong to several things but not to each of these by itself” (*Greek Mathematical Thought* 79–80).

<sup>5</sup>“It appears that the Greeks, including Plato, were not infallibly consistent on this point” (Wedberg, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics* 23). He cites *Laws* 818c and *Hippias Major* 302a.

<sup>6</sup>As Annas puts it, “Plato is not, in fact, any further away from the ordinary Greek concept of number than Aristotle, though they are often sharply contrasted in this respect by scholars” (*Metaphysics M and N* 11). She refers to Plato’s later treatment of number, but her point would apply to *Euthyphro* as well.

<sup>7</sup>I translate *logismon* as “calculation.” As Heath puts it, it is often the case that *logismon* means “arithmetic in our sense,” that is, it “comprised the ordinary arithmetical operations, addition, subtraction, multiplication” (*History of Greek Mathematics* 15). As both Klein and Annas have argued, it is not the case that *logistikē* is merely “practical calculation,” because it has a theoretical branch as well.

<sup>8</sup>T1 shows Plato to be aware of the sort of distinction Aristotle later draws between ethics and mathematics. Because of its subject matter, Aristotle claims, the former can-

I should emphasize that by itself T1 does not tell much about Plato's view of exactly how the two poles comprising this contrast, *arithmos* and morality, relate to one another. In particular, T1 does not explicitly state that when properly understood by the philosopher, morality should become more like *arithmos*, although presumably it should. Obviously, then, it does not explain how, if at all, the transformation of morality, from a realm of violent disagreement to one of arithmetic harmony, would take place. This point should serve as a caveat for all that follows. Yes, Plato thinks *arithmos* is good. It does not necessarily follow, however, that he simply and straightforwardly thinks the good is like *arithmos* or should become an object of a subject that is strictly analogous to arithmetic.

Even with this caveat T1 can still serve to call into question Vlastos's assertion that the young Plato was thoroughly uninterested in mathematics and as a consequence was "epistemologically innocent." At the time he wrote *Euthyphro* Plato understood that the authoritative precision of mathematics results in extraordinary reliability: not only can we count with *arithmos*, we can also count on it. We are confident that eventually we will agree when it comes to the question "how many?"<sup>9</sup> By contrast, the questions of morality seem unable to be answered with a comparable degree of clarity and finality.

Consider *Ion*, another early dialogue. In examining Ion's claim to have the rhapsode's *technē* (530b3, 530c8) and to "expound" or "speak well" about Homer, Socrates asks whether he can speak equally well about other poets such as Hesiod and Archilochus. Ion answers no. This puzzles Socrates, since Homer and Hesiod often address the same subject. Why is it, then, that Ion can "expound" *only* Homer's poetry

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not achieve as high a degree of precision (*to akribēs*) as the latter. Ethics cannot be rendered fully demonstrative, as of course mathematics can, because the human good is residually indeterminate. He puts it this way: "It is characteristic of an educated man to seek after just that degree of precision that the nature of the subject matter admits. For it seems to be equally [inappropriate] to accept merely persuasive talking from a mathematician and to demand a demonstration from a rhetor" (EN 1094b25–27). (The subject matter of rhetoric overlaps that of ethics.)

<sup>9</sup>See *Euthphr.* 12d for further evidence of the early Plato's appreciation of the clarity of number. About this passage, Vlastos states only that because of its nontechnical description of even numbers, it demonstrates that "Socrates is sadly deficient in the mathematical know-how his namesake proudly displays in the *Meno*" (*Socrates* 273).

and not Hesiod's? To illustrate the problem Socrates offers the counter-example of arithmetic:

(T2) *Socrates.* So, my dear Ion, when many people are talking about number and one of them speaks best, I suppose there is some one who will be able to distinguish the man who speaks well?

*Ion.* Yes, I'd say so.

*Socrates.* And will this same man be able to identify those who speak badly, or will it be someone else?

*Ion.* The same man, I suppose.

*Socrates.* And this is the man who has the arithmetic *technē*, isn't it?  
(*Ion* 531d12–e4)

If someone possesses the arithmetic *technē* (531e3) he can identify those who speak well, that is, correctly, and those who speak badly, that is, incorrectly, about number. Socrates assumes that Ion's claim to the rhapsodic *technē* is analogous. As a result, Ion should be able to identify and discuss not only those who speak well within his field, like Homer, but also those, like Hesiod, who do not.

In this passage *arithmos* represents a field that can be mastered by a *technitēs* (an "expert") who can authoritatively distinguish between right and wrong answers, and in turn good and bad speakers who enter that field. As such, T2 suggests that arithmetic is paradigmatic of this feature of *technē*. This point is not made explicit (and Socrates also uses medicine to illustrate his point at 531e9), but Vlastos's assertion that it is not until *Meno* that Socrates identifies a mathematical *technē* such as geometry as paradigmatic of authoritative knowledge must at least be called into question.

*Ion* exemplifies what numerous commentators (notably Irwin in *Plato's Moral Theory*) have recognized as a prominent feature of the early dialogues, namely Socrates' frequent use of the "craft (*technē*) analogy" in arguments that either refute an interlocutor's claim to knowledge, or exhort him to pursue knowledge.<sup>10</sup> For the present purpose, what is most striking about these analogical arguments is their heavy reliance on mathematics to supply examples. Consider *Charmides*.

When examining Critias' definition of *sōphrosunē* as self-knowl-

<sup>10</sup>For a critique of Irwin see Roochnik, "Socrates' Use of the *Technē*-Analogy."

edge, Socrates states that since self-knowledge is a kind of knowing (*gignōskein ti*), it must be an *epistēmē* (a synonym for *technē* in the early dialogues). Furthermore, it must be an *epistēmē* of something particular; it must be *tinōs* (165c4–6). As examples Socrates uses medicine, whose specific “product” (*ergon*) is health, and building, whose product is houses. What, asks Socrates, is the analogous product of *sōphrosunē*?

Critias objects that Socrates has falsely homogenized the *epistēmāi/technai*. Some do not have a product at all. Critias marshals the *logistikē* and the *geometrikē technai* as counterexamples (165e3–6). Socrates rebuts:

- (T3) You’re right. But I can show you this. Each of these *epistēmāi* is an *epistēmē* of something, which happens to be other than the *epistēmē* itself. For example, calculation (*logistikē*) is about the odd and the even, how they hold in relation to each other. (Chrm. 166a3–7)

As in *Euthyphro*, Socrates also uses the example of weighing (*statikē*, 166b1) to make his point. Mathematics here supplies the critical examples of the subject/object structure of the *technai* in general: each is about some identifiable object other than the knowledge (the subject) itself.

A similar point is made in *Gorgias*. Gorgias initially states that his *technē*, rhetoric, is about “speeches” (*logous*, 449e1). According to Socrates, however, “speeches” is too vague adequately to identify the subject matter of rhetoric, since other *technai*, such as medicine and gymnastic, also make “speeches” (about the health of the body). Gorgias tries again: unlike the other *technai*, which involve some degree of manual work (*cheirourgia*) and activity (*praxis*), rhetoric is purely “logical”; it takes place “through *logos*” (450b9) alone. Socrates again objects:

- (T4) There are other *technai* which achieve their purpose entirely through *logos* and, one might say, either require no *ergon* or very little, like arithmetic, and calculation, and geometry, draught-playing, and many other *technai*. (Grg. 450d4–7)

Since the mathematical *technai* provide counterexamples to the assertion that only rhetoric is purely “logical,” Gorgias has failed to

identify what is unique about rhetoric.<sup>11</sup> Throughout the argument, Socrates continually pressures the famous rhetorician to say exactly what rhetoric is. For Socrates, however, the question "what is rhetoric?" amounts to "what is rhetoric about? what is its subject matter?" To help Gorgias answer this question, he offers examples:

- (T5) Suppose someone asked me now about those *technai* that I was talking about: "Socrates, what is the arithmetic *technē*?" I would say to him, as you just now did to me, that it is one of those which have their effect through *logos*. And suppose he went on to ask, "with what is its *logos* concerned?" I should say: with the odd and even numbers, whatever may chance to be the amount of each. And if he asked again, "what *technē* is it that you call calculation?" I should say that this is also one of those who achieve their whole effect by *logos*. And if he proceeded also to ask, "with what is it concerned?" I should say in the manner of those who draft amendments in the Assembly, that in all calculation corresponds with arithmetic, for both are concerned with the same thing, the odd and the even; but that they differ to this extent, that calculation considers the numerical values of odd and even numbers not merely in themselves but in relationship to each other.<sup>12</sup> (Grg. 451ba7–c5)

Once again, mathematics provides the pivotal examples with which to illustrate two decisive and related features of the *technai* in general: (1) they have a basic subject/object structure in which the object, or subject matter, is different from the subject, and (2) this object is determinate, that is, it can be clearly delineated and thus distinguished from other such objects. (Socrates also uses the example of astronomy at 451c5–10). It follows that since *technē* plays so prominent a role in the early dialogues, and since mathematics is crucial in articulating what a *technē* is, mathematics too must (*pace* Vlastos) be acknowledged as significant in dialogues such as *Charmides* and *Gorgias*.

Vlastos is, of course, aware of T5 and other passages cited here. He grants that Socrates E was not a "mathematical illiterate" and that we "can safely assume that he had learned some mathematics before

<sup>11</sup>About draught–playing, Dodds (*Gorgias* 197) says that "it appears again in a list of *technai* at *Phdr.* 274d, and is cited as an example of a skilled activity at *Charm.* 174b, *Rep.* 333b, and *Alc.* i 110e." The "logos element" of this game was "planning the moves."

<sup>12</sup>My translation here largely follows that of Lamb in the Loeb Classical Library Series.

his concentration on ethical inquiry had become obsessive" (*Socrates* 272). What he denies is that Socrates E had studied *advanced* mathematics, which becomes a decisive characteristic of the maturing Plato. Again, I need not dispute the claim that Plato studied advanced mathematics, for my view is that his development as a mathematician did not cause him to revise his views concerning the fundamental value of the mathematical *technai* in relation to philosophy.

In T2, T3, T4, and T5, Socrates uses the "*technē* analogy" to refute his interlocutors (Critias' definition of *sōphrosunē* in T3, Ion's claim to the rhapsodic *technē* in T2, Gorgias' claim to rhetoric in T4 and T5). In these passages Socrates puts the analogy to good use because through it he is better able to demand that his interlocutor specify what exact epistemic claim he is making. A similar passage is found in *Laches*.

The question is, what is courage? Laches first answers that it is "staying at one's post." Socrates easily refutes this with the counterexample that a courageous retreat is possible (191c). Laches next offers "endurance of the soul" (192b). This definition proves to be too general: "endurance of the soul" would include foolish endurance, which the participants agree is not good. Since they agree that courage is always good, the definition must be revised again (192c).

Laches' third definition is "intelligent (*phronimos*) endurance" (192e). The problem with this definition is that it is unclear what "intelligent" means. To demand clarification Socrates questions Laches via the *technē* analogy. He asks, "If someone shows intelligent endurance in the spending of money, knowing (*eidōs*) that if he spends more he will possess more, would you call this man courageous?" (192e). In other words, if a man has the money-making *technē* and can calculate correctly that a certain investment will be profitable, it takes no courage to make that investment. Similarly;

- (T6) If a man endures in war and is willing to fight, and because he has calculated wisely (*phronimōs logizomenon*) and knows (*eidota*) that others will help him, and that he is doing battle against fewer and inferior troops than those with him, and further that he has the superior position, would you call such a man who is enduring with this kind of intelligence and preparation more courageous than one who is in the opposite camp and is willing to stand fast and endure?  
(*La.* 193a3–9)

Like the financial expert, the general who can calculate (*logizomenon*, 193a4) correctly that he has more and better troops than his enemy does not require courage to press the attack. Both examples concern persons who possess a *technē* (193b10, 193c10) and can thereby *calculate* well enough to reduce significantly the risk of the actions they are performing. Thus, even though Socrates does not explicitly cite a mathematical discipline here, the pattern of *Laches* 192d–193d is similar to that found in *Ion*, *Charmides*, and *Gorgias*. Socrates uses the calculative *technai* of money-making and generalship in order to provide clear examples of intelligence. They offer models of determinacy against which Laches' vague, that is, indeterminate, statement, "courage is intelligent endurance," can be measured and ultimately rejected.

It is just this feature of "determinacy" that is most significant in the early Plato's interest in and appreciation of mathematics. When Socrates appeals to the *technai* in his analogical arguments, he looks towards their clarity and authority, both of which follow from the fact that their subject matters are determinate and thus can be mastered. Mathematics is thus paradigmatic of *technē* in two senses: it is most clear and authoritative (hence its use in T1), and its subject matter is the epitome of determinacy. This point is made most explicit in a statement by Socrates in the *Republic*:

- (T7) The trivial (*phaulon*) business of distinguishing the one, the two, and the three. In sum, I mean counting (*arithmos*) and calculation. Or isn't it the case concerning these that every *technē* and *epistēmē* is forced to participate in them? (Rep. 522c5–9)

Socrates does not explain in what exact sense every *technē* must participate in *arithmos*.<sup>13</sup> Does he mean that every *technē* is some version of applied mathematics? Perhaps. But this statement could be also taken in a more general, almost metaphorical sense. On this reading, a *technē* must have a determinate subject matter, some *one* area of expertise. And *arithmos* is the paradigm case, and indeed the principle, of determinacy.

To explain, I digress for a moment and discuss two fragments by Philolaus. I justify doing so, first, on the basis of convenience: Philolaus

<sup>13</sup> At Rep. 522c1–2 Socrates states all *technai*, *dianoiai*, and *epistēmai* must be "supplemented" by arithmetic, which must be learned first. See also *Phlb.* 55e1–3 for a later, and more elaborate, description of this relationship.



succinctly treats what I take to be the relevant points in Plato. Second, it is at least possible that he may actually have had some influence on Plato (although in no way does my argument hinge on that being the case).<sup>14</sup>

Philolaus says this:

- (B3) For there will not even be an object of apprehension at all if everything is indeterminate.
- (B4) And indeed all objects of apprehension have *arithmos*, for it is not possible for us to think of or apprehend anything without this.<sup>15</sup>

Even allowing for the ambiguity in these statements, they seem to imply two propositions: (1) determinacy is the necessary condition of intelligibility (and thus knowledge), and (2) *arithmos* is either equivalent to or the necessary condition of determinacy. It is not clear exactly how *arithmos* functions in either of these capacities. Nussbaum understands Philolaus to be making a kind of transcendental argument. The world is intelligible to us; we can apprehend or recognize (*gignōskein*) things. And the condition for the possibility of such apprehension is our ability to distinguish “this” from “that.” Making such distinctions necessarily requires delimiting the bounds of “this” and thus treating it as a countable unit separate from “that” (“Eleatic Conventionalism” 92).

Huffman argues somewhat similarly (although he disagrees sharply in that he believes that *gignōskein* actually refers to secure knowledge, and not merely “apprehension” or “recognition”): “Philolaus accepts Parmenides’ claim that the object of knowledge must be a determinate state of affairs but wants to preserve a plurality. The bold step he takes is to argue that numerical relationships and mathematical relationships in general solve the problem” (“The Role of Number” 22). In turn, what this means is that “we only really understand something when we understand the structure of and relationship between its various parts” (28).

For our purpose, it is not necessary to determine exactly the meaning of Philolaus’ fragments, but simply to use them to illuminate

<sup>14</sup>Timon reports that Plato once paid forty minae for Philolaus’ book (fr. 54; DK 44 A8). See Nussbaum, “Eleatic Conventionalism” 64.

<sup>15</sup>I use Nussbaum’s translation, substituting only “indeterminate” for her “unbounded.” Huffman, “Number in Philolaus’ Philosophy,” offers both a different translation and interpretation of these fragments.

Plato's T7, about which it seems safe to say only this much: even if he does not explain it in precise conceptual terms, Socrates explicitly states that there is an intimate, perhaps even a foundational, relationship between *arithmos* and *technē*. Because of its mastery of a determinate subject matter, the latter is a good, perhaps the best, example of sustained intelligibility (or knowledge). At the very least, the former is a good, perhaps the best, example, of the latter (a point made clear in T3, T4, and T5). Because *technē* plays a central role in the early dialogues, a similar claim can be made about mathematics as well.

This thesis, even stated with maximum caution and with the somewhat circuitous assistance of Philolaus, should be enough to challenge Vlastos's contention that the *Republic* is so drastically different from the earlier dialogues that a "new" author must be postulated. As early as *Euthyphro* Plato is fully aware of the distinctive and impressive epistemic features that make *arithmos*, to which he contrasts moral judgment, so reliable. He uses mathematical examples to illustrate the decisive epistemic features of *technē* in *Ion*, *Charmides*, and *Gorgias*. Since *technē* is critical in the early dialogues, at least insofar as it appears as an element in Socrates' many analogical arguments, it follows that mathematics plays an important, even if somewhat muted, role in them as well.

There is another angle from which to approach this issue. The early Plato, like the middle and late, believes that *arithmos* in particular, and mathematics in general, is good.<sup>16</sup> *Arithmos* is the principle of determinacy; it is clear, stable, and epistemically reliable. We can count on it, and it represents a realm in which agreement is prior to hostility. It is (in some unspecified way) the basis of *technē*, which is a good example of authoritative knowledge. Nowhere does this sense of the goodness of mathematics emerge more powerfully than in Socrates' extended discussion with Callicles in *Gorgias*.

Callicles is the favored interlocutor of this dialogue. Socrates says that he possesses three characteristics that make him so: knowledge, goodwill, and frankness (487a2–3). Callicles, in turn, even goes so far as to suggest that in some way he and Socrates are like brothers (see the citation from Euripides' *Antiope* at 484e4–7). Like Socrates, Callicles is a lover: Socrates loves Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles loves the

<sup>16</sup>For a modern exposition of a view similar to that I attribute to Plato see Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good."

son of Pyrilampes, Demos, and the people or Athenian *dēmos* itself (481d1–5). Like the philosopher's, Callicles' desires are strong, his intelligence is acute, and his firmness real. Like Socrates, he conceives of a sharp distinction between *nomos* and *phusis* and, in a parallel fashion, between the many and the few (483a ff.).<sup>17</sup> For these reasons, I suggest, Socrates says to him, "Know well that if you agree with me concerning the things my soul opines, then these things themselves are true" (486e5–6).

Callicles differs from Gorgias and Polus, the previous two interlocutors who were easily defeated by Socrates, in one obvious but critical way: he practices what they teach, namely rhetoric. Because they are professional teachers, Gorgias and Polus claim, either implicitly or explicitly, to possess a *technē*, a determinate body of knowledge for which they can reasonably charge tuition.<sup>18</sup> As a consequence, the scope of their expertise is intrinsically, even if implicitly, limited: they profess to teach rhetoric, not music or mathematics. By contrast, Callicles suffers no such limitation, for he professes no *technē*. Indeed, he seems to despise *technē*. This is brought out quite clearly in the following exchange that he has with Socrates.

Callicles has asserted his principle of *pleonexia* (483c3–4), namely that "the superior should take by force what belongs to the inferior, that the better should rule the worse, and the more worthy have a greater share than the less worthy" (488b). Socrates demands that the critical terms in this assertion—"superior," "better," "more worthy"—be clarified. Callicles obliges with "more intelligent" (*phronimōterous*, 489e8). Socrates, however, remains unsatisfied and demands again that "more intelligent" be clarified. In order to press Callicles to do so, he foists upon him the *technē* analogy.

When it comes to food and drink, doctors are more intelligent than laypersons, and so should have more. When it comes to clothes, the weaver is more intelligent, and so should have more; to shoes, the cobbler; to land, the farmer. The question towards which Socrates attempts to direct Callicles is, with respect to what particular, that is, determinate, field is your "intelligent man," the one who should have more, more intelligent? (490b–e).

<sup>17</sup>Of course, this is not to imply that Callicles' view of either *nomos* or *phusis* is similar to Socrates', only that like the philosopher he sharply distinguishes them.

<sup>18</sup>On the role of teachability as an essential characteristic of a *technē*, see Heimmann, "Eine vorplatonische Theorie der *Technē*."

Callicles, however, does not allow Socrates to lead him. Unlike Laches, whose definition of courage ("intelligent endurance") uses the same term as Callicles does here and who is also faced with a similar line of Socratic questioning (see T6), Callicles refuses to allow Socrates to wield the *technē* analogy against him:

- (T8) By the gods, you simply (*atechnōs*) never cease from speaking of cobblers, fullers, cooks, and doctors, as though our discussion had something to do with them.<sup>19</sup> (Grg. 491a1–3)

This is quite right: Socrates, in his many analogical arguments, does continually talk about men who possess a *technē*. Unlike other interlocutors, however, Callicles decries such talk as "nonsense" (490e4); he refuses to accord to *technē* the kind of goodness implied by Socrates' frequent use of the analogy. For example, when Socrates likens Callicles to an "engineer" (*mēchanopoios*), one who makes devices with which life can be preserved, Callicles objects. He is contemptuous of "the *technē* of that man" and would refuse to allow his child to marry into the family of a *technitēs* (512c1–7). Such objections can of course be attributed to "the contempt generally felt by the Greeks for 'banausic' occupations" (Dodds, *Gorgias* 349). I suggest, however, that Plato's depiction of Callicles' attitude towards *technē* tokens something deeper.

Callicles' ambition is grand, and so he is driven beyond the limitations implied by a *technē*. He is a *pleonektēs*, a man who continually demands to have more than his fair share and is willing to take advantage of others to get what he wants (483c3). Unlike Gorgias and Polus he does not limit himself even to the profession of rhetoric. He wants instead to exploit rhetoric, use it for his own advantage. Callicles rejects limits, wants nothing bounded, and contemptuously describes Socrates' mode of argumentation as "small" and "narrow" (497c1). Again, in one sense Callicles is quite right: Socrates repeatedly uses the *technē* analogy, and a *technē* is narrow in that its subject matter is determinate.

Socrates criticizes Callicles precisely for this rejection of limits

<sup>19</sup>There is no doubt that Plato puns with *atechnōs* here. See Roochnik, "Plato's Use of *Atechnōs*." Also, compare this line with Alcibiades' description of Socrates at *Smp.* 221e.

and his inability to restrain himself; he does not have the virtue of *sōphrosunē*. Callicles agrees. For him, a *sōphrōn* man is a “simpleton” (491e2). He insists that the “man living correctly should allow his desires to be as great as possible and not restrain them” (491e8–492a3). In short, Callicles’ desires are those of a potential tyrant. His love of political power, his brutal honesty about the weakness of the many, and his disregard for convention have transformed him into a genuinely dangerous character, exactly the sort Socrates feels obligated to combat. But how is such a man to be combated?

Without rehearsing the many details of their battle, I simply assert here that Socrates attempts to reform Callicles by offering him a vision of an orderly and knowable whole. In other words, Socrates follows the advice that Aristotle later will give: the only effective cure for the man of tyrannical desires is philosophy (*Pol.* 1267a10–16). What this means is that the truly tyrannical personality, the one who strives always for more than his share and is willing to trample those beneath him to meet his indefinitely expanding desires, can only be reformed by having his sights shifted away from the political realm to the “largest” of all possible objects, the whole itself. Only the love of wisdom can adequately replace the tyrant’s desire for unlimited power, for only it can satisfy at the same level.

Regardless of whether Aristotle’s advice is sound, Socrates seems to be following some version of it:

- (T9) The wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and the gods and men are held together in community and friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice; and, my friend, for these reasons they call the whole a cosmos rather than a chaos or a realm of unrestraint. You, it seems to me, do not pay attention to these things, even though you are wise, but the fact that geometrical equality has great power among both the gods and men has eluded you. You hold that taking–more (*pleonexia*) is what one ought to practice, for you disregard geometry. (*Grg.* 507e6–508a8)

Here Socrates urges Callicles to partake in a fundamental moral revision of himself, namely, to replace his chaotic strivings after political power with a vision of a cosmos, an orderly, “geometric” world that can be known. What is most striking about this passage is Socrates’ assertion that there is a causal relationship (note the *gar* at 508a8) between Callicles’ moral failing, that is, his advocacy of *pleonexia*, and his

neglect of geometry. Mathematics, it seems, can be therapeutic, instrumental in the shaping of character and perhaps even in the reform of a potential tyrant.

As Irwin rightly notes, Socrates' "mere reference to geometrical equality leaves many unanswered questions" (*Gorgias* 226), for Socrates does not explain how geometry can effect positive moral changes in its students. Nevertheless T9 secures one point: the early Plato, like the middle and late, believes that mathematics is good, and in a specifically moral sense.<sup>20</sup> What this sense might be is made more clear in a passage from the *Republic*. After having offered the image of the cave, Socrates asks Glaucon,

- (T10) Do you want us now to consider in what way such men [philosophers] will come into being and how one will lead them up to the light, just as some men are said to have gone from Hades up to the gods? . . . Then, as it seems, this wouldn't be the twirling of a shell, but the turning (*periagōgē*) of a soul around from a day that is like night to the true day; it is that ascent to what is, which we shall truly affirm to be philosophy.<sup>21</sup>  
(*Rep.* 521c1–8)

Socrates then asks, what study can facilitate this turning of the soul away from becoming and towards being? The answer: calculation and counting (*arithmein*, 522e2).<sup>22</sup>

This passage is important to Vlastos, for he takes it to supply evidence of a new Plato, one who got his start in *Meno* with a praise of geometry, and who then rejected the moral and elenctic philosophizing of the historical Socrates. By the time of the *Meno* and *Republic*, says Vlastos, "Plato himself has taken that deep, long plunge into mathematical studies he will be requiring of all philosophers when he comes to write book VII of the *Republic* and the effect is proving as transformative of his own outlook as he believes it would be of theirs" (*Socrates* 118).

What Vlastos has in mind here is Plato's "discovery," via his study

<sup>20</sup>On geometrical equality see *Laws* 757b; Arist. *EN* 1131b13 and *Pol.* 1301b29.

<sup>21</sup>Here I follow Allan Bloom's literal translation.

<sup>22</sup>I move from geometry in *Gorgias* to arithmetic in the *Republic* without offering comment on the differences between the two because my basic point holds for both: as mathematical *technai*, both have determinate subject matters that can be apprehended clearly and methodically. In general, Plato seems more interested in geometry, perhaps because both its methodology and its results were more prominent during his lifetime.

of mathematics, of the separate, eternal Forms that come to be the core of his later theories. But does T10 really represent a view so totally new that it requires postulating a dramatic transformation on the part of its author? I suggest it does not.

Consider in what sense counting is able to turn the soul around. Socrates explains by discussing sensation. Some sensations appear to be self-contradictory. When looking at three fingers on a single hand, it may seem that the middle of the three is both larger and smaller. Reflection on this appearance discloses that this is because the middle is larger than the smallest finger, and smaller than the largest: the intellect has been “summoned” in order to stabilize a seeming contradiction (523b–524e).

The most obvious way the intellect is summoned to do its work is by measuring and counting. If I can first separate the three fingers and conceive of them as discrete individuals, and then determine that they are respectively, two, three, and four inches long, and then recombine the three individuals into an ordered triad, that the middle finger appears both larger and smaller no longer seems contradictory in the least.

It is in this very *ordinary* act of counting that the soul is invited to turn around. *Arithmein* is always a counting of items, of units. If I count the three fingers on my hand, each finger functions as just such a unit. But the number, three, can also be used to count three toes on my foot. The same number is invoked to count different sensible items: a toe is not a finger; indeed, even each of the three fingers is different from the other two. In the act of counting, however, the number, the count, treats each finger as an equal unit. As Klein puts it, “whenever we are engaged in counting, we substitute—as a matter of course, even if we are not aware of what we are doing—for the varied and always ‘unequal’ visible things to be counted ‘pure’ invisible units which in no way differ from each other” (*Meno* 117).

In other words, even in the “vulgar” count of ordinary people (see *Phlb.* 56d5), we invoke, and thereby implicitly gain access to, a purely intelligible, formal, stable entity: the number. Simply to count, then, is fundamentally informative: it tells us that noetic stability can and does intervene into human experience, that there is something, even amidst the “barbaric bog” (*Rep.* 533d1) of human life, on which we can count. In this sense, *arithmos* can turn the soul around, away from becoming to being, for it can become a compelling invitation to shift one’s sights, away from the sensible towards the noetic. Counting, the most ordinary

of intellectual acts, "leads the soul powerfully upward" (525d6); in other words, it can inspire us to think, supply us with both the material to think about and some ideal at which to aim.<sup>23</sup>

Again, does T10 require us to postulate a dramatic shift on the part of the author of the earlier dialogues? No. The goodness of *arithmos* expressed here in T10 is not simply a theoretical matter for Plato. It must be remembered that since the pedagogical role of mathematics in book 7 of the *Republic* is propaedeutic, its value is instrumental. The study of mathematics is good for turning around the souls of the future philosopher-kings. Even if by the time he wrote the *Republic* Plato was on the verge of developing a complex theory of mathematics, and even if the guardians' mathematical curriculum as described in book 7 is surely not ordinary or common, it remains the case that in earlier dialogues, notably *Gorgias*, mathematics is evaluated in almost identical terms. In T9, for example, Callicles' failure as a moral being is attributed to a flaw in his education: he did not study geometry. Geometry is good, not as a theoretical end in itself, but in turning the soul away from *pleonexia* to *sôphrosunê*. A person who has been informed by the goodness of equality or of number is, in practical and political terms, a better person.

Because of the *Republic's* emphasis on equal and nonsensible units it is frequently taken to allude to "parts of the theory of Mathematical Numbers" that Aristotle discusses in the *Metaphysics* (Wedberg, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics* 124). Perhaps it does. Even if so, however, this would not jeopardize the thesis that when it comes to the goodness of *arithmos* Plato has maintained a consistent set of views since his earliest works. To hearken back to T7 and *Rep.* 522c5, it should be noted that Socrates there mentions the "trivial" (*phaulon*) act of counting. He does so because counting is indeed so very ordinary. Nonetheless, at the same time it is fundamentally informative, for it can inform the counter of a stable and intelligible entity, the *arithmos*, and thus supply him with a possible conceptual ideal. Whether there is a theory of numbers to buttress this ideal is another question entirely. In other words, one need not invoke an extraordinary theory of numbers

<sup>23</sup> As Whitehead puts it, "Our existence is invigorated by conceptual ideals, transforming vague perceptions. . . . Here we find the essential clue which relates mathematics to the study of the good" ("Mathematics and the Good" 674).



in order to realize the goodness of counting. Indeed it is precisely this realization that informs T1, the passage from *Euthyphro*.

In sum, the thesis I hold does not necessarily lead to any specific position on the question of the separability and ontological status of number or of the Forms. Thus it is possible for me to gloss over the question whether T10 and passages like it, from the *Republic* and elsewhere, allude to Plato's unwritten mathematical-ontological theory or contribute to his theory of the Forms. Indeed, it is unnecessary here to raise the many difficult questions concerning this putatively late stage of Plato's thought. In what sense did Plato attribute separate and independent reality to numbers and Forms? Did he divide numbers into various kinds, such as form numbers, intermediates, combinable and uncombinable numbers? How did they interact? What roles did the "one" and the "indeterminate dyad" play in his theory of the foundations of arithmetic?<sup>24</sup>

These are, of course, all important questions in their own right, but they do not bear on what I take to be Plato's enduring position towards *arithmos*. If I am right, then, *pace* Vlastos, T10 does not testify to a radically new understanding or appreciation of *arithmos* for Plato. Indeed in virtually all the passages studied above, from *Euthyphro* to the *Republic*, a remarkable level of consistency in Plato's attitude towards mathematics has emerged. Specifically, he thinks that *arithmos* (and, of course, geometry) is good. To render such a judgment means to locate *arithmos* in a practical context and to invoke a standard that is not itself arithmetical. *Arithmos* is good because it turns souls around, leads them to *sōphrosunē*, makes them care about something beyond the senses. It gives them an ideal and an inkling of formal perfection. All of these are practical considerations and have to do, finally, with leading a good life.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Annas is a good guide to these questions.

<sup>25</sup> Even in the late *Philebus* this theme is prominent. The dialogue is a debate on what kind of life to lead, that of pleasure or that of mind? Eventually, through an enormously complex route in which so many of the issues discussed in this paper are treated at the highest level of abstraction, the life of mind triumphs over that of pleasure. Note that Socrates classifies pleasure within the category of the indeterminate (27e–28a), and that this becomes the basis of its eventually being judged inferior to mind. In other words, indeterminacy is worse than determinacy. Also consider that *arithmos* is what introduces determinacy into the indeterminate (25e). Finally, Socrates also states that *technē* requires *arithmos* (55e1–3). All of these theoretical arguments are summoned for the sake of deciding what is ultimately a practical question.

Even if he was right about much, Vlastos was thus wrong in postulating a drastic shift between Socrates E and Socrates M when it comes to mathematics. While it may well be true that Plato studied advanced mathematics in the middle of his career, and that this influenced him, it does not follow that he went through a drastic "turn" in his thinking. On my reading, a basic intuition unifies all of the dialogues: *arithmos*, with its beautiful and gentle stability, its *akribeia*, its critical role in making *technē* possible, is good.<sup>26</sup>

DAVID ROOCHNIK

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

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## VATIC ADMONITION IN HORACE *ODES* 4.9

. . . dictae per carmina sortes, et vitae monstrata via est  
—*Ars Poetica* 403–4

Scholarly opinion is nearly unanimous that Horace *Odes* 4.9, *Ne forte credas interitura* . . . , was written in praise of its addressee, Marcus Lollius.<sup>1</sup> The reasons for Horace's alleged praise and his enthusiasm for the task, however, have frequently been questioned. Aspects of this ode which have most troubled scholars are (1) the conflict between the perceived praise of Lollius and the character his subsequent historical record reveals; (2) Horace's delay in naming his addressee; (3) his perceived lack of sincerity or enthusiasm for this particular subject; and (4) the apparent irrelevance of the topological conclusion.<sup>2</sup> Despite valuable insights and useful commentary, no interpretation of this ode to date has addressed all of these issues in a manner which preserves its integrity and reveals its underlying unity. Such an interpretation is pos-

<sup>1</sup>The major editions support this view—e.g., Bentley, Keller and Holder, Kiessling and Heinze, Orelli, Klingner—as do the earlier commentators (Havthall, *Acronis et Porphyronis Commentarii* 31–44). Comments in such popular texts as Bennett, Moore, Page, Shorey and Laing, and Smith reflect the scholarly *communis opinio*, with Bennett's Loeb edition even carrying "In Praise of Lollius" as the ode's subheading. See also Syndikus, *Lyrik* II 375; and Radke, "*Carmen Lollianum*" 768, 774, although he claims that Horace idealizes Lollius to show what lyric can do and that Lollius is not of particular significance to the ode.

<sup>2</sup>Lollius' image and character: Collinge, *Structure* 94–95; Syme, *Roman Revolution* 429 and *Augustan Aristocracy* 402; Fraenkel, *Horace* 426. Delay in naming: see Fraenkel, *Horace* 426; Nisbet and Hubbard, *Odes* II xiii. Nisbet and Hubbard, *Odes* I 68, include 1.4, 1.7, 2.1, and 2.12 as other odes with delayed addressees. It should be noted that in each of these odes, to Sestius, Plancus, Pollio, and Maecenas, the narrator offers advice to his addressee. I find the pattern significant enough to counter the idea that this delay is somehow anomalous. Lack of enthusiasm: see, e.g., Groag, "Lollius" 1383; Fraenkel, *Horace* 425–26; Collinge, *Structure* 102; Commager, *Odes* 321–22; Becker, *Spätwerk* 135; West, "Horace's Poetic Technique" 35–36. Topological conclusion: Page, *Carmina* 432–33; Fraenkel, *Horace* 426; Reckford, *Horace* 131. Others claim that Horace includes Lollius in the gnomic conclusion: e.g., Esser, *Untersuchungen* 60; Putnam, *Artifices* 168; Armstrong, *Horace* 148 (although he says that the poem "goes on as much to instruct Lollius in as to ascribe to him the qualities of the wise man"). Collinge, *Structure* 102, calls this section a "coda," which connects *either* to the first section *or* to Lollius. Esser (56) classifies the ode as "Gnome mit Relativsatz," along with 1.13, 3.16, 2.2, 2.18, and 3.2.

sible, but only when one challenges the prevailing assumption that the ode is a poem of unambiguous praise.<sup>3</sup>

While I agree with those who claim that 4.9 explores further the theme sounded in 4.8, the power of poetry to confer immortal fame, I do not agree with the implicit assumption which accompanies that view: that Horace is talking only about the power to eulogize.<sup>4</sup> Nor do I find the statement of this general theme alone an adequate explanation for the specific content of this ode. Horace does not equate fame with praise; he is, on the contrary, careful to leave the nature of Lollius' fame an open question.

The assumption that this ode praises Lollius is the very factor which has denied interpreters access to its unity. The ode reads as praise only if praise is all that the reader is disposed to hear, if its ambiguities are ignored, and if the reader fails to recognize the larger context of the narrator's position. Horace emphasizes his narrative stance in this ode, focuses the reader's attention on it, and promises something new. The narrator here, in fact, seems to go out of his way to avoid praise. He not only delays it, but qualifies it by indirection and ambiguity.<sup>5</sup> I argue that despite the suggestion of encomium in the cen-

<sup>3</sup> Although Putnam (*Artifices* 168 n. 19) notes the possibility of irony, he does not pursue it. Ambrose ("Ironical Meaning") remains the only challenger to an encomiastic interpretation. He carries his interpretation to an opposite extreme and reads the poem as a "mock encomium" which censures Lollius in the guise of praise and perhaps calls for his banishment or condemnation and suicide. Reckford (*Horace* 131) notes that "Horace wishes to stimulate Lollius to praiseworthy deeds and is not above using death's head as prod," but he considers Lollius relatively unimportant to the ode.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Putnam, *Artifices* 160; Commager, *Odes* 321–22; Klingner, *Opera* 121; Armstrong, *Horace* 146–48; Porter, "Recurrent Motifs" 192. Reckford (*Horace* 130–31) claims the ode presents the "powers of poetry against a backdrop of mortality"; Page, (*Carmina* 433) notes that often such poetry presents an idea of "what a man should be [rather] than . . . what a particular man is."

<sup>5</sup> I use Empson's general definition of ambiguity (*Seven Types of Ambiguity* 1): "any verbal nuance, however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of language." Similar ambiguity may be found elsewhere in Horace (although none of the following discussions mentions 4.9). See, generally, Zetzel, "Structure of Ambiguity"; Quinn, "Syntactical Ambiguity." For ambiguity in specific odes (1.4, 2.2, 2.18, e.g.) see Will, "Ambiguity in 1.4" 240; Commager, *Odes* 76–77. For ambiguity in 2.2 see esp. Hulton, "Inimice Lamnae Crispe Sallusti"; Calder, "Irony in 2.2" 175; Alexander, "Nullus Argento Color." Ode 2.2 provides an important parallel for 4.9, since the ambiguity lies in the question of whether the *nisi* clause (lines 3–4) modifies *nullus color est* or *inimice lamnae*, and how its reading affects the portrayal of Sallustius Crispus' character, about which the historical record also leaves some doubt. Will (243–45) cites parallels in other Augustan art of the time.

tral section of the ode, Horace assumes instead a narrative stance of vatic admonition, through which he admonishes his addressee rather than praising or blaming him. Horace's identification of his role as *vates sacer* (4.9.28) provides, through its association with Apollo and thus with the tradition of the Delphic oracle, a larger context for both ambiguity and admonition.<sup>6</sup>

The identification of Horace's narrative position allows the sections of 4.9 to be read as a unified whole. The examples of poets and heroes in the first part of the ode, the indirection and ambiguity of the central section, and the nature of the topological conclusion work together to support this interpretation. Such a reading places Horace and Lollius within a larger literary context of wise advisors and their chosen recipients. The tradition begins in Greece, with the literary record of Solon and other Delphic spokesmen and their advice to rulers, as well as with such Greek lyric poets as Simonides and Pindar.

In 4.9 Horace as narrator speaks with oracular indirection when he promises the still-living Lollius that he will not escape his immortalizing *verba*. Lollius does not escape, but the ode concludes with the final word on Lollius unspoken. The narrator appears to have taken a

<sup>6</sup>OLD defines *vates* as "prophet" or "divinely inspired poet." Newman (*Concept of Vates* 63–65) argues for two contending concepts of the *vates* in Horace: an earlier one of *vates* as teacher of morals and manners, and a later one as Hellenistic eulogist. He posits the later type for 4.8; but sees 4.9 as a reversion to the earlier type, claiming that Horace is still uneasy throughout *Odes* 4 as to the role of the poet in society. I prefer Horace himself on the role of the *vates*; see *Ars Poetica* 391–407. I see the role of the *vates* in 4.9 as a combination of the two functions Newman posits. If the Roman *vates* is, as Newman maintains (9–10), intimately connected to Apollo and the opening of his temple on the Palatine, it should not surprise that Horace turns to Delphic wisdom as a source of material for teaching. Among the most familiar examples of Delphic wisdom were the reported conversations between wise men and tyrants, the most famous of these being that between Solon and Croesus, most fully presented in Herodotus 1.29–33 (cf. also Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.13–23; Diod. Sic. 9.27). For other examples of the tradition, see [Plato] *Ep.* B; Hor. *AP* 218. Cf. also Cody (*Callimachean Aesthetics* 29–30), who calls Horace an "ethical teacher in the Socratic tradition" and equates the *vates* with a poet-philosopher. Other odes fit this pattern. It has been noticed, e.g., for 2.2 and 2.10, but not for 4.9. Nisbet and Hubbard (*Odes II* xxi) refer to Horace's "Pindaric admonition"; Fraenkel (*Horace* 426 n. 2) notes that many have seen a strong Pindaric strain in 4.9 and compares 4.9.21ff. with *Nemean* 5.16ff.; Reckford (*Horace* 131) suggests comparing *Pythian* 2. I do not ignore the obvious affinities of Horace's narrative stance here with Pindar's (*Pythian* 3, or 4, e.g.), but my emphasis remains on the older, more pervasive literary tradition of Delphic wisdom, in which Pindar also participates, and which the verbal echoes of the concluding section (lines 45–52) of 4.9 further support. Horace, furthermore, does nothing in this ode to identify himself with Pindar more than with the other poets he cites.

position in many ways similar to that of the Herodotean Solon, when he admonished Croesus to "count no man truly happy, until he has completed his life."<sup>7</sup>

The ambiguity and indirection present throughout the ode rule out an unqualified reading of either praise or condemnation. An admonitory reading, on the other hand, receives additional support from the position of 4.9 in book 4, and from Horace's use of similar ambiguity elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> The poem is placed in book 4 significantly and, perhaps in part transitionally, between 4.8 (*Donarem pateras grataque commodus, / Censorine*) on the value of poetry in conferring immortality, and 4.10 (*O crudelis adhuc et Veneriis muneribus potens*), which offers an unambiguous warning to Ligurinus that he will regret the passing of external beauty and the lack earlier of the *mens* he has now.<sup>9</sup> Ode 4.9 reflects a modified combination of these themes.

The structure of 4.9 mirrors its Janus-like position between the

<sup>7</sup>Hdt. 1.32. Others have noted references to Croesus and echoes of Solon's poetry elsewhere in Horace, though not in 4.9. Nisbet and Hubbard (*Odes I* ad 2.2, *oculo in-retorto*) note Solon's indifference to Croesus, mentioning Hdt. 1.30.1–3; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.15, 8.1.42; Diod. Sic. 9.27.2; they also compare 2.2.13 to Solon 13.71ff. (West), and 2.2.21 to Solon 15.2W. I would add echoes in 1.1 of Solon 13W, and in 3.9 of Solon 27W. Commager (*Odes* 81–83), Nisbet and Hubbard (loc. cit.), Fraenkel (*Horace* 425) and Cody (*Callimachean Aesthetics* 62) link 2.2 and 2.18. Commager includes the parallel of 4.9 for its play on *beatus*. I think the Herodotean logos provides the connection. Ode 2.2 refers directly to Cyrus (as do 1.3 and 3.9), and to Croesus indirectly. There is a precedent in the poetic tradition as well for such exhortation. Pindar, in fact, echoes the Solon–Croesus logos in both language and thought in *Nemean* 7.12–13.

<sup>8</sup>See notes 5 and 7 above for the considerable evidence for both deliberate ambiguity and admonition in the poetry of Horace, despite the absence of references in these discussions to 4.9. For further testimony to Horace's use of deliberate ambiguity as a vehicle for admonition see DeWitt, "Parresiasitic Poems" 30:312–19; and 31:205–11, for a description of admonition through apparent praise as a practice of the Epicurean *contubernium*, with which he associates Horace, although he does not include 4.9 in his discussion. Cf. also McGann, *Studies* 33, who claims that books 1 and 2 of the *Epistles* establish the themes of self-improvement and admonition which he calls the "ethical preoccupation" of *Odes* book 1. He also notes (37) the indirection of Horace's admonitory approach there. It may be significant on the basis of approach that Epistle 1.2 is addressed to a Lollius also, whatever the nature of the actual relationship between these two men.

<sup>9</sup>Ode 4.10 even repeats the use of *quotiens* (line 6), and *animus* (line 8) from 4.9. I see strong connections and transition among 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, despite the tendency to group 4.7–9 as a triad. Cf. Fraenkel, *Horace* 426; Putnam, *Artifices* 131; Porter, "Recurrent Motifs" 192; Cody, *Callimachean Aesthetics* 62; Reckford, *Horace* 131; Commager, *Odes* 321–22; Collinge, *Structure* 42; Dettmer, *Study* 512–13.



Reading the ode as praise, on the other hand, leads to speculation either that Horace misjudged Lollius' character, that he wrote under constraint, or that all the historical sources on Lollius are biased in the extreme. Seeking an interpretation of 4.9 which reconciles its elements with the evidence we have seems preferable to basing a reading on one or the other of a group of speculative explanations external to the poem. A detailed examination of Horace's sketch of Lollius and its place in the larger structure of the ode permits such an interpretation.

The ode unfolds in chronological progression, from the opening mention of the narrator's birth to the concluding reference to death (*perire*, 4.9.52), and from past to future: from earlier examples of a tradition of poets and their celebrated subjects, to his position with Lollius in the present, and finally to an ideal—not what Lollius is, but what he could be, or perhaps what Horace thinks he should be. The ode's predominantly tripartite structure is carefully balanced.<sup>18</sup> The four-line introduction (1–4) is followed by twenty-four lines of examples of earlier poets and the characters on whom they conferred immortality (5–28), sixteen lines on Lollius (29–44), and eight on the poet's concluding ideal (45–52). Between the opening section (1–28), which emphasizes in the past tense the immortality conferred by poetry, and the closing section (45–52), which contains a capsule portrait of the person most deserving to be called “truly happy” (*beatus*) in the conditional future, Horace addresses Lollius in the present tense. He presents him (29–44) with apparent praise, which is not only delayed but also qualified by ambiguity.

In the introductory section Horace sounds his dominant theme by emphasizing his position as narrator, locating himself geographically in Italy, warning with authority that his words will not die, and promising something new—perhaps in part that he will do for Italy what the poets named in the lines which follow did for Greece:

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Peterson, *Prosopographia* 84, “vix recte”). An ironic interpretation lacks motivation and appears to be based on scholarly hindsight, crediting Horace with knowing events in Lollius' life which took place after Horace died.

<sup>18</sup> As often in the *Odes*, a case can be made for bipartite division, with a pivotal line at the center of the ode. In the case of 4.9, with the four-line introduction excepted, the central line (29) is of pivotal significance to the ode; but there is general agreement that its predominant structure is as I set it forth here. Collinge (*Structure* 122–23) sees six divisions; Esser (*Untersuchungen* 56) subdivides even further.

Ne forte credas interitura quae  
 longe sonantem natus ad Aufidum  
 non ante volgas per artis  
 verba loquor socianda chordis.<sup>19</sup>

(4.9.1-4)

But there are significant differences. Horace draws his subject matter from contemporary Roman history and his concluding exemplum from the Greek gnomic and historical tradition.<sup>20</sup> He combines the role of wise advisor with that of the poet who confers immortality, and who gains it for himself in the process.

The catalogue of poets and remembered heroes in our ode demonstrates poetry's ability to confer immortality; the poets mentioned—Homer, Pindar, Simonides (and/or Bacchylides),<sup>21</sup> Alcaeus, Stesichorus, Anacreon, Sappho—balance the examples of heroes that owe their fame to a poet—Helen, Teucer, Idomeneus, Sthenelus, Hector, Deiphobus, Agamemnon. Establishing a range of content and style which raises possibilities for himself, Horace sketches the Greek poets named, briefly and with indirection:

non, si priores Maeonius tenet  
 sedes Homerus, Pindaricae latent  
 Caeaeque et Alcaei minaces  
 Stesichorique graves Camenae,  
 nec, siquid olim lusit Anacreon,  
 delevit aetas; spirat adhuc amor  
 vivuntque commissi calores  
 Aeoliae fidibus puellae.

(5-12)

The poets mentioned here are identified geographically and by brief allusion to subject matter. Homer is characterized as Maeonian (*Maeonius*) and as holding the earlier, possibly more important position (*priores sedes*). Horace thus subordinates the other poets to Homer, but he does so without diminishing their capacity to immortalize. There

<sup>19</sup>Citations throughout are from the Oxford Classical Text (Garrod's 2d ed. of Wickham). English translations, where they appear, are my own.

<sup>20</sup>He has already done this in books 1-3; the "Roman Odes" are prime examples.

<sup>21</sup>*Caeae* is generally assumed to refer to Simonides, although it could include as well his nephew Bacchylides (cf. Fraenkel, *Horace* 252). Only this poet (or poets) and Sappho are left unnamed, and only this example is left ambiguous. The presence of ambiguity here is significant in itself, perhaps helping to set up the sustained ambiguity which follows.

may even be the hint that, if Homer had not mentioned the figures first, they would not perhaps have been known to later poets. Pindar is recognized through his *camenae*,<sup>22</sup> as are Simonides/Bacchylides, Alcaeus, and Stesichorus. The muses of Alcaeus and Stesichorus are further styled *minaces* ("threatening") and *graves* ("weighty") respectively; Anacreon *lusit* ("played"), and Sappho is identified, but not named, as the Aeolian girl whose passionate love lyrics live on.<sup>23</sup> Pindar, Simonides, and Bacchylides are all known to us, as they presumably were to Horace, for lyrics which contain admonition as well as praise; and Stesichorus and Alcaeus present Homeric figures, including Helen, in contexts not always laudatory.<sup>24</sup> Nowhere here does Horace mention praise. As presented, the poets offer a varied range of subject matter. Horace has, in fact, identified himself only with "threatening" Alcaeus, by his use of Alcaic strophe in this ode. That choice seems discordant with a reading of this ode as a poem of praise.

It is the passion of Sappho which leads the narrator from the seven poets (eight, if we include Bacchylides) to their seven subjects in the next section, since the first mentioned is Helen's burning (*arsit*):<sup>25</sup>

non sola comptos arsit adulteri  
crinis et aurum vestibus illitum  
mirata regalisque cultus  
et comites Helene Lacaena,  
primusve Teucer tela Cydonio  
direxit arcu; non semel Ilios

<sup>22</sup>Interestingly, Horace here selects the purely Latin term in connection with the Greek poets (*OLD*, Lewis and Short s.v.), while he uses the Greek *musis* a few lines later in a more general context (21), as if he deliberately wished to conflate the Greek and Roman traditions.

<sup>23</sup>For valuable discussion of these lines see Putnam, *Artifices* 160–64.

<sup>24</sup>One can point to Pindar and Bacchylides, and to Simonides both as poet and sage (see, e.g., Xenophon's *Hiero* for Simonides' advice to Hiero). That Horace takes care here to mention several poets places emphasis on his position in a wider tradition rather than suggesting a comparison with Pindar (as, e.g., Ode 4.2), or even exclusively one between epic and lyric. See Pl. *Phaedr.* 243a, and Campbell, *Greek Lyric* 286–87, for traditional views of Stesichorus and Alcaeus.

<sup>25</sup>Putnam (*Artifices* 163) points out the relationship of all the figures mentioned through their association with Helen, noting the erotic cast and the possibility of reference to poets' ability to deceive. This may provide a partial explanation for Horace's choice, but not a sufficient one, by itself, to explain the relationship of this section to the rest of the ode. The hint of deception, however, may be significant in signaling the ambiguity which both accompanies and follows these examples.

vexata; non pugnavit ingens  
 Idomeneus Sthenelusve solus  
 dicenda Musis proelia; non ferox  
 Hector vel acer Deiphobus gravis  
 excepit ictus pro pudicis  
 coniugibus puerisque primus.  
 vixere fortes ante Agamemnona  
 multi; sed omnes illacrimabiles  
 urgentur ignotique longa  
 nocte, carent quia vate sacro.

(13-28)

Horace characterizes each of these examples briefly: Helen, for her attraction to her adulterer's external appearance, wealth, and splendor; Teucer, for bowmanship; Idomeneus and Sthenelus, for praiseworthy fighting; Hector and Deiphobus, fierce and savage, for taking blows to protect chaste wives and children; and, last, Agamemnon, simply as one of many brave men. The characters named, all immortalized by Homer first, were also all remembered subsequently by other poets, up to and including Horace.

The context for the examples here is the Trojan War; but poets after Homer added to the immortality of these figures by recording other aspects of their lives which affected the way they were remembered. Helen's characterization differs even between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and she is variously portrayed by later poets as both victim and villain.<sup>26</sup> Horace's own mention of her here as his first example casts her in less than favorable light; she is attracted to Paris' wealth and beauty. Paris is cast as adulterer; but Horace's use of the term for him is suggestive of Helen as well. Teucer and Idomeneus were not only famous for their prowess at Troy; they were also remembered by other poets for reversals of fortune they subsequently experienced.<sup>27</sup> Sthene-

<sup>26</sup>Horace himself refers to the famous story of Stesichorus' vilification of Helen, his blinding and subsequent recantation (Epode 17.42); he implicates her in Nereus' dire prophecy to Paris in Ode 1.15, where he also pairs Teucer and Sthenelus as brave warriors at Troy, in a context where Nereus warns and Paris does not heed. Ambrose ("Ironic Meaning" 3) emphasizes the misconduct of Paris and Helen.

<sup>27</sup>There were two Teucers: one was the founder of the Trojan race, who would have been known to Horace's audience through Augustan popularization of the founding legend; the other, the Greek fighter at Troy, is the one more suited to this context and the one Horace also mentions in Odes 1.7 and 1.15. But the duality repeats in this section the potential for ambiguity. Teucer is immortalized after Homer for his attempt to secure a noble burial for his half-brother Ajax. When he returned home without his brother, he was exiled by his father, but promised another Salamis by Apollo, which he founded on

lus, Hector, and Deiphobus fought bravely, but were defeated *and died* at Troy.<sup>28</sup> Agamemnon returned victorious to meet an ignominious death at home, the prime example of the man who lived too long, the one who appears in the *Odyssey* to warn Odysseus about the faithlessness of women.<sup>29</sup>

The figures Horace names here were long dead before being immortalized by the poets named, themselves also part of a remote past. And all, except those who died at Troy, are remembered with mixed accounts. The variety of their subsequent fates becomes as important as the fact that they are remembered at all. The only one who emerges alive without significant suffering is Helen, the one attracted to "all that glitters" and implicitly contrasted to the "chaste wives and children" for whom Hector and Deiphobus died. Intertextual allusions in this section of the ode create subtle ambiguities which affect what follows.

Horace, as narrator, includes himself in the list of poets who confer such immortality. By implication, then, Lollius becomes a figure in the list of those remembered. Placing Lollius in this context invites his association with the other figures named and generates comparison and contrast. The mixed fates of the figures who precede him, coupled with the fact that he is still alive, raise questions about how he will be remembered at the conclusion of his life. If Horace as narrator was simply intent on praising Lollius, his particular selection of immortalized figures is a strange list.

One could, I suppose, assume, as some have, that these examples were randomly chosen to illustrate the simple fact that immortality is conferred by poetry, and not press the implications farther.<sup>30</sup> Thematic and verbal echoes in subsequent sections of the ode, however, reinforce

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Cyprus (cf. Soph. *Ajax*; Eur. *Helen*). In addition to his valor at Troy, Idomeneus was remembered as Deiphobus' rival for the love of Helen, and for having difficulties returning to Crete which resulted in his having to sacrifice his son and in his consequent exile and flight to Italy (cf. *Aen.* 3.121–23, with Servius ad loc., 11.252–93; schol. *Il.* 13.516; Eust. 944.43). Deiphobus is also remembered as Helen's husband after the death of Paris.

<sup>28</sup>*Il.* 5. Ambrose ("Ironical Meaning" 4) also suggests that Hector's nobility is qualified by his association with Deiphobus here, since it was in his guise that Athena caused Hector finally to stop running and fight Achilles. Deiphobus was also betrayed by Helen (cf. *Aen.* 6), which, given the reference here (23–24) to "chaste wives and children," adds to the ironic cast of the section (I thank *AJP*'s anonymous reader for this suggestion).

<sup>29</sup>*Od.* 11.441–61. That Agamemnon would have met a happier end had he died at Troy is emphasized at *Od.* 4.512–47, 11.387–434, 13.383–91, 24.19–97; cf., of course, Aesch. *Ag.*

<sup>30</sup>See note 4 above.

the importance of the specific choices. The brief, gnomic sentence which follows strengthens the connection of this section of the ode to what follows:

paulum sepultae distat inertiae  
celata virtus. (29–30)

The legendary figures just mentioned had neither their virtue hidden nor their inactivity concealed, because they had a *vates sacer*. The brevity and the thought of this sentence closely connect the *vate sacro* with the ending of the previous sentence and with *non ego te*, with which the next opens. The transition establishes the narrator Horace as the next *vates* and Lollius as the next figure to be named, as it advances the time from the remote past to the present.

At the same time that this sentence provides skillful transition, its pithy quality attracts attention. Not only is it the shortest sentence in the ode, but it appears near the midpoint as well, separating the primarily tripartite ode into two parts.<sup>31</sup> At this central point in the ode, indirection and ambiguity hold sway. At the same time that the form of this utterance is striking, its thought is curiously understated. It does not speak of praise, or promise fame and glory; it dwells instead on the anonymity of the concealed.<sup>32</sup> The thought is clear: virtue almost equals inactivity, when each goes unrecorded. The tone, however, is ambiguous: the sentence is equally a somewhat wistful concluding comment on those not named in the preceding sentence, and a warning from the narrator to the addressee named in the next:

non ego te meis  
chartis inornatum sileri,  
totve tuos patiar labores  
impune, Lolli, carpere lividas  
obliviones. (30–34)

<sup>31</sup> If we except the four-line introduction, this sentence divides the ode into nearly equal sections (lines 5–28 = 24 lines, lines 29–52 = 24 lines).

<sup>32</sup> As Horace moves here to the historical, more prosaic section of this ode, one cannot help but be reminded, both by 29–34 and by numerous verbal echoes in 34–44, of the historical preface to Sallust's *Catiline*. Cf., e.g., his comparison (*Cat.* 2.8–9): *Sed multi mortales dediti ventri atque somno indocti inculti vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere; quibus profecto contra naturam corpus voluptati, anima oneri fuit. Eorum ego vitam mortemque iuxta aestumo, quoniam de utraque siletur*. One wonders whether the echoes are intentional or accidental.

I will neither allow you to be  
 unheard of, unadorned by my pages,  
 nor will I allow envious oblivion,  
 unpunished, Lollius, to consume  
 your many deeds.

Read in this way, these lines are considered as the introduction to the section of the ode traditionally referred to as the *laudes Lollii* (30–44).<sup>33</sup> But it is the scholarly tradition and the expectation of readers, *not* Horace's Latin, that have insisted on seeing exclusively *laudes* in these lines. The patent ambiguity, both verbal and syntactic, which exists in the Latin of this section is too strong not to be intentional. These lines could as easily contain a warning as a promise. With the caveat that lexically possible alternatives do not necessarily imply equally likely choices, I suggest that they could also be rendered thus:

I will not allow you to be  
 unheard of, unadorned by my pages,  
 nor will I allow your many deeds,  
 unpunished, Lollius, to take and enjoy envied  
 oblivion.

The unqualified use of *labores* here is neutral as to the quality of the deeds—they could be good or evil.<sup>34</sup> The paired accusatives (*labores, obliviones*) in 32–34 are interchangeable as subject and object of *carpere*, a verb which occurs elsewhere in Horace with both beneficial and harmful connotations, depending on the perspective.<sup>35</sup> *Lividas* can have either an active or passive sense, that is, “envious” or “envied.”<sup>36</sup> “Envious oblivion” as subject of *carpere* would seek to devour “many [good] deeds” and thus destroy Lollius’ *fama*, while “many [evil] deeds” as subject would seek to seize and enjoy “envied oblivion” and thus escape *fama*.

Horace promises to provide *fama* for Lollius in any case, allowing neither possibility: he promises only that Lollius will be remembered;

<sup>33</sup> See notes 1 and 2 above.

<sup>34</sup> Ambrose (“Ironical Meaning” 6–7) notes the neutrality of *labores* here.

<sup>35</sup> At *O.* 1.11.8 (*carpe diem . . .*), e.g., *carpere* has the sense of “take and enjoy”; at 4.2.29 (*grata carpentis thyma per laborem . . .*) its force is “feed on and consume.”

<sup>36</sup> Literally, “spiteful” (wanting to cause bruises?), or “bruised” (bearing the marks of another’s envy): *OLD*, Lewis and Short s.v.

he says nothing as to how. The deliberately ambiguous language leaves the final interpretation, in effect, in the hands of Lollius and/or subsequent readers. Horace is speaking in the role of sacred *vates*: his purpose admonitory, his ambiguity in keeping with the tradition of the Delphic oracle and its interpreters.

The position of specific words contributes further to this ambiguity. The parenthetical positioning of *ego* and *meis* with *te* (30), of *tuos* and *labores* with *patiar* (32), and, more dramatically, of the adverb *impune* between Lollius and his deeds (33)—all reinforce the dual possibilities. Syntax reflects content; ambiguity is artfully achieved through meaning and arrangement. Horace has quite literally trapped Lollius, binding him with interlocking word order. The point is not to select one reading or the other, but to admit the simultaneous (although not necessarily equally likely) possibility of both.

Lines 34 and following continue and intensify the indirection and ambiguity which have been building as the ode progresses. The impersonal *est animus tibi* begins a sentence which does not end until line 44. It too admits alternate readings. I offer here a rather literal translation which illustrates the verbal ambiguities by positing alternate readings in parentheses. Again, I emphasize that I see the ambiguous language as intending to raise doubt and perhaps to hint at alternative voices, rather than to challenge the more apparent readings with equal likelihood.

est animus tibi  
rerumque prudens et secundis  
temporibus dubiisque rectus,  
vindex avarae fraudis et abstinens  
ducentis ad se cuncta pecuniae,  
consulque non unius anni,  
sed quotiens bonus atque fidus  
iudex honestum praetulit utili,  
reiecit alto dona nocentium  
vultu, per obstantis catervas  
explicuit sua victor arma.

(34–44)

Yours is a disposition (intention, haughtiness)  
both prudent (clever, discreet) in business and upright (guided)  
in favorable as well as dubious circumstances,  
an avenger (champion) of greedy fraud and not covetous of  
(temperate with)  
money, which leads all things to itself (*animus* or *pecuniae*),



and not as consul of a single year,<sup>37</sup>  
 but as often as a good and faithful  
 judge preferred the honest to the expedient,  
 it (*animus*) has cast down the gifts of the wicked  
 with a lofty (haughty) expression, and through opposing hosts  
 as victor has extricated its own armor.<sup>38</sup>

Horace's impersonal construction here distances the subject from the description of him to a greater degree than the more intimate second person would have, contributing to a qualification of the apparent praise.<sup>39</sup>

The qualities mentioned, furthermore, even when read favorably, are ascribed to Lollius' disposition or potential; they are not an account of his deeds. In this way, as well as by addressing the civic rather than the military domain, they contrast with the actions of the earlier examples.<sup>40</sup> Having the ability is not the same as acting on it. Horace could be suggesting that Lollius' *virtus* may still be hidden in his *animus*, where it would be no different from inactivity.

Grammatically, *animus*, not Lollius, is the subject of *est*, *reiecit*, and *explicuit*; it is modified by *prudens*, *rectus*, and *abstinens*; and it is renamed by *vindex*, *consul*, and *victor*.<sup>41</sup> The clause *sed quotiens . . .*

<sup>37</sup>There is no evidence for Lollius as consul other than in 21. Thus I have elected to render the line with the negative transposed, rather than substitute a version of the more typical "and as consul not only for one year."

<sup>38</sup>Wickham (*Horace* 254) cites Porphyryon and notes the possibility for ambiguity in this sentence, but he opts for *explicuit . . . victor* as apodosis to *quotiens iudex . . . reiecit*.

<sup>39</sup>Putnam (*Artifices* 167–68) recognizes the possibility that Horace is ironizing against Lollius in this passage, but explains it away. Both he (citing Syme) and Wickham (*Horace* 254) continue to assume that the ode praises Lollius. I continue to think that one of Syme's reasons for minimizing the *clades* may have been his own reading of 4.9 as praise.

<sup>40</sup>Putnam (*Artifices* 161) sees the contrast between military (outer) and civic (inner) virtue as the point of Horace's praise of Lollius. A link between the two spheres is provided by the metaphorical reference to the *arma* of Lollius' *animus*, and the use of *victor* and *catervas* in the same passage, serving, in my view, to diminish the contrast. Sallust (*Cat.* 2.3) expresses the wish that the *virtus animi* of leaders was as healthy in peace as in war.

<sup>41</sup>Bentley (*Horatius* 248) styles these lines a "perdifficilis locus"; he too is apparently discomfited by the ambiguity, which he seeks to resolve rather than accept as deliberate.

*utili* seems capable of modifying either *unius anni* or *reiecit*, with quite different meaning.<sup>42</sup> *Animus* has a range of semantic possibilities, from simply "mind" or "spirit" to "intention," or even "haughtiness"; *vin-dex* can have the force of "champion, defender," "avenger," or "one who lays claim to something"; *rectus* can be rendered "morally right" or merely "straightforward"; *alto* can be "lofty" or "haughty."<sup>43</sup> Grammatically, *se* can have as its antecedent either the more immediate *pecuniae*, or *animus*, the subject of the sentence.<sup>44</sup> The effect of such ambiguity is to distance and qualify any praise which the lines on first reading appear to render.

The tension of the Latin in 30–44 has been felt by many, although most have assumed an encomiastic intention for the ode and have interpreted within this context.<sup>45</sup> Accepting, however, the repeated ambiguity in this section of the ode as deliberate, rather than trying to explain it away, alters the interpretation and makes possible a consistent and unified reading of the whole.

It is, in fact, the last eight lines (45–52) which give substance to Horace's admonition to Lollius by presenting alternatives of what he should, and should not, be if he wishes to be called *beatus*. It is significant that this concluding section offers not only a positive example, but a negative one as well. The clearly stated alternatives provide the focus toward which the heavy use of negatives and ambiguity throughout the ode has been directed:

<sup>42</sup> Could Horace have been making an ironic comment about the honesty of judges?

<sup>43</sup> OLD s.vv. Ambrose ("Ironical Meaning" 8) notes the potential ambiguity of *vin-dex*.

<sup>44</sup> Exceptions to the rule that the reflexive pronoun generally refers to the subject occur regularly enough to allow this possibility. I thank Sharon Quimby, an especially astute Latin 301 student, for noticing *se*'s ambiguous potential here (all translators and commentators I have encountered take *pecuniae* as the antecedent). Cf. Hofmann, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* II.2 I 174–76.

<sup>45</sup> Either as Fraenkel (*Horace* 425–26), that this topic did not prove "congenial" to Horace, that the eulogy sounds "somewhat laboured," and that Lollius would not have been pleased by such unenthusiastic praise; or as Page (*Carmina* 433), that Horace really wanted to focus on the ideal at the end anyway; or, as various others, that Horace as "poet laureate" had to praise people against his wishes; or that Lollius had duped Horace as well as Augustus with regard to his character; or that Horace was rushing to the defense of a friend in need after his defeat. Cf. Shorey and Laing, *Horace* 219; Lytton, *Odes* 421; Moore, *Horace* 369; Commager, *Odes* 321–22; Syme, *History in Ovid* 153; Wickham, *Horace* 251; Syndikus, *Lyrik* 375.

non possidentem multa vocaveris  
 recte beatum: rectius occupat  
     nomen beati, qui deorum  
     muneribus sapienter uti  
 duramque callet pauperiem pati  
 peiusque leto flagitium timet,  
     non ille pro caris amicis  
     aut patria timidus perire.

(45–52)

You would not correctly call the man possessing much  
 truly happy: more correctly does he take  
     the title "truly happy" who  
     uses wisely the gifts of the gods,  
 knows how to endure harsh poverty,  
 and fears disgrace worse than death;  
     not that man for his dear friends  
     or fatherland afraid to die.

The transition to this last section of the ode is indirect. The connection is actually provided more by verbal and thematic echoes throughout the ode, than through any direct connection to the lines which immediately precede. It may be that the contrast between 44 and 45 was designed to startle in order to reflect a contrast in the thought. Lollius' *animus* has emerged at the end of the last sentence as *victor* with its own *arma* (44). Line 45 begins with a negative (*non possidentem*), as have each of the preceding sections.

Horace's use of negatives, often in combination with privatives to create litotes, is, in fact, the most prominent rhetorical feature of this ode, a rhetorical strategy which contributes heavily to the indirection sustained throughout, as well as to its unity.<sup>46</sup> Thematic and verbal echoes assist in unifying the ode as well. Topics or examples on the use and misuse of wealth, on courage and inactivity, on surviving and dying (in poetry and in history), appear in every section of the ode.<sup>47</sup> They

<sup>46</sup>The ode begins and ends with a negative phrase. I count twelve negatives (lines 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 18, 19, 21, 30, 39, 45, and 51). Complementing these are the privatives: *interitura* (line 1), *illacrimabiles* (26), *ignoti* (27), *inertiae* (29), *inornatum* (31), *impune* (33), *abstinens* (37), *reiecit* (42). Also related are the uses of *carent*, *paulum*, and *sileri* (28–29, 31).

<sup>47</sup>Wealth is a topic at lines 13–15, 37–38, 42 (twice in the section on Lollius), and 45–49. Courage and inactivity, frequently associated with living and dying, appear at lines 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 29–30, 32, 36, 42, 43–44, 48, 51–52. Putnam (*Artifices* 164–68) notes the frequent play between the hidden and the revealed as another rhetorical device sustained

appear in combined form in the concluding section, in both their positive and negative form.

The last eight lines of this ode have traditionally been accepted as topological and have been left for the most part without further analysis. While many have described their content as Stoic and/or Epicurean,<sup>48</sup> that alone is not sufficient to explain their close relationship to the rest of the ode. The lines *are* topological; but the topos derives from a source which antedates Stoic or Epicurean thought (and may have influenced their development as well), one which is more specifically suited to the context of this ode. As in earlier sections of the ode, intertextual allusion here serves to deepen and to unify its thought.

Both language and thought in 46–50 echo the advice that Solon, in the tradition of Delphic wise men, gave to Croesus about the distinction between wealth and true happiness. The fullest, and earliest extant, account of this topological conversation appears in Herodotus (1.29–33), but it is frequently retold and alluded to elsewhere in Greek literature.<sup>49</sup> These versions share consistent features: dialogue form, a discussion of wealth versus happiness, verbal similarity, and, frequently, the use of exempla. In each, a wise man warns a historical figure about the dangers of counting someone happy on the basis of wealth alone and before that person dies. Horace's ode does not contain a conversation, but the second-person narrative structure is, in effect, a one-sided conversation.

The thematic connections in the ode which combine in its conclusion are reflected in the Herodotean Solon's summary of why he awards

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throughout which points to a thematic emphasis on inner rather than outer virtue for Lollius. I think this play complements the other antitheses in the ode's structure and is not unrelated to greed (hoarding), inactivity, and death.

<sup>48</sup>Cf. Sellar, *Horace* 168; Ambrose, "Ironical Meaning" 7; Commager, *Odes* 77; Collinge, *Structure* 122. Fraenkel (*Horace* 426) characterizes these last two stanzas as "entirely filled with general moral maxims, fine maxims indeed, but not particularly relevant to Lollius." Syndikus (*Lyrik* 376) assumes it applies to Lollius. Putnam (*Artifices* 168–69) describes this section as the portrait of a "Stoic saint" which glorifies Lollius' inner life.

<sup>49</sup>There is no reason to think that Horace had not read Herodotus (see notes 6 and 7 above for allusions to Solon elsewhere in his poetry); but he could also have had access to the versions of Xenophon (*Cyr.* 7.2.13–23) or Diodorus Siculus (9.3, 9.27). The language of *Cyr.* 8.2.23 (another conversation of Cyrus and Croesus) echoes the language of lines 45–49 most closely; all passages reflect the thought. For other evidence that Horace read Xenophon see Nickel, "Xenophon und Horaz"; and Maguinness, "Eclecticism."

Tellus first place as *olbiōtatos* of men. Tellus the Athenian, a citizen of a prominent city, had sufficient, but not excessive, wealth, had children and grandchildren whom he saw live and thrive, died fighting victoriously with his countrymen, and was honored by his fellow citizens with a lasting monument. The man more rightly called happy in lines 46–50 of the ode parallels Tellus. Both Horace's *beatus* and Herodotus' *olbios* and *eudaimōn* play similarly on the meanings of "rich" and "truly happy."<sup>50</sup> Both sages, Solon and Horace, advise those whom they address; both question who should rightly be called happy and refer to the completion of life. Both also respond with indirection and example rather than praise or blame.

In all the instances in this ode, from the variety of the poetic examples at the beginning, through the repeated verbal and syntactic ambiguity of the more prosaic and historical middle section on Lollius, to the choices provided by the topological conclusion, any praise and any pronouncement of happiness are accorded only to those who have died. Horace tells Lollius that he will not escape his immortalizing *verba*, gives testimony to the validity of his warning, characterizes Lollius as he is in the present, and concludes by evoking for the still-living Lollius the suggestion of Solon's maxim: "Count no man truly happy until he has completed his life."

The concluding section, furthermore, does not present a positive ideal alone. Lines 45–46 and 51–52 frame the topological ideal and serve as a reminder of its negative alternative. One searching the ode for examples of those who fit the positive ideal will not find Lollius among them. Hector and Deiphobus (21–24), who died fighting for chaste wives and children, come the closest. Lollius, as the ode concludes, parallels more closely those who did not die at Troy, especially Agamemnon. Given the structure, the interconnections, and the intertextual allusions in this ode, it is difficult to see how Horace could have been praising Lollius.

The ode's vision extends beyond the present, making clear that history's verdict on Lollius has yet to be rendered and is, perhaps in part, contingent on whether Lollius understands and heeds its speaker. It is Horace's narrative position, then, which explains the ode's ambi-

<sup>50</sup>Horace plays on the meanings of *beatus* elsewhere. Commager (*Odes* 336 n. 37) connects the play on inner and outer wealth here to Ode 2.18 and sees *beatus* used ambiguously in *O.* 1.29.1, 3.7.3, 3.16.25, 32, 39–40; *S.* 1.3.142, 2.6.74; *Ep.* 1.6.20, 2.1.39 (p. 77 and n. 32). See also *O.* 1.4, 2.2; *Epod.* 2 (I thank David Mankin for this suggestion).

guity; it has been constructed to admonish and exhort rather than either to offer unqualified praise or to condemn.

From the vantage point of life's completion, not the present, the ode reads as a warning to Lollius that his present behavior can still affect the quality of his yet unsecured, but inevitable, immortality. Through Delphic indirection and allusion to tradition, Horace, in the manner of Solon, has assumed the position of vatic sage, cautioning his addressee obliquely about the dangers of greed, the proper attitude toward wealth and courage, and the nature of true happiness. Unknown to Horace, but adding a note of irony for modern readers, Lollius' ultimate end appears to have validated the need for Horace's warning.

Horace, furthermore, has lived up to his claim in the first four lines of the ode. He speaks in a voice not heard before in Latin lyric and thereby broadens its scope. His narrative position in this ode reveals a sophisticated, subtle, and complex relationship, not only to the long Greek and Latin lyric tradition but to the historical, gnomic, and philosophical traditions as well.<sup>51</sup>

PAULA WINSOR SAGE

HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES

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## THE PRAETORSHIP OF FAVONIUS

Though Willems deemed M. Favonius a praetor of 50, and Sumner maintained that his praetorship "is not assured,"<sup>1</sup> Favonius has been assigned a praetorship in 49 by a consensus so overwhelming that his service in that post in that year is no longer considered controversial.<sup>2</sup> Yet Bonnefond-Coudry includes Favonius in her list of senators who spoke in debate in 49.<sup>3</sup> Since magistrates were not allowed to deliver a *sententia* in the *interrogatio* during their year of office,<sup>4</sup> Favonius could not have fulfilled both the functions which historians attribute to him. He might have taken the floor as a senator, or he might have held the praetorship; he might have done neither, but he could not have done both.<sup>5</sup>

We may begin by setting out the evidence for the praetorship of Favonius. Only two texts have been thought to bear on the question. In a letter to Cicero composed on 2 September 51, M. Caelius Rufus (ap. Cic. *Fam.* 8.9.5) mentioned a few details about the recent electoral comitia: *nolo te putare Favonium a columnariis praeteritum; optimus quisque eum non fecit*. The second piece of evidence comes from Vel-leius Paterculus' (2.53.1) narrative of the year 48: *Pompeius profugiens cum duobus Lentulis consularibus Sextoque filio et Favonio praetorio*.

<sup>1</sup>Willems, *Le Sénat* I 513–14; Sumner, *Orators* 145. Sumner might have noted the doubts of Stella Maranca, "Fasti Praetori" 334, 356: "48 o 49?"

<sup>2</sup>Wehrmann, *Fasti Praetorii* 74; Hölzl, *Fasti Praetorii* 76; Drumann and Groebe, *Geschichte* 35; Münzer, "Favonius" 2075; Broughton, *MRR* II 257; Geiger, "Favonius" 162 n. 2; Broughton, *MRR* III 90 and *Candidates* 37. In the last passage ("Favonius . . . must have been elected . . . in 49, as he is termed a *praetorius* in 48"), the words "in 49" quite obviously are intended to mean "for 49" or "in 50."

<sup>3</sup>Bonnefond-Coudry, *Le Sénat* 629.

<sup>4</sup>Hofmann, *Der Senat* 85–93, 99–104; Willems, *Le Sénat* II 189; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* III 944–46. Bonnefond-Coudry is aware of the exclusion of magistrates from membership in the Senate (*Le Sénat* 166) and in her index identifies Favonius as praetor in 49 (p. 816); but in her catalogue of Senate speakers she lists Favonius as a senator of aedilician rank in 49 (p. 629).

<sup>5</sup>One might object that the Romans would abandon constitutional niceties in 49, but on 26 January Cicero (*Att.* 7.15.2) could write: *consules conveni multosque nostri ordinis*. Thus we have evidence that the distinction between senators and magistrates was still valid in the very month in which Favonius spoke in the Senate; in Cicero *noster ordo*, like *summus ordo* and *amplissimus ordo*, signifies the *ordo senatorius* (cf. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire* 429 and n. 7).

The interpretation offered by Wehrmann is now the received view: since Caelius shows that Favonius was defeated for a praetorship of 50 in 51, and Velleius calls him a *praetorius* in 48, Favonius must have been elected to a praetorship of 49 in 50.<sup>6</sup>

The case in favor of a praetorship in 49 is not as strong as it seems. The campaign in 51 has long been considered a campaign for the praetorship,<sup>7</sup> though Caelius does not tell us this. It is just possible that Favonius was a candidate at the *comitia sacerdotum* in 51, but probability strongly favors a campaign for the praetorship.<sup>8</sup> That Favonius actually held the post, as Sumner realized, depends solely on the accuracy of Velleius in calling him a *praetorius*: "Favonius may have been only *pro praetore* 49–48."<sup>9</sup>

The weakness of the case for his praetorship is disturbing in view

<sup>6</sup>Wehrmann, *Fasti Praetorii* 74; Broughton, *Candidates* 37.

<sup>7</sup>Orelli and Baier, *Onomasticon* 252; cf. Afzelius, "Cato" 188 and n. 5 (where *Wahlniederlage* "im Jahre 50" should read "51"); Badian, "Caesar's *Cursus*" 85 and n. 37 (where "C. Favonius" should read "M.").

<sup>8</sup>As of 1 August 51, the consular and sacerdotal comitia had been held, but the praetorian comitia were still in the future (Cael. ap. Cic. *Fam.* 8.4.1, 3). The election of curule aediles had taken place by 2 September (Cael. ap. Cic. *Fam.* 8.9.1), so Favonius (mentioned later in the same letter) could have been a candidate at the praetorian comitia which preceded the aedilician. It is hard to believe that Favonius stood in the one sacerdotal election which certainly took place in this year. The place among the XVviri for which P. Dolabella bested L. Lentulus Crus (Cael. ap. Cic. *Fam.* 8.4.1) was reserved to patricians; though it appears that all vacancies in priesthoods were open to plebians in law (Cic. *Dom.* 37; cf. Taylor, "Caesar's Colleagues" 386–87), and though three candidates could be nominated for one place (Liv. 40.42.11; Tac. *Ann.* 4.16; with Szemler, *Priests* 30), it seems that there were recognizable "patrician vacancies" in priesthoods open to plebians (Cic. *Scaur.* 34). The occurrence of another sacerdotal election in this year is itself hypothetical. Since we do not know that he took his father's place in the pontifical college, it is possible that C. Scribonius Curio was elected at the *comitia sacerdotum* in 51, though election in 52 seems more likely (Taylor, "Caesar's Colleagues" 405 n. 65; Broughton, *MRR* II 240; Szemler, *Priests* 135 and n. 5); as a plebeian, Favonius might have stood against the younger Curio in 51.

Since Caelius names no office in connection with Favonius at *Fam.* 8.9.5, the mention of Favonius there must be an afterthought (Caelius did not presume that Cicero knew the identities of his own competitors for the aedileship; cf. *Fam.* 8.2.2). The letter in which Caelius revealed the post for which Favonius was standing is now lost; this information was probably included in the letter announcing his own electoral victory, a letter lost to us, and one which seems never to have reached Cicero (*Fam.* 2.10.1). Favonius' campaign is therefore closely related in time to the delayed aedilician comitia (*Fam.* 8.4.3, *comitiorum dilationes*), so it is likely that he was a candidate in the delayed election for the praetorship.

<sup>9</sup>Sumner, *Orators* 145.

of the evidence suggesting that Favonius was called upon for his *sententia* in January 49. Bonnefond-Coudry cites two sources for the participation of Favonius. Plutarch (*Pomp.* 60.7) and Appian (*BC* 2.37) both record that Favonius told Pompey that it was now time for him to stamp on the ground;<sup>10</sup> Pompey had boasted that he had only to stamp on the ground to raise up armies to defend the city against Caesar (*Plu. Pomp.* 57.9). There can be no doubt that these words of Favonius were spoken at a meeting of the Senate.<sup>11</sup> It does not necessarily follow that Favonius spoke in the capacity of a senator. If we had a Latin source with Favonius as the grammatical subject of *sententiam dicere*, we could be certain that he spoke as a senator and not as a magistrate.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, the sources which mention Favonius are Greek; Plutarch and Appian tell us that Favonius "bade" Pompey to stamp on the ground.<sup>13</sup> Even if we saw Favonius proposing a course of action, we could not be certain that this recommendation constituted the motion of a senator rather than the opinion of a magistrate. As his *bon mot* was the only memorable remark Favonius made that day, it alone is recorded.

The names of the other men who took part in this debate will not help us much. Plutarch places Favonius' witticism between a speech of L. Volcacius Tullus (cos. 66) and one of Cato (pr. 54).<sup>14</sup> We would expect Favonius to speak after Cato, and Plutarch might have confused

<sup>10</sup>The same witticism is attributed to Favonius at *Plu. Caes.* 33.5.

<sup>11</sup>*Caes. BC* 1.33.2; *Plu. Pomp.* 60.5; *App. BC* 2.37. Caesar does not mention Favonius by name, but confirms that Pompey was *in senatu* when he declared that he would regard senators remaining in the city as enemies; Appian makes this threat part of Pompey's reply to Favonius. The accounts of Plutarch and Appian show independently that this exchange took place in the Senate. *Plu. Pomp.* 60.5: εὐθὺς μὲν ἡ βουλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν Πομπήϊον συνέτρεχον. *App. BC* 2.37: ὁ (sc. Πομπήϊος) μὲν δὴ τοσάδε εἰπὼν καὶ ἀπειλήσας τοῖς ἐπιμένουσιν . . . ἐξῆλθε τῆς τε Βουλῆς. . . .

<sup>12</sup>The *sententia* was peculiar to senators, even though Latin has no single noun to signify the speeches of magistrates; cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* III 942 and n. 5; Talbert, *The Senate* 236–37.

<sup>13</sup>*Plu. Pomp.* 60.7: Φαώνιος δὲ τις . . . ἐκέλευε τὸν Πομπήϊον τῷ ποδὶ τύπτειν τὴν γῆν. *Plu. Caes.* 33.5: Φαώνιος . . . ἐκέλευε. *App. BC* 2.37: Φαώνιος . . . παρεκάλε.

<sup>14</sup>The proposal to send envoys to Caesar is attributed to Κικέρων by Appian (*BC* 2.36), and to Τύλλος by Plutarch (*Pomp.* 60.6). Tullus has been confused with Tullius, though it is not immediately clear whether the mistake is that of Plutarch (Holzapfel, "Die Anfänge" 229 n. 1) or Appian (Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* 295 and n. 5; cf. Gundel, "Volcatius" 756). The identity of this senator does not matter to us. Both Volcacius and Cicero were consulars, and would normally speak before Favonius; the fact that one of them did so cannot help us decide whether Favonius was of praetorian or merely aedilician rank. Those with an inordinate interest in Roman senators should see my article "Tullus or Tullius?"

the order of speakers to this extent.<sup>15</sup> But the order given by Plutarch, even if correct, does not constitute proof that Favonius was not a senator; in the course of senatorial debates, senior men sometimes spoke after colleagues of lesser rank.<sup>16</sup>

More significant than the apparent order of speakers is the mere fact that Favonius spoke, for this is enough to suggest that he was not praetor in 49. Our sources are agreed that the consuls were present at the meeting (Plu. *Pomp.* 61.6, App. *BC* 2.37). For the sake of argument, we may assume that the praetors were present, though this assumption is supported only by a vague reference in Plutarch.<sup>17</sup> Since the consuls were present, it is unlikely that any of the men who spoke at the meeting were praetors. While Mommsen was wrong in believing that praetors could not make a *relatio* in a meeting summoned by consuls, the fact that he could maintain such a view underscores the rarity of praetorian *relationes*.<sup>18</sup> When we are forced to decide whether a man who spoke at a meeting summoned by consuls was a praetor or a senator, all we can say is that probability greatly favors the latter alternative.

To this point we have found no very good reason to believe that Favonius was praetor in 49, and no very good reason to believe that he was a *privatus*; Velleius indicates that he was praetor, but Appian and Plutarch imply that he was a senator. We may bring four further texts to bear on our problem, arranged from the least to the most decisive. The first of these is the second Sallustian *Epistula ad Caesarem Senem*

<sup>15</sup>The accuracy of Plutarch cannot be checked against Appian since the latter's account does not mention the speech of Cato.

<sup>16</sup>According to Sallust (*Cat.* 53.1), all the consulars present on 5 December 63 praised Cato (tr. pl. 62) after his speech. Pompey spoke after Cato on 8 February 56 (Cic. *Q. fr.* 2.3.3). M. Livius Drusus (iudex 50) might have spoken before L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50) at a meeting in 43 (D. Brutus ap. Cic. *Fam.* 11.19.1). In a forthcoming note I point out that Drusus was iudex and not praetor in 50, if—as seems likely—the Scantian procedure was civil: see Ryan, "The *Lex Scantinia* and the Prosecution of Censors and Aediles."

<sup>17</sup>Plu. *Pomp.* 60.5: ἡ βουλὴ . . . συνέτρεχον, καὶ παρήσαν αἱ ἀρχαί.

<sup>18</sup>Mommsen (*Staatsrecht* II 130 n. 4, III 911 n. 3, 954) thought the consul "perhaps" could permit the praetor to make a *relatio*, a view based largely on Dio's (55.3.6) report that Augustus granted praetors the right to introduce proposals to the Senate. Willems (*Le Sénat* II 134–37, esp. 136 n. 7) has undoubtedly given the correct interpretation of Augustus' reform: he removed from the consuls the right to suppress praetorian *relationes* through their *maior potestas*, extending to praetors the exemption from consular interference which tribunes already enjoyed. Dio was quite right insofar as he tied the anger of the praetors to the fact that they were senior to the tribunes.

(2.9.4). Here we cannot discuss in detail the authorship of the pamphlet, nor the date of its publication. It is enough to note that the years 51, 50, and 49 have been offered as the date of composition (or as the dramatic date).<sup>19</sup> Five names are found in a catalogue of Caesar's opponents: M. Bibulus (cos. 59), L. Domitius (cos. 54), M. Cato (pr. 54), L. Postumius, and M. Favonius. None of the first three held ordinary magistracies in the years 51–49. According to Pseudo-Sallust, all five men belonged to a powerful *factio* in the Senate. It is only natural to suppose that all five were *privati* when the letter was composed.<sup>20</sup> We know that the first four men were *privati* at the beginning of 49, but all might have been *privati* at the end of 50, as Favonius was. We therefore cannot say that the letter must date to early 49. But we can be more certain that Favonius was a *privatus* at the time the letter was composed. A conditional conclusion follows: if the letter dates to 49, Favonius was a senator in that year.

The second text describes events in Capua on 25 January 49. Cicero wrote a letter to Atticus (7.15.2) on the following day: *Consules conveni multosque nostri ordinis. omnes cupiebant Caesarem abductis praesidiis stare condicionibus iis quas tulisset; uni Favonio leges ab illo nobis imponi non placebat, sed is (non) auditus in consilio*. Cicero seems to be describing a *consilium* of the consuls rather than a Senate meeting.<sup>21</sup> But he goes on to report that Cato declared that he wished to be

<sup>19</sup>Bonnefond-Coudry (*Le Sénat* 718 n. 225) has recently accepted 50 as the year of composition. In favor of 49 (as either the date of composition or the dramatic date) is the appearance of a Postumius in Cicero's account of a meeting of senators on 25 January 49. The identification of L. Postumius ([Sal.] *Rep.* 2.9.4) with Postumius (Cic. *Att.* 7.15.2) is no longer controversial, though dispute over his praenomen continues: Willems, *Le Sénat* I 514; Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* 572–73; Münzer, "Postumius"; Syme, "Pseudo-Sallust" 51–52 and *Sallust* 338; Sumner, *Orators* 144; Shackleton Bailey, *Two Studies* 37.

<sup>20</sup>Bibulus was proconsul of Syria in 51–50. At the end of 50 Bibulus, Domitius, and Cato were all *privati*; Postumius was certainly a *privatus* at the beginning of 49.

<sup>21</sup>Holzapfel, "Die Anfänge" 217: "eine Versammlung (*consilium*) der daselbst anwesenden Senatoren"; Münzer, "Favonius" 2076: "[die] Verhandlungen der Parteihäupter in Capua"; Münzer, "Postumius" 898: "die Beratung der Pompeianer in Capua"; Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* 303: "[die] Beratung in Capua, unter Vorsitz der Consuln"; Syme, "Pseudo-Sallust" 52: "consultations among the Pompeians at Capua." P. Stein, *Die Senatssitzungen* 119, did not include the meeting at Capua on 25 January in his list of "überlieferte Sitzungstage." M. J. Bayet (Paris, 1964) rendered *in consilio* "à la délibération"; Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 1968), "in the conclave." Cicero used the phrase *in consilio* frequently, but I have found that only at *Fam.* 10.17.2 does the bare phrase mean "in advising"; otherwise this notion is conveyed by the addition of *dando*.

present in the Senate to debate terms with Caesar. Since Cato delayed assuming his command in Sicily, the Senate decreed (*senatus decrevit*) that Postumius should relieve T. Furfanius in Sicily at once. When Postumius said that he would not go without Cato, C. Fannius was selected: *is cum imperio in Siciliam praemittitur*. The text of the letter leaves no doubt that there was a formal Senate meeting in Capua on 25 January.<sup>22</sup> Here we can spare ourselves the trouble of deciding whether *in consilio* is technical, in which case the presence of Favonius is attested at the *consilium* but not at the Senate meeting which followed. Doubt is cast upon the praetorship of Favonius on either interpretation. If he spoke<sup>23</sup> at a Senate meeting he was probably not praetor, since both consuls were present in Capua. And if he spoke in a *consilium* of the consuls it is all but certain that he was not praetor. Roman praetors did not accept appointments to *consilia*; they made them.<sup>24</sup> But Cicero does not leave us proof that Favonius was a senator: the meeting he attended could well have been a Senate meeting, and it is always possible that he spoke *qua praetor* in a meeting summoned by consuls.

The two remaining texts (Cic. *Att.* 7.15.2–3, 8.11b.1) further erode our confidence in the *fasti praetorii*. At least three praetors of 49 were assigned military duties: P. Rutilius Lupus, C. Coponius (Pompey ap. Cic. *Att.* 8.12a.4), and L. Manlius Torquatus (Caes. *BC* 1.24.3). It would be impossible to make much of the fact that the name of Favonius does not arise in a military connection, did we not know the geographical area in which some commanders were stationed. Incumbent praetors were being charged with military tasks. If Favonius was a praetor in 49, it is hard to understand why Cato was entrusted with command in Sicily; Favonius had served as *legatus* in Sicily, probably after his

<sup>22</sup>Bonnefond–Coudry (*Le Sénat* 213, 629) is of two minds about the meeting. She does not include Favonius, Cato, and Postumius in her list of “interventions de sénateurs.” But the meeting at Capua is included in her chronological list of dated sessions (though for some reason the date 25 January appears with a query).

<sup>23</sup>The words (*non*) *auditus* do not mean that Favonius was silent, but that no one listened to him. Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 5.27: *est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur(que) suis cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur*.

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* III 1031: “Auf die Senatoren ist für dieses (sc. das Consilium) der Magistrat rechtlich nicht beschränkt. Indess hat er sicher auch für die Consilien sich immer vorzugsweise der Senatoren bedient.” Cf. Badian (“Notes” 133) on the removal of Claudius Glaber (pr. 73) from the *consilium* of 73: “A praetor of the current year was not likely to be in the body of a *consilium*.” Our earliest evidence for *consilia* shows that they were composed entirely of senators: Liv. 40.38.7 (180 B.C.); SIG<sup>3</sup> 646 = RDGE no. 2, lines 10–12 (170 B.C.); Cic. *Amic.* 37, Val. Max. 4.7.1 (132 B.C.).

quaestorship.<sup>25</sup> We cannot suppose that Favonius was engaged in tasks elsewhere, since we know that he was present in Capua when Cato revealed his intention to delay the assumption of his duties. And though we might allow Favonius to be passed over once, it is also hard to understand why he was not sent to Sicily after Cato's temporary withdrawal, inasmuch as he was already (*ex hypothesi*) in possession of *imperium*. Instead, he was passed over a second and a third time, in favor of Postumius and Fannius. It almost becomes necessary to believe that Favonius was preparing to take up military duties in another place, and the only obvious alternative to Sicily is Tarracina, his hometown.<sup>26</sup> And indeed we do find a praetor of 49 stationed at Tarracina with three cohorts: P. Rutilius Lupus (Caes. *BC* 1.24.3). The other man holding *imperium* whom we find at Tarracina in this year is not Favonius but Cicero (*Att.* 8.11b.1), and he informed Pompey that the only senator in the area was M. Eppius, who was staying at Menturnae. Favonius was passed over twice in the posting of commanders to Tarracina. Since he was not even present in the area, we may surmise that there was little he could do in person, and that he could accomplish little because he did not possess *imperium* of any kind at the beginning of 49.

The doubts caused by Favonius' presence in the Senate are strengthened by his absence from Sicily and Tarracina. Save that of Velleius, all the evidence we have seen suggests that Favonius was a simple senator in 49. We cannot maintain that *praetorio* in the text of Velleius originally read *praetore*; Favonius could not have been praetor in 48, as the Pompeians did not hold elections for that year (Dio 41.43.1–2). Why not return to Willems's view that Favonius was praetor in 50? Velleius could then be right in calling Favonius a *praetorius* in 48, and all the sources which imply that Favonius was a *privatus* in 49 could also be right. The words of Caelius do not rule out his solution. Though his words have long been taken to mean that Favonius was defeated for the praetorship, they are actually as ambiguous with respect to the outcome of the election as they are about the office itself. Caelius does not say that Favonius suffered a *repulsa*, but that he was "passed over" (*praeteritum*). This statement itself is not absolute: we are not told

<sup>25</sup> *CIL* X 6316 = *ILS* 879 (found at Tarracina): "M. Favonio M. f. | leg. | popul. Agrigent." Cf. Wiseman, *New Men* 231; Broughton, *MRR* III 90. In a forthcoming article I argue that the *terminus non post quem* for his quaestorship is 61, not 59: see "The Quaestorship of Favonius and the Tribunate of Metellus Scipio."

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Syme, "Pseudo-Sallust" 53; Wiseman, *New Men* 231.

simply that Favonius was "passed over," but that he was passed over *a columnariis* and by *optimus quisque*. Though lacking support from the very best and the very worst men, he might have attracted enough votes from other quarters to win the election. As attractive as this solution is, it cannot possibly be maintained. Willems was not aware of a crucial piece of evidence concerning Favonius' activities in 50. For that year we have precisely the kind of evidence which we lack for 49: a Latin source which yields the certain conclusion that Favonius was a senator. In the debate on the voting of a *supplicatio* to Cicero, Hirrus concurred with Cato, and *tertius ad hos Favonius accessit* (Cael. ap. Cic. *Fam.* 8.11.2). Caelius goes on to tell Cicero that he was indebted to these men for making their views known in brief compass, instead of in a lengthy oration (*pro sententia*). Favonius was without doubt a senator in 50.

The historicity of Velleius can now be defended only by a proliferation of hypotheses. One might argue that Favonius was aedile in 53 and praetor in 51, and that the election he lost in 51 concerned a public priesthood. But the extant evidence does not allow us to determine whether Favonius was aedile in 53 or 52,<sup>27</sup> and he could not have been elected to the praetorship in 52 if he was aedile in that year. And though it is nowhere stated, we have already seen that Favonius was probably contending for the praetorship in 51. A praetorship for Favonius in 51 remains theoretically possible, but seems even less likely than a praetorship in 49.<sup>28</sup>

If Velleius was correct in calling Favonius a *praetorius* in 48, the year 49 remains the likeliest date for his praetorship, however unlikely this seems on the basis of the texts examined so far. Certainty has eluded us to this point, but one approach to the question has not been tried: an investigation of the praetorian fasti for 49. The way was shown by Willems. When attributing a praetorship in 50 to Favonius, Willems noted that the eight praetors of 49 are known; therefore, though the text of Caelius implies that Favonius was defeated in the praetorian elec-

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Linderski, "Favonius," esp. 199–200.

<sup>28</sup> We might as well list another theoretically possible solution: an aedileship in 53, and a praetorship in 52 (the elections for 52 were held in 52). The weakest point in the cases for a praetorship in 52 or 51 remains the election in 51, which was almost certainly an election for the praetorship. This has always been believed, perhaps as a mere inference from the *cursus* of Favonius, but we have shown that the election is associated in time with the aedilician election. And since Caelius did not mention Favonius in his report of the sacerdotal comitia, the possibility that Favonius was standing for a public priesthood in 51 is very remote indeed.



tions in 51, he must have won: "Wehrmann . . . place Favonius parmi les préteurs de 49, mais il supprime le préteur Thermus."<sup>29</sup>

Let us now turn to the eighth man attested as praetor in 49, a certain Thermus (Caes. *BC* 1.12). Caesar did not bother to give him a praenomen and nomen. Orelli<sup>30</sup> identified the Thermus mentioned by Caesar with the Q. Thermus who was *propraetor* in Asia in 51, and probably in 52.<sup>31</sup> Willems objected that the two men must be distinguished, since the Thermus mentioned by Caesar is called praetor under the year 49. Wehrmann and Hölzl also assumed that the governor of Asia was an *ex-praetor*. Instead of following Willems in his creation of two different Thermi, they awarded Thermus a praetorship in the 50s; since they included Favonius among the praetors of 49, there was no room for Thermus in the college of that year, and neither Wehrmann nor Hölzl addressed the testimony of Caesar.<sup>32</sup> The solution proposed by Willems—a solution which denies Favonius a place among the praetors of 49—cannot be ruled out. Four other texts mention the Pompeian Thermus in 49 (Cic. *Att.* 7.13a.3, 23.1; Lucan 2.463; Flor. 2.13.19). Like Caesar, these sources do not reveal the praenomen or nomen of Thermus. It is therefore possible that the Pompeian adherent of 49 is not the same man as Q. Minucius Thermus, the Asian *propraetor*.<sup>33</sup> But it is altogether unlikely that we are dealing with two different men. Münzer noticed that Q. Minucius Thermus was usually identified by his cognomen alone, and concluded that he was the only man of this name in Cicero's time.<sup>34</sup> Münzer's logic is compelling enough, but his argument can be strengthened. Since Cicero was on friendly terms with Q. Minucius Thermus,<sup>35</sup> we should suppose that a man identified only as Thermus in one of his letters was none other than the same.<sup>36</sup> Willems's reconstruction is therefore lacking in cogency.

<sup>29</sup>Willems, *Le Sénat* I 513–14. Though Broughton displayed no doubt about the praetorship of Favonius in 49, and deemed Q. Minucius Thermus "probably *propraetor*" in that year, he noted correctly that Caesar calls him *praetor* (*MRR* II 257, 262).

<sup>30</sup>Orelli and Baier, *Onomasticon* 402.

<sup>31</sup>Cf. *MRR* II 238; Cic. *Fam.* 2.18: *M. Cicero imp. s.d. Q. Thermo pro pr.*

<sup>32</sup>Wehrmann, *Fasti Praetorii* 69; Hölzl, *Fasti Praetorii* 58.

<sup>33</sup>Willems (*Le Sénat* I 474) believed that Q. Minucius Thermus (the former Asian *propraetor*) remained neutral in the civil war.

<sup>34</sup>Münzer, "Minucius" 1972.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Two Studies* 34.

<sup>36</sup>There can be no doubt that the Thermus of Cic. *Att.* 7.13a.3 and of Caes. *BC* 1.12 are the same man, for Cicero and Caesar both place "Thermus" at Iguvium.

The Thermus who followed Pompey in 49 was Q. Minucius Thermus, who had served as *propraetor* in Asia. As hard as it is to believe that Favonius was praetor in 49, it might seem no easier to believe that Thermus was made *propraetor* while still a *tribunicus*.<sup>37</sup> But Thermus might have owed his *propraetorship* to the province he held rather than to his own *cursus*, since the governor of Asia was usually a *propraetor*.<sup>38</sup> Thus L. Antonius, left in command of the province by Thermus, served as *proquaestor pro praetore*.<sup>39</sup> The career of C. Fannius may provide us with an exact parallel for that of Minucius Thermus: a *tribunicus* made *propraetor* of Asia. He was probably *propraetor* in 49–48, since it is only natural to read ἀντιστράτηγος for ἀρχιστράτηγος in the manuscripts of Josephus (*AJ* 14.230). Sumner has stressed that the praetorship of Fannius is not attested.<sup>40</sup> It is of interest to us that C. Fannius is included in the praetorian *fasti* by Wehrmann and Hölzl;<sup>41</sup> in view of their readiness to include Asian *propraetors* in their lists of praetors, their attribution of an earlier praetorship to Thermus should not greatly disturb us.

We must concede the possibility that Q. Minucius Thermus was made *propraetor* of Asia while a *tribunicus*, and became praetor after his *propraetorship*. Our decision about the eighth praetor of 49 becomes a contest over the reliability of two texts, that of Velleius and that of Caesar. There are no variations in the manuscripts for *Favonio praetorio* (*Vell.* 2.53.1) and *Thermum praetorem* (*Caes. BC* 1.12). It is not possible to defend Velleius by arguing that his text originally read *Favonio praetore*; as we have already seen, the Pompeian side elected no magistrates for 48. One could attempt to defend Caesar and resolve his contradiction of Velleius by maintaining that his manuscript should read *Thermum praetorium*; Favonius would then belong to the college of 49, and Thermus to that of an earlier year. This solution was put forth by Münzer,<sup>42</sup> but it cannot possibly be correct. In the whole of *Bellum Civile*, Caesar never identifies a single individual with the word *prae-*

<sup>37</sup>Iteration of the praetorship is hardly a serious possibility, and it is rendered still more hypothetical by the unlikelihood that Thermus (*tr. pl.* 62) is one of the missing praetors of 60 (and so eligible, in the absence of a dispensation from the laws, for a praetorship in 49).

<sup>38</sup>Cf. Sumner, *Orators* 145.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. Hölzl, *Fasti Praetorii* 58; *J. AJ* 14.235: ἀντιπαμίας καὶ ἀντιστράτηγος.

<sup>40</sup>Sumner, *Orators* 145; cf. Broughton, *MRR* III 90.

<sup>41</sup>Wehrmann, *Fasti Praetorii* 72–73; Hölzl, *Fasti Praetorii* 62–65.

<sup>42</sup>Münzer, "Favonius" 2075.

*torius*. The title itself occurs just once, in the plural, and in conjunction with no personal names: *et consulares praetoriosque* (3.82.2). In sum, one cannot transfer Favonius from 49 to 48 by emending the text of Velleius, and one cannot transfer Thermus from 49 to an earlier year by emending the text of Caesar. The contradiction between Velleius and Caesar is real and cannot be explained away through textual emendations: both assign the only open place in the college of 49 to different men.

Contradictory sources displease. Incredible as it may seem, we are asked to believe that Caesar commonly used *praetor* to denote *praetorius* or *pro praetore*.<sup>43</sup> As we have pointed out, Caesar never used *praetorius* to identify an individual as an ex-praetor. But neither did he use *praetor* to designate such a man. None of the former praetors mentioned in *Bellum Civile* is called *praetor*.<sup>44</sup> The notion that Caesar substi-

<sup>43</sup>Münzer, "Minucius" 1973, on the words *Thermum praetorem* at Civ. 1.12: "Jedoch es bedarf nicht einmal der . . . angenommenen Änderung des überlieferten *praetorem*, sondern es kann unbedenklich in dem Sinne von *praetorium* oder *pro praetore* aufgefasst werden." Meusel (*De Bello Civili* 22, 30) had already made this argument, and pointed to BC 1.6.5–6 as a parallel: *provinciae privatis decernuntur duae consulares, reliquae praetoriae, Scipioni obvenit Syria, L. Domitio Gallia. . . . in reliquis provincias praetores mittuntur*. Meusel laid stress on the service of Cato (pr. 54) in Sicily (the other men he mentioned might not have been *praetorii*; cf. *MRR* II 222), and concluded that *praetores* at 1.6.6 also stands for *praetorii*. Meusel relied on Mommsen for further proof that "*praetores* steht oft für *praetorii*." Mommsen (*Staatsrecht* II 240 n. 5) cited just these two passages of Caesar (along with passages of Cicero, Livy, and Velleius) to prove that *praetor* could represent *praetorius*. This scholarship was taken to heart by P. Fabre (Paris, 1936), who confidently rendered *Thermum praetorem* "l'ancien préteur Thermus."

If *praetor* does not mean *praetorius* at 1.12, then there is no parallel to support the claim that *praetores* at 1.6 means *praetorii*. Two solutions may be suggested. We could emend *praetores* at 1.6.6 to *praetorii*. As we have seen, the one time Caesar used *praetorius*, it was used in the plural, in conjunction with *consulares*, and in conjunction with no personal names; all these conditions are met in 1.6. Alternatively, we might retain the reading *praetores*, though with its usual meaning. The *senatus consultum ultimum* had already been passed, and the military duties which we see incumbent praetors exercising might have been assigned at the meeting recorded in 1.6. Emendation seems preferable, since *in reliquis provincias* seems to pick up *reliquae praetoriae*, rather than introducing a new thought.

<sup>44</sup>Q. Sertorius: 1.61. M. Terentius Varro: 1.38; 2.17, 19–21. M. Petreius: 1.38–40, 42–43, 53, 61, 63, 65–67, 72–76, 87; 2.17–18. T. Ampius Balbus: 3.105. M. Calpidius: 1.2. Q. Valerius Orca: 1.30–31. P. Vatinius: 3.19, 90, 100. T. Annius Milo: 3.21, 22. P. Attius Varus: 1.12, 13, 31; 2.23, 25, 27–28, 30, 33–36, 43–44. M. Porcius Cato: 1.4, 30, 32. P. Servilius Isauricus: 3.1. C. Caninius Rebilus (1.26; 2.24, 34) might be added to the list. The Lucceius mentioned at 3.18.3 presents a problem. He is certainly the same man as the "Luc-

tuted *praetor* for *pro praetore* makes even less sense, since he did use *pro praetore* on two occasions (1.6.3, 1.30.2). All the men identified with *praetor* in *Bellum Civile* were incumbent praetors.<sup>45</sup> If we look again at the chapter (1.12) in which Thermus is described with *praetor*, we find the name of (P.) Attius (Varus), and we must ask why this ex-praetor is not also called *praetor* to signify his status as a *praetorius*. Attius is actually in worse need of a title, since he might be confused with homonymous contemporaries. In sum, we cannot believe that Caesar originally identified Thermus with the term *praetorius*, nor that Caesar called him *praetor* to show that he was a *praetorius*. If Thermus was not praetor in the year in which Caesar so describes him, then he is the only man in the whole of *Bellum Civile* of whom this is true.<sup>46</sup>

Since his text is sound, the contemporary evidence of Caesar must be preferred to that of Velleius.<sup>47</sup> We can say without hesitation that the missing praetor of 49 is Q. Minucius Thermus; or rather, that no praetor of 49 is missing, since the praetorship of Thermus is explicitly attested by Caesar. We must remove Favonius from the college of 49, and we

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ceius" found at Cic. *Att.* 9.1.3 and 11.3, since Luceius is linked with Theophanes of Mytilene in these passages (McDermott, "De Luceiis" 238–39). McDermott assigns these three references to L. Luceius M. f. (the businessman) rather than L. Luceius Q. f. (the historian). Though McDermott deemed both men *praetorii*, it is not clear that the son of Marcus held the praetorship (Broughton, *MRR* III 127–28).

<sup>45</sup> Praetors of 49: L. Roscius (1.3.6, 8.4), L. Manlius Torquatus and P. Rutilius Lupus (1.24.3), M. Aemilius Lepidus (2.21.5). Praetors of 48: M. Caelius Rufus and C. Trebonius (3.20.1), Q. Pedius (3.22.2), P. Sulpicius Rufus (3.101.1). L. Valerius Flaccus (pr. 63), the only earlier praetor whose praetorship is mentioned (*qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat*, 3.53.1), provides no exception to the pattern, since the clause in which he is called *praetor* refers to the year of his praetorship. For the sake of completeness we may note that the Thessalian Androsthenes is termed *praetor Thessaliae* at 3.80.3.

<sup>46</sup> The ancient sources frequently employ *quaestor* in place of *pro quaestore* (cf. Sumner, "The *Lex Annalis*" 365; Linderski, "Two Quaestorships" 37). Caesar himself (*BG* 6.6.1) could describe M. Licinius Crassus, his quaestor of 54, as *quaestor* in 53 (cf. Linderski and Kaminska-Linderski, "Marcus Antonius" 214). In *Bellum Civile* three men are identified with *quaestor*, and all were in office at the time: Sex. Quintilius Varus (qu. 49), 1.23.2, 2.28.2; Marcius Rufus (qu. 49), 2.23.5, 43.1; P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus (qu. 48), 3.62.4. None of these men is mentioned after laying down the quaestorship. But since Caesar did not use *quaestor* for ex-quaestors in *Bellum Civile*, even though the term *quaestorius* is absent from the work (so C. Antonius is given no title, 3.4, 10, 67), it seems likely that Caesar was inclined to refer only to his own quaestors in this way.

<sup>47</sup> Velleius did not always possess accurate information about magistrates of the late Republic; he (2.46.4) joined other ancient sources in wrongly attributing a quaestorship in 53 to C. Cassius (cf. Linderski, "Two Quaestorships" 35–37).

should remove the praetorship from the *cursus* of Favonius. It is theoretically possible that he was praetor in 52 or 51, but both these years are so unlikely as never to have been suggested;<sup>48</sup> it is certain that Favonius was not praetor in 50, 49, or 48. Unless Velleius was not even remotely close to the truth, Favonius was *pro praetore* in 48<sup>49</sup>—and therefore, like Q. Minucius Thermus, a *propraetor* who had never held the praetorship. The evidence examined in this essay allows us to raise the number of our praetorian revisions to four. Since *praetor* was omitted by Cicero at *Att.* 8.11b.1, Shackleton Bailey doubted that L. Manlius Torquatus was correctly called *praetor* by Caesar at *BC* 1.24.3, and Broughton later identified Manlius as “Pr. 50 or 49”;<sup>50</sup> with complete confidence, I think, we can return Torquatus to the college of 49. Having filled that college once again, we can at last flatly deny that Sex. Peducaeus was praetor in 49.<sup>51</sup> Thermus and Manlius, Favonius and Peducaeus: two praetors and two non-praetors of 49.

F. X. RYAN

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

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<sup>48</sup>They never will be suggested, if we keep in mind the Ninth Commandment of Karl Lehrs: “Du sollst nicht glauben, dass zehn schlechte Gründe gleich sind einem guten.”

<sup>49</sup>To Sumner’s suggestion (*Orators* 145) that Favonius was *pro praetore* in 49–48, we make the slight objection that there is no evidence that Favonius served in a military capacity in 49; his absence from Cicero’s list of men *cum imperio* in March 49 (*Att.* 8.15.3) implies that he was not *pro praetore* in that year.

<sup>50</sup>Shackleton Bailey, *Letters to Atticus* IV 342–43; Broughton, *MRR* III 136.

<sup>51</sup>Not *sub anno*, but at *MRR* II 600, Peducaeus was identified as “Pr.? ca. 49?”; Sumner, “Pompeii” 19, also identified Peducaeus as “praetor? 49?”

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## A HITHERTO UNRECOGNIZED FRAGMENT OF CAECILIUS

Of the important lost writings of Caecilius of Caleacte the most substantial are preserved by Photius in codices 259–68 of the *Bibliotheca*. Ofenloch's *Caecilii Calactini Fragmenta* includes these six, but omits another, *Bibl.* 489a15–32, which, as I show here, should be included with them. The six passages accepted by Ofenloch are either stylistic analyses of parts of orators' speeches or rulings on authenticity. All are authoritative analyses of figures or the use of figures, along with other formal aspects of style. While Photius' literary critiques elsewhere in the *Bibliotheca* rely primarily on descriptive adjectives, these passages employ the technical language of rhetoric.<sup>1</sup>

Ofenloch ends his fragment 109 just before a sentence containing a typically Photian list of elements presented in a simple string. Two short sentences then introduce discussion of Lysias' *On the Olive Stump*, one explaining to the reader what a σῆκος is. The passage that follows, 489a15–34, Ofenloch did not assign to Caecilius:

ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν γνήσιος Λυσίου, ἐκ τῶν κεφαλαίων δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ προοιμίου τῆς τε διηγήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλόγου (πάνυ γὰρ δαιμονίου καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰθισμένην τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπλότῃ δεινότητᾷ ἐστὶν ἐξεργασμένα ταῦτα). καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνθύμημα ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐπιχείρημα πρᾶττειν τὰς ἀποδείξεις τοῦ Λυσίου μάλιστα τὸ ἰδίωμα ἀπαγγέλλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ καθ' ἐν διατρέβοντα μηκύνειν τὸν λόγον τῆς τοῦ Λυσίου ἀκριβείας, καὶ τὸ εὐπαγὲς τῶν λόγων καὶ τὸ διὰ βραχύτητος πολλὴν παρέχειν ἡδονήν, ὃ μετὰ γε Δημοσθένει οὗτος μόνος τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων φαίνεται κατορθώσας, καὶ τὸ κάλλος δὲ τῆς διατυπώσεως, ἐν ᾧ μήτε Πλάτωνος μήτε Δημοσθένους μήτε Αἰσχίνου τὸ ἑλαττόν ἐστιν ἀπενηνεγμένος. ἰδίωμα δὲ Λυσίου καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις προάγειν μηδαμῶς μὲν ἐμφαινουσας τὸ ἐπιβεβουλευμένον, τὸ δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπεσπασμένον δεικνύειν. τεκ-

<sup>1</sup> Ofenloch fr. 103: τὰ σχήματα κατὰ διάνοιαν, ἡ τροπὴ ἐκ τοῦ πανούργου, ἡ ἀν-  
άλλαξις, ἐρώτησις, παράλειψις. Fr. 109: ἠθικὸς κατὰ διάνοιαν, διήγησις, αὔησις, and  
δείνωσις. Fr. 110: αὔησις. Fr. 143, two passages: τὰ πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν and how these  
and other elements such as τὸ παθητικόν are distributed throughout the speech. Fr. 144:  
qualities that are characteristic of Demosthenes' style: πλαγιασμός, ἡ συνέχεια τῶν  
περιόδων, εὐτονία, these being employed from the poem on; ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων and  
σύνθεσις, γοργότης, ὑποστροφὴ, ἀσύνδετον, ἐνάργεια.

μήριον δὲ τῆς λυσιακῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ περιόδῳ τῶν κώλων εὐάρμοστον καὶ μετὰ καθαρότητος εὐανθές.<sup>2</sup>

This is the plain Attic style of Lysias, whom Caecilius famously admired. The diction is simple, the expression clear and concise, and the periods of regular and moderate length. The consistency of this style with that of Caecilius can be illustrated by comparing Ofenloch's fragment 103:

οὐ τοῦτο λέγω . . . ὥς οὐδὲν εὐρίσκεται διανοίας παρὰ Ἀντιφῶντι σχήμα· καὶ γὰρ ἐρώτησις πού καὶ παράλειψις καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνεῖσιν αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλὰ τί φημι; ὅτι μὴ κατ' ἐπιτήδευσιν μήτε συνεχῶς ἐχρήσατο τούτοις, ἀλλ' ἔνθα ἂν ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ μεθοδεῖας τινὸς χωρὶς ἀπῆγεν· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τοὺς τυχόντας τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἔστιν ὁρᾶν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅταν τις ἀσχηματίστους εἶναι λέγῃ λόγους, οὐ καθάπαξ οἰητέον τῶν σχημάτων αὐτοὺς ἀπεστερημένους εἶναι (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον) ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἐμμέθοδον καὶ συνεχὲς καὶ ἐρρωμένον τῶν σχημάτων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρώμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς.<sup>3</sup>

The simplicity of style is effected partly through sentences of moderate length and clear articulation. Even the most complex sentence in these six passages is easy to follow:

<sup>2</sup>"That this speech is genuinely Lysias' is clear from its main topics, the argument of the topics, the proem itself, the narration, and the epilogue (for these elements belong to a very gifted writer and are worked out quite marvelously and, as is Lysias' way, with simplicity). Even the offering of proof by demonstration rather than argument announces Lysias' style. And in addition, not lengthening the speech by dwelling on things one by one is a mark of Lysias' precision, and the compactness of his language, and the provision through brevity of no little pleasure—a thing which, after Demosthenes, he alone of all the orators does successfully—and the beauty of his vivid descriptions, in which he is inferior to neither Plato, nor Demosthenes, nor Aeschines. It is also Lysias' style to execute antitheses without revealing his design, but to show that the speaker is drawn onward by the facts themselves. A sign of Lysias' forcefulness is both the harmony of the parts in each period as a whole and the bright freshness which comes with their purity."

<sup>3</sup>"I do not say that no figure of thought is to be found in Antiphon; for there are certainly *erotēsis* and *paraleipsis* and other such things in his speeches. Then what do I mean? That he did not use figures habitually or constantly, but only where nature herself directed, apart from any method—which can be seen even in the speech of ordinary men. For this reason, when someone says his speeches are without figures it is not to be thought for a moment that they are bereft of figures (for this is impossible), but that a systematic, constant, and predominant use of figures does not appear in them."

δοθεν οὐ χρή ψιλῶς τὰ πραχθέντα λέγειν, / ἄλλὰ καὶ τὴν γνώμην συνάπτειν μεθ' ἧς ἐπράττετο ἕκαστον, / οἷον ἂν μὲν χαλεπὰ ἦ / καὶ πρὸς φίλους ἢ ἄλλως μετρίους τὴν ἀνάγκην αἰτιάσθαι, / ἂν δὲ ἀμείνω, τὴν προαίρεσιν. (488b27–31)

There is constant balancing of elements within sentences, but variation creates a natural effect, neither the tight jingling of Gorgias nor the more relaxed metronome of Isocrates. In 489a20, for example, καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνθύμημα ἄλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐπιχείρημα πράττειν, antithesis is softened by the asymmetry of μὴν καὶ and μὴ κατ'. In line 30, . . . καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις προάγειν μηδαμῶς μὲν ἐμφαινούσας τὸ ἐπιβεβουλευμένον, τὸ δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπεσπασμένον δεικνύειν, the articular infinitives are balanced, but the placement of the participles and the differing introductions—καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις and τὸ δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων—create variation.

The rhetor's prose exemplifies his craft: in addition to balanced structure, occasional artful arrangement of words adds ornament, though it never interferes with the clarity of the sentence. This is also to be observed in 489a18–32:

(πάνυ γὰρ δαιμονίου καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰθισμένην τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπλότῃ δεινότητά ἐστιν ἐξεργασμένα ταῦτα). Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνθύμημα ἄλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐπιχείρημα πράττειν τὰς ἀποδείξεις τοῦ Λυσίου μάλιστα τὸ ἰδίωμα ἀπαγγέλλει. ἄλλὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ καθ' ἑν διατρέβοντα μηκύνειν τὸν λόγον τῆς τοῦ Λυσίου ἀκριβείας, καὶ τὸ εὐπαγὲς τῶν λόγων καὶ τὸ διὰ βραχύτητος πολλὴν παρέχειν ἡδονήν, ὃ μετὰ γε Δημοσθένην οὗτος μόνος τῶν ἄλλων δητόρων φαίνεται κατορθώσας, καὶ τὸ κάλλος δὲ τῆς διατυπώσεως, ἐν ᾧ μήτε Πλάτωνος μήτε Δημοσθένους μήτε Αἰσχίνου τὸ ἐλαττόν ἐστιν ἀπεννηγεμένος. ἰδίωμα δὲ Λυσίου καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις προάγειν μηδαμῶς μὲν ἐμφαινούσας τὸ ἐπιβεβουλευμένον, τὸ δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπεσπασμένον δεικνύειν.

Compare 485b36–40, Ofenloch fragment 109:

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅταν τις ἀσχηματίστους εἶναι λέγῃ λόγους, οὐ καθάπαξ οἰητέον τῶν σχημάτων αὐτοὺς ἀπεστερημένους εἶναι (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον) ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἐμμέθοδον καὶ συνεχὲς καὶ ἐρρωμένον τῶν σχημάτων οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρώμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς.

And 489b3–9, Ofenloch fragment 110:

ἔστι δὲ ὁ Λυσίας δεινὸς μὲν παθήνασθαι, ἐπιτήδειος δὲ τοὺς πρὸς αὐξή-  
σιν διαθεῖναι λόγους. Τινὲς μὲν σὺν τῶν περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς διατρι-  
βόντων λόγους οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπήχθησαν εἰπεῖν περὶ Λυσίου ὡς (ἀποδείξει  
μὲν τὰ ἐγκλήματα) παρ' ὄντιναοῦν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν (τὸ προκεκρι-  
μένον ἔχει), (αὐξῆσαι δὲ ταῦτα) (πολλῶν ἐνδεής).

Both style and subject suggest that Photius drew 489a15–32 from Caecilius as he did the six passages Ofenloch counted as *fragmenta*. It is followed, however, by a comment on a judgment made by Paul of Mysia.<sup>4</sup> If that comment were written by the same author as the preceding sentences (as Ofenloch seems to have thought), Caecilius could not be their author. The section introducing and condemning Paul of Mysia, however, shows little similarity with Caecilius' prose: the subject has changed from specific rhetorical analysis to general observation,<sup>5</sup> and the ornate style is studied, scholarly, and Byzantine. The complaint about Paul of Mysia's actions and their effect on the survival of Lysias' speeches is, I suggest, Photius' own addition to Caecilius' defense of *On the Sacred Olive Stump*, and I therefore propose 489a15–32 as a much read but hitherto unrecognized fragment of Caecilius of Caleacte.

REBEKAH M. SMITH

MEREDITH COLLEGE

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<sup>4</sup>A rhetor of the second, third, or fourth century about whom little is known. For that little, see Stegeman, "Paulus."

<sup>5</sup>For detailed analysis of this passage in comparison with Photius' style, see Smith, "Photius on the Ten Orators" 179–80, 187, and McComb, *The Tradition of "The Lives of the Ten Orators"* 196–98. It is impossible to know what Photius drew on for this material, whether a whole treatise by Caecilius or lengthy quotations mixed with other commentary. If a work of Caecilius, then perhaps it was the *Style of the Ten Orators*, a title listed by the *Suda*. (In which case, then why did Photius quote Caecilius only in the lives of Antiphon, Lysias, and Demosthenes?) These ten codices in the *Bibliotheca*, on the other hand, may be the origin of the *Suda* title.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

DOUGLAS L. CAIRNS. *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. xvi + 474 pp.

For many reasons *Aidōs* is a welcome contribution to scholarship. It is the only comprehensive, full-length treatment of this important ethical concept since Carl von Erffa's 1937 study, which, as Cairns notes (vii), has serious limitations. *Aidōs* collects a wealth of data in analyzing usages and meanings of *aidōs* and numerous related terms (*aischros*, *aeikēs*, *sebas*, *nemesis*, *elenchos*, etc.), covering most genres in the period from Homer through Aristotle (comedy, history, and oratory are omitted). Cairns provides many detailed critical studies of individual works, as well as discussing the concepts of shame and guilt from a broad, cross-cultural, theoretical perspective, showing an admirable command of the bibliographies of many different fields. He demonstrates the immense importance of *aidōs* for an understanding of Greek literature and society, and shows its essential connection with concepts such as honor and *hybris* that have been more extensively studied.

However, *Aidōs* also has defects that detract from its usefulness. The exposition sometimes lacks clarity. More selectivity in works and passages discussed would have improved the book by shortening it and by eliminating some superficiality and oversimplification. The most serious problems, however, concern methodology. Word and concept studies are most often deductive, analyzing occurrences of a word in a given corpus, and then using the data to arrive at conclusions about meanings and usage. (Von Erffa follows this approach.) Alternatively, a word study may begin with a hypothesis, which is then tested by examination of individual occurrences. (A successful application of this principle is that of N. R. E. Fisher, in *Hybris* [Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1992], which takes as basic Aristotle's definition in *Rhetoric* 1378b). While concept studies may appropriately take various related terms into account, it is essential to provide clear, explicit, and verifiable criteria for relevancy. (This is skillfully done by Helen North in *Sophrosyne* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966].) Cairns's method is a kind of ad hoc combination of all of these procedures. He begins by giving "provisional definitions": "Let *aidōs* be an inhibitory emotion based on sensitivity to and protectiveness of one's self-image, and let the verb *aideomai* convey a recognition that one's self-image is vulnerable in some way" (2). While he sometimes uses occurrences of the terms to test this hypothesis, at other times he seems to beg the question by assuming that it has already been proven. This frequently happens when he takes into account numerous other terms, some of which are "probably cognate" with *aidōs*, others of which "can

operate within the same field of usage," as well as "passages in which none of the basic terms occurs, but which seem . . . to merit discussion" because they "manifest some element typically constitutive of the *aidōs*-situation or reveal the operation of similar standards" (4). Since Cairns fails to provide definite criteria for relevancy, this procedure sometimes leads to difficulties.

The introduction is one of the best chapters in the book. Cairns argues that *aidōs* is "a unique way of looking at the world" (10), bound up with the values of Greek culture, especially honor. He then draws on an impressive range of anthropological, philosophical, and psychological studies of the concepts of shame and guilt to challenge the distinction made by A. W. H. Adkins and others between "shame cultures," based on external sanctions, and "guilt cultures," based on internal sanctions. Cairns makes the commonsense point that "A priori it is extremely doubtful that any society could exist in which no internalization of standards . . . took place" (39).

Chapter 1, on Homer, also has many strong points. Cairns argues that *aidōs* has evaluative aspects and is essentially inhibitory, preventing the performance of an action (48). Opposing Adkins's view that "*aidōs* is weak in the co-operative, strong in the competitive" spheres (51), he gives convincing examples to show that "competitive and co-operative failure are condemned in similar, often identical terms" (68). He argues that the honor of each hero is bound up with that of his companions, and concludes, reasonably, that the idea of personal honor plays an important role in cooperation as well as in competition (83-87). In addition, he cites passages in which it is clear that a hero such as Hector is not merely moved by external sanctions but has also internalized the values of his society (80-83). The discussions of the connections of *aidōs* with *xenia*, women, sex, and the gods are also helpful.

On the other hand, the chapter is weakened by faulty reasoning. Although he began by stating that *aidōs* is essentially inhibitory (2, quoted above), Cairns now makes the more questionable claims that *aidōs* also has "an angry, resentful aspect" (84) and that there is a "competitive *aidōs*" (100). He successfully demonstrates, on the basis of several passages in which the two terms occur together, that there is a close connection between *nemesis* and *aidōs*, and that "*aidōs* . . . foresees and seeks to forestall *nemesis*" (52). From this, however, one cannot conclude, as Cairns appears to do, that *nemesis* implies *aidōs* even in passages in which the latter does not occur (e.g., *Il.* 16.544-46). He writes: "the *nemesis* of Sarpedon's fellow soldiers is directed not at Patroclus but at themselves; the breach of *aidōs* is their own, or would be. There are two sides to the reaction of shame at the prospect of disgrace: the inhibitory, when the agent suppresses the action which might lead to ignominy; and the angry, resentful aspect, which comes into play when the reprehensible action is abandoned and positive steps are taken to wipe out any suggestion of an insult; this emotion can be covered by *aidōs* . . . but here it is expressed by *nemesis*" (84). Greater caution would be advisable in drawing important conclusions from such uncertain and inferential evidence.



Chapters 2–5 provide many fine insights into tragedy and early Greek poetry. Cairns argues convincingly that Solon, not Socrates, as Adkins holds, was the first to oppose a popular standard of the honorable, sanctioned by *aidōs*, by means of a standard of one's own (166). He finds that *aidōs* is a central concept in suppliant plays, and calls attention to an important connection between *aidōs* and *sebas*, both of which are connected with the honor of another. He also provides excellent discussions of *aidōs* in connection with *philoī*, and *xenoi*, pollution, and education. But a lack of caution also mars these chapters, as a few examples will indicate.

Cairns states that *aidōs* is "central to Aeschylus' representation of the crucial moral choice" involved in Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice Iphigenia. In Cairns's view, Agamemnon is pulled in one direction by *aidōs* at deserting his army, and in another by *aidōs* at sacrificing his daughter (199–200). Yet *aidōs* and cognates do not appear in *Ag.* 205–27. Cairns cites an *aischro*-compound (*Ag.* 222–23) used in connection with the sacrifice, but the idea that Agamemnon's reluctance to desert the army is a form of *aidōs* is not based on anything in this passage. Cairns also argues that Oedipus' self-blinding is a result of *aidōs*, pointing out (217–19) that self-blinding, like *aidōs*, leads one to avert one's gaze: "that he does experience *aidōs* . . . I regard as certain, even in the absence of the word itself" (219). Such certainty is questionable in that, far from hiding, Oedipus deliberately displays himself to the chorus, and in that they characterize his self-blinding as "most terrible" and "madness" (1298, 1300), terms that would normally be applied to a shameless act. Cairns's treatment of *Philoctetes* is particularly disturbing. After noting that "there is no instance of the word *aidōs* in the *Philoctetes*" (250), he nevertheless claims to find in this play "a clear and unambiguous representation of *aidōs* as a subjective awareness that a given course of action is against the agent's own principles, regardless of the correspondence or otherwise of those principles with the opinions of others" (262). He reaches this conclusion by studying passages in which "terms from the *aidōs*-complex" (257), such as *aischron* and *aischunē*, occur. He assumes without argument that these terms are equivalent to *aidōs*: "*aischunē* (= *aidōs*)" (259); "since he feels that his conduct has been *aischron*, his reaction to it is presumably one of *aidōs*" (261). His arguments depend in part, here and elsewhere (cf. 295–303, on *Heracles* 1199–1201), on his view that *aidōs* and *aischunē* have an "essential synonymy" (299 n. 121). While no one would deny that the terms have a close connection, a concept study should not assume, but question and investigate, the precise nature of this connection. Cairns's examples are too few, too disputable, and too little discussed to prove synonymy.

He is on firmer ground in his discussion of the sophists and Plato (chapter 6), arguing convincingly, as he did in the introduction, against the view that ancient Greece was a "shame culture." He shows that the idea of a "conscience," or internalized sanctions, was not a new, "enlightened" phenomenon, since many passages suggest a wide popular acceptance of the idea that morality is not maintained by external sanctions alone (343–44, 358–59). Of particular

interest is the analysis of Democritus' statements that one can *aidesthai* oneself. These expressions, Cairns claims, suggest "a familiarity with subjective senses of guilt or remorse" (365). He also gives good accounts of the ways in which Plato adopted and adapted many conventional beliefs about *aidōs*. He argues convincingly that Plato's location of *aidōs* in the *thumos* shows that more than fear of external sanctions is involved, and that the philosopher's writings offer little support for the view that Greek society was a shame culture (392).

The discussion of Aristotle is somewhat weaker. Cairns shows that, in Aristotle's view, "*aidōs* is not solely dependent on the judgements of others, . . . it can spring from a form of conscience based on internalized moral standards" (431), and he provides a good treatment of the role of *aidōs* in education. On the other hand, he ignores or gives cursory treatment to a number of complex and controversial issues: Aristotle's views on virtue, on the difference between virtuous and emotional mean states, and on potentiality and actuality, the problems of consistency of one Aristotelian work with another, and of the development of Aristotle's thought. He also slights some problems specific to the interpretation of individual passages. His concluding criticism of Aristotle's account of *aidōs* (426–30) is particularly confusing: "Aristotle's only real error, then, in his treatment of *aidōs*, is to ignore its dispositional aspect by denying it the status of *hexis*; this, however, is understandable, given that he rightly sees that *aidōs* cannot, as it stands, constitute an Aristotelian *aretē*, and given his sense that any *hexis* which is not an *aretē* must be a *kakia*. He is right, I think, to resist the temptation to create a revisionary *aretē* out of *aidōs*" (429). It is unclear to me from this passage and from the preceding discussion whether Cairns holds that Aristotle is right or wrong to deny that *aidōs* is a virtuous *hexis*, like *aretē*. I am also left uncertain about whether he chiefly criticizes Aristotle for internal inconsistency, or for a failure to take sufficient account of the external *phainomena*. The discussion would benefit from a clearer and more detailed examination of the philosopher's ethical views.

To sum up: *Aidōs* will be an indispensable tool for future studies of this extremely important, but too long neglected, ethical concept, and of other, related concepts, such as honor and *hubris*. Its chief value consists in its comprehensive collection and analysis of occurrences of *aidōs* and related words, and in its successful attack on the view that ancient Greece was a "shame culture." The defects, however, are substantial. Cairns is too ready to conclude too much from too little evidence, and he is especially lacking in caution in his use of passages in which the term *aidōs* does not actually occur.

ELIZABETH BELFIORE

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, TWIN CITIES

JOHN J. KEANEY. *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaiōn Politeia*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1992. xii + 191 pp.

In the centenary of Kenyon's 1891 *editio princeps*, Aristotle's *Athenaiōn Politeia* has inspired a number of conferences and publications. Keaney's volume, however, is no mere product of centennial fever. Instead it represents the culmination of three decades of work, especially on the literary structures of *AP*. The impetus for the studies in this book (xi), and perhaps for Keaney's approach generally, arose from other scholars' complaints about *AP*'s poor quality, leading some to question its authorship. Keaney set out to show that *AP* displays both an intellectual coherence and a verbal style, informed by a series of intricate literary devices, many of which are characteristic of Aristotle elsewhere. Scholars have failed to appreciate this text because they have been ignorant of Aristotle's goals. Hence—Keaney's subtheme—*AP* is by Aristotle.

The subtitle of the volume is *Observation and Explanation*: these are the major foci of Keaney's endeavor. With very little use of scholarly literature, he has carefully examined the text of *AP*, collecting all cases of devices such as ring composition, chiasmus, structural parallels, and verbal echoes (often in quite distant contexts), and raising all kinds of often quite narrow questions of style or content, which he then seeks to explain by discovering their significance or purpose in the text. The organization is unusual: in 182 pages, nineteen chapters each discuss in isolation a single problem or aspect of *AP*. Though each chapter is discrete, the general arrangement seems to be (1) authorship, (2–4) general or overall concepts, (5–9) general aspects of style, (10–18) particular aspects of style or content, and (19) the other *Politeiai*. Fragmentation by chapter helps to isolate certain themes, even if a more synthetic treatment would have lent greater coherence. For an obvious example, chapter 13 argues that when *AP* 27 (in Keaney's view) adds to Theopompos' account that Kimon's generosity was limited to his demesmen and Perikles countered by the *misthophoria*, this addition reflects *AP*'s theme of personal versus institutional politics. However, this might best have been incorporated in chapter 10, which is devoted to that theme. So, too, chapter 18 demonstrates that *AP* 45, on the Boule of Five Hundred, shows ring composition and chiasmus and reflects the wider thematic structure of the growth of Athens' democracy. These discussions could also have been integrated in earlier chapters that deal with those topics.

Many of Keaney's wealth of observations about this text are both valid and enlightening. Following his method in *AJP* (1969), chapter 8 ably sets out all examples—some quite complex—of ring composition in *AP*. So, too, in chapter 9 he usefully collects all examples of what he calls "horizontal structure," or chiasmus, the word order *abb'a'*. Chapter 11 examines *AP*'s repeated use of *dok-* (e.g., *dokein*) to introduce politicians who "are thought" to be worthy. The role of this formula is a solid discovery. Chapter 16 is devoted to a useful (if not always transparent) discussion of *AP*'s distinctions between *dēmos*, *plēthos*, and *polis*. Chapter 17 sets out *AP*'s patterns and variations in dating formulae.

All of this confirms and further demonstrates—a significant result—that *AP* was composed as a coherent literary work, rather than casually or piecemeal.

In regard to the explanations which Keaney suggests for the patterns of style and content which he has observed, his approach is potentially revolutionary. He contends that these patterns are quite consciously used in order to convey meaning. Here, in addition to structural patterns, he introduces (chapter 6) the concepts of “subtexts” (essentially sources) and “paratexts” (within *AP*, passages meant to be linked with other passages, which clarify their meaning). To illustrate the subtext, he observes that in Herodotos and Plutarch (= Androktion, for Keaney) Solon alleges that he is leaving Athens for trade or sightseeing; in *AP* the pretense is missing. Why? Because *AP* presents Solon as a highly moral man, a view which Keaney finds inconsistent with such pretenses. Taken one way, this method of criticism is traditional enough. By associating subtexts with the concept of “extrareferentiality” (56), however, Keaney appears to argue that Aristotle intended his readers to remember the earlier passages, see the correction, and hence draw the conclusion that Solon was moral.

Keaney’s concept of paratext, of interpreting one passage in the light of another within *AP*, is much more commonly exploited, as are deductions from parallel structures and contents within *AP*. Again, he believes these techniques are used to carry meaning. In essence, he seeks to show how Aristotle sought to communicate “once [the reader] got below a superficial level” (64), by manipulating both language and structure. I give three examples of both paratexts (a–c) and parallel structures and contents (d–f).

(a) In his initial demonstration of the concept of paratext, in chapter 6, Keaney “deconstructs” *AP* on Perikles, who is only apparently presented in a favorable light. For example, the verb *eudokim-*, used to introduce Perikles in the context of prosecuting the general Kimon (27.1), was also used to introduce Peisistratos (14.1), but there in connection with the war with Megara. “Nothing is said in [*AP*] about Pericles’ military abilities, and the contrast between the successful generalship of Peisistratos and Pericles’ prosecution of a general is striking” (59).

(b) In Aristotle’s phrase that the archons *nun proanakrinein* (3.5), “the combination of *pro-* and *nun* brings to mind a theme which is developed especially in the description of the contemporary constitution, a theme which is usually signalled by the contrast of *proteron* (formerly) and *nun*. . . . Thus, the *pro-* of *proanakrinein* initiates a theme which finds its full expression many chapters later” (65).

(c) Chapter 14, focused on Theramenes, is a detailed application of Keaney’s analytical techniques to the literary structures of *AP* 28, internally, in relation to other parts of *AP*, and in the light of earlier treatments of Theramenes used here as subtexts. He argues that in *AP* Theramenes is an *alter Solon*, by vocabulary echoes (e.g., *AP* uses the verb *parainein* only of them) and other points.

(d) On page 23 Keaney adduces three points to show that the Areopagos

was a focus of *AP*. First, in the list of constitutional changes in *AP* 41, that involving the Areopagos "is precisely in the middle." Second, over time the demos appropriates functions from archons, Areopagos, and Boule of Five Hundred, in that order (it is unclear to me why this detail is important). Third, in *AP* the word *mekhri* occurs just three times: before Solon's reforms, before the discussion of the Areopagos, and in 41.2 before the discussion of the fourth-century democracy. Keaney writes: "the first and third of these signals are of obvious importance, and so must be the second."

(e) In chapter 7 he also asks, e.g., why *AP* 3 stresses the magistrates' judicial functions and discusses their office buildings. He answers that this parallels *AP* 63–69, which describe "the people who have taken over the judicial decisions of the archons and their operation in public buildings" (i.e., the law courts) (70).

(f) In chapter 10, Keaney finds one theme of *AP* in the distinction between "the politics of institutions" and "the politics of personality." Thus Peisistratos was a tyrant but Solon refused to be; Peisistratos grants a tax exemption in "implicit contrast" with the *ekklesia*'s later use of decrees for this purpose; Kimon's liturgies and personal generosity reflect both types of politics, but Perikles practiced only institutional politics.

Keaney's is a potentially revolutionary mode of interpretation in that it essentially presupposes that *AP* is a literary work composed in the manner of Hellenistic or Roman poetry, with a highly conscious and labored artistic style, where parallel structures and echoes of word and concept are consciously meant to stir the reader's memory of the contexts of earlier passages, either within a specific work or else between works. Thus in the *Aeneid*, from book to book the progressively more brutalized Aeneas speaks to his son Ascanius progressively less, to a climax in book 12 when his single address is delivered through the visor of his helmet. The reader is meant to observe this progression within the text and also to compare Aeneas with Hektor, who for Astyanax in *Il.* 6 took his helmet off. In a final artistic flourish, Virgil makes Aeneas' speech in book 12 the same length as Hektor's. Many of Keaney's parallels in *AP* presuppose a similar artistic technique. The possibility is tantalizing, and (in the light of Hellenistic poetry) I often found myself tempted to follow him along. The difficulty is that the use of this kind of communication in *AP* or other prose works or works by Aristotle has not been demonstrated. In contrast to Aeneas and Ascanius, for example, none of the parallels or echoes which Keaney adduces is clear or obvious enough to establish the significance of such literary techniques for *AP*. Of the cases I have outlined, in (a) through (d), would the reader notice these subtle stylistic points? Would the reader remember that *eudokim*—had been used of Peisistratos and in a military context, on arriving at 27.1 on Perikles? And would the reader think to compare these passages? In (e), I admit we must guess why Aristotle included information about magistrates' buildings in *AP* 3, and why the discussion of the *dikasteria* in 63–69 is so lengthy (a notorious topic of controversy, which to his own detriment Keaney does not

discuss). However, surely the most likely explanation for the buildings in *AP* 3 is that on this point, for Athens' obscure early magistrates, Aristotle simply had evidence and so used it. As for (f), the lack of any clear statement of a distinction between personal and institutional politics implies that these points were inherent in Aristotle's material rather than a conscious and deliberate literary theme.

To be valid these cases must presuppose a certain methodology by Aristotle: they cannot establish it. As Keaney relentlessly seeks to explain every facet, however minor, of *AP*'s exposition, his explanations for what may be simply matters of style or even casual details (e.g., of word repetition) sometimes seem strained and unnecessary. He presses too hard for "literary" significance where none is needed. "Since Marathon is . . . dated by an archon year, that victory is not brought in to establish a chronology: therefore, to mention it must have another purpose, and this can only be to explain the confidence of the demos" (158). But surely Marathon is mentioned primarily as an important historical event. Keaney himself advances many of his hypotheses as simply possibilities or speculations, on the presumption that some such explanation must apply. I am not convinced that such points are not merely incidental, and unintended. Why should we think that Aristotle sought to communicate "on a subsurface level"?

In consequence, for all their ingeniousness and the careful observations on which they are based, Keaney's explanations for various aspects of Aristotle's exposition have often failed to persuade me.

This book also presents a second difficulty, in that its arguments are sometimes compressed to the point of obscurity. Virtually every chapter contains paragraphs that I can at best only partly follow. In addition, I have found several whole chapters difficult to understand. Thus, for example, despite several readings chapter 12 continues to elude me. *AP* states (23.1) that the Areopagos became leader of the city "by no dogma" but as responsible (*aitia*) for Salamis. For Keaney this exemplifies (a) the nondemocratic accomplished by democratic means (as, e.g., the demos voted Peisistratos a bodyguard [but in 23 the demos precisely did *not* vote?]), and (b) the *dok-* formula (in "dogma"). Although (he says) *AP* elsewhere uses *gnomē* and *psephisma* for "decree," the use of *aitia* in 23.1 is paralleled by its use in 21.1 for Kleisthenes, where, however, it substituted for the *dok-* formula. Hence in 23.1 *dogma* conflates two formulae: the *dok-* formula as in Keaney's chapter 11, and "the constitutional formula introducing a non-demos regime" (124) [but Kleisthenes' regime was democratic?]. Fragmentation by structure may thus be paralleled by a certain disjointedness of argument.

I now comment on central points of the first four and also the final chapter, which have not yet been discussed.

(1) Keaney sets out the uniform, early tradition that the *Politeiai* and certain works on *nomoi* were written by Aristotle or by Aristotle and Theophrastos. He then demonstrates that one verbal formula common in Aristotle

and *AP* is absent from Theophrastos. He therefore concludes that Aristotle wrote *AP*. However, the sources he quotes need not imply that Theophrastos collaborated on the *Politeiai*: note, e.g., that in what Keaney quotes as Timaios' "attack on Aristotle and Theophrastus" (6–7) Timaios does not in fact mention Theophrastos. Furthermore, even if Theophrastos was thought to have collaborated on some *Politeiai*, Keaney's valid argument that he did not write *AP* does not rule out the assistance of other, less famous students—which also surely cannot be excluded by the ancient tradition that Aristotle wrote the *Politeiai*. (On the other hand, in chapter 19 Keaney makes the valid observation that the lengths of the other 157 *Politeiai* are unknown, and so therefore is the need for research or writing assistance.)

(2) To demonstrate that *AP* is an example of cultural history and not (Jacoby's) "scientific" *politeia*, Keaney first sets out a standard Aristotelian conceptual pattern also present in *AP*, of a beginning small yet pregnant with possibilities, followed by gradual expansion leading to *ti megethos*—something big. (This he treated in *HSCP* [1963], following Else.) He then shows—but not without difficulties—that this pattern seems to appear in two small works of cultural history by Aristotle's students. As an argument that *AP* is also a work of cultural history this is problematic. Demonstrating the pattern is again valuable.

(3) Keaney shows that *AP* and the other *Politeiai* were not an established genre, but the product of research in comparative law and Aristotle's increasing interest in and use of historical data.

(4) He doubts the standard view that *AP*'s structure is marked by a chronological break in 404/3 (*AP* 41), because of future references before that chapter and past references after it. He retains the traditional division into narrative and description, but contends that *AP* is structured in four parts, having as a common theme the growth of the demos' power at the expense of the archons, the Areopagos, and the Boule of Five Hundred. *AP*'s history is thus one of continuity and process. We may again ask, however, how far this theme was inherent in Athenian constitutional history and therefore to some extent inevitable, rather than consciously formulated by Aristotle.

(19) Keaney returns to his subtheme (*AP*'s authorship) by seeking similar uses of structure, subtext, and paratext in the fragmentary other *Politeiai*. Despite his heroic efforts, however, the scanty fragments of these texts yield little on these matters.

Finally, despite all his hard work, in technical matters Keaney's volume is too often imperfect. Misprints are common (one scholar told me he found more than 170), in the Greek but also elsewhere; so are minor oversights (e.g., five instances of μάλλον, correct elsewhere). The spellings of Greek names sometimes vary even on the same page (e.g., 130, Athenaios and Athenaues), and are sometimes awkwardly hybrid (179, Lykurgus, but 37, Lycurgus; Cleisthenes *passim*, but 112, Kleisthenes). At page 183 nn. 3 and 9, Heracleides (= 107 and 179 Heraclides) appears to become "Herod." On page 59 Damonides' deme is

Oe; on 128 it is Oia. On page 127 Damonides becomes Damon. On page 118 an emended text of 23.3 is printed without comment, but on the critical point Keaney's translation does not agree with it. Other translations are incomplete (e.g., p. 56, Hdt. 1.29), or misplaced (e.g., p. 82, *XVI* on 24.2), or obscure the point in question (e.g., p. 101 on *Pol.* 1303a27–b3). The note references are often awkwardly included in the middle rather than at the ends of sentences, and their placings sometimes seem arbitrary (e.g., p. 69 n. 13, p. 100 n. 23, p. 169 n. 2).

So, then, a qualified judgment. Keaney's study contains many good observations and discussions of specific points, which are valid and demonstrate clearly the deliberate and even systematic literary style of *AP*. At the centenary of Kenyon's *editio princeps*, this volume makes good progress in the literary analysis of that work, a subject which Keaney virtually pioneered. Although its fundamental premise regarding Aristotelian methodology remains to be established and may never be, Keaney's is an idea book, always suggestive and sometimes genuinely illuminating.

ROBERT W. WALLACE

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

LÉOPOLD MIGEOTTE. *Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques*. Geneva: Librairie Droz; Quebec: Les Editions du Sphinx, 1992. iv + 410 pp. Paper, price not stated. (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe Section, Sciences Historiques et Philologiques, III, Hautes Etudes du Monde Gréco-Romain, 17)

This monograph is a companion to Migeotte's *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques* (1984). Public subscription, ἐπίδοσις, is defined as voluntary contribution (usually money) for public purposes (provision of grain supply, preparation for war, defense of local territory, building, etc.) solicited by debate in the assembly as the needs became evident. The harvest of eighty-seven items comes mostly from inscriptions (decrees specifying purpose, lists of contributors, citations in honorary decrees, penalties for default) and ranges over, perhaps, seven centuries (fifth century B.C. to second century A.D.), with examples throughout the Greek world.

Athens provides nearly one-fourth of the total and accounts for *all* of the literary references. Nevertheless Migeotte does not do a systematic word-study of ἐπίδοσις and related verbal forms, especially those signifying contribution (συμβάλλεσθαι, ἐπαγγέλλειν, etc.), but includes only those examples in which the language of subscription is clearly prominent. An anecdote in Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 10.1) suggests that the practice was used in the fifth century, but all other examples are later, with the fourth century B.C., as expected, well represented.

Chapters are devoted to individual cities with significant examples (Ath-



ens, Rhodes) and regions of the Greek world. Each item consists of selective citation of text and commentary, although sometimes only the ensuing discussion makes it clear why a text was included, as when a list of names (not cited) accompanies a heading that is poorly preserved (e.g., nos. 21, 27). A full analysis of this type of fundraising is provided in concluding chapters, on cities using the practice, aims of the subscribers, participation of citizens, women, foreigners, etc.

Consideration of international subscriptions (e.g., for rebuilding the Temple of Apollo at Delphi in the sixth century, Herodotus 2.180) is outside the scope of this book, but discussion of it (307–8) helps the reader to appreciate the background out of which the cities could promote public subscriptions for local needs. A significant result (101) from Migeotte's two studies on finance is the assembling of evidence that Athens used the subscription solicited in the assembly for public purposes, whereas other wealthy cities (e.g., Rhodes in Hellenistic times) resorted to borrowing. On the Samian grain law of the third century B.C. (no. 62) see now D. J. Gargola, *Phoenix* 46 (1992) 12–28, who interprets the fund in terms of converting grain to temple revenue rather than providing for subsistence distribution.

In view of the importance which Migeotte claims for the institution, it is surprising that so few inscribed *epidosis* decrees have survived: only sixteen over five centuries (287). He rightly attributes this to the additional expense of inscribing on stone and to the primary aim of honoring the subscribers rather than recording the decree. One should also note *epidosis* decrees which are referenced in inscriptions of a different type, such as the lists of the naval commissioners for the years 326 to 323 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1628–29, 1631).

WILLIAM C. WEST

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

PATRICK MCGUSHIN. Sallust, *The Histories*. Vol. I, Books i–ii. Translated with introduction and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. xii + 274 pp. Cloth, \$55; paper, \$22.50. (Clarendon Ancient History Series)

For a century now, Bertold Maurenbrecher's collection of the fragments of Sallust's last and greatest work, the *Histories*, has furnished the standard text and commentary; for years a novel edition that will mark the completion of Gerhard Perl's lifelong endeavor has been eagerly awaited. Thus the sudden appearance of McGushin's contribution is a welcome surprise. Maurenbrecher's was "a work, for its time, of considerable merit," McGushin allows (11). The comment invites the inevitable: that the new work be measured against the standards set by its precursor.

McGushin offers no Latin text. A commentary on a translation: that may be excusable in a fully extant work for which editions are readily available. Yet

when dealing with a fragmentary tradition of such multifarious provenance (McGushin's introductory comments, 5–10, obscure rather than illustrate its complexity), the full text, with apparatus criticus, is indispensable, as becomes painfully evident whenever McGushin is compelled to explain his translation in cases of problematic, corrupt, or multiple and varied transmission. At 1.73 M, *plebei tribuniciam potestatem* = 62 McG, "the tribunician power, a prerogative of the people," or on the Vienna fragment (1.100 McG), the commentary is nearly unintelligible without the Latin; for the notoriously troublesome 1.99 M, *cum Sertorius neque erumpere tam levi copia navibus* . . . = 88 McG, "since Sertorius with so small a force was unable to make a sortie with his ships," we are informed that "the translation is based on a version corrected by scholarly conjecture," with no comment on whether *navibus* might be separative rather than instrumental, and no hint at Caviglia's important discussion (*Maia* 18 [1966]). Translating "Sertorius had transformed that pirate emporium into a naval base" (1.114 McG = 124 M), McGushin rightly adopts Frassinetti's emendation *forum [et] (in) castra nautica* (*Athenaeum* 40 [1962]), but without reference or explanation. Similar problems plague the notes on, e.g., 1.20 M = 1.17 McG, 1.26 M = 1.24 McG, 1.31 M = 1.35 McG, 1.46 M = 1.46 McG, 1.55.18–24 M = 1.48.18–24 McG, 1.77.3 M = 1.67.3 McG, 1.108 M = 1.95 McG, 2.15 M = 2.16 McG, 2.21 M = 2.21 McG, 2.42–45 M = 2.40–42 McG, 2.55 M = 2.47 McG, 2.80 M = 2.60 McG, 2.87 M = 2.69 McG, 2.93 M = 2.76 McG.

Next, the lack of a concordance. McGushin rearranges the fragments, as is his privilege. Simple courtesy both to his readers and his predecessors, however, required that the corresponding number in Maurenbrecher (at least, and properly the numbering of earlier editors as well) be given with each fragment. Instead, McGushin makes us wait for volume 2, explaining innocently that he had "not yet dealt with the last two books of the work" (21). That kept him from supplying a concordance for the first two?

Third, the inconvenient design. The fragments are printed first (23–63), followed by a lemmatized commentary (64–259)—a justifiable arrangement (and, in today's publishing reality, perhaps inevitable) when it involves an extant work, with most users able to read the commentary against a separate volume of text. In an edition of fragments, the commentary clearly belongs with each of them. With this book much unnecessary page-flipping is called for, and the Clarendon Press's failure to provide running headers indicating current fragment numbers is a further disservice to author and readers alike.

McGushin with good judgment accepts the results of La Penna's and especially Perl's investigations concerning the compositional structure of the *Historiae*: the work followed a strictly annalistic pattern, dividing in Thukydidic fashion each year's events into a spring/summer and a fall/winter half, with books tending to terminate in the course rather than at the end of a year. In setting out those principles (10–11, 13–14) he succinctly summarizes Perl's seminal study ("Das Kompositionsprinzip der *Historiae* des Sallust," in *XIIIe Confé-*

*rence Internationale d'Etudes Classiques Eirene, Cluj-Napoca 1972* [Amsterdam, 1975] 317–37), unfortunately without a reference there or in his bibliography. (It is cited, without title, in the commentary 203 and 206, and misattributed both times to the Czech periodical *Eirene*.) A tabulated overview (11–13) clarifies the structure of book 2, and becomes useful once the fragment numbers corresponding to each section have been culled from the commentary and entered in the margin (or wherever one prefers them). The commentary would have benefited from subheadings reflecting clearly the narrative structure set out in that table; altogether the lucidity of Maurenbrecher's presentation is sorely missed. Sallust's proem (1.1–18 M = 1–15 McG, following Klingner) and narrative of the early phases of the Sertorian War (1.104–126 M = 93–124 McG, following the implications of the Vienna fragment) undergo substantial and salutary rearrangement; in book 2, the only significant transposition, moving the character sketch of Mithradates Eupator (2.71–79 M = 83–91 McG) to the *res urbanae* of early 74 B.C., is open to doubts. While 2.71 M = 83 McG (the Bithynian inheritance) is reasonably placed there, the king's treaty with Sertorius (2.78–79 M = 90–91 McG) can hardly have been concluded later than 75, and one should think his portrait preceded Sallust's account of the negotiations. Important textual corrections (Figari's on 1.31 M = 35 McG, Paladini's on 1.55.18 M = 48.18 McG, Mazzarino's on 2.110 M = 102 McG) are accepted. Otherwise, there is little change in text or arrangement—a testimony to the fundamental soundness of Maurenbrecher's reconstruction.

The commentary is ample and cautious, as befits a work of this nature. Several fragments Maurenbrecher assigned to specific events are relegated here to "uncertain placement" (e.g., 1.40–41 M = 1.123–24 McG, 1.117 M = 1.135 McG; 2.18, 20, 48, 51, 53 M = 2.92–96 McG), though at times McGushin crosses the line that divides caution from clinging to received scholarship, no matter what the evidence of the sources. Thus, for example, his note on the *lex Licinia Mucia* of 95 B.C. corrects a widespread misconception, but the attendant discussion of the fragment's corrupt *lex †Lucania fratra† fuit* might have given more thought to Landgraf's and Renehan's conjecture *parata* (86–87); he commendably rejects attempts to date the outbreak of the Third Mithradatic War to 73 rather than 74 B.C. (247–50), but dismisses much-needed chronological revisions in the Sertorian War ("no unassailable case for change has been presented") as if the traditional chronology were based on established fact rather than, entirely, conjecture (197–98). At 1.42 M = 34 McG, a correct translation (*ut Sullani fugam in noctem componerent*, "so that the Sullani were planning their escape for the nighttime," cf. *AHB* 2 [1988] 14) is coupled with earlier editors' untenable attribution to the Battle at the Colline Gate. Perl's revised reading (not "emendation") at 2.42 M = 40 McG is rejected with no indication that McGushin inspected the palimpsest, or a photo thereof; and what are we to make of the apparent contention—bewildering, to say the least—that *Ap.* is unattested as an abbreviation for *Appius*?

McGushin's prosopographical notes and general explanations—areas Maurenbrecher rarely touched—will be helpful to students, if used with care. In translation and terminology, McGushin rarely distinguishes between *plebs* and *populus*: “tribune of the people” is a recurring phrase (81, 118, 130–32). Non-entities of the republican constitution like “proconsular *imperium*” or “legionary legate” he employs without hesitation (155, 173), and Philippus’ bon môt about sending Pompeius to Spain *non pro consule sed pro consulibus* is rendered with singular ineptness: “not with proconsular *imperium*, but . . . in place of the consuls” (153). The bizarre notion that a consul returning to Rome to hold elections would thereby “forfeit his province” (130) goes unexplained; to say that the *interrex* was “appointed by and from the senate” (147) is imprecise at best. For appointed military tribunes, read *rufuli*, not “*rufili*” (156). An egregious misunderstanding of Cicero (*De Orat.* 1.25 and 3.11) makes McGushin claim a tribunate for C. Cotta in 90; those passages imply that Cotta failed to secure election. Pompeius Magnus’ mission to Spain is consistently mislabeled a transfer of command, from Metellus Pius to Pompeius, in the war against Sertorius (190, 242, 268): in reality, Metellus governed Farther Spain from 80/79 to 71, Pompeius Hither Spain from 77 onwards; no unified command existed. In nomenclature we encounter little monsters such as “J. Caesar” (138), “M. Antony” (166), and “Octavian Augustus” (16–17); Lucretius Afella reverts to “Ofella” (101–2), discredited by Badian long ago; and the Volcae Arecomici (245) acquire hyphenation, improperly. Geographical items fare no better: read *Guadalquivir* (for “Guadalquiver,” 165), *Tarraconensis* (“Tarraconnensis,” consistently), *Durius* and *Aveiro* (“Duris, Averro,” 177), *Genil* (“Geril,” 220). Venusia, a Latin colony, mutates into a “Latin tribe, the Venusini” (89), and Gallia Narbonensis is identified as a “southern province of Transalpine Gaul” (196).

Bibliographical references are often inexact, sometimes misleading: thus numerous standard works of the last century and a half appear greatly rejuvenated, as reprints routinely remain unidentified; conversely, Maurenbrecher’s original edition (1893) is ascribed to Stuttgart, the 1967 reprint of Peter’s *HRR* to Leipzig. August Friedrich von Pauly (1796–1845) never served as editor of *RE* (p. x) as we know it. The reviewer is flattered to find his dissertation cited copiously (though not, e.g., at 160 or 222–23, where Schulten, too, might have been acknowledged for the interpretation of 2.66, 102 M = 55–56 McG), by name and page number: the absence of a bibliographical reference will make verification (*A Historical Commentary on Plutarch’s Sertorius*, Chapel Hill, 1985; now superseded by a much-expanded treatment, University of North Carolina Press, 1994) rather difficult for those not intimate with matters Sertorian. Considering that subject’s prominence in the *Histories*, one is puzzled at McGushin’s decision (explained unconvincingly, 154) to make reference to Spann’s dissertation (1976) rather than his book—which is not a “condensed version” of the former and was published timely enough (1987) to be incorporated.

In sum, a disappointment. Not because the work is largely derivative and uninspired; such is the nature of commentaries. Their strengths should be exac-

titude, reliability, and clarity of exposition. On all counts, this one is found wanting. Maurenbrecher's was "a work of considerable merit," not only for its time.

C. F. KONRAD

CENTER FOR HELLENIC STUDIES

MARIA H. DETTENHOFER. *Perdita Iuventus: Zwischen den Generationen von Caesar und Augustus*. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992. xii + 359 pp. Cloth, DM 138. (Vestigia 44)

Augustus ruled, so Tacitus asserted, at least in part because none from the nobility remained to stand against him, all having fallen victim either to violence or to the delights of servitude (*Ann.* 1.2). To improve our understanding of the aristocracy's collapse, Maria Dettenhofer has undertaken to scrutinize the careers of seven shimmering members of the last generation—for her, the lost generation—of the Roman republic, all born in the 80s and emerging into history's notice in the late 60s or 50s. The result is a detailed *Kollektivbiographie* portioned into three chronological phases: the events of the 50s; the civil war between Caesar and Pompey; and the assassination of Caesar with its attendant campaigns (down to the destruction of the Liberators). Each phase includes a separate biographical entry for each subject and concludes with a synthesizing summary intended to reveal the shifting social and political structures of the period under consideration. The biographical material is preceded and followed by a general, theoretical discussion of the causes of the fall of the Roman republic.

Dettenhofer's seven may fairly be dubbed magnificent, even (following Tacitus yet again) *ferocissimi*: C. Scribonius Curio (tr. pl. 50); Mark Antony; D. Brutus Albinus (pr. 45, cos. desig. 42); M. Caelius Rufus (pr. 48), the only *novus* in the group; M. Iunius Brutus (pr. 44); P. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. suff. 44); C. Cassius Longinus (pr. 44). Their selection, though explained at length by Dettenhofer, seems arbitrary nevertheless. Their common features are several, admittedly, but not of so typical or so peculiar a quality that the exclusion of certain contemporaries (such as C. Vibius Pansa or L. Munatius Plancus or L. Marcus Philippus) appears justified. Still, these were interesting men, and a comparison of their lives holds potential for illumination (if also potential for lapsing into what has been called the Baconian fallacy).

Dettenhofer's biographies are valuable, but the reader must use them with caution. For instance, in her treatment of the Bona Dea scandal, which in her account of the lost generation represents the entrée of Curio (and the others to whom Cicero refers with his shorthand expression *barbatuli iuvenes*), she confuses the unsuccessful *rogatio* Pupia Valeria with the *Lex Fufia*, the measure which actually established the tribunal to try Clodius (cf. P. Moreau, *Clodiana*

*religio: un procès politique en 61 av. J.-C.* [Paris, 1982], 125ff., a work she has startlingly overlooked). And although she discusses the implications of Curio's illegal conduct during the scandal, she fails to introduce the equally illegal actions taken by Cato in response to Curio, which gives an ill-proportioned picture of the young man's behavior in this (in her view) important episode.

While interesting in their own right, the biographies are meant to display the evidence out of which Dettenhofer draws her general observations concerning the role played by this lost generation in Rome's transformation from oligarchy to autocracy. In her view, members of this generation entered upon their careers at a time when the terms of Roman politics were defined by the reputations of Pompey and Caesar: these two redoubtable generals (especially Pompey) had set heretofore unimagined standards for *gloria* and *dignitas*, a state of affairs that incited the young to excessive ambition; however, in its reaction to the menacing success of the *socer generque*, the Senate (an ill-defined entity here) endeavored to prohibit extraordinary commands and other such abbreviated avenues to fame and prestige. Consequently, despite their loyalty to *mos maiorum*, the young men of the 50s could perceive no future (of the type to which they aspired) in service to the optimum cause. Hence their tendency to support either Pompey or Caesar. In so doing, the lost generation helped to bring about the circumstances of its own ruin, for Caesar, once established as dictator, proved unresponsive to its collective desires. The dictator, after so many years in Gaul, had fully absorbed the manners and mentality of a commander, thereby abandoning his proper aristocratic sensibilities. He managed Rome as he had managed his campaigns: he was autocratic, he was no respecter of persons, and, being more concerned with capability than with pedigree, he tended to rely on talented specialists (the normal practice of the Roman army, in Dettenhofer's view), a habit which presented opportunities to *novi* at the expense of the nobility. Their *dignitas* damaged and their ambition frustrated, the nobles eliminated the dictator. But this solved nothing; it merely created a political vacuum. Following an observation of Dio's, Dettenhofer stresses that the devastation of the civil war as well as the autocracy of Caesar had by 44 swept away the conventional conception of the republic, the government of which was by then populated by too many *novi* possessing no real link to senatorial traditions. Members of the lost generation who survived discovered that they had become political anachronisms, soon to be consigned to oblivion. The triumvirs, like Caesar, continued to look to able specialists, a trend which explains the explosion of new men in the consular *fasti* during this time.

Although certain elements of Dettenhofer's observations are familiar and true, her overall account does not strike me as very convincing. For one thing, it is not clear to me that the biographies she has collected support her general thesis: the fit between the two parts of the book is rough to say the least. But be this as it may, there are obvious flaws in her approach, only some of which can be mentioned here: (1) The complexity and the influence of the Senate are

consistently unappreciated; she too often treats this body as if it were little more than the *severus senex* of her story, which can only be described as damaging to the case she argues, if not downright vitiating. (2) The emphasis on Caesar's military mentality—and especially the claim that the Roman army provided the model for Caesar's reliance on specialists—misses the mark. This notion derives from a provocative study by the eminent Dutch scholar L. de Blois (*The Roman Army and Politics in the First Century B.C.* [Amsterdam 1987]), who maintains that the Roman army, its troops, staff, and officers, constituted what was virtually a professional corps by the time of the late republic. De Blois's thesis is difficult to support (cf. J. F. Lazenby, *CR* 39 [1989] 150–51), and the realities of Roman conscription and time in service make it unlikely that the armies of the republic could be considered professional in any real sense (cf. P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of Rome and Other Essays* [Oxford 1989] 253ff.). Caesar's concern for competence was not entirely an innovation in Roman government, and the enhanced opportunities for new men and for the equestrian class generally under Augustus require (and have received) more satisfactory explanations than that provided by Dettenhofer's simple military model (e.g., R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* [Oxford 1939] chapter 24; C. Nicolet, "Augustus, Government and the Propertied Classes," in F. Millar and E. Segal, *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* [Oxford 1984] 89ff.). (3) The permeation of the *fasti* by new men is a conspicuous and often discussed characteristic of the triumviral period and the principate of Augustus. But that phenomenon should not be confused with the complete elimination of the old noble families, many of whom persevered to witness the aristocratic renaissance in 17 B.C. and subsequently (R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy* [Oxford 1986] 27–31, 53ff.). (4) Nor is it safe to think that new men did not assiduously assimilate themselves to the traditional values of the old Roman Senate, that their presence in Rome's government in and of itself precipitated an ideological break with the past that made autocracy more palatable to the ruling class.

It is unpleasant to be so negative about a work which is clearly the product of immense industry by an author of recognizable merit. But there is no denying that this is a disappointing book, whose principal contribution will be not its social or political analysis but its collection of biographical material.

W. JEFFREY TATUM

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

ROBERTO NICOLAI. *La storiografia nell'educazione antica*. Pisa: Giardini Editore, 1991. 407 pp. (Materiale e Discussioni per l'Analisi dei Testi Classici, 10)

The modern practice of history by academic historians significantly interferes with our understanding of ancient historians. It is a given that the facts

that the ancient historians treat are often obscure and their context shadowy. Equally important, the goals of the historians, their place in society, and the expectations of their audiences are distant from our own. The contemporary academic historian, working within a discipline with recognized methodologies, writes books and articles principally if not exclusively for an audience of peers. In antiquity, the historians were educated men but not specialists, writing for an educated, nonspecialist audience in a culture fundamentally shaped first by oral persuasion, then by formal rhetoric. Nicolai's book addresses the role of the historian in ancient society through a focus on education, defining "the position of historiography in ancient education through the study of rhetorical and grammatical theories, with the aim of reconstructing some aspects of the didactic praxis and contributing a better understanding of the manner in which Greeks and Romans conceived of history" (19, my translation). He has succeeded admirably.

Interpreting his task broadly, Nicolai reviews in detail three major topics. In the first and longest part, "Rhetoric and Historiography," he examines how the rhetorical schools used history and historians, the rhetorical theories concerning historiography, and the rhetorical training of historians. The second part discusses the educational stage prior to the rhetorical schools, where historical authors were a major element in the program of the *grammaticus*. Finally, he considers the evidence for a canon of Greek historians.

Building on Pfeiffer's work, Nicolai traces the origin of the canon to the great Alexandrian grammarians, who treated prose works as well as poetry (265–75). The selection of works suitable for study was an integral part of the development of the educational curriculum. By Cicero's day there had emerged a standard list of six authors in two triads: Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon; and Philistus, Ephorus, and Theopompus. The former were seen as creators of their respective styles and more important; the latter, as distinguished imitators of their predecessors. The evidence indicates that this canon, like others in antiquity, was flexible and "open," able to be adapted by each teacher to the needs of his cultural context and his own theories. Variations from the standard list—found in Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian, and Dio Chrysostom—Nicolai correctly explains by the particular interests of each writer. It is no accident that our manuscript tradition preserves only the authors of the first triad, more significant and "classic" than the second.

Reading of the canonical historians furnished a large fraction of the raw material for education in the school of the *grammaticus* and of the *rhetoricus*. Wilamowitz erred in thinking that historiography played no role in the educational system. History was not taught as an independent discipline, as were philosophy and rhetoric. But Nicolai shows with a wealth of citations that the *grammaticus* employed the historians as models of language and style, for training in general historical knowledge, and as a rich supply of *exempla*. When the student progressed to the rhetorical schools, historians again served as models for stylistic imitation alongside the orators, and were often used in *progym-*



*nasmata*. Under the Empire, for example, the *progymnasmata* of Theon drew heavily from the historians, especially for examples of narrative (*diēgēsis*), of discussions of reliability (*anaskeuē* and *kataskeuē*), and of description (*ecphrasis*) (cf. 215–33). This method of teaching focused on the stylistic and literary features of the work, to the exclusion of questions of historical method or reliability. Thucydides in this context was appreciated not for his efforts to reconstruct a true account of an event, but for the vividness with which the event was told. The notion of “truth” when speaking of history referred more to the simple fact that the events had taken place, in contrast to poetic fictions, than to scientific verification leading to a precise and accurate knowledge of events, motivations, and causes. The result, for Nicolai, is that “in antiquity one cannot separate historiography as a scientific discipline from historiography as a literary genre. . . . Thucydides was much admired as an author, and canonical, but for motives substantially different from those of Ranke: initially, he provided a model of political analysis and probably also a repertory of exemplary discourses; later he became essentially a model of style (for *inventio* and *dispositio* as well as for *elocutio*)” (94, 95).

Nicolai lucidly summarizes and organizes earlier studies of education, citing a wealth of passages from ancient authors, and provides a forty-page bibliography. His focus on historiography, moreover, permits him to address a number of fundamental points. The most important issue, the position of history in the curriculum, I have already mentioned. Almost as significant is his argument that there was no neat division between the activity of the *grammaticus* and that of the teacher of rhetoric. Rather, he stresses the variety of overlapping approaches taken by teachers in different situations, noting that one person frequently was given both titles (197–215). Both, at different levels, could use historians as examples of style and treasure houses of *exempla*, and both could use *progymnasmata*. With some reservations, he accepts Thomas Cole’s suggestion (*QUCC* 23 [1986] 7–21, now repeated in *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* [Baltimore 1991]) that Thucydides’ work was meant, in addition to other goals, to serve as a model for rhetorical study, “furnishing examples of argumentation and political discourse” (63–69). He thus pushes the beginnings of the interaction of history and rhetoric before the innovations of Isocrates, a move which raises other questions. For if we are no longer talking about schools, but about imitation and modeling in a prescholastic environment, we must look at the basic role of history and of narratives of the past (not excluding Homer) in the oral culture of early Greece. In particular, in what way did Herodotus’ work fit into contemporary education? However, the nature of Nicolai’s study precludes consideration of the initial environment of the extant classical historians.

Our evidence points to an active discussion on the goals and methods of education in the first centuries B.C. and A.D., visible in Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintilian. Although many of the passages Nicolai treats are well known, his comprehensive approach to history’s role in ancient education

permits him to place these passages in a larger context. In particular, his book supplies a firm underpinning of passages and interpretation for current efforts at evaluating the importance of ancient rhetorical theory and educational practice to both the writing and reading of historical works. On an axis running from A. J. Woodman (*Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*) to P. A. Brunt ("Cicero and Historiography," now in his *Studies in Greek History and Thought*), Nicolai is clearly much closer to Woodman. He explicitly criticizes Brunt for too neatly distinguishing "scientific historiography" and rhetorical form (93-95). As he sees it, historians wrote and were read in a rhetorical, nonscientific context.

Nicolai has thoroughly documented his position. Nevertheless it is important to realize that writers frequently went beyond the traditions in which they were trained and created new expectations in their audiences, which were not reflected in an essentially quite conservative educational system. A Polybius or a Plutarch could develop new styles and new methods, though remaining strongly influenced by the educational context. Furthermore, in focusing on the literary aspect of historiography, Nicolai's approach of necessity slights the element of political analysis present not only in Thucydides and Polybius, but in Xenophon, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, since this was not of direct interest to the educational system. However, the historians' political analysis depended for its *raison d'être* on a close tie to historical events and facts, at least as the author understood them. Finally, Nicolai speaks only in passing of the moral evaluation of actions which represents such an important dimension of ancient historiography. In recognition of this fact the rhetoricians classified history as *epideictic* (105-8), but their sparse theoretical statements do not do justice to the variety and subtlety practiced by the historians in presenting and interpreting events. Such moral evaluation regularly took the place of modern objective "political analysis" in interpreting political behavior.

This book is essential reading for anyone interested in post-Isocratean historians. "In the ancient world the study of history was fundamentally scholastic: tied, that is, more to the needs of teaching and rule making than to those of rigorous and scientific investigation of the past" (28). This rule is generally valid, with the caveat that while the formal study of historical writing took place only in a rhetorical context, the authors and audience read it not only with rhetoric in mind, but looking toward a much larger political and even philosophical sphere.

PHILIP A. STADTER

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

OLLI SALOMIES. *Adoptive and Polyonymous Nomenclature in the Roman Empire*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1992. iv + 179 pp. Paper, price not stated. (*Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, 97)

Finland is a bastion of Roman brick studies (cf. *CP* 78 [1983] 89–90) and of Roman name studies. In the latter field Iiro Kajanto, and more recently Heikki Solin and his school, have produced a stupendous series of monographs and manuals that have changed the face of Roman onomastics. Who can now seriously study Roman epigraphy, or social history, or prosopography, without having at hand Kajanto's *Latin Cognomina* (1965) or Solin's *Die griechischen Personennamen in Rom* (1982) or Solin's and Salomies's *Repertorium Nominum Gentilium et Cognominum Latinorum* (1988)? Of many detailed monographs we can list Solin's delightful *Namenpaare* (1990) and now Salomies's study of that pervasive (and for prosopographers frustrating) phenomenon, the polyonymous nomenclature in the Roman Empire.

In the Republic everything was simple. A Roman had always two names, and normally three, as Marcus Tullius Cicero: *praenomen* (cf. Salomies, *Die römischen Vornamen*, 1987), *nomen*, and *cognomen*. Into this system the first complication was introduced by the practice of adoption, whereby the adopted son took the *tria nomina* and the filiation of his adoptive father, but retained his previous *gentilicium* with a modified ending in *-anus*, as, e.g., P. Cornelius P. f. P. n. Scipio Aemilianus (a son of L. Aemilius L. f. Paullus adopted by P. Cornelius P. f. P. n. Scipio).

The main goal of adoptions was to ensure the continuity of the *gens* and of the name. Hence we hear very little of adoptions of women: apart from adoptions in imperial families only four or five cases are attested, and none under the Republic (4, 20 n. 1).

Following in the footsteps of the classic study by D. R. Shackleton Bailey on adoptive nomenclature in the late Republic (2d ed. 1991), Salomies ventures into the Empire, a *magnus labor* indeed. First he tabulates the amazing variety of adoptive name-forms that sprouted up in the closing years of the Republic and proliferated in the Principate. On the basis of a full catalogue of adoptions (fifty-eight cases, but excluding adoptions in the imperial family) he distinguishes seventeen name types (an important feature of the name system under the Empire was the disappearance of the hereditary *cognomen*, p. 83). The adoptee would normally include in his style the adoptive *praenomen* and *nomen*, but would now often also retain his original *cognomen* or even the whole original name, old and new elements variously collocated. This produced long strings of names, e.g. (pp. 37–38) Cn. Domitius Sex. f. Volt(inia tribu) Afer Titius Marcellus Curvius Lucanus (*ILS* 990). As we know from Pliny (*Ep.* 8.18.5), Lucanus and his brother Tullus were adopted (*testamento*) by Cn. Domitius Afer, an orator from Nemausus. Their natural father appears to have been another notable from Nemausus, Sex. Curvius Sex. f. Vol(tinia) Tullus (cf. *Mart.* 5.28.3:

*Curvii fratres*). This leaves the elements Titius Marcellus unexplained; they probably came from the name of Tullus' (natural) mother.

This illustrates well the difficulty in dealing with the polyonymy: the various name elements could either derive from adoption or could be a combination of the paternal and maternal names (a phenomenon that deserves a separate sociological study), sometimes with further items inherited from other relatives. Take, for example, Sex. Pulfennius M. f. Ter. Salutaris M. Luccius Valerius Severus Plotius Cilo (*CIL* 10.4864). Without further information (as in the case of Domitius Tullus) we are not able to elucidate the provenience of the individual items of this name (p. 19). Such names are onomastic and prosopographical puzzles, and those who enjoy solving them will love Salomies's book.

JERZY LINDERSKI

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

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